.w^' 


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BL  2759  .S53  1907 
Sheldon,  Henry  C.  1845-1928 
Unbelief  in  the  nineteenth 
century 


Other  Works  by  the  Same  Author: 

HISTORY    OF  CHRISTIAN    DOCTRINE— Two  volumes. 
Octavo.      Per  set  ^3.50. 

SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE.      Octavo,  $2.50. 

HISTORY  OF  THE    CHRISTIAN  CHURCH— Five    vol- 
umes.    Cloth.      Per  volume  ^2.00. 


UNBELIEF 


^^  OF  mfjci> 
16  1942 


IN  THE 


NINETEENTH    CENTURY 


A  CRITICAL  HISTORY 


BY 


HENRY  C.  SHELDON 

Professor  in  Boston  University 


NEW    YORK:    EATON  &  MAINS 
CINCINNATI :  JENNINGS  &  GRAHAM 


Copyright,  1907,  by 
EATON  &  MAINS. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION 

PART  I 

Philosophical  Theories 


CHAPTER  I 

Radical  Idealism 
section  page 

I.  Kantian  Antecedents 1 1 

II.  Grounds    of   a    Favorable    Estimate    of   the    Post- 
Kantian  Idealism i6 

III.  Questionable  Points  in  Fichte's  Thinking 23 

IV.  Schelling's   Philosophy,   Especially   in   its   Middle 

Stage 28 

V.  The  System  of  Hegel 32 

VI.  Tendencies  Derived  from  the  Post-Kantian  Ideal- 
ism   40 

CHAPTER  II 
Radical  Sensationalism  and  Materialism 

I.  The  Sensational  Psychology — Its  Leading  Represen- 

tatives and  its  Distinguishing  Features 42 

II.  Failure  of  the  Sensational  Psychology 48 

III.  A  Question  as  to  the  Genuine  Representatives  of 

Materialism 54 

IV.  Cardinal  Conclusions  of  Materialism 64 

V.  Shortcomings  of  the  Materialistic  Theory 69 

CHAPTER  III 

Positivism 

I.  The  Positivism  of  Comte 78 

il.  Representatives    of    Positivism     in    Germany    and 

England 91 

V 


vi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IV 
Agnostic  and  Antitheistic  Evolutionism 

section  page 

I.  Herbert  Spencer's  Evolutionary  Philosophy 96 

II.  Comments  on  the  Spencerian  System 108 

III.  Features  of  Haeckel's  Evolutionism 119 

IV.  Recent  Teachings   More   or  Less   Affiliated   with 

Agnostic  or  Antitheistic  Premises 123 

CHAPTER  V 

Pessimism 

I.  The  Teaching  of  Schopenhauer 135 

II.  Von  Hartmann  and  Other  Advocates  of  Pessimism.    144 


PART  II 
Quasi-Scientific,  Theological,  and  Ethical   Theories 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Challenging  of  the  Supernatural 

I.  The  Different  Forms  op  the  Challenge 153 

II.  Examination  op  the  Grounds  of  the  Challenge.  . . .    167 

CHAPTER  II 

The  Denial  of  the  Finality  of  Christianity 

I.  Free  Religion 181 

II.  Theosophy  and  Kindred  Mysticisms 188 

III.  Secularism  and  Ethical  Culture 204 

IV.  A  Word  on  the  Superior  Claims  of  Christianity 215 

CHAPTER  III 

Denial  of  the  Transcendent  Sonship  of  Jesus  Christ 

I.  The  Principal  Instances  of  Denial 227 

II.  The  Denial  in  the  Light  of  New  Testament  Attes- 
tations     236 


CONTENTS  vii 

CHAPTER  IV 

Utilitarian  and  Naturalistic  Ethics 
SECTION  page 

I.  Specimen  Theories 241 

II.  Points  of  Failure  in  the  Theories 253 


PART  III 
Critical  Theories 

CHAPTER  I 

Criticism  of  the  Gospel  History  by  Strauss 

I.  Assumptions  and  Conclusions  of  Strauss 263 

II.  Grounds  of  Exception  to  the  Criticism  of  Strauss.   275 

CHAPTER  II 

Criticism  of  the  New  Testament  by  Baur 

I.  Main  Contentions  of  Baur 282 

II.  Arbitrary    and    Extravagant    Features    in    Baur's 

Criticism 291 

CHAPTER  III 

Critical  Reconstruction  of  the  Life  of  Jesus  by 
Renan  and  Others 

I.  Renan's  Vie  de  Jesus 298 

II.  Schenkel's  Sketch  of  the  Character  of  Jesus 313 

III.  Keim's  History  of  Jesus ....   317 

CHAPTER  IV 

Elements  of  Radicalism  in  the  Recent  Criticism 
OF  the  Old  Testament 
I.  Views  Relative  to  the  Stories  of  the  Patriarchs.  .   324 
II.  Estimates  of  Moses  as  Leader  and  Lawgiver 334 

III.  Judgments  on  Prophecy 342 

IV.  Conclusions    Respecting   the    Significance    of   the 

Old  Testament  Revelation  in  General 353 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  V 

Elements  of  Radicalism  in  the  Recent  Criticism 

OF  THE  New  Testament 

section  page 

I.  Denial  of  the  Supernatural  Conception 362 

II.  Unfriendly  Treatment  of  the  Gospel  History....  372 

III.  The  Elimination  of  Pauline  Authorship 377 

Conclusion 387 

Index 395 


PREFACE 

Compact  and  accurate  exposition  was  the  first  end  kept 
in  view  in  the  preparation  of  this  treatise.  Criticism  of 
the  different  forms  of  unbehef  was  the  second  end.  The 
author  would  express  the  hope  that  he  has  not  been 
greatly  at  fault  as  respects  observing  a  proper  balance 
between  these  two  ends. 

Boston  University,  February,  1907. 


INTRODUCTION 


Complete  self-consistency  is  not  to  be  expected  in 
the  average  man,  or  even  in  the  superior  man.  Fini- 
tude  implies  limitation  of  vision,  and  the  imperfect  out- 
look is  likely  to  effect  a  wryness  in  the  judgment.  Thus 
it  may  come  about  that  an  unbelieving  head  should  be 
yoked  with  a  believing  heart,  a  mutilated  creed  be  asso- 
ciated with  unreserved  committal  to  known  truth. 
Doubtless  the  sound  disposition  is  favorable  to  the  sound 
belief,  and  in  the  long  run  works  for  its  ascendency.  But 
in  the  case  of  the  individual,  as  he  is  found  at  a  particular 
epoch,  the  harmonious  adjustment  may  fail  to  appear. 
The  same  person  who  gives  place  to  a  very  considerable 
measure  of  intellectual  skepticism  may  be  liberally 
endowed  with  the  ethico-religious  temper  of  faith.  In 
spite  of  the  negations  to  which  he  subscribes  in  theory, 
he  may  be  intent  to  discover  the  highest  ideals  and  culti- 
vate a  habit  of  hearty  surrender  to  them.  And  herein 
lies  the  very  essence  of  faith  as  a  principle  of  personal 
worth.  No  man  who  is  bent  upon  knowing  the  highest 
and  the  best,  and  who  unites  himself  with  it,  so  far  as 
discovered,  in  affectionate  loyalty  and  self-devotement, 
is  practically  an  unbeliever. 

In  the  light  of  the  above  discrimination  it  will  be 
readily  understood  that  it  is  quite  foreign  to  this  volume 
to  pas3  judgment  upon  persons.  The  volume  deals  with 
unbelief  taken  purely  in  the  theoretic  or  intellectual 
sense.  There  is  no  intention  to  render  a  decision  respect- 
ing the  practical  unbelief  of  any  person  or  party.    Indeed, 


2  INTRODUCTION 

it  is  freely  admitted  that  not  a  few  of  those  who,  on  the 
score  of  their  opinions,  are  made  to  represent  one  or 
another  phase  of  unbehef  may  have  been,  in  the  practical 
or  ethico-religious  sense,  very  stanch  behevers,  and 
entitled  in  this  respect  to  outrank  many  whose  reputation 
for  orthodoxy  is  unblemished. 

II 

That  the  theme  in  hand  should  be  treated  in  an  objec- 
tive manner  is  quite  obvious.  At  the  same  time  the 
nature  of  the  theme  makes  it  difficult  to  exclude  a  subjec- 
tive element.  What  is  to  be  embraced  in  unbelief  can  be 
determined  only  by  reference  to  a  standard,  and  there  is 
no  standard  available  in  which  the  personal  standpoint, 
the  element  of  individual  faith,  does  not  enter.  The 
absolute  standard,  fixed  and  indubitable,  untouched  by 
personal  prejudice  or  preference,  has  never  been  num- 
bered among  the  possessions  of  men.  Granting  that  it 
exists  in  the  intellectual  and  ethical  nature  of  God,  we 
have  nevertheless  to  look  for  guarantees  that  it  has  been 
made  available  in  its  pure  objectivity  for  human  use. 
And  who  can  furnish  such  guarantees?  Who  can  point 
to  the  standard  and  say,  "There  it  is,  entire,  faultless, 
accessible"?  We  have  before  us,  it  is  true,  the  biblical 
revelation.  But  the  presence  of  this  revelation  affords 
no  sure  pledge  of  entire  release  from  the  bonds  of  sub- 
jectivity. Even  if  it  be  supposed — a  thing  beyond  the 
range  of  possible  demonstration — that  no  one  of  the 
biblical  writers  mingled  aught  of  his  own  individual 
thought  or  feeling  with  the  divine  message,  it  still 
remains  true  that  our  possession  of  the  biblical  contents 
must  measure  our  competency  to  use  them  as  a  standard, 
and  that  possession  in  our  case  is  conditioned  by  our 
intellectual  and  religious  development.     So  long  as  we 


INTRODUCTION  3 

keep  clear  of  dogmatic  frenzy,  and  are  sane  enough  to 
recognize  our  indubitable  limitations,  we  must  confess 
that  we  cannot  bring  the  opinions  of  our  fellows  to  the 
judgment  seat  of  an  absolute  standard,  but  must  estimate 
them  by  a  standard  in  which  our  individual  point  of 
view  is  more  or  less  of  a  factor. 

It  follows  that  in  developing  the  present  theme  the 
reasonable  requirement  is  simply  the  reduction  of  the 
subjective  factor  to  the  lowest  terms  that  are  practicable. 
And  by  what  is  practicable  is  meant,  in  this  connection, 
that  which  may  have  place  within  the  limits  of  conformity 
to  the  requirements  of  essential  Christianity.  In  a  treatise 
which  is  written  professedly  from  the  Christian  standpoint 
unbelief  naturally  will  not  be  judged  by  a  less  exacting 
standard  than  the  essential  content  of  the  Christian  sys- 
tem. Accordingly,  the  reduction  of  subjectivity  to  the 
lowest  practicable  terms  implies  simply  the  use  of  proper 
caution  against  reckoning  into  the  essential  content  of 
Christianity  any  items  of  a  merely  personal  faith.  Just 
what  a  wise  caution  will  permit  to  be  included  in  this 
content  will  doubtless  be  a  subject  for  varied  opinions. 
To  the  writer  it  seems  evident  that  nothing  should  be 
included  which  is  not  easily  to  be  derived  from  the 
Scriptures  by  a  fair  exegesis,  and  for  which  also  a  clear 
support  is  not  provided  in  the  general  consensus  of 
Christian  scholarship.  We  say  general  consensus,  for  a 
demand  for  strict  unanimity  would  be  exorbitant  in 
a  world  which  has  never  yet  shown  itself  to  be  proof 
against  eccentricities.  Applying  now  the  double  test 
just  stated,  we  are  under  compulsion,  in  the  first  place, 
to  reckon  as  a  part  of  the  essential  Christian  content  a 
stanch  theistic  conception,  that  conception  in  which  the 
ultimate  reality  is  presented  as  thoroughly  personal. 
Authentic  Christianity  knows  nothing  of  a  supra-per- 


4  INTRODUCTION 

sonal  God.  The  supra-personal,  in  its  view,  is  an  ill- 
chosen  name  for  the  infra-personal.  It  regards  person- 
ality as  the  highest  category,  and  will  not  consent  to  take 
up  with  any  substitute  for  the  God  who,  as  intelligent  and 
free,  can  create  a  kingdom  of  intelligent  and  free  beings, 
and  provide  for  their  beatification  in  true  fellowship 
with  himself.  In  the  second  place,  we  are  under  com- 
pulsion to  include  in  the  essential  Christian  content  the 
truth  that  Jesus  Christ  was  a  transcendent  personality, 
and  came  into  the  world  to  fulfill  an  extraordinary 
mediatorial  office.  In  construing  Christ's  person  and  in 
interpreting  his  mediatorial  work,  it  may  not  be  neces- 
sary to  insist  upon  a  clear-cut,  exclusive  theory.  But 
both  the  extraordinary  personality  and  the  extraordinary 
work  are  of  vital  importance.  Preeminence  and  finality 
belong  to  Christianity  precisely  on  the  ground  that  he  in 
whom  it  centers  was  fitted,  in  virtue  of  his  extraordinary 
personality  and  office,  to  be  the  perfect  bearer  of  the 
truth  and  grace  of  God;  and,  of  course,  real  faith  in 
Christianity  cannot  claim  anything  less  for  this  reli- 
gion than  preeminence  and  finality.  In  the  third  place, 
we  are  under  constraint  to  locate  within  the  essential 
Christian  content  such  a  view  of  man  as  is  consonant 
with  his  dignity  as  a  subject  of  moral  rule,  as  a  servant 
and  a  son  of  the  Most  High,  and  as  a  candidate  for  the 
pure  blessedness  and  high  fellowships  of  an  immortal 
life.  Any  theory  which  makes  man  simply  a  part  of  a 
cosmic  mechanism,  a  mere  link  in  a  chain  of  causes 
operating  according  to  the  law  of  mechanical  necessity, 
abolishes  the  subject  which  Christianity  contemplates. 
From  first  to  last  it  requires  that  man  should  be  defined 
as  a  free  personality,  dowered  with  essential  aptitudes 
for  morality  and  religion. 

With  this  essential  content  of  Christianity,  which  can- 


INTRODUCTION  5 

not  be  denied  without  exposure  to  a  legitimate  charge 
of  unbeHef,  is  to  be  associated  the  claim  that  the  content 
in  its  full  compass  has  received  a  credible  historic  attesta- 
tion. Christianity  is  not  a  name  for  a  purely  speculative 
system  or  a  body  of  ideal  truth.  It  assumes  to  be  an 
historical  religion,  to  rest  upon  a  basis  of  ascertained 
facts.  A  contrary  assumption  would  involve  a  manifest 
incongruity,  a  contradiction  to  the  fundamental  Christian 
postulate  as  to  the  ultimate  reality.  Given  a  God  who 
stands  to  men  in  the  relation  of  a  Supreme  Father,  and 
it  inevitably  follows  that  he  must  reveal  himself.  What 
kind  of  a  father  would  he  be  who  would  not  show  himself 
to  his  children,  or  to  those  having  an  inborn  capacity  to 
become  in  spirit  his  children?  God's  fatherhood  toward 
men  implies  revelation  to  men.  Human  history  under 
the  superintendence  of  the  Divine  Father  could  not  be 
left  to  run  a  meaningless  course.  The  clearest  demands 
of  fitness  require  that  it  should  be  utilized  to  disclose  the 
Father  to  the  dim  vision  of  men,  and  to  lift  them  up  to 
the  realization  of  their  filial  privilege.  Had  Christianity 
postulated  a  merely  transcendent  God,  a  being  dwelling 
apart  in  lofty  indifference,  it  would  not  be  so  clearly 
committed  to  the  idea  of  an  historic  revelation.  With 
its  actual  theistic  content  it  is  under  rational  compulsion 
to  assume  that  by  the  divine  ordination  an  ofiice  of  revela- 
tion is  fulfilled  in  the  unfoldments  of  human  history. 
Theoretically  this  history  in  its  entirety  might  serve 
as  a  medium  of  revelation;  and  doubtless  within  limits 
it  does  fulfill  that  office.  But,  inasmuch  as  Jesus  Christ 
in  his  extraordinary  personality  and  mediatorial  work 
is  central  to  the  Christian  system,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  that  system  revelation  must  be  regarded  as  hav- 
ing its  crown  or  focus  in  him.  And  here  is  the  consider- 
ation which  justifies  the  claim  of  a  certain  primacy  for 


6  INTRODUCTION 

the  Bible.  It  is  the  most  authentic  record  of  the  revela- 
tion leading  up  to  and  culminating  in  Jesus  Christ.  As 
such  it  fulfills  a  special  function  in  mirroring  the  truths 
which  are  of  the  highest  ethical  and  religious  import.  It 
has  authority  as  being  on  the  whole  a  trustworthy  com- 
pendium of  these  truths.  This,  rather  than  the  question 
of  the  precise  quality  of  the  inspiration  of  its  authors, 
is  the  vital  consideration.  If,  when  taken  in  its  trend 
and  outcome,  the  Bible  conveys  to  us  a  trustworthy  wit- 
ness on  the  essential  content  of  the  true  religion,  it  is  a 
worthy  instrument  of  divine  providence,  and  fulfills  as 
high  an  office  as  could  properly  be  asked  of  a  sacred 
literature.  Christian  theologians,  it  is  true,  have  often 
gone  further,  and  claimed  a  detailed  infallibility  for  the 
Bible.  But  the  defense  of  so  adventurous  a  theory 
involves  a  very  troublesome  task,  and  with  the  advance 
of  scholarship  becomes  more  and  more  a  matter  of 
despair.  Least  of  all  is  there  any  propriety  in  using  such 
a  theory  as  a  test  of  the  Christian  character  of  opinions. 
It  is  enough  to  claim  that  the  Bible  in  its  trend  and  out- 
come affords  to  the  candid  and  intelligent  inquirer  trust- 
worthy means  of  ascertaining  the  essential  content  of  the 
true  religion.  Accordingly,  in  the  following  pages  only 
those  critical  theories  which  seem  to  contradict  or  to 
compromise  this  office  of  the  Bible  will  be  treated  as 
belonging  to  the  sphere  of  unbelief. 

Ill 

The  disposition  of  the  subject-matter  into  three  parts 
has  been  adopted  on  the  score  of  general  convenience 
rather  than  of  strict  logical  propriety.  Some  of  the  items 
reserved  for  the  second  part  might,  without  breach  of 
consistent  terminology,  have  been  considered  in  the  first 
part.     It  seemed  desirable,  however,  to  treat  of  them 


INTRODUCTION  7 

aside  from  specific  connection  with  the  historical  sys- 
tems which  are  dwelt  upon  in  that  part.  In  relation  to 
the  terms  used  in  the  title  of  the  third  division,  it  only 
needs  to  be  said  that  under  "critical  theories"  are  included 
various  products  of  the  historico-critical  study  of  the 
Bible. 

IV 

A  due  regard  to  the  demands  of  economy  will,  of 
course,  forbid  a  detailed  description  of  each  of  several 
forms  of  unbelief,  which,  however  distinct  a  place  they 
may  appear  to  have  had  in  the  historical  evolution,  are 
very  nearly  identical  in  substance.  The  same  demands, 
as  also  the  fitness  of  things,  will  exclude  reference  to 
manifestations  of  unbelief  which  have  had  no  basis  in 
scholarly  industry  or  acquisitions,  and  which  seem  to 
have  been  thrust  into  the  face  of  the  public  mainly  for 
the  purpose  of  gratifying  an  intemperate  appetite  for 
notoriety.  Even  to  manifestations  of  unbelief  which 
have  come  from  men  of  masterful  scholarship  it  will  not 
always  be  appropriate  to  render  any  large  consideration. 
An  expert  in  a  particular  branch  of  scientific  study  may 
have  some  competency  in  the  domain  of  philosophy  or 
of  theology;  and  again  he  may  be  signally  incompetent 
to  pass  upon  the  great  questions  of  those  domains.  His 
just  reputation,  therefore,  in  his  special  branch  is  not 
to  be  taken  as  in  itself  a  valid  recommendation  of 
opinions  which  he  may  choose  to  utter  on  philosophical 
or  theological  themes.  These  opinions  may  be  wise 
and  profound,  but  there  is  a  liability  of  their  being 
venturesome  and  superficial.  A  species  of  fraud,  or  at 
least  of  unwitting  deception,  takes  place  when  expert 
scholarship  is  allowed  to  give  prestige  to  judgments 
which  fall  quite  outside  the  province  of  that  scholarship. 


PART  I 
PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 


CHAPTER I 

RADICAL   IDEALISM 

I. — Kantian  Antecedents 

The  idealistic  philosophizing  of  the  early  part  of  the 
nineteenth  century  owed  so  much  of  incentive  and  direc- 
tion to  Kantian  points  of  view  that  it  becomes  fitting, 
before  bringing  it  under  examination,  to  notice  briefly  the 
more  characteristic  features  of  Kant's  system. 

1.  A  fundamental  postulate  of  the  system  is  the  activity 
of  the  mind,  its  real  agency  or  determining  efficiency  in 
the  processes  of  cognition.  The  mind,  according  to  Kant, 
is  far  from  being  like  a  sheet  of  blank  paper  which  merely 
takes  the  record  which  may  be  inscribed  upon  it  by  an 
exterior  power.  No  more  is  it  like  an  empty  vessel  which 
is  simply  receptive  of  a  content  that  may  be  poured  into 
it.  So  far  from  being  the  passive  subject  of  impres- 
sions, the  mind  by  its  own  intrinsic  energy  reacts  upon 
impressions  and  supplies  from  itself  necessary  factors  in 
rational  experience. 

2.  The  activity  of  the  mind  proceeds  according  to 
certain  constitutional  aptitudes  or  necessities.  By  virtue 
of  this  constitutional  outfit  the  mind  is  able  to  organize 
the  data  which  are  supplied  through  sense  impressions 
and  to  find  in  a  particular  order  of  impressions  a  par- 
ticular meaning.  Its  constitution  is  not  evolved  out  of 
experience,  but  it  has  the  experience  of  a  cognitive  being 
because  of  its  possession  from  the  start  of  a  constitution. 
In  other  words,  the  mind  as  such  is  dowered  with  a  priori 
forms.     It  construes  reality  by  applying  to  it  a  series  of 


12  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

categories,  such  as  unity,  plurality,  causality,  existence, 
possibility,  and  necessity.  Temporally  considered,  these 
a  priori  forms  are  not  indeed  antecedent  to  experience, 
but  logically  they  are  prior  to  experience  and  serve  as 
its  condition. 

3.  The  a  priori  forms  which  belong  to  the  mind,  as 
being  simply  subjective  forms,  cannot  by  themselves 
serve  as  an  adequate  ground  for  deducing  a  system  of 
reality.  Any  structure  that  could  be  formed  out  of  them 
would  be  purely  ideal,  and  no  guarantee  could  be  afforded 
of  its  correspondence  with  aught  in  the  sphere  of  the 
actual.  Knowledge  of  the  real  comes  only  with  the  pre- 
sentation of  objects.  While  the  objects  can  gain  no 
intelligible  presentation  without  the  a  priori  forms  of 
intuition  and  thought,  the  forms  are  empty  without  the 
objects.  Even  with  the  conjunction  of  the  two  only  a 
limited  knowledge  is  guaranteed.  For  just  one  class  of 
objects  is  presented,  namely,  appearances  or  phenomena. 
The  noumena,  the  things-in-themselves,  the  substantial 
entities  back  of  appearances,  are  inaccessible  to  us.  They 
lie  beyond  the  range  of  cognition.  They  are  not  defined 
to  us  by  the  categories,  for  these,  as  being  subjective 
forms,  cannot  be  assumed  to  have  any  objective  validity. 
It  seems,  therefore,  that  our  knowledge  is  confined  within 
rather  narrow  limits ;  that,  in  fact,  we  are  debarred  from 
confident  assertion  even  on  such  important  matters  as 
the  substantial  being  of  the  soul  and  the  existence  of  God 
as  Supreme  Person.  At  least,  on  the  basis  of  purely 
intellectual  or  theoretical  procedure,  which  in  its  infer- 
ences pays  strict  deference  to  the  causal  relation,  we  have 
no  clear  means  of  passing  beyond  the  province  of  the 
phenomenal. 

4.  The  limited  results  of  intellectual  procedure  do  not 
by  any  means  consign  us  to  a  blank  agnosticism.     Man 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  13 

is  not  simply  intellect;  he  is,  above  all,  a  moral  agent. 
Deeply  inbedded  in  his  moral  nature  there  is  an  all-com- 
prehending law  of  duty,  a  categorical  imperative,  which 
requires  him  so  to  act  that  the  maxim  of  his  will  can 
serve  at  the  same  time  as  a  principle  of  universal  legis- 
lation. In  the  presence  of  this  great  law,  which  it  is 
impossible  for  him  to  challenge,  he  is  under  compulsion 
to  infer  his  freedom,  his  immortality,  and  his  relation 
to  a  personal  God.  This  inference  may  partake  of  the 
nature  of  faith,  as  opposed  to  strict  knowledge;  but  the 
faith  is  rational  and  warranted,  and  thus  has  the  prac- 
tical worth  of  knowledge.  In  the  exercise  of  this  rational 
faith  man  passes  beyond  the  bounds  of  the  phenomenal 
in  which  he  seemed  to  be  inclosed,  and  secures  a  good 
degree  of  certitude  respecting  the  substantial  existence 
of  finite  spirits  and  of  God  as  the  intelligent  ruler  over 
all. 

5.  Man's  highest  dignity  lies  in  the  recognition  and  the 
fulfillment  of  the  moral  law.  In  achieving  this  fulfill- 
ment there  is  no  substitute  for  personal  endeavor.  Strenu- 
ousness  of  righteous  will  is  the  great  demand.  Religion 
offers  no  valid  substitute  for  this.  The  best  that  it  can 
do  is  to  illustrate  and  enforce  the  moral  law  which  is 
contained  in  the  constitution  of  man.  Only  as  it  fulfills 
this  end  has  a  revealed  religion  a  just  claim  to  univer- 
sality. 

With  the  first  two  of  these  cardinal  points  of  the  Kan- 
tian system  the  idealistic  philosophers  who  followed  the 
Konigsberg  sage  were  in  substantial  agreement.  They 
did  not,  indeed,  regard  Kant's  list  of  categories  as  beyond 
revision,  but  they  accepted  his  fundamental  conceptions 
as  to  the  nature  and  agency  of  mind.  In  relation  to  the 
third  point  they  received  a  profound  incentive.  The 
unfinished  construction  which   seemed  here  to  pertain 


14  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

to  the  Kantian  system  served  to  them  as  a  summons  to 
pass  on  to  a  speculative  standpoint  more  inclusive  and 
adequate  than  that  occupied  by  their  great  predecessor. 
They  were  not  willing  to  leave  the  thinking  subject  set 
over  against  an  inaccessible  noumenal  realm  or  sphere  of 
substantial  being.  It  was  the  proper  task  of  philosophy, 
as  they  conceived,  to  overcome  the  agnosticism  and  dual- 
ism pertaining  to  this  order  of  representation,  and  to 
achieve  a  unified  view  of  the  entire  sum  of  reality.  The 
ways  in  which  they  attempted  to  execute  this  task  gave 
to  their  respective  philosophies  their  distinctive  pecul- 
iarities. The  fourth  point,  or  the  primacy  which  Kant 
assigned  to  the  practical  reason — that  is,  to  the  demands 
of  the  nature  of  man  as  a  moral  agent — was  made  funda- 
mental in  Fichte's  system.  As  regards  the  fifth  point, 
all  the  great  idealists  who  built  on  the  foundations  sup- 
plied by  Kant  differed  from  him  in  making  larger  account 
of  religion  as  distinguished  from  simple  morality,  and  in 
explicit  stress  laid  upon  the  divine  immanence,  as  opposed 
to  the  somewhat  deistic  way  in  which  the  Kantian 
philosophy  expounded  the  relation  of  God  to  the  human 
spirit. 

It  is  a  very  common  judgment  that,  in  spite  of  its 
greatness  and  suggestiveness,  the  system  of  Kant  is 
open  to  strictures  on  its  metaphysical  as  well  as  on  its 
religious  side.  In  relation  to  the  former  it  may  be  said 
to  err  by  giving  place  to  an  unnecessary  agnosticism. 
This  appears  in  the  assumption  of  an  unqualified  antithe- 
sis between  phenomena  and  things-in-themselves.  The 
supposition  seems  to  be  entertained  that  the  knowledge 
of  the  one  does  not  imply  any  real  knowledge  of  the  other. 
But  this  certainly  is  a  quite  gratuitous  supposition.  In  a 
universe  built  on  a  rational  plan — as  the  universe  in  which 
man  is  placed  must  be  understood  to  be,  if  he  has  any 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  iS 

vocation  to  think  about  it  at  all — phenomena  may  war- 
rantably  be  conceived  to  truly  advertise  the  realities  to 
which  they  belong,  so  that  the  knowledge  of  the  one  must 
involve  a  valid,  though  not  necessarily  an  exhaustive, 
knowledge  of  the  other.  A  like  qualification  of  the 
agnostic  element  in  Kant's  thinking  may  be  reached 
through  an  inspection  of  his  thesis  upon  the  purely  sub- 
jective validity  of  the  categories.  This  thesis  he  has  not 
justified.  He  has  not  even  been  true  to  it  himself,  since 
in  one  relation  or  another  he  has  assumed  that  the  objec- 
tive world  has  that  which  corresponds  to  our  subjective 
forms  of  thought.  Furthermore,  he  has  indirectly  fur- 
nished a  very  cogent  ground  for  accepting  the  objective 
validity  of  the  categories.  In  considering  man  as  a 
moral  agent  he  has  assumed  that  the  arrangement  of  the 
universe  must  correspond  with  the  demands  of  moral 
personality.  Why  not  assume  also  that  the  universe  is 
harmoniously  related  to  man  as  an  intellectual  being? 
Why  suppose  that  our  knowledge  must  be  subject  to  sus- 
picion just  because  we  must  know  as  men?  If  as  men 
we  are  aliens  in  the  universe,  then  an  attempt  to  philoso- 
phize is  pure  foolishness.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  are  in 
any  wise  properly  coordinated  with  the  rest  of  the  uni- 
verse, then  we  are  entitled  to  conclude  that  our  necessary 
forms  of  thought  have  their  counterpart  in  the  sphere  of 
objective  realities. 

The  deficit  of  the  Kantian  system  of  thought  on  the 
side  of  religion  has  already  been  intimated.  It  applies 
to  this  domain  an  inadequate  measure.  While  it  magni- 
fies worthily  the  grandeur  of  the  moral  law,  it  makes 
scanty  room  for  the  sense  of  dependence  upon  God  and 
for  the  thought  of  inner  enrichment  through  communion 
with  him. 


i6  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

II, — Grounds  for  a  Favorable  Estimate  of  the 
Post-Kantian  Idealism 

Idealism  as  such  has  no  necessary  affiliation  with  unbe- 
lief. On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  natural  ally  of  a  spiritual 
creed.  In  giving  the  primacy  to  the  supersensuous,  in 
contending  that  spirit  or  mind  is  ultimate  and  funda- 
mental, so  that  a  comprehensive  and  rational  interpreta- 
tion of  the  universe  must  proceed  from  the  conception  of 
spirit  or  mind,  idealism  takes  ground  that  lies  very  close 
to  many  a  declaration  in  the  Christian  oracles.  Has  not 
Christ  said  that  God  is  Spirit  and  must  be  worshiped 
in  a  spiritual  manner  ?  Has  not  Paul  taught  that  in  this 
infinite  Spirit  we  all  live  and  move  and  have  our  being? 
Has  not  the  apostle  furthermore  identified  the  eternal 
with  the  unseen  and  the  temporal  with  the  seen?  Such 
statements  are  obviously  quite  in  line  with  idealistic  pos- 
tulates, and  along  with  other  sentences  of  a  similar  tenor 
serve  to  manifest  the  congenial  relation  subsisting  between 
idealism  and  Christian  faith.  Even  radical  idealism  is  not 
necessarily  hostile  to  any  part  of  the  Christian  creed.  For, 
however  far  it  may  go  in  its  assumption  that  in  the  last 
analysis  all  forms  of  being  reduce  to  thought,  mind,  or 
spirit,  it  may  still  affirm  that  it  makes  no  question  about 
the  actuality  of  the  world,  and  only  advocates  a  special 
view  of  the  nature  of  the  world.  Now,  this  special  view  of 
the  nature  of  the  world,  so  long  as  it  does  not  deny  the 
proper  conception  of  God  or  of  man,  will  make  no  trouble 
for  Christian  faith;  since  what  this  faith  requires  is 
simply  the  actuality  of  the  world,  the  presence  of  con- 
ditions or  powers  which  have  for  the  consciousness  of 
the  individual  the  practical  worth  of  a  standing  theater 
or  environment.  Religious  faith  can  assume  a  neutral 
position  toward  the  most  radical  idealism  which  leaves 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  17 

God  and  man  in  their  integrity.  But,  while  this  is  true, 
it  is  legitimate  to  be  somewhat  slow  and  cautious  in 
accepting  the  claims  of  any  specific  scheme  of  radical 
idealism.  However  little  ground  of  suspicion  there  may 
be  against  idealism,  there  is  considerable  ground  for 
a  doubting  and  halting  attitude  toward  radicalism.  It 
often  happens  that  the  radical  system-maker,  in  order  to 
gain  for  his  system  the  credit  of  being  all-inclusive, 
treats  as  non-existent  that  which  is  really  existent.  Radi- 
cal idealists,  as  being  men  of  like  infirmities  with  other 
radicals,  may,  of  course,  have  fallen  sometimes  into  the 
fault  of  sacrificing  fact  in  an  intemperate  exaltation  of  a 
favorite  theory. 

The  capacity  of  idealism  to  stand  in  friendly  relations 
with  Christian  faith  found  an  appreciable  measure  of 
illustration  in  the  post-Kantian  idealistic  philosophy, 
which  was  represented  in  particular  by  Fichte,  Schelling, 
and  Hegel,  and  which  had  its  principal  literary  period 
between  the  last  years  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  the 
fourth  decade  of  the  nineteenth.  In  truth,  the  teaching 
of  these  illustrious  men  contains  not  only  much  of  high 
intellectual  interest,  but  also  much  that  must  command 
the  appreciation  of  any  serious  and  enlightened  believer 
in  Christianity. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  characteristic  of  these  philoso- 
phers profoundly  to  emphasize  the  religious  element  in 
man's  life.  It  would  not  be  easy  to  find  stronger  words 
on  this  theme  than  those  which  they  have  written.  "All 
irreligion,"  says  Fichte,  "remains  upon  the  surface  of 
things,  caught  in  the  empty  appearance,  and  just  on  this 
account  presupposes  a  lack  of  power  and  energy  of  spirit, 
and  betrays  a  weakness  of  the  head  as  well  as  of  charac- 
ter ;  on  the  contrary,  religion,  as  rising  above  the  appear- 
ance and  pressing  into  the  essence  of  things,  necessarily 


i8  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

discloses  the  happiest  use  of  the  powers  of  the  spirit,  the 
greatest  profundity  and  penetration,  and,  as  necessarily 
connected  therewith,  the  highest  strength  of  character."^ 
"The  one  thing  truly  noble  in  man,  the  highest  form  of 
the  one  idea  which  has  become  clear  within  him,  is 
religion."^  "In  religion  there  is  no  fate,  but  only  wisdom 
and  goodness,  to  which  man  is  not  compelled  to  submit 
himself,  but  which  embrace  him  with  infinite  love."^ 
"Religion  elevates  him  who  is  devoted  to  her  service  above 
time  as  such,  above  the  transient  and  the  perishable,  and 
puts  him  in  immediate  possession  of  eternity."^  "Blessed- 
ness is  unwavering  repose  in  the  One  Eternal ;  wretched- 
ness is  vagrancy  amid  the  manifold  and  transitory."^  In 
Schelling  much  the  same  high  estimate  of  religion  may 
be  observed.  "A  philosophy,"  he  says,  "which  in  its 
principle  is  not  already  religion  we  do  not  acknowl- 
edge to  be  a  philosophy."^  Again  he  remarks,  "Only  he 
who  knows  God  is  truly  moral."'^  If  Hegel  speaks  with 
less  warmth  than  does  Fichte  of  personal  religion,  his 
estimate  is  still  a  very  exalted  one.  "All  that  has  worth 
and  dignity  for  man,"  he  says,  "all  wherein  he  seeks  his 
happiness,  his  glory,  and  his  pride,  finds  its  ultimate 
center  in  religion,  in  the  thought,  the  consciousness,  and 
the  feeling  of  God."^  "Religion  is  the  ultimate  and 
highest  sphere  of  human  consciousness."^  "Religion  is 
a  product  of  the  Divine  Spirit;  it  is  not  a  discovery  of 
man,  but  a  work  of  Divine  operation  and  creation  in 
him."^*'  "The  object  of  religion  as  well  as  of  philosophy 
is  eternal  truth  in  its  objectivity,  God  and  nothing  but 

*  Die  Anweisung  zum  seligen  Leben,  Vorlesung  xi. 

'  Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age,  trans,  by  William  Smith,  Lecture  xvii. 

'  Ibid.,  Lecture  xvii.  *  Ibid.,  Lecture  xvi. 

'Anweisung,  Vorlesung  i.  ^ -^^gj-ke,  v.  ii6. 

^  Cited  by  Kuno  Fischer,  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophie,  vi.  882. 

*  Philosophy  of  Religion,  trans,  by  Speirs  and  Sanderson,  i.  2. 
» Ibid.,  i.  54.  »« Ibid.,  i.  33. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  19 

God  and  the  explication  of  God."^  "Religion  is  not  con- 
sciousness of  this  or  that  truth  in  individual  objects,  but 
of  the  absolute  truth,  of  truth  as  the  universal,  the  all- 
comprehending,  outside  of  v^hich  there  lies  nothing  at 
all."2 

In  the  second  place,  these  philosophers  occupied  in  the 
main  a  friendly  attitude  toward  Christianity  as  a  his- 
torical religion,  and  made  no  question  as  to  its  preemi- 
nence and  finality.  Fichte  may  not  have  been  very  rever- 
ential toward  some  of  the  objects  of  common  Christian 
appreciation.  He  spoke,  for  example,  very  disparagingly 
of  the  Pauline  writings  as  being  largely  given  to  a  futile 
argumentation.  It  was  his  conviction,  however,  that  the 
New  Testament,  especially  in  the  writings  of  John, 
serves  as  a  trustworthy  mirror  of  the  eternal  verities  of 
true  religion.  He  expressed  the  judgment  that  a  candid 
review  of  the  content  of  Christianity  would  show  that 
it  had  the  same  purpose  as  his  own  philosophy.^  That  he 
considered  Christianity  distinctly  superior  to  every  other 
form  of  religion,  and  above  the  liability  of  being  super- 
seded, is  manifest  from  the  position  which  he  assigned  to 
Christ.  According  to  the  Christian  dogma,  he  says, 
"Jesus  of  Nazareth  absolutely,  by  and  through  himself, 
without  deliberate  act,  is  the  perfect  sensible  manifesta- 
tion of  the  eternal  Word,  as  no  one  whosoever  has  been 
before  him ;  while  those  who  become  his  disciples  are 
as  yet  not  such,  since  they  still  stand  in  need  of  its  mani- 
festation in  him;  they  must  become  such  through  him." 
This  dogma  he  approved  in  both  its  parts,  expressing  his 
assent  to  the  first  part  in  these  terms :  "Jesus  of  Nazareth 
is  in  a  wholly  peculiar  manner,  attributable  to  no  one  but 
him,  the  only  begotten  and  first  born  Son  of  God ;  and  all 
ages  which  are  capable  of  understanding  him  at  all  must 

'  Philosophy  of  Religion,  I.  19.  2  Ibid.,  I.  22. 

'  Appelation  an  das  Publicum,  Werke,  V.  223,  224. 


20  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

recognize  him  in  this  character."^  Schelling  was  not 
uniform  throughout  his  philosophical  career  in  his  atti- 
tude toward  Christian  tenets.  He  seems,  however,  in 
all  stages  to  have  been  appreciative  of  the  fact  of  the  incar- 
nation in  Christ  as  being  at  least  the  central  specimen  of 
that  union  of  the  divine  with  the  human  which  is  ever 
in  process,  and  in  his  later  teaching  distinctly  attributed 
a  transcendent  nature  to  Christ.  With  Hegel  the  abso- 
lute character  of  the  Christian  religion  was  a  clearly 
recognized  conclusion.  The  Christian  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity,  taken  in  its  essential  meaning,  was  pronounced 
by  him  to  be  indispensable  to  a  sound  philosophy.  He 
spoke  of  the  life  story  of  Christ  as  a  true  history  with  a 
divine  content.  He  affirmed  that  the  Son,  as  the  other 
of  the  Father,  has  "the  entire  fullness  of  the  divine  nature 
in  himself,"  and  repudiated  the  application  to  him  of 
merely  human  measures  in  these  emphatic  terms :  "If  we 
say  nothing  more  of  Christ  than  that  he  was  a  teacher 
of  humanity  and  a  martyr  of  the  truth  we  do  not  occupy 
the  Christian  standpoint,  the  standpoint  of  the  true  reli- 
gion."^  A  question  may  indeed  be  raised  as  to  whether 
Hegel  always  put  the  sense  of  catholic  Christianity  into 
catholic  formulas;  but  that  his  estimate  of  historical 
Christianity  was  very  high  there  is  no  good  reason  to 
doubt. 

Once  more,  these  philosophers  may  be  credited  with  a 
real  service  to  Christian  faith  by  their  forceful  advocacy 
of  important  elements  of  truth.  Thus  Fichte  profoundly 
emphasized  man's  moral  agency  as  conditioning  his 
insight.  "Only  by  the  fundamental  improvement  of  my 
will,"  he  says,  "does  a  new  light  arise  within  me  con- 
cerning my  existence  and  vocation  ;  without  this,  however 
much  I  may  speculate,  and  with  what  rare  gifts  soever  I 

1  Anweisung,  Vorlesung  vi.  ^  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Hi.  70,  78. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  21 

may  be  endowed,  darkness  remains  within  me  and  around 
me."^  Not  only  did  he  make  moral  agency  the  neces- 
sary basis  of  enlightenment  as  respects  our  higher  rela- 
tions ;  he  affirmed  also  that  it  is  the  one  substantial  ground 
of  intellectual  confidence  in  the  existence  of  the  world. 
"Whatever  has  existence  for  me,"  he  contends,  "has  it 
only  through  its  relation  to  my  own  being.  But  there  is 
in  the  highest  sense,  only  one  relation  to  me  possible; 
all  others  are  but  subordinate  to  this:  my  relation  to 
moral  activity.  My  world  is  the  object  and  sphere  of 
my  duties  and  absolutely  nothing  more.  .  .  .  From  this 
necessity  of  action  proceeds  the  consciousness  of  the  act- 
ual world.  .  .  .  We  do  not  act  because  we  know,  but  we 
know  because  we  are  called  upon  to  act;  the  practical 
reason  is  the  root  of  all  reason.  The  laws  of  action  for 
rational  beings  are  immediately  certain;  their  world  is 
certain  only  through  that  previous  certainty."^  "Our 
world  is  the  sensible  material  of  our  duty;  this  is  the 
properly  real  in  things,  the  true  basal  principle  (Grund- 
stoff)  of  all  appearance."^  Fichte  may  be  thought  to 
have  run  into  paradox  in  the  stress  which  he  placed  upon 
the  worth  of  moral  agency  for  cognition;  but  it  cannot 
well  be  denied  that  he  touched  here  upon  a  great  truth 
which  no  sane  philosophy  can  overlook.  Among  the  con- 
tributions of  Schelling  special  mention  may  be  made  of 
the  stimulus  which  he  gave  to  the  recognition  of  the 
divine  in  nature.  To  Hegel  belongs  the  merit  of  helping 
forward  a  needful  revision  of  the  conception  of  spirit, 
whether  taken  in  the  divine  or  the  human  range.  Over 
against  the  abnormal  stress  upon  simplicity  of  essence 
as  distinctive  of  spirit  and  especially  of  God,  which  had 


*  Vocation  of  Man,  trans,  by  William  Smith,  Book  iii. 
^  Ibid.,  Book  iii. 

5  Ueber  den  Grund  unseres  Glaubens  an  eine  gottliche  Weltregierung, 
Werke,  V.  185. 


22  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

place  in  Christian  dogmatics  from  the  days  of  the 
fathers,  Hegel  profoundly  emphasized  the  truth  that  a 
certain  manifoldness  pertains  to  spirit,  that  its  capacity 
for  life  is  based  in  contrast,  and  that  it  comes  to  self- 
realization  through  diverse  activities.  "Whatever,"  he 
says,  "is  merely  or  abstractly  simple,  v^ithout  complexity, 
is  a  dead  thing."^  From  this  point  of  view  he  laid  great 
stress  upon  the  trinitarian  conception,  declaring  that 
"God  is  recognized  as  spirit  only  when  known  as  the 
Triune."^  Doubtless  exception  may  be  taken  to  the 
way  in  which  Hegel  carried  out  his  thought  of  spirit  as 
subsisting  in  its  proper  character  only  through  a  pro- 
cess; but  it  can  scarcely  be  questioned  that  in  his  general 
thought  on  this  theme  he  provided  an  improved  basis  for 
conceiving  of  God  as  the  living  God,  to  say  nothing 
about  furnishing  a  suitable  foundation  for  the  specific 
doctrines  of  trinity  and  incarnation. 

In  addition  to  the  several  grounds  of  appreciation 
which  have  been  stated,  it  may  be  noticed  that  these 
philosophers  were  decidedly  antagonistic  to  the  rational- 
ism of  the  preceding  century,  the  "Illuminism,"  with 
its  deistic  preferences  and  its  infinite  confidence  in  its 
possession  of  all  truth.  The  terms  in  which  they  men- 
tion it  are  little  less  than  scornful.  Schelling  remarks 
that  in  relation  to  Christianity  the  so-called  Aufklarerei 
might  better  be  called  an  Ausklarerei,  a  clearing-out 
rather  than  a  clearing-up.^  Hegel  characterizes  the  sys- 
tem of  Illuminism  as  "only  an  abstract  metaphysic  of 
the  understanding,"  which  turns  God  into  a  poor  and 
empty  being.^ 


1  Logic,  trans,  by  Wallace,  chap,  iv,  p.  82. 

'  Philosophy  of  History,  trans,  by  Sibree,  p.  331;  see  also  various  state- 
ments in  the  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

^  Vorlesungen  ueber  die  Methode  des  akademischen  Studiums,  Werke, 
V.  300.  ■*  Philosophy  of  Religion,  I.  29,30. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  23 

It  was  appropriate  to  notice  the  post-Kantian  idealism 
on  the  side  of  its  affihation  with  Christian  behef  before 
turning  to  the  reverse  side.  In  the  light  of  this  pro- 
cedure it  will  be  understood  that  the  mention  of  that 
idealism  in  a  history  of  unbelief  involves  no  judgment 
that  it  made  on  the  whole  for  skepticism  rather  than  for 
faith.  All  that  the  mention  imports  is  that  certain  fea- 
tures had  place  in  the  philosophies  of  Kant's  idealistic 
successors  upon  which  a  superstructure  of  unbelief  might 
be  built,  and  to  some  extent  has  been  built.  The  asser- 
tion of  this  much  will  still  leave  one  free  to  attribute  a 
distinct  value  to  those  philosophies  as  contributions 
toward  the  solution  of  great  problems  with  which  man's 
spirit  has  been  wrestling  through  the  ages. 

III. — Questionable  Points  in  Fichte's  Thinking 

Zeller  remarks  respecting  Fichte  that  "the  paradoxical 
nature  of  a  proposition  was  to  him  no  occasion  for  sub- 
jecting it  to  doubt."^  His  earnest,  doctrinaire  temper 
stopped  at  nothing  which  seemed  to  be  implied  in  an 
accepted  point  of  view.  This  characteristic  may  serve 
to  explain  in  a  measure  the  remarkable  speculative  shift 
by  which  Fichte  essayed  to  gain  the  unified  view  of  reality 
which  Kant  failed  to  achieve.  Instead  of  permitting  the 
world,  as  an  objective  entity,  to  confront  the  self,  or 
ego,  he  reduced  all  to  the  ego.  The  ego,  he  maintained, 
is  the  thing-in-itself,  the  real  noumenon,  and  there  is  no 
other.  In  its  essence  the  ego  is  activity,  an  activity  which 
is  aware  of  itself,  and  thus  is  at  once  being  and  con- 
sciousness, the  real  and  the  ideal.  But  to  be  properly 
aware  of  itself  the  ego  needs  to  be  set  in  antithesis  with 
an  object,  or  non-ego,  since  a  self-conscious  subject  is 


Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic  seit  Leibniz,  p.  600. 


24  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

conceivable  only  in  relation  to  an  object.  The  ego  comes 
into  this  necessary  relation  by  its  own  act.  It  posits  the 
non-ego,  not  as  an  objective  reality,  but  as  a  limit  set  up 
within  itself,  by  reacting  against  which  it  fulfills  its 
calling  to  free  self-development.  The  world  appears, 
indeed,  as  an  exterior  object,  but  in  truth  it  is  only  a 
limit  which  the  ego  from  out  of  itself  imposes  upon 
itself,  and  thereby  secures  a  ground  for  that  perpetual 
striving  with  which  its  very  being  is  identified.  The 
goal  toward  which  it  looks  is  independence  of  all  limits ; 
but,  as  this  can  never  be  reached,  the  striving,  and  with 
that  the  selfhood,  never  ceases.  As  has  been  intimated 
in  the  preceding  section,  the  striving  falls  under  the 
law  of  duty,  and  may  be  described  as  the  action  of  the 
moral  will.  Fichte's  system  appears  thus  as  a  monism 
in  which  the  moral  will  is  everything. 

Upon  this  philosophical  scheme  two  criticisms  may  be 
passed,  a  lesser  and  a  greater.  The  lesser  criticism 
relates  to  the  forced  and  unsatisfactory  account  which 
is  given  of  the  non-ego.  If  we  start  with  the  definition 
of  the  ego  as  pure  activity,  where  shall  we  find  a  logical 
warrant  for  the  conclusion  that  the  ego  sets  up  a  limit 
to  itself  in  the  non-ego?  Is  it  the  nature  of  activity  to 
raise  a  barrier  across  its  own  path,  the  nature  of  pure 
spontaneity  to  erect  a  wall  against  which  it  may  deceive 
itself  with  a  sense  of  passivity?  Surely  the  Fichtean 
account  of  the  non-ego  is  somewhat  fantastic  as  well  as 
entirely  gratuitous.  Such  a  tremendous  fact  as  is  the 
outer  world  in  the  experience  of  the  ego  cannot  credibly 
be  explained  as  simply  the  ghostly  product  of  a  subjec- 
tive activity.  How  does  it  happen  that  a  purely  subjec- 
tive working  is  so  amazingly  particular  to  furnish,  in 
connection  with  a  given  impression  of  geographical  loca- 
tion, a  substantially  identical  impression  of  the  collocation 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  25 

of  objects  on  any  number  of  successive  occasions  and 
in  any  number  of  conscious  subjects?  The  "productive 
imagination,"  to  use  Fichte's  phrase,  which  works  with 
such  persistent  conformity  to  infinite  complexities,  is  cer- 
tainly a  most  astonishing  thing,  especially  as  it  works 
in  the  dark,  or  beneath  consciousness.  As  against  such 
a  miracle  it  is  comparatively  easy  to  accept  a  real  world 
with  which  the  ego  proper,  or  the  finite  self,  stands  in 
relations  of  interaction.  How  this  world  is  to  be  con- 
strued in  the  ultimate  analysis  may  be  very  difficult  to 
determine,  but  that  it  is  the  mere  product  of  the  observer 
into  whose  experience  it  enters  only  a  very  peculiar 
intellectual  demand  can  make  one  believe. 

The  greater  criticism  of  the  Fichtean  philosophy 
applies  to  the  way  in  which  it  construes  the  thought  of 
the  absolute,  or  God.  Implicitly  and  explicitly  it  collides 
at  this  point  with  the  requirements  of  Christian  theism. 
It  is  openly  intolerant  of  the  idea  of  a  personal  God. 
While  it  speaks  of  an  absolute  ego,  its  own  premises  show 
that  the  term  is  a  misnomer.  The  only  personal  sub- 
ject which  it  acknowledges  is  the  empirical  ego,  the  self- 
conscious  finite  being,  which  has  personality  just  because 
it  exists  under  limitations.  Whatever  God  may  be, 
according  to  Fichte,  he  cannot  be  a  personal,  conscious, 
distinct  being.  The  moment  we  describe  him  as  such 
we  deny  his  infinitude,  and  fashion  him  after  the  pattern 
of  our  own  finiteness.  It  would  seem,  then,  that  we  must 
apply  to  him  some  impersonal  or  abstract  term,  or 
renounce  the  attempt  to  define  him.  Between  these  alter- 
natives Fichte  does  not  appear  to  have  occupied  a  per- 
fectly consistent  position.  On  the  one  hand,  he  has  said 
that  to  form  a  concept  (Begriff)  of  God  is  to  misrep- 
resent him  and  turn  him  into  an  idol.^     On  the  other 

'  Gerichtliche  Verantwortungsschriften,  Werke,  V.  266,  267. 


26  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

hand,  he  defines  God  formally  as  the  moral  order  of  the 
world.  "That  living  and  working  moral  order,"  he  says, 
"is  itself  God ;  we  need  no  other  and  can  conceive  of  no 
other."^  In  this  definition  the  terms  "living"  and  "work- 
ing" may  be  permitted  to  imply  that  God  is  not  a  mere 
abstraction;  but  evidently  he  is  left  to  be  regarded  as 
simply  a  common  factor  in  a  plurality  of  moral  persons. 
He  cannot  be  thought  to  have  any  real  existence  apart 
from  this  company  of  moral  persons,  since  a  moral  order 
without  moral  persons  is  an  empty  figment. 

For  this  denial  of  the  personality  of  God  Fichte  can- 
not be  said  to  have  offered  grounds  that  merit  any  great 
amount  of  respect.  His  assumption  that  personality  is 
incompatible  with,  infinitude  is  to  be  challenged,  as  involv- 
ing both  a  false  measure  of  greatness  and  a  false  view  of 
the  necessary  conditions  of  consciousness.  It  involves 
a  false  measure  of  greatness  because  it  pays  no  proper 
respect  to  the  supereminence  of  the  qualitative  element 
in  greatness.  Being  is  great  by  the  possession  of  great 
qualities,  and  the  greatest  of  qualities  are  those  of  per- 
sonality, foremost  among  which  are  self-knowledge  and 
self-direction.  To  apply  tliese  qualities  in  their  highest 
reach  to  God  is  to  exalt  him.  To  lock  God  out  of  such 
high  attributes  is  to  lower,  diminish,  and  degrade  him. 
He  is  infinite  as  being  all-comprehending  in  his  intelli- 
gence and  of  unlimited  potency  in  his  will.  To  place  him 
as  person  over  against  finite  persons  does  not  reduce  him 
to  finitude;  for  these  finite  persons,  if  not  simply 
moments  or  factors  in  the  process  of  his  personal  life,  at 
any  rate  subsist  only  by  his  permission  and  through  his 
efficiency.  The  sole  original  and  independent  one, 
faced  by  no  limits  that  are  not  self-imposed,  what  does 


1  Ueber  den  Grund  unseres  Glaubens  an  eine  gottliche  Weltregierung, 
Werke,  V.  i86. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  27 

he  lack  of  being  the  greatest  conceivable,  the  truly 
infinite?  Surely  it  is  a  strange  procedure  to  deny  infini- 
tude to  such  a  personality  and  to  claim  it  for  an  imper- 
sonal moral  order  which  has  no  existence  outside  a 
totality  of  finite  persons,  a  totality  that  cannot  be  certified 
to  be  infinite. 

The  Fichtean  view,  as  was  noticed,  is  also  to  be  chal- 
lenged as  involving  a  false  view  of  the  necessary  con- 
dition of  the  consciousness  which  is  indispensable  to 
personality.  Consciousness,  it  is  claimed,  can  exist  only 
in  antithesis  to  an  object;  and,  accordingly,  only  a  sub- 
ject, that  is  limited  by  an  object,  and  therefore  not 
infinite,  can  possess  consciousness.  The  claim  is  arbi- 
trary, and  is  especially  gratuitous  in  connection  with 
Fichte's  conception  of  the  nature  of  being.  What  con- 
sciousness requires  is  not  an  object  proper,  or  anything 
presented  under  the  category  of  objectivity,  but  simply 
a  content.  Suppose  an  ego  that  is  essentially  static  or 
passive,  and  then  we  may  have  occasion  to  assume  the 
impact  of  an  outside  power  to  set  it  in  motion  and  to 
furnish  it  with  the  requisite  content  for  consciousness. 
But  Fichte,  very  rightly,  as  we  think,  rejects  this 
fiction  of  a  passive  ego.  Activity,  as  he  contends, 
is  its  very  essence.  Why,  then,  should  the  ego 
require  to  be  put  in  antithesis  to  an  object  to  become 
conscious?  In  its  own  activities  it  is  revealed  to  itself 
— in  other  words,  made  conscious  of  itself.  Fichte 
seems  in  this  relation  to  have  made  the  mistake  of  judg- 
ing self-consciousness  universally  by  the  peculiarity  of 
one  form  or  element  of  self-consciousness.  So  far  as 
consciousness  is  shaped  by  the  instrumentality  of  sense 
perception,  it  has,  as  an  indispensable  content,  an 
impression  of  externality.  But  consciousness  is  much 
wider  than  this  impression.     It  is  not  dependent  upon 


28  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  impression,  since  it  finds  means  of  realization  in  the 
activities  of  an  ego  which  is  in  its  nature  active.  Only 
a  self  that  is  a  mere  blank,  or  at  least  empty  of  every 
element  of  spontaneity,  and  therefore  no  true  self,  needs 
to  run  its  head  against  a  barrier  in  order  to  become 
aware  of  itself.  Thus  the  assumption  on  which  Fichte 
based  his  denial  of  the  personality  of  God  is  found  in 
both  of  its  members  to  be  groundless. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  system  of  Fichte 
ran  into  speculative  collapse  at  the  point  of  its  inade- 
quate conception  of  God.  The  philosopher  himself  seems 
to  have  come  ultimately  to  a  half-confessed  conviction 
that,  to  gain  a  sufficient  world  ground,  we  must  posit 
something  else  than  a  moral  order.  He  therefore  veered 
toward  the  Spinozistic  notion  of  a  universal  substance 
of  which  finite  personalities  are  forms  of  manifesta- 
tion. The  revision,  however,  was  implicit  rather  than 
formal,  so  that  his  philosophy  ends  in  a  very  consider- 
able mist.^ 

IV. — Schelling's  Philosophy,  Especially  in  its 
Middle  Stage 

It  has  been  said  of  Schelling  that  he  conducted  his 
philosophical  education  before  the  public ;  and  the  remark 
cannot  be  charged  with  any  serious  trespass  against 
the  claims  of  charity.  Brilliant,  enthusiastic,  and  adven- 
turous, he  figured  as  the  champion  of  views  toward 
which  his  own  zeal  cooled  after  a  brief  interval.  Apart 
from  any  special  account  of  transition  periods,  at  least 
three  marked  stages  may  be  noted  in  his  thinking.  In 
the  first  he  wrought  as  a  disciple  of  Fichte.  In  the  third 
he  advanced  to  the  theistic  standpoint,  but  at  the  same 


>  Compare  Zeller,  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic  seit  Leibniz,  pp 
630-635;  Weber,  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  486,  487. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  29 

time  neutralized  to  a  considerable  extent  the  philosoph- 
ical advantage  of  this  standpoint  by  his  predilection  for 
theosophic  vagaries.  To  the  intermediate  stage  belongs 
that  phase  of  Schelling's  thinking  which  naturally  claims 
most  attention  in  a  general  glance  at  modern  speculation. 

The  system  brought  out  at  this  middle  stage  has  been 
called  the  "philosophy  of  identity."  The  name  expresses 
the  goal  to  which  Schelling  was  directed  in  his  quest 
after  complete  unity.  Having  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  Fichte's  scheme  failed  to  give  a  satisfactory  account 
of  the  non-ego,  he  was  led  to  postulate  the  absolute  as 
that  which  is  above  and  beyond  all  contrast,  the  primal 
and  basal  unity,  which  is  neither  ego  nor  non-ego,  sub- 
ject nor  object,  ideal  nor  real,  but  the  identity  of  these. 
It  is  the  essence  in  which  all  distinctions  are  abolished, 
to  which  the  terms  universal  and  particular,  infinite  and 
finite,  are  alike  inappropriate.  It  is  such  a  unity  as 
incloses  a  complete  synthesis  even  of  unity  and  contrast. 

The  absolute,  which  is  thus  in  itself  void  of  all  con- 
trasts, comes  to  manifestation  in  a  double  series,  the  sub- 
jective and  the  objective,  the  sphere  of  thought  and  con- 
sciousness and  the  sphere  of  nature.  Inasmuch  as  there 
is  the  same  identical  essence  in  both — namely,  the  abso- 
lute— the  two  spheres  are  contrasted  phenomenally 
rather  than  essentially.  Nature  is  objective  only  so  far 
as  contemplated  in  relation  to  a  subject.  It  is  not  mere 
body  or  mass.  "There  is  no  pure  corporeity  in  nature. 
.  .  .  Everything  in  the  universe  is  possessed  of  soul.  In 
other  words,  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  that  is 
merely  body  and  not  as  such  also  immediately  soul."^ 
Plants  and  even  inorganic  nature  have  a  psychic  interior. 
Existence  as  individual  has  in  the  union  of  body  and  soul 


^Vorlesungen  ueber  die  Methode  des  akademischen  Studiums,  xi ;  System 
der  gesammten  Philosophic,  Werke,  VI.  217. 


30  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

its  necessary  form,  and  action  is  to  be  imputed  neither 
to  the  soul  nor  to  the  body,  but  to  the  one  identical 
essence  that  is  in  both.  As  appears  from  these  state- 
ments, Schelling's  philosophy  of  nature  was  a  panpsy- 
chism,  in  which  the  world  as  a  whole  was  viewed  as  an 
organism,  and  every  part  of  it  as  sharing  more  or  less 
in  psychic  life. 

Schelling's  attempt  to  construe  nature  in  an  a  priori 
manner,  while  it  had  its  suggestive  points,  was  con- 
fessedly very  much  of  a  failure  as  respects  details.  But 
this  is  a  ground  of  criticism  which  we  have  little  occasion 
to  emphasize.  The  great  objection  to  be  urged  against 
the  "philosophy  of  identity"  is  that  it  is  a  pantheistic 
monism,  which  satisfies  neither  philosophy  nor  religion 
in  the  substitute  which  it  offers  for  a  personal  God,  and 
which  also  is  compromising  to  the  personality  of  man. 
For  the  legitimacy  of  at  least  the  former  part  of  this 
objection  the  philosopher's  own  maturer  judgment  may 
be  cited. 

An  obvious  ground  of  exception,  from  the  philo- 
sophical standpoint,  to  Schelling's  notion  of  the  absolute 
is  the  logical  impossibility  that  such  a  primal  being 
should  ever  evolve  anything  out  of  its  own  blankness. 
As  well  look  to  empty  space  to  act  the  part  of  the  world- 
maker  as  think  of  getting  a  world  out  of  an  abyss  of 
being  which  is  totally  void  of  distinctions,  which  in  its 
lack  of  consciousness  cannot  purpose  to  make  anything, 
and  which  affords  in  itself  no  pattern  for  anything. 
Schelling  says,  indeed,  that  the  orignial  being  must 
reveal  itself  by  bringing  to  actuality  both  the  ideal  and 
the  real,  but  he  neglects  to  tell  us  how  it  has  in  itself  any 
basis  of  such  a  revelation.  In  fact,  it  is  by  the  merest 
violence  that  any  result  can  be  gotten  out  of  the  dis- 
tinctionless  absolute.     One  is  reminded  of  the  expedient 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  31 

to  which  Herbert  Spencer  resorts  for  getting  his  primary 
undifferentiated  being  into  motion,  namely,  the  assump- 
tion of  the  instabihty  of  the  homogeneous.  The  homo- 
geneous must  forsooth  evolve  motion  and  difference, 
but  why  it  should  do  so,  apart  from  the  mere  accom- 
modation of  the  philosopher,  is  not  in  the  slightest 
degree  apparent.  On  the  premises  of  Schelling  and 
Spencer  alike  it  is  a  perfect  enigma  how  the  primal 
Dead  Sea  of  the  undistinguished  absolute  should  have 
escaped  from  its  motionless  calm  and  bestirred  itself  to 
any  intelligible  result.  As  respects  satisfying  the 
demands  of  religion,  it  is  quite  evident  that  the  colorless 
absolute  of  Schelling  is  entirely  incompetent  to  provide 
for  the  sense  of  fellowship  in  which  religion  has  its  per- 
manent life.  Doubtless  the  thought  of  divine  imma- 
nence has  great  worth  for  religious  feeling,  and  panthe- 
istic teaching  like  that  of  the  "philosophy  of  identity" 
does  emphasize  the  divine  immanence.  But  in  the  long 
run  the  religious  mind  must  make  demands  as  to  the 
character  of  the  divine  which  is  supposed  to  be  imma- 
nent. What  it  wants  is  the  Father  of  spirits,  not  an  imper- 
sonal absolute  in  which  the  beating  heart  of  love  and 
sympathy  can  be  placed  only  by  an  ill-disguised  fiction. 

As  might  be  expected,  the  pantheistic  standpoint  of 
the  "philosophy  of  identity"  is  shown  to  have  its  dubious 
bearings  on  questions  of  anthropology.  Pantheism  is 
intrinsically  unfriendly  to  freedom  in  the  sense  of  a 
power  of  real  alternativity.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact 
the  statements  which  Schelling  put  forth  on  this  theme, 
at  the  pantheistic  stage,  are  compromising.  "Only  such 
an  act,"  he  says,  "as  follows  with  absolute  necessity  from 
the  essence  of  the  soul  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  from 
the  divine  so  far  as  it  is  the  essence  of  the  soul,  Is  an 
absolutely  free  act.  ...  In  the  soul  as  such  there  is  no 


32  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

freedom,  but  only  the  divine  is  truly  free,  and  the  essence 
of  the  soul  so  far  as  it  is  divine."^  Here  we  have  the 
assumption  that  freedom  in  its  whole  range  is  identical 
with  necessity;  an  assumption  which  certainly  does  not 
tend  to  conserve  the  notion  of  freedom  in  its  integrity. 
In  like  manner  Schelling  retrenches  the  idea  of  immor- 
tality. As  identical  with  the  primal  essence  the  soul  must 
indeed  live  on,  but  it  is  not  immortal  in  the  sense  in 
which  the  term  includes  the  persistence  of  individual 
existence.  "For,  since  this  cannot  be  thought  apart  from 
connection  with  the  finite  and  the  body,  so  would  immor- 
tality in  this  sense  be  in  truth  only  a  perpetual  mortality 
and  no  liberation,  but  rather  a  continued  imprisonment 
of  the  soul."^  That  a  liberation  which  extirpates  indi- 
viduality and  leaves  no  place  for  a  sense  of  personal 
identity  is  not  to  be  counted  any  great  boon  Schelling 
himself  seemed  to  realize  at  a  later  stage. 

V. — The  System  of  Hegel 

Like  his  idealistic  associates,  Hegel  considered  the  dis- 
tinctive task  of  philosophy  to  consist  in  discovering  and 
construing  the  all-embracing  unity.  With  the  Fichtean 
attempt  to  fulfill  this  task  he  could  not  reconcile  himself, 
since  it  involved  a  too  easy-going  and  arbitrary  disposal 
of  the  objective  world.  To  Schelling's  conception  of  a 
neutral  absolute  coming  to  manifestation  in  the  parallel 
streams  of  nature  and  spirit  he  could  not  long  render 
his  assent,  as  this  conception  seemed  to  him  to  afford 
no  adequate  account  of  movement  and  diversity,  and 
also  to  fail  of  attributing  to  spirit  its  rightful  supremacy. 
He  therefore  sought  an  improved  interpretation  of  the 
absolute,  that  is,  one  in  which  the  absolute,  instead  of 


*  System  der  gesammten  Philosophic,  Werke   VI.  539,  541. 
'  Philosophie  und  Religion,  Werke,  VI.  60. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  33 

figuring  as  a  neutral  background  of  the  world  process, 
is  presented  as  subsisting  in  and  through  the  world 
process ;  an  interpretation  also  in  which  nature  takes  the 
rank  of  a  factor  or  stage  in  the  self-realization  of  spirit 
and  is  thus  made  subordinate. 

According  to  a  basal  assumption  of  the  Hegelian  sys- 
tem the  universe  is  not  merely  rational,  or  built  accord- 
ing to  a  thought  plan,  but  is  thought  itself.  "God  him- 
self," says  Hegel,  "exists  in  his  proper  truth  only  in 
thought  and  as  thought."^  A  thinker  he  defines  as 
"thought  conceived  as  a  subject."^  He  considers  it 
admissible  to  speak  of  nature  as  "the  system  of  uncon- 
scious thought,  or,  to  use  Schelling's  expression,  a  fos- 
silized intelligence."^  In  comprehensive  terms  he 
declares,  "Everything  we  know,  both  of  outward  and 
inward  nature,  is  in  its  own  self  the  same  as  it  is  in 
thought."^  According  to  a  second  assumption  equally 
distinctive,  thought  is  an  organism  in  which  all  the  parts 
or  members  are  so  related  that  each  demands  the  whole 
and  can  be  contemplated  in  its  full  truth  only  in  relation 
to  the  whole.  To  isolate  a  part  is  to  put  it  out  of  the 
plane  of  reality  and  make  it  abstract.  A  lower  category 
never  affords  a  point  of  rest.  A  complement  is  demanded 
in  a  higher  category,  and  so  on  to  the  highest,  the  abso- 
lute idea,  the  category  of  self-consciousness,  wherein 
all  the  other  categories  find  their  unity  and  proper  sig- 
nificance. The  movement  from  the  lower  to  the  higher 
is  dialectic;  that  is,  it  proceeds  by  contradiction  and 
reconciliation.  Thus  the  idea  of  "pure  being"  is  con- 
fronted immediately  by  the  idea  of  "nothing,"  and  the 
union  of  the  two  gives  the  idea  of  "becoming."  In  the 
same  way  the  other  categories,  or  fundamental  concepts, 

*  Logic,  chap,  ii,  p.  28,  in  trans,  by  Wallace. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  30.  s  Ibid.,  p.  39.  *  Ibid.,  p.  37. 


34  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

are  evolved  until  the  crown  of  the  hierarchy  is  reached. 
For  the  consummation  of  the  movement  of  thought 
three  great  stages  are  required,  corresponding  to  which 
are  the  three  principal  branches  of  philosophy:  logic, 
the  science  of  the  idea  in  itself ;  the  philosophy  of  nature, 
the  science  of  the  idea  in  the  reflection  of  itself;  the 
philosophy  of  mind  or  spirit,  the  science  of  the  idea  in 
its  return  to  itself  from  its  self-estrangement  in  nature. 
As  passing  on  through  different  stages  the  evolution  of 
thought  may  seem  to  involve  a  time  element,  but  it  is 
probable  that  Hegel  meant  to  predicate  succession  in  the 
logical  rather  than  in  the  temporal  sense,  though  a  ques- 
tion may  be  rasied  as  to  whether  the  philosopher  kept 
with  entire  consistency  to  this  point  of  view.^ 

Philosophical  method,  as  Hegel  maintained,  is  prop- 
erly determined  by  the  nature  of  the  universe  as  the 
complete  system  or  organism  of  thought.  The  great 
demand  in  philosophical  thinking  is  to  produce  a  rescript 
of  thought  in  its  essential  relations,  a  rescript  which 
by  the  nature  of  the  case  will  be  no  fanciful  structure, 
but  a  true  mirror  of  reality.  To  meet  this  demand  the 
thinker  must  give  himself  over  to  the  impulsion  of 
thought  and  permit  himself  to  be  carried  in  its  direction. 
In  true  thinking,  says  Hegel,  "we  renounce  our  selfish 
and  particular  being,  sink  ourselves  in  the  thing,  allow 
thought  to  follow  its  own  course,  and  if  we  add  anything 
of  our  own  we  think  ill."^  Using  the  words  of  Pro- 
fessor Paulsen,  we  may  give  a  succinct  description  of 
Hegel's  conception  of  philosophical  method  as  follows : 
"Reality  as  such  is  thought,  an  idea  unfolding  itself  with 
inner  necessity.  Perfect  knowledge  consists  in  thinking 
the  actual  thoughts  over  again.   In  the  dialectical  evolu- 

*  Compare  McTaggart,  Studies  in  the  Hegelian  Dialectic,  pp.   166-176 
Zeller,  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic  seit  Leibniz,  pp.  792,  793. 
'Logic,  chap,  ii,  p.  41.     Compare  Philosophy  of  Religion,  L  33. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  35 

tion  of  philosophical  thinking  the  self-existent  and  active 
absolute  idea  is  repeated,  or  rather  becomes  conscious 
of  itself."^  The  emphatically  a  priori  character  of  the 
philosophical  construction  which  conforms  to  this  pattern 
is  quite  apparent. 

In  the  application  of  philosophical  tests  critics  have 
found  various  faults  in  the  Hegelian  system.  They  have 
noticed  that  its  assumption  of  the  self-evolving  nature 
of  thought  is  without  any  good  warrant;  that  it  is  not  a 
mere  thought  element  which  calls  up  its  opposite,  or  a 
spontaneous  movement  of  thought  by  which  two  notions 
are  united  in  a  third ;  that  what  really  achieves  this  is  a 
true  self,  or  thinking  agent,  which  has  had  experience 
of  reality  in  its  fullness  and  complexity,  and  so  cannot 
rest  in  the  partial  and  isolated.  Again,  the  charge  has 
been  made  against  the  Hegelian  system  that  it  fails  to  dis- 
tinguish consistently  between  the  simply  logical  and  the 
metaphysical  or  ontological.  "Hegel,"  says  Professor 
Seth,  "systematically  and  in  the  most  subtle  fashion  con- 
founds these  two  points  of  view,  and  ends  by  offering  us 
a  logic  as  a  metaphysic."^  Still  further,  the  Hegelian 
system  has  been  criticised  as  providing  no  intelligible 
account  of  the  transition  from  the  ideal  to  the  sensible, 
from  the  realm  of  categories  to  the  realm  of  a  material 
manifold  in  space  and  time.  Hegel,  it  is  claimed,  has 
simply  made  a  resolute  leap  across  "the  ugly  broad 
ditch."  He  has  made  a  bridge  of  nothing  better  than 
metaphorical  phrases.  "His  passage  from  logic  to  nature 
is  to  the  full  as  mythological  as  anything  we  find  in 
Plato."3 

These  criticisms,  it  strikes  us,  are  not  without  sub- 


•  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  2 1 . 
'Seth,  Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  104. 
'  Ibid.,  p.   11^. 


36  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

stantial  foundations;  but,  not  dwelling  upon  them,  we 
will  notice  some  grounds  of  objection  to  the  Hegelian 
system  which  may  be  urged  both  from  a  philosophical 
and  a  religious  point  of  view.  In  the  first  place,  the 
system  is  chargeable  with  a  one-sided  intellectualism. 
Under  the  constraint  of  an  imperious  ambition  to  secure 
a  completely  unified  view  of  reality  it  confines  reality 
within  the  terms  of  a  definition  that  is  distinctly  too 
narrow.  Thought  cannot  be  admitted  to  be  another 
name  for  being.  One  might  as  well  join  Schopenhauer 
in  reducing  all  to  will  as  side  with  Hegel  in  reducing 
all  to  thought.  Will  in  a  rational  universe  may  be  pre- 
sumed, indeed,  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  demands 
of  reason  or  thought,  but  only  by  giving  to  thought  an 
unnatural  breadth  of  meaning  can  it  be  made  to  include 
what  customary  speech  denotes  by  will.  My  thought  of 
a  given  possible  act  is  one  thing;  my  willing,  or  putting 
forth  of  energy,  which  consummates  the  act,  is  a  differ- 
ent thing.  Again,  the  thought  which  I  entertain  about 
certain  matters  of  conduct  may  be  fairly  correct,  while 
my  attitude  of  will  in  relation  to  the  same  matters  may 
be  decidedly  perverse.  To  merge  the  latter  in  the  former 
is,  accordingly,  compromising  to  an  ethical  or  religious 
interest  as  well  as  metaphysically  defective.  The  same 
remark  applies  to  the  slighting  treatment  which  Hegel 
accords  to  the  element  of  feeling.  He  renders  even  less 
scanty  justice  to  this  element  than  to  that  of  will.  While 
his  general  postulates  are  implicitly  adverse  to  accredit- 
ing to  will  its  proper  province,  he  explicitly  disparages 
the  office  of  feeling.  "The  form  of  feeling,"  he  says, 
"is  the  lowest  in  which  spiritual  truth  can  be  expressed."'^ 
Again  he  remarks:  "God  exists  essentially  in  thought. 
The  suspicion  that  he  exists  through  thought,  and  only 

*  Logic,  chap,  ii,  p.  28. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  n 

in  thought,  must  occur  to  us  from  the  mere  fact  that 
man  alone  has  religion,  not  the  beasts."^  This  certainly 
is  in  amazing  contrast  with  the  biblical  statements, 
which  represent  God  as  no  less  alive,  and  no  less  rich, 
in  the  element  of  feeling  than  in  that  of  intelligence. 
And  plainly  the  reason  of  the  case  is  with  the  biblical 
representation.  A  plenitude  of  the  nobler  order  of  feel- 
ings is  an  immense  factor  in  the  inner  wealth  of  the 
normal  man.  By  a  thoroughly  warrantable  inference 
we  may  conclude  that  personality  in  its  highest  range 
cannot  be  destitute  of  this  kind  of  wealth,  for  the  source 
of  our  nature  cannot  be  poor  in  that  which  enters  so 
largely  into  our  riches.  Hegelianism  cannot  be  said  to 
make  even  a  plausible  case  for  its  one-sided  intellectual- 
ism. 

In  the  second  place,  the  Hegelian  system  is  open  to 
criticism  on  the  score  of  its  ambiguous  treatment  of  the 
subject  of  the  personality  of  God.  It  contains,  indeed, 
no  denial  of  this  great  theistic  postulate.  On  the  con- 
trary, some  of  its  representations  are  capable  of  being 
interpreted  as  implying  divine  personality.  Thus  the  stress 
which  is  placed  upon  self-consciousness,  as  the  supreme 
category,  can  easily  suggest  that  this  distinctive  char- 
acteristic of  personality  must  be  attributed  to  God.  Fur- 
thermore, sentences  occur  which  look  like  formal  asser- 
tions that  God  is  true  person.  "The  Christian  God," 
says  Hegel,  "is  God  not  known  merely,  but  also  self- 
knowing;  he  is  a  personality  not  merely  figured  in  our 
minds,  but  rather  absolutely  actual. "^  Again,  referring 
to  Spinoza's  doctrine,  he  says :  "Though  an  essential 
stage  in  the  evolution  of  the  idea,  substance  is  not  the 
same  as  absolute  idea,  but  the  idea  under  the  still  limited 
form  of  necessity.     It  is  true  that  God  is  necessity,  or, 

>  Philosophy  of  Religion,  I.  132.  *  Logic,  chap  viii,  p   233. 


38  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

as  we  may  put  it,  that  he  is  the  absolute  thing  or  fact; 
he  is,  however,  no  less  the  absolute  person.     That  he  is 
the  absolute  person,  however,  is  a  truth  which  the  phi- 
losophy of  Spinoza  never  perceived;  and  on  that  side  it 
falls  short  of  the  true  notion  of  God  which  forms  the  con- 
tent   of    the    religious    consciousness    in    Christianity." 
To  have  completed  his  view  Spinoza  should  have  added 
to  the  Oriental  conception  of  the  unity  of  substance  the 
Occidental  principle  of  individuality.^     But,  in  spite  of 
declarations   apparently  so  unequivocal,    Hegel   affords 
grounds  for  doubt  as  to  his  dogmatic  intention.    We  are 
left  to  question  whether  he  designs  to  attribute  to  God 
a  proper  consciousness  of  his  own,  or  merely  such  a  con- 
sciousness as   is  mediated  through  finite  spirits.     The 
latter  meaning  is  at  least  suggested  in  such  statements 
as   these:    "God    knows   himself    in   the   finite   spirit."^ 
"The  self-consciousness  of  God  knows  itself  in  man's 
knowing."^    "This  vast  congeries  of  volitions,  interests, 
and    activities    [displayed    in    history]    constitutes    the 
instruments  and  means  of  the  world-spirit  for  attaining 
its  object;   bringing  it  to  consciousness,   and   realizing 
it.      And    this    aim    is   none   other   than   finding   itself, 
coming  to  itself,   and  contemplating   itself   in   concrete 
actuality."*    "History    in    general    is    the    development 
of     spirit     in     time,     as     nature     is    the    development 
of   the   idea   in  space."^    Along  with   these   statements 
may   be   placed   others   which    if   they   do   not   directly 
testify  on  the  mode  of  the  divine  consciousness,  do  serve 
to  raise  the  query  as  to  whether  God  has  any  other  than 
a   purely   immanent  being,    such    as   may  naturally   be 
regarded  as  implying  only  a  mediated  consciousness,  or 


*  Logic,  chap,  viii,  p.  236.  'Philosophy  of  Religion,  II.  327,  328. 
'  Vorlesungen  ueber  die  Beweise  vom  Daseyn  Gottes. 

*  Philosophy  of  History,  pp.  24-27.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  75. 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  39 

one  brought  to  realization  in  finite  spirits,  whose  thought 
of  God  is  taken  to  signify  God's  thought  of  himself. 
Thus  Hegel  says  of  the  idea,  which  he  makes  to  be 
God  as  he  is  in  himself:  "Everything  actual,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  true,  is  the  idea,  and  has  its  truth  by  and  in  virtue 
of  the  idea  alone.  Every  individual  being  is  some  one 
aspect  of  the  idea."^  "The  truth  is  that  there  is  only  one 
reason,  one  spirit;  that  spirit  as  finite  has  no  true  exis- 
tence."^ As  appears  in  these  citations,  Hegel  was  minded 
to  make  room  for  but  one  subject  in  the  universe.  That 
everything  should  be  referred  to  one  subject  he  regarded 
as  the  demand  of  unity.  So  he  preferred  to  speak,  not 
of  the  Divine  Spirit  and  of  human  spirits,  but  simply 
of  spirit.  In  some  of  his  propositions  the  reality  of 
finite  spirits  seems  to  be  seriously  abridged;  in  other 
infinite  spirit  seems  to  be  conditioned,  in  respect  of  con- 
tent, upon  the  experience  of  finite  spirits.  On  the  whole, 
it  must  be  said  that  Hegel  has  left  the  question  of  the 
proper  personality  of  God  in  a  dubious  light.  Discrimi- 
nating critics,  like  Seth  and  Zeller,  have  opportunity  to 
question  his  fidelity,  on  this  subject,  to  the  Christian 
standpoint.  The  latter  remarks :  "Hegel's  expressions 
relative  to  the  personality  of  God  have  such  an  indefi- 
nite sound  that  it  is  difficult  to  extract  from  them  his 
real  meaning.  However,  if  account  is  taken  of  his  phi- 
losophy as  a  whole,  it  will  appear  that  for  him  the  essen- 
tial meaning  of  this  item  of  faith  was  only  the  fact  of 
God's  becoming  personal  in  human  personality."^ 

A  third  criticism  upon  the  Hegelian  system  concerns 
the  dependent  relation  toward  the  world  in  which  it 
places  God.  Whatever  ambiguity  may  attach  to  Hegel's 
thought   respecting  the  divine  personality,   it  is  quite 

'  Ix>gic.  -"hao   ix   p    305.  '  Philosophy  of  Religion,  III.  77. 

*  Ge'^chichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic  seit  Leibniz,  p.  834. 


40  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

certain  that  he  conceived  of  the  mundane  process  as  a 
necessary  means  of  self-realization  on  the  part  of  God. 
The  trinity  which  he  predicates  is  intramundane  rather 
than  transcendent  or  extramundane.  It  relates  to  the 
stages  of  a  cosmic  process  which  are  likewise  stages  in 
the  self-realization  of  spirit.  Now,  it  is  quite  evident 
that  a  theory  of  this  sort  is  remote  from  the  platform 
of  catholic  Christianity.  It  may  well  be  claimed  also 
that  there  are  good  grounds  for  preferring  the  latter. 
Surely  it  is  the  higher  conception  which  represents  God 
as  being  self-sufficient  through  the  independent  posses- 
sion of  trinitarian  life  and  then  describes  the  world  as 
the  product  of  freedom  and  intelligence,  a  sphere  of 
being  which  fulfills,  indeed,  the  far-reaching  purpose  of 
God  but  does  not  condition  his  subsistence  in  any  such 
sense  as  he  conditions  its  being. 

VI. — Tendencies  Derived  From  the  Post-Kantian 

Idealism 

The  review  which  has  been  given  has  sufficiently  indi- 
cated that,  under  the  category  of  adverse  tendencies, 
each  of  the  prominent  forms  of  this  idealism  may  be 
charged  with  rendering  support  to  pantheism.  Fichte's 
denial  of  personality  to  God  coincided  with  the  charac- 
teristic assumption  of  Occidental  pantheism,  and  was 
more  than  once  cited  by  the  advocates  of  pantheistic 
teaching.  It  is  not  to  be  overlooked,  however,  that 
Fichte's  stress  upon  the  moral  will  provided  somewhat  of 
a  counterpoise  to  the  pantheistic  incentives  furnished  by 
his  system ;  since,  undoubtedly  a  stress  of  this  kind  is 
congenially  related  to  a  theistic  conception,  as  being  the 
one  conception  which  makes  room  for  freedom  back  of 
the  world,  and  so  for  freedom  in  the  world.  The  adap- 
tation of  Schelling's  philosophy,  in  one  of  its  stages,  to 


RADICAL  IDEALISM  41 

promote  a  pantheistic  propagandism  was  illustrated  by 
several  of  his  disciples.  Thus  Lorenz  Oken  merged 
philosophy  into  a  theory  of  nature  and  identified  God 
with  the  universe. 

While  the  Hegelian  philosophy  numbered  adherents — 
such  as  Gabler,  Goschel,  Hinrichs,  and  Marheineke — 
who  regarded  it  as  reconcilable  with  Christian  ortho- 
doxy, it  also  served  as  the  starting-point  of  radicalisms 
of  the  most  extreme  and  anti-Christian  character.  That 
Hegelianism  was  responsible  for  the  whole  brood  can- 
not fairly  be  asserted.  Still  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
sweeping  attempt  of  that  philosophy  to  reduce  everything 
to  a  unified  point  of  view  afforded  a  certain  stimulus 
to  extreme  theories.  Disciples  who  varied  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  master  were  not  less  insistent  than  the 
master  in  accommodating  the  whole  round  of  facts  to 
the  chosen  standpoint.  So  we  have  in  criticism  schemes 
as  radical  as  those  of  David  Friedrich  Strauss  and 
Bruno  Bauer;  in  religious  philosophy,  the  ultra  teaching 
of  Ludwig  Feuerbach  which  left  no  place  for  any  God 
beyond  the  human  race ;  in  psychological  theory,  the  em- 
phatic sensationalism,  not  to  say  materialism,  of  both 
Strauss  and  Feuerbach;  in  socialistic  speculation,  the 
theories  of  F.  J.  G.  Lassalle  and  Karl  Marx.  A  closer 
consideration  of  the  views  of  some  of  these  men  will  be 
given  later.  The  mention  of  their  names  here  serves  to 
indicate  either  that  Hegel  was  unfortunate  in  his  follow- 
ing or  that  his  philosophy  was  not  so  thoroughly  friendly 
to  the  Christian  system  as  he  assumed  it  to  be. 


CHAPTER  II 

RADICAL  SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM 

I. — The  Sensational  Psychology — Its  Leading 
Representatives  and  its  Distinguish- 
ing Features 

In  introducing  the  theme  of  the  preceding  chapter 
occasion  was  found  to  disclaim  any  intention  to  dis- 
parage ideaHsm  or  to  question  its  compatibility,  even  in 
its  radical  forms,  with  the  Christian  faith.  For  the 
theme  of  the  present  chapter  a  disclaimer  of  this  kind 
is  not  seriously  demanded.  Judged  by  their  content,  radi- 
cal sensationalism  and  materialism  can  be  seen  to  stand 
in  the  way  of  assigning  to  man  such  attributes  and 
such  a  position  in  the  world  as  are  agreeable  to  the  Chris- 
tian point  of  view.  Moreover,  in  actual  history — at 
least  in  that  of  more  recent  times — they  have  exhibited 
a  distinct  tendency  to  ignore  or  to  set  aside  the  Chris- 
tian system.  Among  the  prominent  representatives  of 
radical  sensationalism  in  the  nineteenth  century  a  few 
may  have  indulged  in  appreciative  references  to  one  or 
another  Christian  truth ;  but  not  one  of  them  stands 
revealed  as  a  cordial  friend  of  the  Christian  faith.  As 
for  nineteenth  century  materialism,  where  it  has  come 
to  undisguised  expression  it  has  almost  uniformly 
treated  Christianity  as  quite  outside  the  province  of 
rational  belief. 

The  most  conspicuous  field  of  the  sensational  psy- 
chology in  the  last  century  was  supplied  by  Great  Britain. 
Very  radical  doctrines  in  the  line  of  that  psychology 
had  been  advocated  by  writers  of  the  preceding  century, 

42 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  43 

especially  by  Hume  and  Hartley.  Among  those  who 
appropriated  these  doctrines  and  industriously  cham- 
pioned them  four  men  have  taken  a  preeminent  rank, 
namely,  James  Mill,  John  Stuart  Mill,  Alexander  Bain, 
and  Herbert  Spencer.  While  Jeremy  Bentham  was  in  a 
sense  the  forerunner  of  the  group,  his  attention  was 
directed  rather  to  ethics  and  to  civic  reforms  than  to  the 
elaboration  of  psychological  theory.  Other  writers 
might  be  mentioned,  particularly  G.  H.  Lewes,  but  there 
is  no  cogent  ground  for  making  any  specific  reference 
to  their  views,  since  the  full  scheme  of  the  sensational 
psychology  can  be  reviewed  in  the  works  of  the  four 
principal  champions  mentioned.  Within  this  list  John 
Stuart  Mill  claims  a  special  interest  on  account  of  the 
admissions  which  his  candor  and  mental  alertness  led 
him  ultimately  to  make  against  the  scheme  which  fell 
to  him  by  inheritance.  Relative  to  Herbert  Spencer,  it 
may  be  noticed  that  in  his  attempt  to  found  a  cosmic 
philosophy  he  went  beyond  the  province  of  the  school 
which  is  here  under  consideration,  so  that  there  will  be 
occasion  to  give  attention  to  his  speculations  in  another 
connection  as  well  as  in  the  present. 

Proceeding  now  to  a  rapid  characterization  of  the 
sensational  psychology,  as  taught  by  its  foremost  rep- 
resentatives in  Great  Britian,  we  notice,  in  the  first  place, 
its  resolute  denial  of  all  a  priori  elements  of  knowl- 
edge, and  its  reference  of  the  entire  mental  content  to 
experience.  It  unhesitatingly  adopted  the  tabula  rasa 
doctrine,  according  to  which  the  mind,  essentially  blank 
in  itself,  derives  its  entire  fund  of  materials  through  the 
senses.  It  contributes  nothing  out  of  itself  to  the  struc- 
ture of  knowledge.  As  John  Stuart  Mill  asserts,  it  does 
not  originally  contain  so  much  as  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction.    All  the  so-called  necessary  truths,   so  far 


44  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

from  being  dictated  by  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  are 
the  product  of  experience.  Mill  supposes  them  to  be  the 
product  of  individual  experience.  Spencer  differs  from 
Mill  and  the  earlier  members  of  the  school  in  making 
them  the  product  of  race  experience — in  a  sense  a  priori 
for  the  individual  as  being  given  to  him,  but  a  poste- 
riori for  the  entire  series  of  individuals.^  In  the  view  of 
Spencer  no  less  than  of  Mill  they  are  no  original  datum 
of  mind.  Instead  of  being  the  logical  antecedent  of 
experience,  they  are  the  product  or  result  of  experience. 

In  the  second  place,  the  sensational  psychology  under 
review  exhibits  a  decided  bent  to  subsume  experience 
under  the  category  of  sensations  or  feelings,  making 
these  the  units  of  the  mental  life  and  postulating  noth- 
ing aside  from  them  and  their  relations.  James  Mill 
speaks  of  feeling  as  including  "every  phenomenon  of 
the  mind,"  and  construes  ideas  as  transformed  sensa- 
tions.2  "My  mind,"  says  John  Stuart  Mill,  "is  but  a 
series  of  feelings,  a  thread  of  consciousness,  however 
supplemented  by  believed  possibilities  of  consciousness 
which  are  not,  although  they  might  be,  realized."^ 
"Mind,"  says  Herbert  Spencer,  "consists  of  feelings 
and  the  relations  among  feelings."* 

In  the  third  place,  it  is  characteristic  of  the  sensational 
psychology  to  lay  great  stress  upon  the  association  of 
ideas  as  the  means  by  which  the  mind  is  furnished  with 
its  habitual  points  of  view — its  so-called  intuitions  or 
necessary  beliefs.  Defining  the  teaching  of  his  school  on 
this  subject,  John  Stuart  Mill  makes  the  following  sum- 
mary of  the  laws  of  association:  "(i)  Similar  phe- 
nomena   tend    to   be    thought    of    together.     (2)   Phe- 

*  Principles  of  Psychology,  II.  414,  edition  of  1876. 
'  Leslie  Stephen,  The  English  Utilitarians,  II.  290. 
^  Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  p.  207. 

*  Data  of  Ethics,  p.  104. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  45 

nomena  which  have  either  been  experienced  or  conceived 
in  close  contiguity  to  one  another  tend  to  be  thought 
of  together,  (3)  Associations  produced  by  contiguity 
become  more  certain  and  rapid  by  repetition.  (4)  When 
an  association  has  acquired  this  character  of  insepara- 
bihty,  when  the  bond  between  the  two  ideas  has  been 
thus  firmly  riveted,  not  only  does  the  idea  called  up  by 
association  become,  in  our  consciousness,  inseparable 
from  the  idea  which  suggested  it,  but  the  facts  or  phe- 
nomena answering  to  those  ideas  come  at  last  to  seem 
inseparable  in  existence:  things  which  we  are  unable  to 
conceive  apart,  appear  incapable  of  existing  apart,  and 
the  belief  we  have  in  their  coexistence,  though  really  a 
product  of  experience,  seems  intuitive."^ 

In  the  fourth  place,  it  is  distinctive  of  the  sensational 
psychology  to  question  the  fact  of  a  conscious  self.  This 
point  may  not  have  been  put  explicitly  by  Professor 
Bain,  and  may  have  been  qualified  in  the  exposition  of 
John  Stuart  Mill.  Still  there  was  an  evident  inclina- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  sensational  school  to  follow  Hume 
in  substituting  for  the  self-knowing  agent  a  mere  suc- 
cession of  feelings  or  psychical  phenomena.  The  defi- 
nition of  mind  as  "a  series  of  feelings,"  which  was  cited 
above  from  Mill,  is  quite  in  line  with  Hume's  negation 
of  the  conscious  self,  and  with  Herbert  Spencer  we  find 
an  express  denial  of  the  possibility  of  any  direct  con- 
sciousness of  the  self.  "A  true  cognition  of  self,"  he 
says,  "implies  a  state  in  which  the  knowing  and  the 
known  are  one,  in  which  subject  and  object  are  identified, 
and  this  Mr.  Mansel  rightly  holds  to  be  the  annihilation 
of  both."2 

Once    more,    the    sensational    psychology    exhibits    a 


*  Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  p.  191. 
2  First  Principles,  p.  65. 


46  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

decided  affiliation  with  necessitarianism.  Professor 
Bain,  it  is  true,  made  room  for  an  element  of  spontaneity 
in  the  human  constitution;  but  his  description  of  this 
element  does  not  seem  to  identify  it  with  a  proper  capa- 
bility of  choice  or  power  of  alternativity  pertaining  to 
a  conscious  agent.  "Spontaneity,"  he  says,  "expresses 
the  fact  that  the  active  organs  may  pass  into  movement, 
apart  from  the  stimulus  of  sensation."^  James  Mill  is 
credited  with  rating  free  will  as  "nonsense."^  John 
Stuart  Mill  questioned  the  right  to  assume  the  fact  of  any 
direct  control  over  the  volitions,  and  placed  events  of 
this  order  on  the  same  plane  with  physical  events  as 
respects  relations  to  determining  antecedents.  "A  voli- 
tion," he  says,  "is  a  moral  effect,  which  follows  the  cor- 
responding moral  causes  as  certainly  and  invariably  as 
physical  effects  follow  their  physical  causes.  Whether 
it  must  do  so  I  acknowledge  myself  to  be  entirely  ignor- 
ant, be  the  phenomena  moral  or  physical.  All  I  know 
is  that  it  always  does."^  Herbert  Spencer  characterized 
the  sense  of  free  will  as  an  illusion,  and  urged  against 
the  fact  of  free  will  the  requirement  of  conserving  due 
credit  to  his  treatise  on  psychology,  as  also  to  similar 
treatises.  "Psychical  changes,"  he  remarked,  "either 
conform  to  law  or  they  do  not.  If  they  do  not  conform 
to  law  this  work,  in  common  with  all  works  on  the  sub- 
ject, is  sheer  nonsense;  no  science  of  psychology  is  pos- 
sible. If  they  do  conform  to  law  there  cannot  be  any  such 
thing  as  free  will."^ 

Sensationalism,  in  its  compromising  bearing  upon  the 
recognition  of  a  true  mental  agent,  has  a  certain  kin- 
ship with  materialism.    It  is  to  be  observed,  however, 

'Mental  Science,  p.  318,  edition  of  1868. 
^Stephen,  The  English  Utilitarians,  II.  313. 
^Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  p.  501. 
*  Principles  of  Psychology,  I.  503. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  47 

that  a  confessed  preference  for  materialism  has  not  been 
characteristic  of  the  school  to  which  consideration  is  here 
given.  Its  representatives  in  general  have  emphasized 
the  broad  contrast  which,  to  our  apprehension,  subsists 
between  mental  facts  and  physical  facts.  As  respects  the 
teaching  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  it  is  more  properly  de- 
scribed as  leaning  to  idealism  than  as  affiliating  with 
materialism.  Alexander  Bain  made  large  account  of  the 
physiological  basis  or  accompaniment  of  the  mental  life, 
and  also  spoke  betimes  in  a  rather  apologetic  vein  for 
the  champions  of  materialism;  but  in  his  concluding 
statement,  in  place  of  materialism  pure  and  simple,  he 
adopted  the  monistic  conception.  "The  one  substance," 
he  says,  "with  two  sets  of  properties,  two  sides,  the 
physical  and  the  mental — a  double-faced  unity — would 
appear  to  comply  with  all  the  exigencies  of  the  case."^ 
Herbert  Spencer's  theory  may  also  be  characterized  as 
formally  monistic.  He  assumed  the  existence  of  one  pri- 
mordial force  or  substance,  the  manifestations  of  which 
fall  into  two  aggregates  "constituting  the  world  of  con- 
sciousness and  the  world  beyond  consciousness."^ 
Furthermore,  he  considered,  although  confessing  the  ab- 
sence of  strict  proof,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  experience  to 
suppose  feeling  and  nervous  action  to  be  "inner  and 
outer  faces  of  the  same  change."^  In  consideration  of 
the  fact  that  both  the  mental  and  the  physical  are  manifes- 
tations of  an  unknown  ground,  he  rated  the  controversy 
between  the  materialist  and  the  spiritualist  as  a  war  of 
words.^  It  is  not  to  be  overlooked,  however,  that  he  has 
scarcely  succeeded  in  maintaining  a  neutral  attitude 
toward  the  controversy.  Much  in  his  writings  is  cer- 
tainly adapted  to  convey  the  impression  that  mind,  so 

1  Mind  and  Body,  p.  196.  ^  pirst  Principles,  p.  156 

3  Principles  of  Psychology,  I.  128.  ■♦  First  Principles,  pp.  556,  557. 


48  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

far  as  discoverable  in  the  universe,  has  its  efficient  ante- 
cedent, or  real  source,  in  physical  energy.  Whether  con- 
sistently or  not,  he  has  accorded  a  certain  primacy  to 
matter. 

As  has  been  intimated,  the  attitude  of  the  sensational 
school  toward  the  Christian  and  theistic  faith  was  by  no 
means  cordial.  When  not  hostile  it  was  cold  and  nega- 
tive. Herbert  Spencer  was  willing,  indeed,  to  grant 
large  liberties  to  religion  in  what  he  considered  its  ap- 
propriate province,  the  field  of  the  unknown,  at  least  on 
condition  that  religion  should  confess  utter  ig-norance 
of  its  supreme  objects.  We  find,  however,  in  a  late 
writing  of  John  Stuart  Mill  the  most  distinct  concessions 
to  fundamental  points  of  theism  and  Christianity  that 
are  on  record  from  the  pen  of  any  prominent  representa- 
tive of  the  school.  In  his  essay  on  Theism,  while  he 
emphasized  the  difficulty  of  reconciling  the  goodness  of 
God  with  his  omnipotence,  he  admitted  a  balance  of  evi- 
dence on  the  side  of  creation  by  intelligence,  denied  that 
science  has  any  refutation  of  the  doctrine  of  immortality,, 
and  confessed  that  religion  has  made  a  discreet  choice 
in  fixing  upon  Christ  as  the  ideal  representative  and  guide 
of  humanity.  That  herein  he  went  beyond  the  commonly 
recognized  standpoint  of  his  school  is  evinced  by  the  fact 
that  his  disciples  were  somewhat  scandalized  by  the 
essay  on  Theism.^ 

II. — Failure  of  the  Sensational  Psychology 

Whether  the  sensational  psychology  be  judged  by  fun- 
damental rational  demands,  or  by  the  success  of  its  advo- 
cates in  maintaining  agreement  with  their  own  premises, 
it  offers  very  scanty  claims  to  appreciation.  On  the  side 
of  rational  demands  it  offends  against  a  sane  conception 

*  Stephen,  The  English  Utilitarians,  III.  433. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  49 

of  the  conditions  of  mental  experience.  It  is  simply 
turning  experience  into  a  magician  when  it  is  given 
credit  for  every  characteristic  and  item  of  the  mental 
content.  Experience  surely  is  not  something  that  floats 
in  vacuo.  In  order  to  experience  there  must  be  that 
v^^hich  experiences.  In  order  to  community  in  experience 
there  must  be  a  plurality  of  beings  fundamentally  alike 
as  respects  their  constitution.  It  contradicts  the  prin- 
ciple of  sufficient  reason  to  suppose  that  men  universally 
must,  or  that  they  assuredly  do,  follow  certain  lines  of 
rational  procedure  without  being  put  upon  those  lines  by 
inner  and  essential  characteristics  of  being.  Granting 
that  a  common  environment  may  work  toward  com- 
munity of  mental  habits,  we  must  still  hold  that  environ- 
ment can  be  efficient  for  a  given  result  in  a  plurality  of 
individuals  only  on  the  score  of  a  definite  coordination 
between  the  outer  and  the  inner;  and  this  means,  of 
course,  that  the  inner  or  mental  sphere  has  characteris- 
tics of  its  own.  In  short,  in  analyzing  away  the  mind, 
as  the  sensational  psychologists  really  do  in  at  least  some 
of  their  utterances,  they  take  away  the  intelligible 
ground  for  the  experience  from  which  they  endeavor  to 
derive  all  the  laws  and  necessities  as  well  as  the  con- 
crete items  of  the  mental  life. 

More  specifically,  the  sensational  psychology  offends 
against  a  reasonable  account  of  that  unity  of  conscious- 
ness which  is  presupposed  in  even  the  elementary  forms 
of  mental  activity.  Discrimination  and  combination  lie 
at  the  very  beginning  of  cognition  and  condition  it  at 
every  step  of  progress.  But  how  is  discrimination  or 
combination  conceivable  apart  from  a  unitary  psychical 
agent,  which,  in  its  capability  of  being  present  to  several 
terms,  can  isolate  them  from  one  another  or  bring  them 
into  conjunction,  now  taking  note  of  this,  now  of  that, 


50  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

and  now  recalling  a  term  as  one  previously  recognized? 
Under  the  definition  of  mind  as  a  mere  series  of  feelings 
this  entire  process  would  seem  to  be  outlawed.  A 
series,  such  as  that  in  question,  has  no  existence  except 
in  its  present  member ;  that  is,  it  has  no  actual  existence 
at  all  as  a  series,  but  only  a  conceptional  existence.  The 
past  feeling,  as  simply  nonexistent,  cannot,  of  course, 
exercise  any  agency,  whether  of  discrimination  or  com- 
bination. As  for  the  present  feeling,  if  it  is  to  recall  the 
past  feeling  and  discriminate  itself  from  it  or  combine 
itself  with  it,  then  it  passes  far  beyond  the  rank  of  a 
simple  feeling  and  takes  on  the  character  of  a  conscious 
subject,  being  made  to  fulfill  under  another  name  the 
role  of  a  real  agent.  Openly  or  surreptitiously  the  con- 
scious subject,  the  real  agent,  is  bound  to  be  introduced. 
It  cannot  be  dispensed  with  in  an  exposition  of  the 
simplest  facts  of  the  mental  life.  The  supposition  that 
evolution  releases  from  the  necessity  of  postulating  such 
an  agent  is  much  like  the  mythological  attempt  to  find 
a  firm  support  for  the  earth  by  placing  it  upon  an  ele- 
phant, and  the  elephant  upon  a  tortoise.  Evolution  can- 
not dispense  with  the  indispensable.  Rational  experi- 
ence, involving  as  It  does  at  Its  very  initiation  acts  of 
discrimination  and  combination,  can  neither  begin  nor 
continue  apart  from  a  real  subject,  a  unitary  psychical 
agent. 

A  serious  ground  for  objection  lies  against  the  sensa- 
tional psychology  on  the  score  of  Its  rank  necessitarian- 
ism. In  canceling  freedom  it  cancels  the  intelligible 
ground  of  proper  moral  distinctions.  Room  may  be  left 
for  aesthetic  distinctions.  Some  forms  of  conduct  may 
be  adapted  to  produce  spontaneous  impressions  of  unseem- 
liness and  ugliness,  others  to  excite  impressions  of  seem- 
llness  and  beauty.    But  all,  as  being  equally  necessitated, 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  51 

are  on  a  perfect  parity  as  respects  praiseworthiness  or 
blameworthiness,  and  to  speak  of  responsibility  for  any 
of  them  is  like  ascribing  responsibility  to  the  nettle  for 
being  a  nettle,  or  to  the  rose  for  being  a  rose.  Trouble 
is  also  made  for  the  theory  of  knowledge  by  this  sweep- 
ing denial  of  freedom.  If  every  act  is  determined,  if 
nothing  is  left  to  a  better  or  worse  use  of  free  agency, 
then  false  judgments  have  the  same  basis  as  the  true. 
All  alike  are  dictated  by  the  nature  of  things,  and  the 
conclusion  follows,  not  merely  that  it  is  difficult  to  fix 
upon  a  standard  for  the  discrimination  of  truth  from 
error,  but  even  to  conceive  that  there  can  be  such  a  stand- 
ard. As  for  Herbert  Spencer's  plea  in  behalf  of  neces- 
sity, cited  above,  if  it  is  not,  as  characterized  by  Pro- 
fessor James,  "beneath  criticism,"^  it  is  certainly  far 
from  being  weighty.  It  is  not  warrantable  to  assume 
either  that  man  was  made  for  the  convenience  of  the 
psychologist  or  that  his  freedom  makes  him  an  impos- 
sible subject  for  psychological  treatment.  Only  a  psy- 
chology that  is  bent  upon  seeing  nothing  in  the  universe 
but  mechanism  is  ruled  out  by  the  supposition  of  free- 
dom. Freedom  may,  indeed,  transcend  law  as  it  applies 
to  mechanisms,  but  who  is  qualified  to  say  offhand  that 
it  is  not  in  accordance  with  one  of  the  higher  laws  of 
the  universe  that  personalities  should  subsist  which  are 
above  the  plane  of  mechanism  as  being  dowered  with  a 
power  of  initiation?  The  possession  of  such  a  power 
may  interfere  with  the  certain  forecast  of  conduct;  but 
who  pretends  to  be  able  to  write  biographies  in  advance? 
Probability  has  been  characterized  as  the  guide  of  life, 
and  free  beings  are  subjects  for  probable  conclusions, 
since  motives,  if  not  in  strictness  causes  of  conduct,  are 
yet  persuasives.     Political  science  asks  for  no  more  defi- 

^  Principles  of  Psychology,  IL  576. 


52  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

nite  basis  than  this,  and  psychology  has  no  call  to  fret 
over  the  lack  of  mechanical  exactness  in  a  sphere  to 
which  it  is  foreign. 

The  difficulty  on  the  part  of  leading  representatives 
of  the  sensational  psychology,  in  adhering  to  their  own 
premises,  has  been  pretty  amply  illustrated.  John  Stuart 
Mill  has  furnished  some  striking  instances.  Referring 
to  the  definition  of  mind  current  in  his  school,  he  added : 
"If  we  speak  of  the  mind  as  a  series  of  feelings,  we  are 
obliged  to  complete  the  statement  by  calling  it  a  series 
of  feelings  which  is  aware  of  itself  as  past  and  future; 
and  we  are  reduced  to  the  alternative  of  believing  that 
the  mind,  or  ego,  is  something  different  from  a  series  of 
feelings,  or  possibilities  of  them,  or  of  accepting  the 
paradox  that  something  which  ex  hypothesi  is  but  a 
series  of  feelings  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series."* 
Again  he  remarked:  "There  is  a  bond  of  some  sort 
among  all  the  parts  of  the  series  which  makes  me  say  that 
they  were  the  feelings  of  a  person  who  was  the  same 
person  throughout,  and  this  bond,  to  me,  constitutes 
my  ego,"^  In  making  such  admissions  Mill  seems  to  have 
opened  a  trapdoor  in  the  floor  of  his  own  philosophy.^ 
He  as  much  as  confessed  that  the  atomistic  conception  of 
mind  with  which  he  set  out  must  be  rated  as  inadequate. 
"When  Mill,"  says  Hoffding,  "recognizes  the  uniting 
bond  as  equally  real  with  the  particular  elements  he  cor- 
rects the  entire  conception  of  consciousness  from  which 
Hume,  and,  following  him,  James  Mill,  had  started.  The 
laws  of  association  are  now  seen  to  be  nothing  more  than 
special  forms  of  the  uniting  principle."^ 


»  Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  p.  213. 

2  Notes  on  James  Mill's  Analysis  of    the    Phenomena  of   the    Human 
Mind,  II.  175. 

^  Masson,  Recent  British  Philosophy,  p.  215. 
<  History  of  Modem  Philosophy,  II.  4131  416. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  53 

Illustration  has  also  been  given  by  Herbert  Spencer 
of  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  a  consistent  and  straight- 
forward adherence  to  the  demands  of  the  sensational 
creed.  As  Thomas  Hill  Green  has  noted,  he  smuggles 
in  the  unity  of  consciousness  which  he  assumes  to  de- 
duce.* As  Professor  Bowne  has  pointed  out,  though  he 
had  made  the  mental  order  the  resultant  of  the  physical 
order,  and  characterized  the  notion  of  free  will  as  pure 
illusion,  he  yet,  in  his  argument  with  the  idealist,  brings 
back  the  ego  as  a  real  agent.  "It  is  no  longer  a  series 
of  faint  impressions,  or  the  inner  side  of  nerve  motions, 
but  a  true  source  of  energy,  and  the  warrant  for  affirm- 
ing a  thing-series,  apart  from  the  thought-series,  is  found 
in  the  fact  that  our  energy  is  resisted  by  an  energy  not 
our  own."^  Furthermore,  Spencer  seems  to  have 
afforded  means  of  controverting  his  own  assertion  that 
nothing  can  be  subject  and  object  at  once,  which  he  urges 
against  the  possibility  of  direct  self-consciousness. 
While  he  defines  consciousness  as  the  sum  of  our  psy- 
chical states,  and  affirms  that  the  absolute  is  manifested 
in  all  our  psychical  and  physical  states  alike,  he  main- 
tains that  there  is  in  us  not  merely  a  negative,  but  a  posi- 
tive, though  indefinite  consciousness  of  the  absolute.* 
Now,  in  saying  that  the  absolute  is  manifested  in  the 
states  mentioned,  Spencer  obviously  meant  to  imply  that 
it  is  the  ultimate  or  true  subject  of  the  states.  Therefore, 
as  being  manifested  in  every  psychical  state,  the  absolute 
is  the  subject  of  all  consciousness;  accordingly,  it  is  the 
subject  of  the  particular  consciousness  of  which  it  is  the 
object — that  is,  subject  and  object  at  once. 

Clearer  illustration  of  the  bankruptcy  of  the  sensa- 
tional psychology  could  not  well  be  given  than  that  which 

*  Works,  I.  438-440.  2  Metaphysics,  revised  edition,  pp.  319,  320. 

3  First   Principles,   pp.   65,   88-92,    156,    157;  Principles  of   Psychology, 
I.  627,  II.  503. 


54  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

has  been  furnished  by  its  own  representatives.  It  has 
suffered  the  hard,  but  appropriate,  fate  of  being  dis- 
credited in  the  house  of  its  friends. 

III. — A  Question  as  to  the  Genuine  Representa- 
tives OF  Materialism 

Somewhat  of  an  incentive  to  the  spread  of  materiaHstic 
theories  was  naturally  furnished  by  the  great  advance  in 
the  physical  sciences  which  began  to  be  made  near  to  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Absorbed  in  this  line 
of  studies,  and  elated  by  the  discoveries  made,  various 
minds  experienced  a  temptation  to  assign  to  the  physical 
point  of  view  a  preeminent  or  even  exclusive  place  in  the 
interpretation  of  the  universe.  The  tendency  thus  evoked 
was  reinforced,  at  least  in  some  quarters,  by  a  reaction 
from  the  great  speculative  systems  of  the  early  part  of 
the  century.  Not  a  few  were  made  to  feel  that  the  prac^ 
tical  achievements  of  these  systems  fell  vastly  short  of 
their  lofty  claims. 

A  relative  decline  of  interest  in  the  fundamental  ques- 
tions of  metaphysics  ensued.  An  opportunity  was  thus 
provided  for  the  insinuation  of  materialistic  thinking; 
for,  as  Professor  Eucken  has  remarked,  "materialism, 
powerless  against  every  scientific  philosophy,  always 
steps  forward  instantlv  in  a  time  of  speculative  exhaus- 
tion."i 

Among  scientific  writers  of  any  considerable  note  dis- 
tinct professions  of  the  unadulterated  creed  of  material- 
ism have  been  rather  infrequent.  Even  where  they  have 
given  expression  to  points  which  the  most  thorough- 
going materialist  is  wont  to  assert  they  have  hesitated 
formally  to  subscribe  to  the  materialistic  scheme  in  its 
totality.     Accordingly,   a  question   of  classification  ob- 

*The  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Modern  Philosophy,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  123 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  55 

trudes  itself.  We  need  to  inquire  whether  this  or  that 
name,  conspicuous  in  recent  Hterature,  belongs  in  the 
list  of  genuine  materialists. 

If  we  take  this  inquiry  into  English  territory  no  name 
will  be  more  readily  called  up  than  that  of  Thomas  H. 
Huxley.  It  takes  but  little  search  to  reveal  the  fact  that 
he  was  free  to  express  himself  in  such  terms  as  might 
be  employed  by  a  stanch  materialist.  Taken  as  they 
stand,  the  following  statements  seem  certainly  to  favor 
the  materialistic  theory:  "As  every  future  grows  out  of 
past  and  present,  so  will  the  physiology  of  the  future 
gradually  extend  the  realm  of  matter  and  law  until  it  is 
coextensive  with  knowledge,  with  feeling,  and  with 
action."^  "What  we  call  the  operations  of  the  mind  are 
functions  of  the  brain,  and  the  materials  of  consciousness 
are  products  of  cerebral  activity."^  "There  is  every  rea- 
son to  believe  that  consciousness  is  a  function  of  nervous 
matter,  when  that  nervous  matter  has  attained  a  certain 
degree  of  organization,  just  as  we  know  the  other  'actions 
to  which  the  nervous  system,  ministers,'  such  as  reflex 
action  and  the  like,  to  be."^  "If  these  positions  [set  forth 
in  an  article  on  Conscious  Automatism]  are  well  based, 
it  follows  that  our  mental  conditions  are  simply  sym- 
bols of  consciousness  of  the  changes  which  take  place 
automatically  in  the  organism ;  and  that,  to  take  an  ex- 
treme illustration,  the  feeling  we  call  volition  is  not  the 
cause  of  the  voluntary  act,  but  the  symbol  of  the  state 
of  the  brain  which  is  the  immediate  cause  of  that  act."* 
But,  in  spite  of  all  this  stress  on  the  primacy  and  efficacy 
of  matter,  Huxley  refuses  to  be  classified  as  a  material- 

1  Collected  Essays,  I.  159  f-.  cited  by  James  Ward  in  Naturalism  and 
Agnosticism,  I.  17. 

2  Collected  Essays,  VI.  94,  cited  by  Edward  Clodd  in  Life  of  Huxley, 
p.    ri6. 

^  Darwiniana,  p.  162. 
'Cited  by  Ward,  I.  179. 


56  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

ist.  He  notices  that  in  the  ultimate  analysis  matter  and 
motion  are  names  for  phenomena  of  consciousness,  so 
that  the  making  of  mental  phenomena  the  products  of 
material  phenomena  amounts  to  an  assertion  that  one 
order  of  phenomena  of.  consciousness  may  be  presumed 
to  be  preceded  by  another  order.  ^  He  expresses  his  sense 
of  the  groundlessness  of  materialism  in  these  strong 
words :  "I  understand  the  main  tenet  of  materialism  to 
be  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  but  matter  and 
force;  and  that  all  the  phenomena  of  nature  are  explic- 
able by  deduction  from  the  properties  assignable  to  these 
two  primitive  factors.  .  .  .  But  all  this  I  heartily  disbe- 
lieve. In  the  first  place,  it  seems  to  me  pretty  plain  that 
there  is  a  third  thing  in  the  universe,  to  wit,  conscious- 
ness, which,  in  the  hardness  of  my  heart  or  head,  I  can- 
not see  to  be  matter  or  force,  or  any  conceivable  modi- 
fication of  either,  however  intimately  the  manifestations 
of  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  may  be  connected 
with  the  phenomena  known  as  matter  and  force.  In  the 
second  place,  the  arguments  used  by  Descartes  and 
Berkeley  to  show  that  our  certain  knowledge  does  not 
extend  beyond  our  states  of  consciousness  appear  to  me 
as  irrefragable  now  as  they  did  when  I  first  became 
acquainted  with  them  some  half  century  ago.  All  the 
materialistic  writers  I  know  of  who  have  tried  to  bite 
that  file  have  simply  broken  their  teeth.  But,  if  this  is 
true,  our  one  certainty  is  the  existence  of  the  mental 
world,  and  that  of  Kraft  imd  Stoif  falls  into  the  rank  of, 
at  best,  a  highly  probable  hypothesis."^  Accordingly, 
he  testifies,  "If  I  were  forced  to  choose  between  material- 
ism and  idealism  I  should  certainly  elect  for  the  latter."^ 
It  is  to  be  noticed,  further,  that  he  repudiates  the  anti- 

'  Collected  Essays,  VI.  94,  95,  cited  by  Clodd 

*  Essays  upon  Some  Controverted  Questions,  1892,  pp.  171,  172. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  174. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  57 

theistic  dogmatism  largely  characteristic  of  materialism  as 
"not  merely  baseless,  but  impertinent."^  We  seem  to  be 
restrained,  therefore,  from  numbering  Huxley  among 
materialists.  Following  his  own  choice  of  names,  we 
might  call  him  an  agnostic;  but  we  should  have  reason  to 
add  that  for  an  agnostic  he  said  too  much  which  looks 
like  an  assurance  of  the  primacy  of  matter  over  mind. 

In  his  famous  address  at  Belfast  John  Tyndall  used 
words  which  may  be  understood  to  be  a  declaration  of 
materialistic  faith.  The  passage  which  probably  elicited 
most  remark  was  the  following:  "Believing  as  I  do  in 
the  continuity  of  nature,  I  cannot  stop  abruptly  where 
our  microscopes  cease  to  be  of  use.  Here  the  vision  of 
the  mind  authoritatively  supplements  the  vision  of  the 
eye.  By  an  intellectual  necessity  I  cross  the  boundary 
of  the  experimental  evidence,  and  discern  in  that  matter 
which  we,  in  our  own  ignorance  of  its  latent  powers, 
and  notwithstanding  our  professed  reverence  for  its 
Creator,  have  hitherto  covered  with  opprobrium,  the 
promise  and  potency  of  all  terrestrial  life."^  On  the 
other  hand,  Tyndall  strongly  emphasized  the  utter  con- 
trast between  the  physical  and  the  mental.  "The  pas- 
sage," he  says,  "from  the  physics  of  the  brain  to  the  cor- 
responding facts  of  consciousness  is  unthinkable. 
Granted  that  a  definite  thought  and  a  definite  molecular 
action  in  the  brain  occur  simultaneously,  we  do  not  pos- 
sess the  intellectual  organ,  nor  apparently  any  rudiment 
of  the  organ,  which  would  enable  us  to  pass  by  a  process 
of  reasoning  from  the  one  phenomenon  to  the  other."^ 
Again,  he  rated  as  inconceivable  the  notion  that  atoms 
which  individually  are  destitute  of  thought  and  sensa- 


*  Essays  upon  Some  Controverted  Questions,  pp.  26,  27. 

^Address,  revised  edition,  pp.  58,  59. 

^  Cited  by  Romanes  in  Mind,  Motion,  and  Monism,  p.  64. 


58  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

tion  should  by  their  combination  give  thought  and  sen- 
sation.^ Furthermore,  he  intimated  that  he  had  as  Httle 
ambition  as  Huxley  to  espouse  antitheistic  dogmatism. 
Referring  to  the  doctrine  of  "material  atheism,"  he 
added :  "I  have  noticed  during  years  of  self-observation 
that  it  is  not  in  hours  of  clearness  and  vigor  that  this 
doctrine  commends  itself  to  my  mind ;  that  in  the  pres- 
ence of  stronger  and  healthier  thought  it  ever  dissolves 
and  disappears,  as  offering  no  solution  of  the  mystery  in 
which  we  dwell,  and  of  which  we  form  a  part."^  On 
the  whole,  it  appears  that  Tyndall  did  not  hold  a  clear- 
cut  materialistic  creed,  and  was  able  to  view  matter  as 
a  sufficient  source  of  all  terrestrial  life  only  by  putting 
into  matter  a  mystical  and  indefinable  meaning. 

At  the  time  when  he  wrote  his  Candid  Examination 
of  Theism,  G.  J.  Romanes  was  disposed  to  maintain  that 
a  sufficient  explanation  of  everything  in  the  world  may 
be  found  in  the  persistence  of  force  and  the  primary 
qualities  of  matter.  While  not  very  definite,  this 
language  implies  a  certain  affiliation  with  the  material- 
istic point  of  view.  Near  the  close  of  his  life  he  recovered 
his  theistic  faith.  In  his  ultimate  psychological  theory 
he  endeavored  to  combine  the  materialistic  and  the  spirit- 
ualistic points  of  view.  Unhappily,  the  resulting  monism 
took  the  least  credible  of  all  forms,  that  of  an  identifica- 
tion of  physical  and  mental  phenomena.  Defining  the 
chosen  form,  he  said :  "This  theory  is  that  mental  phe- 
nomena and  physical  phenomena,  although  apparently 
diverse,  are  really  identical."^  This  looks  very  much  like 
saying  that  unlike  appearances  are  identical  appearances. 
The  theory  is  staggering  to  the  mind's  power  of  con- 
ception.    As  Professor  Ladd  remarks:  *Tt  is  not  simply 

1  Belfast  Address,  p    38.  ^  Preface  to  Belfast  Address. 

3  Mind,  Motion,  and  Monism,  p.  83. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  59 

true  that  to  identify  these  two  kinds  of  phenomena — 
phenomena  of  the  motion  of  material  atoms  and  phe- 
nomena of  change  in  mental  states — is  difficult  for  the 
average  mind,  but  attainable  by  the  scientific  observer; 
it  is  rather  true  that  no  mind  can  frame  any  intelligible 
idea  of  what  would  be  meant  by  identifying  the  two."^ 
In  the  passage  cited,  Romanes,  by  identifying  physical 
and  mental  phenomena,  seems  to  have  placed  the  two 
upon  a  parity.  It  may  be  noticed,  however,  that  he  some- 
times indulged  in  expressions  which  imply  the  primacy 
of  mind — expressions  that  lie  very  close  to  a  pronounced 
idealism.  "According  to  monism,"  he  observes,  *'all 
matter  in  motion  is  mind;  and,  therefore,  matter  in 
motion  is  merely  the  objective  revelation  to  us  and  for 
us,  of  that  which  in  its  subjective  aspect — or  in  its  ulti- 
mate reality — is  mind.  .  .  .  Everywhere  the  reality  may 
be  psychical,  and  the  physical  symbolic ;  everywhere  mat- 
ter in  motion  may  be  the  outward  and  visible  sign  of 
an  inward  and  spiritual  grace."^  Evidently  the  mind 
from  which  these  sentences  issued  was  not  anchored  in 
materialism. 

Under  the  peculiar  term  "mind-stuff"  Professor  W.  K. 
Clifford  has  been  thought  to  give  harborage  to  material- 
istic suppositions.  As  summarized  by  himself,  his  main 
thoughts  are  these:  "(i)  Matter  is  a  mental  picture  in 
which  mind-stuff  is  the  thing  represented.  (2)  Reason, 
intelligence,  and  volition  are  properties  of  a  complex 
which  is  made  up  of  elements  themselves  not  rational, 
not  intelligent,  not  conscious."^  His  editor,  F.  Pollock, 
interprets  these  statements  as  significant  of  an  idealistic 
monism.    It  is  not  to  be  denied,  however,  that  the  ideal- 


1  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology,  pp.  589,  590. 

2  Mind,  Motion,  and  Monism,  pp.  iii,  114. 

3  Lectures  and  Essays,  second  edition,  p.  286. 


6o  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

ism  which  they  inclose,  if  indeed  the  term  is  applicable, 
is  of  a  special  kind  as  making-  consciousness  and  intelli- 
gence late  and  limited  products  in  the  universe.  As  Pro- 
fessor Clifford  taught,  the  elements  of  the  mind-stuff 
themselves  are  totally  void  of  this  order  of  attributes  or 
activities.  Only  in  connection  with  such  an  organism 
as  the  brain  do  they  have  any  subsistence.  In  the  lack 
of  evidence  of  a  cosmic  or  universal  brain  structure  it 
follows  that  the  theistic  conception  is  unfounded.  So 
Clifford  seems  to  have  concluded,  though  expressing  his 
reverence  for  the  conception  and  his  sense  of  its  great 
practical  worth.  Speaking  of  those  who  have  felt  com- 
pelled to  part  with  the  thought  of  a  personal  God,  he 
said :  "We  have  seen  the  spring  sun  shine  out  of  an  empty 
heaven  to  light  up  a  soulless  earth;  we  have  felt  with 
utter  loneliness  that  the  Great  Companion  is  dead."^  We 
conclude  that,  while  not  formally  materialistic,  Clifford's 
scheme,  in  its  derivation  of  the  conscious  and  intelligent 
from  the  unconscious  and  nonintelligent,  has  a  prominent 
point  of  affiliation  with  materialism.  Romanes  noticed 
the  bearing  of  this  item  both  in  the  teaching  of  Clifford 
and  in  that  of  Herbert  Spencer.  "The  essential  feature 
of  materialism;,"  he  remarked,  "remiains  untouched — 
namely,  that  what  we  know  as  mind  is  dependent 
(whether  by  way  of  causality  or  not  is  immaterial)  on 
highly  complex  forms  of  zvhat  we  know  as  matter,  in 
association  with  highly  peculiar  distributions  of  what  we 
knozv  as  force."^ 

In  passing  from  England  to  Germany  we  enter  a  field 
which  has  witnessed,  on  the  part  of  men  of  standing  in 
science  and  literature,  a  more  explicit  and  unequivocal 
advocacy  of  materialism.     We  find  here,   nevertheless, 


'  Lectures  and  Essays,  p.  389. 

*  A  Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  Supplement,  p.  188. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  6i 

several  prominent  writers  respecting  whom  a  question 
of  classification  may  be  raised.  This  question  applies 
first  of  all  to  Ludwig  Feuerbach.  Stated  in  brief  the 
ascertained  facts  are  these:  The  pronounced  materialists 
in  Germany  in  the  latter  part  of  the  century  recognized 
Feuerbach  as  the  great  oracle  in  philosophy,  and  counted 
him  as  being  in  an  important  sense  their  own  forerunner. 
In  an  early  statement  of  his  standpoint  he  expressed  his 
assent  to  a  leading  postulate  of  sensationalism.  *T 
found  my  ideas,"  he  said,  "on  materials  which  can  be 
appropriated  only  through  the  activity  of  the  senses."^ 
Somewhat  later,  in  reviewing  Moleschott's  Lehre  der 
Nahrungsmittel,  he  penned  these  words:  "Food  be- 
comes blood,  blood  becomes  heart  and  brain,  thoughts 
and  mind-stuff.  Man  is  what  he  eats."^  Such  a  state- 
ment might  very  naturally  be  taken  as  an  explicit  decla- 
ration of  the  most  unqualified  materialism.  Still,  it  is 
to  be  doubted  whether  Feuerbach  would  have  consented 
to  be  classed  as  a  materialist.  His  strong  language  may 
be  in  part  explained  by  his  penchant  for  smart  hyper- 
bolical sayings.  While  he  was  definitely  committed  to 
sensationalism,  he  was  inclined  to  an  agnostic  position 
on  the  nature  of  the  human  spirit.  His  biographers 
represent  him  as  refusing  to  subscribe  formally  either  to 
materialism  or  spiritualism.^  As  will  be  noticed  later, 
his  scheme  may  be  described  as  positivism,  being  quite 
analogous  to  that  of  Comte.  Like  his  French  contem- 
porary, he  had  no  real  use  for  the  notion  of  a  personal 
God. 

In  his  ultimate  confession  of  belief,  as  it  appears  in  his 
book  entitled  The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,  D.  F.  Strauss 


•  The  Essence  of  Christianity,  Preface  to  second  edition. 
'Cited  by  Hoffding,  History  of  Modem  Philosophy,  II.  281. 
'  W.   Bolin,  Ludwig  Feuerbach,    sein  Werken  und  seine  Zeitgenossen, 
1 891;  A.  Levy,  La  Philosophie  de  Feuerbach,  1904. 


62  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

put  himself  in  line  with  Feuerbach  both  in  his  rejection 
of  the  theistic  conception  and  in  his  apparent  sanction 
of  the  materialistic  theory.  Ulrici  has  declared  of  his 
teaching  at  this  stage  that  it  was  nothing  but  "naked 
atheism  and  materialism."^  If  acknowledging  no  God 
besides  an  impersonal  cosmos  stamps  one  as  an  atheist, 
then  certainly  Strauss  earned  that  name.  It  is  also  cer- 
tain that  he  indulged  in  expressions  which  furnish  very 
plausible  grounds  for  classifying  him  as  a  materialist. 
He  pronounced  the  continued  existence  of  the  soul,  after 
the  destruction  of  the  brain,  to  be  as  little  conceivable 
as  the  existence  of  the  center  of  a  circle  after  the  dis- 
solution of  its  circumference.^  He  described  life  as 
"only  a  special,  namely,  the  most  complicated,  kind  of 
mechanics."^  He  intimated  his  conviction  that  the  psy- 
chical may  properly  be  referred  to  a  purely  physical 
source.  Apparently  forgetful  of  the  fact  that  "heat"  is 
a  name  for  a  sensation,  he  asked,  "If,  under  certain  con- 
ditions, motion  is  transformed  into  heat,  why  may  it 
not,  under  other  conditions,  be  transformed  into  sensa- 
tion?"* As  Strauss  himself  admitted  that  his  conclusion 
had  an  appearance  of  "unmitigated  materialism,"  there 
is  little  occasion  to  search  for  qualifying  considerations. 
The  most  that  can  be  said  is  that  he  placed  more  em- 
phasis upon  the  proposition  that  man  in  body  and  soul 
is  of  one  substance  than  upon  the  theory  that  this  sub- 
stance is  definable  in  the  proper  terms  of  matter. 

While  Ernst  Haeckel  is  very  emphatic  in  styling  him- 
self a  "monist"  rather  than  a  materialist,  there  is  good 
reason  for  affirming  that  in  the  quality  of  his  monism 
there  lurks  a  large  amount  of  materialism.    That  is  the 

*  Strauss  as  a  Philosophical  Thinker,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  78. 

2  The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,  sixth  edition,  Eng.  trans.,  pp.  150,  151. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  199. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  240. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  63 

judgment  of  many  German  scholars.  His  claim  that  the 
monism  which  he  represents  is  patterned  after  the  pan- 
theism of  Spinoza  is  not  allowed  to  pass  without  chal- 
lenge. As  Professor  Adickes  observes,  he  replaces  the 
unitary  substance  of  Spinoza  with  an  aggregate,  and  sub- 
stitutes for  the  conception  of  a  parallelism  between  the 
corporeal  and  the  mental  a  doctrine  of  the  dependence 
of  the  latter  upon  the  former.^  He  asserts  in  undis- 
guised terms  almost  every  proposition  which  has  been 
made  a  shibboleth  by  recent  materialism.  At  the  same 
time  it  must  be  admitted  that  his  teaching  includes  some 
elements  that  are  no  necessary  part  of  a  materialistic  sys- 
tem. This  is  especially  true  of  his  hylozoism,  or  sup- 
position that  a  kind  of  soul  belongs  to  each  of  the  atoms 
which  make  up  the  universe.  On  the  whole,  a  recent 
manual  of  the  history  of  philosophy  probably  comes  as 
near  to  a  true  description  as  is  practicable  when  it  styles 
Haeckel's  system  an  "inconsequent  materialism."^  We 
may  therefore  cite  from  him  without  compunction  in  a 
resume  of  materialistic  postulates,  only  reserving  some 
special  features  of  his  thinking  for  notice  under  the  topic 
of  antitheistic  evolutionism. 

By  general  consent  three  writers  belonging  to  the 
middle  and  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  have  been 
classified  as  champions  of  materialism  pure  and  simple. 
These  writers  were  Carl  Vogt,  Jacob  Moleschott,  and 
Ludvvig  Biichner.  A  question  may,  indeed,  be  raised  as 
to  whether  one  or  another  of  them  did  not  ultimately 
make  some  revision  of  his  materialistic  creed ;  but  in  case 
of  all  of  them  that  which  most  prominently  calls  atten- 
tion to  their  names  is  the  fact  of  their  outspoken  advocacy 


1  Kant  contra  Haeckel,  Erkenntnistheorie  gegen  natiirwissenschaftlichen 
Dogmatismus. 

^  Vorlander,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  II.  438. 


64  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

of  an  unmitigated  materialism.  Among  contemporaries 
in  Germany  who  approximated  to  their  platform  were 
Heinrich  Czolbe,  J.  C.  Fischer,  and  Eduard  Lowenthal. 

In  France  materialism  has  had  its  representatives  dur- 
ing the  last  century,  but  they  can  hardly  be  said  to  have 
vied  in  reputation  with  their  predecessors  of  the  pre- 
ceding century,  such  as  La  Mettrie  and  Baron  d'Hol- 
bach.  Cabanis,  who  wrote  in  the  last  years  of  the 
eighteenth  century  and  the  first  of  the  nineteenth,  used 
some  very  ultra  materialistic  phraseology  in  repre- 
senting thought  as  a  secretion  of  the  brain^ ;  but  his  con- 
sistent committal  to  the  materialistic  creed  has  been 
questioned. 

In  both  Germany  and  France  materialism  has  had  con- 
siderable currency  in  the  ranks  of  advanced  socialists. 
This  currency,  however,  cannot  be  taken  as  a  measure  of 
well-rooted  conviction.  Evidently  antipathy  to  an  estab- 
lished regime,  which  is  thought  to  owe  its  life  very  largely 
to  religious  ideas  and  traditions,  has  helped  to  commend 
the  materialistic  system  as  appearing  to  be  the  negation 
of  religion. 

IV. — Cardinal  Conclusions  of  Materialism 

Four  main  conclusions  are  characteristic  of  the  ma- 
terialism of  recent  times.  In  the  first  place,  it  denies 
the  substantial  existence  of  mind,  and  describes  all  mental 
activities — thoughts,  feelings,  volitions — as  products  or 
functions  of  the  material  organism.  On  this  point  Vogt 
reproduces,  not  to  say  aggravates,  the  crude  representa- 
tion of  Cabanis.  "In  my  opinion,"  he  says,  "every  investi- 
gator of  nature  will,  in  the  use  of  consistent  thinking, 
come  to  the  view  that  all  those  capabilities  which  we 
include  under  the  name  of  activities  of  soul  are  simply 


1  Ueberweg,  History  of  Philosophy,  II.  339. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  65 

functions  of  the  brain  substance,  or,  to  employ  a  some- 
what rude  expression,  that  thoughts  stand  in  the  same 
relation  to  the  brain  as  gall  to  the  liver  or  urine  to  the 
kidneys."^  Moleschott  affirms  that  in  the  "strictest 
sense"  the  brain  is  the  instrument  or  organ  of  thought. 
Taken  according  to  his  meaning,  Vogt,  he  maintains, 
was  entirely  justified  in  employing  the  figure  which  he 
did.  "Thought  is  a  movement,  a  transposition  of  brain 
substance"  (eine  Umsetzung  des  Hirnstoffs).^  Biichner 
adrrtits  that  Vogt's  illustration  was  badly  chosen,  as 
seeming  to  imply  that  thoughts  are  a  palpable  stuff ;  but 
of  the  absolute  dependence  of  the  mind  upon  the  physical 
organism  he  makes  no  question.  "The  brain,"  he  says, 
"is  bearer  and  generator,  or,  better  said,  sole  cause  of 
thought.  .  .  .  Psychical  activity  is  a  function  of  the  brain 
substance."^  Haeckel  shows  very  distinctly  his  judgment 
on  the  ontological  subordination  of  the  mental  to  the 
physical  by  repeated  references  to  psychology  as  a  branch 
of  physiology.^  More  specifically  he  asserts  the  same 
judgment  in  such  declarations  as  the  following:  "Con- 
sciousness, like  feeling  and  willing,  among  the  higher 
animals  is  a  mechanical  work  of  ganglion  cells,  and  as 
such  must  be  carried  back  to  chemical  and  physical  events 
in  the  plasma  of  these."^  "We  now  know  that  the  flame 
is  a  sum  of  electric  vibrations  of  the  ether,  and  the  soul 
a  sum  of  plasma  movements  in  the  ganglion  cells."*^  "The 
'soul'  is  merely  a  collective  title  for  the  sum  total  of  man's 
cerebral  functions;  and  these  are  just  as  much  determined 
by  physical  and  chemical  processes  as  are  any  of  the  other 


1  Physiologische  Briefe  fiir  Gebildete  aller  Stande,  pp.  323-325. 

*  Der  Kreislauf  des  Lebens,  second  edition,  pp.  385,  418,  419. 
'  Kraft  und  Stofif,  tenth  edition,  pp.  146,  150. 

■*  Monism  as  Connecting  Science  and  Religion,  trans,  by  Gilchrist,  p.  42; 
The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  trans,  by  McCabe,  p.  88 ;  The  Wonders  of  Life, 
trans   by  McCabe,  p.  18. 

*  Monism,  p.  47.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  113. 


66  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

vital  functions,  and  just  as  amenable  to  the  law  of  sub- 
stance."^ 

A  second  characteristic  conclusion  of  materialism  is  the 
groundlessness  of  the  notion  of  freedom.  Following  the 
obvious  demands  of  the  theory  of  the  mechanical  deter- 
mination of  all  events  in  the  universe,,  it  scouts  the  notion 
of  any  possible  option  as  to  human  conduct.  "Man," 
says  Moleschott,  "is  the  sum  of  parents  and  nurse,  of 
place  and  time,  of  pleasure  and  weather,  of  sound  and 
light,  of  food  and  clothing.  His  will  is  the  necessary 
result  of  all  these  causes,  bound  to  a  law  of  nature,  like 
the  planet  to  its  course,  like  the  plant  to  the  soil."^  In 
very  similar  terms  Biichner  defines  man  as  a  product  of 
"outward  and  inward  workings,"  a  being  that  is  subject 
to  the  same  law  which  rules  plant  and  beast.^  For 
Haeckel  the  doctrine  of  freedom  ranks  as  an  obsolete 
fiction.  "The  freedom  of  the  will,"  he  says,  "is  not  an 
object  for  critical  scientific  inquiry  at  all,  for  it  is  a  pure 
dogma,  based  on  an  illusion,  and  has  no  real  existence."* 

A  third  main  conclusion  of  recent  materialism  is  the 
necessary  repudiation  of  the  doctrine  of  man's  immor- 
tality. The  indispensableness  of  the  physical  organism 
to  mental  activities  involves,  it  claims,  the  certainty  that 
the  dissolution  of  the  body  results  in  the  total  cessation 
of  personal  existence.  "Physiology  pronounces,"  says 
Vogt,  "definitely  and  categorically  against  an  individual 
immortality."^  Biichner  approves  this  statement  of 
Vogt,  and  says,  "Not  conviction  but  mere  selfish  caprice, 
not  science  but  mere  faith,  can  support  the  idea  of  con- 
tinued personal  existence."®     Haeckel  contends  that  the 


1  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  p.  204;  compare  Wonders  of  Life,  p.  23. 
*  Der  Kreislauf  des  Lebens,  p.  436.  ^  Kraft  und  Stoff,  p.  260. 

"The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  p.  15. 
^  Physiologische  Briefe,  p.  634.  «  Kraft  und  Stoff,  p.  210. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND   MATERIALISM  (>7 

advance  of  science  in  the  last  sixty  years  has  rendered  the 
notion  of  personal  immortality  inexcusable.^  That  no- 
tion, he  says,  marks  "the  highest  point  of  superstition," 
and  is  in  "hopeless  contradiction  with  the  most  solid  em- 
pirical truths  of  modern  science."^ 

The  fourth  conclusion  of  recent  materialism  gives  ex- 
pression to  its  antitheistic  position.  With  the  same  con- 
fidence with  which  it  vetoes  man's  freedom  and  immor- 
tality it  puts  under  ban  the  thought  of  a  personal  God. 
There  is  no  occasion,  it  assumes,  to  postulate  an  almighty 
designer  of  the  universe,  since  the  universe  reveals  no 
design.  All  changes  take  place  with  unfailing  necessity 
under  the  control  of  the  eternal  laws  immanent  in  the 
eternal  matter.  A  personal  agent  in  connection  with  the 
world-process  would  be  a  superfluity  and  an  impertinence. 
To  identify  the  fixed  laws  of  nature,  says  Biichner,  with 
the  workings  of  an  eternal  reason  will  not  answer. 
"Either  the  laws  of  nature  rule,  or  the  eternal  reason 
rules;  the  two  must  come  into  conflict  every  instant"^ — 
a  statement  which  certainly  is  very  disparaging  either  to 
reason  or  to  nature,  and  leads  one  to  inquire  what 
Biichner  could  have  meant  by  speaking  as  though  man 
might  properly  felicitate  himself  on  being  a  child  of 
nature.^  In  the  view  of  Haeckel  the  conception  of  a 
personal  God  is  so  clearly  untenable  that  it  is  scarcely  a 
matter  for  discussion.  Speaking  of  monistic  science  as 
interpreted  by  himself,  he  says:  "It  marks  the  highest 
intellectual  progress,  in  that  it  definitely  rules  out  the 
three  central  dogmas  of  metaphysics — God,  freedom,  and 
immortality."^  Again  he  remarks :  "Our  clear  modern 
insight  into  the  regularity  and  causative  character  of 


^Monism,  pp.  54,  55.  '  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  pp.  188,  210. 

3  Kraft  und  StofI,  p.  42.  ^  Ibid.,  eighth  edition,  Preface. 

*The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  p.  232. 


68  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

natural  processes,  and  especially  our  knowledge  of  the 
universal  reign  of  the  law  of  substance  are  inconsistent 
with  a  belief  in  a  personal  God,  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  and  the  freedom  of  the  will."^ 

From  these  four  main  conclusions  of  materialism  vari- 
ous inferences  obviously  follow,  such  as  the  complete 
nullity  of  all  supposed  miracles  and  revelations,  and  the 
vanity  of  the  notion  that  man  is  in  any  sense  the  end  to 
which  the  terrestrial  system  is  directed.  The  last  of  these 
inferences  is  strongly  emphasized  by  Haeckel.  Indeed, 
his  despite  toward  the  anthropocentric  conception  of  the 
world  is  of  a  piece  with  his  antipathy  against  the  notions 
of  God,  freedom,  and  immortality.  "The  ridiculous  im- 
perial folly  of  Caligula,"  he  says,  "is  but  a  special  form 
of  man's  arrogant  assumption  of  divinity."^ 

A  very  striking  feature  of  the  German  school  of  ma- 
terialists is  the  satisfaction  which  they  seem  to  take  in 
their  negation  of  God  and  of  man  as  he  is  represented  in 
Christian  thought.  Here  they  stand  in  broad  contrast 
with  the  English  scholars  to  whom  reference  has  been 
made.  When  Romanes  felt  obliged  to  admit  that  the 
evidences  for  theism  had  been  rendered  inconclusive  to 
his  mind  he  confessed  that  for  him  the  universe  had  lost 
its  "soul  of  loveliness,"  and  spoke  of  "the  appalling  con- 
trast between  the  hallowed  glory  of  the  creed"  which 
once  was  his  and  "the  lonely  mystery  of  existence"  to 
which  he  had  been  consigned  by  its  departure.  Words  of 
similar  import  are  on  record  from  Clifford.  On  the  other 
hand,  not  one  of  the  writers  with  whom  we  have  been 
dealing  in  this  connection,  so  far  as  we  have  been  able 
to  discover,  ever  expressed  a  regret  for  the  necessity  of 
believing  in  an  aimless,  godless  world,  in  the  blotting  out 


1  Wonders  of  Life,  p-  67. 

2  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  p.  14;  compare  Monism,  pp.  13-15. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  69, 

of  the  individual  souls  of  men,  and  in  the  prospective 
extinction  of  humanity  as  a  race.  The  complacency  with 
which  they  have  held  their  barren  and  dismal  creed  and 
their  eagerness  to  bear  down  a  competing  faith  suggest 
that  they  must  have  gravitated  unconsciously  into  a  con- 
dition of  scientific,  or  rather  unscientific,  fanaticism. 

V. — Shortcomings  of  the  Materialistic  Theory 

A  very  poor  opinion  of  the  merits  of  materialism  is 
derived  from  a  review  of  its  constituency.  The  list  of  its 
outspoken  advocates  among  recent  scholars  who  have 
any  considerable  reputation  is  by  no  means  formidable. 
Even  those  who  have  affiliated  more  or  less  closely  with 
materialistic  theories  have  quite  generally  preferred  not 
to  dress  up  their  thoughts  in  the  plain  garb  of  material- 
ism, and  have  sought  for  them  a  more  seemly  costume  in 
the  wardrobes  of  monism  and  agnosticism.  Their  quest 
for  an  improved  terminology  may  be  taken  as  a  sign  of  an 
underlying  consciousness  that,  philosophically,  material- 
ism takes  a  low  rank.  And  there  is  good  reason  for  this 
order  of  consciousness.  Notwithstanding  the  wide  cir- 
culation of  the  popular  works  of  Biichner  and  Haeckel, 
the  general  verdict  of  contemporary  philosophy  in  Ger- 
many, as  well  as  elsewhere,  is  decidedly  hostile  to  the 
materialistic  platform.  As  is  stated  in  a  recent  history 
of  philosophy,  "the  Neo-Kantian  movement  in  all  its 
forms,  with  its  earnest  work  upon  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge, has  had  the  result  of  rendering  the  superficial  meta- 
physics of  materialism  evidently  inadequate  and  impos- 
sible."^ That  this  is  a  true  description  of  the  trend  of 
philosophical  conviction  is  indicated  by  the  words  of 
Haeckel.    In  bitterness  of  spirit  over  the  undeniable  facts 

iWindelband,  History  of  Philosophy,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  643;  compare  Sie 
bert,  Geschichte  der  neueren  deutschen  Philosophic  seit  Hegel,  p.  477. 


70  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

he  remarks:  "Most  of  the  representatives  of  philosophy 
at  the  universities  are  narrow  metaphysicians  and  ideal- 
ists, who  think  more  of  the  fiction  of  the  'intelligible 
world'  than  of  the  truth  of  the  world  of  sense."^  Not 
less  significantly  he  confesses  that  he  stands  with  a 
minority  even  of  physiologists  on  a  question  of  capital 
importance.  "Most  physiologists,"  he  says,  "share  the 
view  of  Dubois-Reymond,  that  consciousness  is  not  a 
natural  phenomenon,  but  a  hyperphysical  problem." 
This  point  of  view,  he  adds,  is  naturally  very  agreeable 
to  the  prevalent  metaphysics.^  In  view  of  such  a  pro- 
nounced disparity  between  the  advocates  of  materialistic 
and  of  anti-materialistic  philosophy  one  might  almost 
suspect  that  the  vociferous  champions  of  the  former  are 
shouting  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  up  their  courage. 
Even  the  casual  reader  of  the  materialistic  treatises  cannot 
fail  to  discover  reasons  why  they  receive  so  little  notice 
from  men  of  eminence  in  philosophical  circles.  They 
abound  in  dogmatic  assertions,  but  scarcely  touch  the 
deeper  problems  of  metaphysical  inquiry.  You  will  find 
in  them,  for  instance,  the  assumption  of  the  infinitude 
of  the  world,  but  when  you  ask  for  the  proof  not  so  much 
as  a  first  installment  is  discoverable.  You  will  encounter 
the  most  positive  affirmation  of  the  objective  reality  of 
space  and  time,  but  you  will  look  in  vain  for  any  serious 
attempt  to  justify  the  affirmation.  You  will  meet  the 
unqualified  declaration  that  science  cannot  admat  the 
notion  of  a  personal  God,  but  when  you  inquire  for  the 
grounds  of  so  confident  an  assertion  you  find  nothing 
better  than  the  supposed  demands  of  a  disputable  definition 
of  substance,  or  the  flimsy  assumption  that  a  personal 
will  is  incompatible  with  a  system  of  laws;  and  if  the 
more  serious  consideration  of  the  incongruities  in  the 

^Wonders  of  Life,  p.  71.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  289,  290. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND   MATERIALISM  71 

world  system  is  brought  forward,  the  right  to  use  it  is 
seen  to  be  voided  by  the  endeavor,  which  appears  in  one 
connection  or  another,  to  present  the  world  as  an  object 
of  trust  and  reverence.  In  short,  while  Professor  Adickes 
may  not  have  been  over  observant  of  the  demands  of 
polite  discourse  when  he  said  of  Buchner  and  Haeckel, 
"als  Philosophen  sind  beide  Nullen,"^  he  can  hardly  be 
accused  of  sinful  exaggeration. 

An  easy-going  assumption,  which  is  specially  charac- 
teristic of  Haeckel,  appears  in  emphatic  declarations  that 
recent  science,  especially  in  the  line  of  microscopic  inves- 
tigation, has  profoundly  modified  the  basis  of  psycholog- 
ical theory,  so  that  the  spiritualistic  conception  has  no 
longer  a  standing-ground  against  the  materialistic. 
What  now  are  the  facts?  What  discoveries  have  been 
made  which  require  a  radical  transformation  of  psycho- 
logical theory?  A  more  minute  knowledge  may  have 
been  gained  of  the  outward  manifestations  of  the  body 
in  its  embryological  beginnings.  A  clearer  understand- 
ing of  brain  structure  and  a  more  detailed  acquaintance 
with  the  capacities  of  movement  in  the  brain  substance 
may  have  been  attained.  But  what  is  there  in  all  this  of 
revolutionary  import?  Was  it  unknown  prior  to  the  last 
two  generations  that  man's  bodily  life  began  at  an  in- 
finitesimal point?  Was  the  truth  utterly  hidden  sixty 
years  ago  that  in  his  present  embodied  state  man's  mental 
life  is  intimately  connected  with  the  body,  and  especially 
with  the  brain  ?  What,  then,  has  the  microscope  done  in 
the  hands  of  modern  scientists?  It  has  simply  furnished 
the  ground  for  the  specification  of  certain  details  within 
the  lines  of  long-admitted  facts.  Microscopic  inspection, 
whether  of  the  embryo  or  of  the  brain,  never  discovers 
the  psychical,  and  never  can.    The  only  sphere  in  which 

•  Kant  contra  Haeckel,  p.  2. 


72  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

the  psychical  comes  to  true  revelation  is  the  sphere  of 
consciousness.  Sense-perception,  however  aided  by  me- 
chanical appliances,  can  never  apprehend  aught  besides 
masses  and  movements,  to  which  mental  significance  can 
be  given  only  by  reference  to  experiences  of  the  conscious 
thinking  subject.  Progress  in  physiological  investigation 
is  doubtless  something  to  be  thankful  for ;  but  it  is  simply 
a  bad  case  of  illusion  which  is  presented  when  one  sup- 
poses that  the  data  of  recent  physiological  research  can. 
be  used  to  settle  the  fundamental  questions  of  psy- 
chology. 

Coming  now  to  a  closer  consideration  of  the  shortcom- 
ings of  materialism,  we  notice  in  the  first  place  that  it 
commits  a  palpable  fault  in  judging  the  near  and  the 
known  by  the  remote  and  relatively  unknown.  First- 
hand knowledge  is  confined  to  the  content  of  conscious- 
ness, to  the  mind  in  its  concrete  states  or  modifications. 
Everything  beyond  this  range  is  reached  only  by  infer- 
ence. The  inference  to  the  material  environment  may  be 
very  direct  and  spontaneous,  but  it  is  conditioned,  never- 
theless, upon  antecedents  in  the  conscious  subject,  who 
knows  his  own  modifications  first  of  all,  and  accounts  for 
some  of  them  by  reference  to  an  outside  reality.  Now, 
what  sort  of  a  procedure  is  it  to  bring  in  this  relatively 
remote  and  inferred  outside  reality  to  the  virtual  or  for- 
mal negation  of  the  conscious  subject?  The  incongruity 
into  which  materialistic  theory  runs  at  this  point  is  glar- 
ing and  unmistakable.  "Let  it  be  assumed,"  says  Pro- 
fessor Ladd,  "that  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  have 
no  real  subject  in  the  mind.  Such  phenomena  must,  ac- 
cordingly, be  attributed  to  the  peculiarly  constituted  and 
mutually  interacting  molecules  of  the  brain.  But  these 
supreme  physical  beings  are  themselves,  so  far  as  they  are 
the  object  of  knowledge,  preeminently  mental  creations ; 


SENSATIONALISM  AND   MATERIALISM  73 

and  the  sole  warrant  for  carrying  them  over  into  the  realm 
of  extramental  reality  consists  in  certain  irresistible  con- 
victions or  assumptions  of  mind.  To  make  their  real 
being  the  account  of  the  mental  phenomena,  and  thus  to 
deny  the  real  being  of  the  subject  of  mental  phenomena, 
is  not  only  to  explain  what  is  most  direct  and  certain  by 
what  is  most  indirect  and  uncertain ;  it  even  involves  the 
wonderful  paradox  that  the  one  being  in  whose  active 
energizing  all  conceptions  of  all  real  being  arise  feels  justi- 
fied in  denying  its  own  reality  in  the  supposed  favor  of 
certain  of  its  most  remote  and  doubtful  conceptions."^ 
As  Huxley  remarked,  the  attempt  of  the  materialist  to 
bite  this  file  is  quite  certain  to  be  repaid  with  broken 
teeth. 

In  the  second  place,  materialistic  theory  fails  decidedly 
to  give  any  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  unity  and 
continuity  of  the  mental  life.  That  life  in  its  oneness  and 
persistence  requires  a  unitary  subject.  Such  a  subject  is 
not  supplied  by  the  material  organism,  as  being  an  aggre- 
gate of  separable  and  inconstant  parts.  One  may,  indeed, 
imagine  the  parts  to  act  together  to  produce  a  general 
effect,  but  this  effect  could  not  be  regarded  as  anything 
else  than  a  sum,  not  a  real  unity,  save  as  it  is  seen  to  be 
the  state  or  modification  of  a  unitary  being.  And  then, 
too,  how  is  the  effect  in  question  to  be  united  with  ante- 
cedent effects,  and  all  be  recognized  as  experiences  of  the 
same  subject?  Surely  a  mere  aggregate  of  molecules, 
which  are  in  perpetual  flux,  ought  not  to  be  thought  of  as 
working  such  a  miracle.  Even  if  we  suppose  the  incom- 
ing molecules  to  be  in  like  position  with  their  antecedents, 
and  to  be  subject  to  similar  vibrations,  we  have  done  next 
to  nothing  toward  explaining  the  continued  identity  of 
the  conscious  subject.     Mere  similarity  does  not  consti- 

*  Physiological  Psychology,  p.  677. 


74  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

tute  identity,  any  more  than  the  agreement  of  two  minds 
in  their  thoughts  makes  them  the  same  mind.  The  uni- 
tary persistent  subject  alone  is  adequate  to  explain  the 
facts  of  unity  of  consciousness  and  continuous  personal 
identity.  That  the  assumption  of  such  a  subject  does  not 
provide  full  insight  into  the  problem  of  unity  and  identity 
may  be  granted.  It  is,  however,  an  immense  advantage 
to  have  a  subject  which  by  supposition  is  not  an  aggregate 
of  separable  and  fugitive  parts,  as  opposed  to  a  subject 
which  is  understood  to  be  of  that  order. 

Again,  materialistic  theory  sins  against  the  law  of 
causality  in  deriving  the  higher  from  the  lower.  It  re- 
quires us  to  suppose  that  the  unfeeling  generates  the 
emotional,  the  unconscious  the  conscious,  the  nonintelli- 
gent  the  intelligent,  and  that  something  which  is  without 
recognition  of  itself  either  as  past  or  present  gives  origin 
to  memory.  Materialists  pride  themselves  on  their  strict 
deference  to  the  principle  of  causality;  but  how  is  that 
principle  respected  in  a  scheme  which  thus  makes  results 
to  transcend  so  immeasurably  their  assumed  causes?  A 
spiritual  power  being  supposed,  to  which  emotion,  con- 
sciousness, intelligence,  and  memory  belong  as  native 
capacities,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  in  the  specific  exer- 
cise of  these  capacities  this  power  should  be  influenced  by 
adjacent  matter.  But  to  attribute  to  matter  the  origina- 
tion of  the  spiritual  power  itself,  with  all  its  qualitative 
superiority,  Involves  a  distinct  violation  of  the  principle 
of  sufficient  cause,  unless  the  term  "matter"  is  arbitrarily 
made  to  cover  what  belongs  under  the  category  of  mind  or 
spirit.^ 

Furthermore,  materialistic  theory  is  chargeable  with 
being  entangled  in  this  dilemma:  either  it  must  collide 
with  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  or  it  must 

1  Compare  Flint,  Anti-Theistic  Theories,  pp.  140-145. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND   MATERIALISM  75 

pronounce  the  entire  mental  content  a  counterfeit  of  real- 
ity, a  perfectly  empty  and  powerless  phenomenon.  If 
the  mental  content  is  simply  the  product  of  physical 
energy,  or  of  matter  in  motion,  then  in  the  act  of  produc- 
tion a  portion  of  the  latter  must  pass  over  to  the  former, 
and  so  take  on  a  form  which  is  incapable  of  being  de- 
scribed in  physical  terms  and  cannot  consistently  be  sup- 
posed to  fulfill  physical  functions.  The  physical  energy 
in  question  must  thus  be  regarded  as  having  escaped  from 
its  proper  circle  or  as  lost.  If  this  breach  of  the  law  of  the 
conservation  of  energy  is  not  accepted,  then  the  other 
alternative  must  be  taken,  and  the  conclusion  drawn  that 
physical  energy  in  producing  the  mental  has  produced 
nothing  real,  the  mental  being  as  empty  as  the  shadow 
which  accompanies  the  moving  train,  and  having  as  little 
function  in  determining  aught  in  the  world.  But  what  less 
is  this  than  the  turning  of  human  experience  in  its  en- 
tirety into  mockery  and  illusion?  If  feelings,  ideas, 
hopes,  aspirations,  and  purposes  are  not  veritable  powers 
in  the  world,  then  men  are  under  the  hopeless  dominion 
of  the  purely  phantasmal. 

Once  more,  materialism  involves  sheer  fatalism  with 
all  its  baneful  consequences.  It  assumes  that  everything 
in  the  mental  range  is  in  the  clutches  of  the  same  inexor- 
able laws  which  rule  the  physical  realm.  No  man  has 
any  more  power  to  determine  his  own  conduct  than  has 
the  piece  of  wood  cast  upon  the  sea  to  select  its  own 
course.  The  morally  evil  has  the  same  right  in  the  world 
as  the  morally  good,  having  come  in  by  the  same  com- 
pulsion of  absolute  necessity.  The  rankest  pessimism 
has  at  least  an  equal  claim  with  optimism,  for  there  is, 
according  to  the  materialistic  scheme,  no  wise  or  benevo- 
lent will  back  of  things  to  guarantee  a  worthy  outcome; 
and  who  can  tell  what  blind  necessity  will  effect  in  the 


Tfi  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

course  of  the  ages  ?  For  a  stanch  materiahst  to  be  with- 
out hope,  as  well  as  without  God  in  the  world,  must  be 
regarded  as  perfectly  in  order. 

As  has  been  noticed,  outspoken  materialism  distinctly 
renounces  the  hope  of  immortality.  In  doing  this  it  places 
much  emphasis  on  the  assumption  that  modern  biology 
has  outlawed  faith  in  a  future  conscious  existence  of  the 
individual.  The  assumption  is  baseless.  Modem  biology 
has  not  appreciably  changed  the  conditions  of  faith  in  im- 
mortality. If,  on  the  one  hand,  it  has  enlarged  the  circle 
of  detailed  observation  of  the  dependence  of  psychical 
experience  on  the  physical  organism,  on  the  other  hand  it 
has  enlarged  the  scope  of  observed  dependence  of  physical 
processes  on  psychical  activity.  The  balance  has  not 
turned  against  the  psychical  factor.  And  since  all  the 
objections  to  construing  this  factor  as  a  mere  function  of 
a  material  organism  remain  in  full  force.  Christian  faith 
is  as  free  as  ever  it  was  to  found  on  the  existence  of  a 
personal  God,  conceived  as  universal  Father,  an  assurance 
of  immortality.  Where  this  great  theistic  postulate  is 
firmly  grasped  that  assurance  has  also  a  firm  tenure.  As 
has  been  well  remarked,  "The  hope  of  immortality  for 
the  individual  is  a  hope  in  God  as  perfect  Ethical  Spirit, 
regnant  over  all  life  in  every  stage  and  form  of  its  mani- 
festation,"* 

The  above  exposition  has  indicated  that  materialism 
is  quite  apt  to  take  refuge  under  the  name  of  "monism." 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed,  however,  that  monism  is  neces- 
sarily in  affiliation  with  materialism.  A  spiritualistic  mon- 
ism, or  a  doctrine  which  makes  spirit  the  one  substance, 
is  quite  as  possible  as  a  materialistic  or  agnostic  monism. 
In  our  view  the  only  tolerable  monism  is  that  which 
makes  infinite  Spirit  the  ultimate  reality,  and   regards 

1  G.  T.  Ladd,  Philosophy  of  Rehgion.  II.  537. 


SENSATIONALISM  AND   MATERIALISM  -77 

matter  and  finite  spirits  as  diverse  forms  or  products 
of  his  energizing,  having  in  him  their  constant  source, 
and  also  in  him  their  uniting  bond.  Materiahstic  mon- 
ism is  rationally  excluded,  and  an  agnostic  monism  is 
likely  to  suffer  mortal  pangs  in  its  attempt  to  avoid  a 
virtual  affirmation  of  either  materialism  or  spiritualism. 


CHAPTER  III 

POSITIVISM 

I. — The  Positivism  of  Comte 

The  era  of  positivism,  so  far  as  it  may  be  considered 
to  have  been  marked  by  the  Hterary  activity  of  Comte, 
fell  between  the  years  1824  and  1857.  As  might  be  in- 
ferred from  these  limits,  positivism  received  an  incentive 
from  the  absorbing  interest  which  began  to  be  taken  in 
the  natural  sciences  in  the  second  quarter  of  the  last  cen- 
tury. But  perhaps  a  more  potent  cause  of  its  origin  may 
be  found  in  the  social  ideals  which  were  inherited  from 
the  French  Revolution.  As  a  result  of  that  great  crisis 
there  was  begotten  in  not  a  few  minds  an  enthusiastic 
confidence  in  the  possibility  of  making  over  society 
according  to  new  and  improved  patterns.  Comte  shared 
largely  in  this  confidence.  His  early  association  with 
Saint  Simon  was  indicative  of  his  bent;  and,  though  he 
came  to  speak  disparagingly  of  the  scheme  of  this  social- 
istic leader,  he  ever  regarded  the  working  out  of  a  social 
ideal  as  the  supreme  end  to  be  achieved. 

In  the  view  of  Comte  the  great  excellence  of  positivism 
consists  in  its  being  the  one  system  which  observes  nor- 
mal philosophical  method.  It  builds,  not  upon  unfounded 
assumptions,  but  upon  observed  facts.  Eschewing  all 
metaphysical  speculations,  and  recognizing  the  insuper- 
able limits  of  human  knowledge,  it  confines  itself  to 
the  study  of  phenomena  and  to  such  inductions  as  this 
study  may  warrant.  Its  domain  is  the  relative.  As 
John  Stuart  Mill  observes,  "We  have,  according  to 
Comte,  no  knowledge  of  anything  but  phenomena,  and 

78 


POSITIVISM  79 

our  knowledge  of  phenomena  is  relative,  not  absolute. 
We  know  not  the  essence  nor  the  real  mode  of  production 
of  any  fact,  but  only  its  relation  to  other  facts  in  the  way 
of  succession  or  of  similitude.  These  relations  are  con- 
stant, that  is,  always  the  same  in  the  same  circumstances. 
The  constant  resemblances  which  link  phenomena  to- 
gether, and  the  constant  sequences  which  unite  them  as 
antecedent  and  consequent,  are  termed  their  laws.  The 
laws  of  phenomena  are  all  we  know  respecting  them. 
Their  essential  nature  and  their  ultimate  causes,  either 
efficient  or  final,  are  unknown  and  inscrutable  to  us."^ 
In  dealing  with  the  laws  of  phenomena  the  positive 
philosophy  endeavors  to  reduce  them  to  the  least  possible 
number.^ 

Cognition  of  phenomena  takes  place,  Comte  contends, 
through  the  instrumentality  of  the  senses.  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  a  first-hand  knowledge  of  psychical  facts, 
at  least  of  those  in  the  intellectual  order  as  distingnished 
from  the  emotional  or  moral  order.  Discovery  by  intro- 
spection is  out  of  the  question.  We  can  study,  to  some 
extent,  the  physiological  basis  of  our  mental  operations, 
and  we  can  find  grounds  of  inference  in  the  tokens  of 
mental  operations  which  are  on  exhibition  in  the  history 
of  the  race;  but  we  have  no  means  of  directly  observing 
our  mental  content  or  activities.  Psychology,  so  far  as 
based  on  an  assumed  capability  of  introspection,  is  pure 
illusion.^  On  the  other  hand,  phrenology  has  genuine 
claims  to  consideration,  and  Gall,  though  his  scheme 
needs  revision,  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  precursor  of  posi- 
tivism.'* In  this  stress  upon  sense  perceptions  as  the 
channel  of  authentic  information  Comte  seems  to  come 


1  The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte,  pp.  7,  8 

^  Comte,  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive,  I.  12. 

Mbid.,  I.  28-30. 

*  Catechism  of  the  Positive  Religion,  Eng.  trans.,  pp.  252-254. 


8o  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

very  close  to  the  platform  of  the  sensational  psycholo^. 
Still  he  does  not  commit  himself  distinctly  to  that  plat- 
form, as  may  be  concluded  from  his  reference  to  the  sup- 
plementary phrase,  "except  the  mind  itself,"  which 
Leibnitz  added  to  the  maxim,  "There  is  nothing  in  the 
understanding  which  was  not  previously  in  the  senses."^ 
As  for  the  claims  of  materialism,  Comte  was  not  inclined 
to  concede  to  them  any  formal  recognition.^  On  the 
whole,  his  system  in  relation  to  psychological  theory  may 
be  described  as  a  kind  of  halting  sensationalism  and  a 
naive  empiricism  which  accepted  the  testimony  of  the 
senses  at  full  worth  without  making  any  serious  effort 
to  scrutinize  the  grounds  of  that  acceptance. 

In  commending  his  theory  of  philosophical  method 
Comte  appealed  in  particular  to  an  historical  attestation, 
namely,  to  the  fact  that  men's  conceptions,  or  ways  of 
thinking  about  things,  pass  through  three  great  stages, 
of  which  the  last  is  the  positive.  "The  human  spirit," 
he  says,  "by  its  nature,  employs  successively  in  each  of  its 
researches  three  methods  of  philosophizing  essentially 
different  in  character  and  radically  opposed :  first  the 
theological  method,  then  the  metaphysical  method,  and 
finally  the  positive  method.  Consequently  we  have  three 
kinds  of  philosophy  or  general  systems  of  conceptions 
respecting  the  totality  of  phenomena,  systems  which  are 
mutually  exclusive :  the  first  is  the  necessary  point  of 
departure  of  the  human  intelligence ;  the  third  is  its  fixed 
and  definite  state;  the  second  is  solely  destined  to  serve 
as  a  means  of  transition.  In  the  theological  stage  the 
human  spirit,  essentially  directing  its  researches  toward 
the  interior  nature  of  beings,  the  first  and  final  cause  of 
all  effects  by  which  it  is  impressed — in  a  word,  toward 


*  System  of  Positive  Polity,  Eng.  trans.,  III.  15. 

*  Ibid.,  I.  39-41;  Catechism,  p,  161. 


POSITIVISM  8i 

the  field  of  absolute  knowledge — represents  phenomena 
as  produced  by  the  direct  and  continuous  action  of  super- 
natural agents,  more  or  less  numerous,  whose  arbitrary 
intervention  explains  all  the  anomalous  appearances  of 
the  universe.  In  the  metaphysical  stage,  which  is  at 
bottom  only  a  general  modification  of  the  first,  the  super- 
natural agents  are  replaced  by  abstract  forces,  true 
entities  (abstractions  personified)  inherent  in  the  differ- 
ent beings  of  the  world,  and  conceived  as  capable  of 
engendering  by  themselves  all  the  observed  phenomena, 
the  explanation  of  which  consists,  then,  in  assigning  to 
each  the  corresponding  entity.  Finally,  in  the  positive 
stage,  the  human  spirit,  recognizing  the  impossibility  of 
obtaining  absolute  notions,  renounces  the  search  for  the 
origin  and  destination  of  the  universe  and  for  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  interior  causes  of  phenomena,  in  order  to 
attach  itself  solely  to  the  discovery,  by  a  suitable  combina- 
tion of  reasoning  and  observation,  of  their  effective  laws, 
that  is  to  say,  their  invariable  relations  of  succession  and 
similitude."^  That  the  three  stages  are  repeated  in  the 
progress  of  the  individual  from  childhood  to  manhood 
was  regarded  by  Comte  as  confirming  the  conclusion  that 
the  positive  is  the  ultimate  stage,  the  only  one  tolerable  to 
mature  thinking.^  Among  the  several  stages  the  meta- 
physical was  evidently  least  esteemed  by  the  positivist 
philosopher.  Metaphysics,  he  said,  is  nothing  but  simply 
a  solvent  of  theology.  "It  has  no  other  effect,  in  the  orig- 
inal evolution,  whether  of  the  individual  or  of  society, 
but  to  facilitate  the  gradual  passage  from  theology  to 
positivism."^ 

In  the  intention  of  Comte,  as  was  noticed,  the  positive 
philosophy  was  directed  toward  a  great  social  ideal.  He 
considered  that  society  was  suffering  grievously  from 

*  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive,  I.  2-4.  *  Ibid.,  I.  6. 

^Catechism,  pp.  169,  170. 


82  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

anarchical  or  excessively  individualistic  tendencies,  that 
homogeneity  in  doctrine  was  the  necessary  antecedent  to 
the  overcoming  of  these  tendencies,  and  that  only  by  the 
method  of  the  positive  philosophy  could  this  homogeneity 
be  attained.  How  pronounced  was  his  conviction  upon 
this  subject  may  be  judged  from  the  following  sentences : 
"A  doctrine  of  universal  validity — such  is  the  sole 
remedy,  if  the  reason  of  the  West  is  to  be  freed  from  its 
present  contradictory  position,  in  which  destruction  of 
the  whole  becomes  more  and  more  irreconcilable  with 
construction  in  detail."^  "The  object  of  our  philosophy 
is  to  direct  the  spiritual  reorganization  of  the  civilized 
world. "2  "We  must  call  in  an  authority  superior  to  all 
individual  judgment,  to  be  able  to  prescribe,  even  in 
unimportant  points,  rules  which  shall  have  any  real 
efficacy.  Such  rules  will  then  rest  on  a  view  of  the  needs 
of  society  which  shall  admit  of  no  hesitation  as  to  obedi- 
ence."^ "One  of  the  leading  features  of  our  modern 
anarchy  is  the  general  tendency  to  a  dispersive,  special 
action.  It  is  a  lamentable  waste  of  strength.  Such 
special  action  is  as  absurd  as  it  is  immoral."*  "In.  the 
sphere  of  theory  there  must  be  no  specialty."^  Evidently 
by  Comte  the  individual  was  rated  at  a  very  small  figure 
as  compared  with  society,  and  his  view  of  the  ideal  con- 
stitution of  society  left  as  little  place  for  doctrinal  variety 
as  did  the  scheme  of  the  stanchest  Ultramontanist,  His 
respect,  therefore,  for  such  an  advocate  of  theocratic 
sovereignty  as  De  Maistre  was  not  a  token  of  inconsist- 
ency. He  designed  for  the  reconstituted  society  to  which 
he  looked  forward  a  full  equivalent  for  the  government 
of  the  pope  and  the  hierarchy.^ 


1  System  of  Positive  Polity,  IV.  321.  *Ibid  ,  I.  3  5• 

3  Catechism,  p.  50.  -I  Ibid  .  p.  112.  Mbid.,  p.  113. 

'Compare  Levy-Bruhl,  The  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte,  Eng.  trans., 
pp.  297,  298. 


POSITIVISM  83 

The  superiority  assigned  by  Comte  to  the  social  inter- 
est is  reflected  in  his  classification  of  the  sciences.  Ar- 
ranged according  to  the  degree  of  generality  and  sim- 
plicity they  run  as  follows :  mathematics,  astronomy, 
physics,  chemistry,  physiology,  social  physics  or  soci- 
ology. The  last-named  is  the  crown  of  the  series  to 
which  all  the  others  are  tributary.  In  a  later  enumeration 
Comte  gave  a  distinct  place  to  ethics. 

The  interest  in  sociology  also  dominated  the  religious 
scheme  of  the  positivist  philosopher.  In  the  earlier  part 
of  his  career  religion  stood  in  the  background.  During 
his  latest  years  it  was  treated  as  of  foremost  concern. 
This  change  in  attitude  was  not  unrecognized  by  Comte 
himself.  In  the  grandiloquent  style  to  which  he  was 
very  much  inclined  he  represented  himself  as  fulfilling 
in  the  earlier  stage  the  role  of  Aristotle  and  in  the  later 
that  of  Saint  Paul ;  the  one  being  reflected  in  the  Course 
of  Positive  Philosophy,  and  the  other  in  the  System  of 
Positive  Polity,  as  also  in  the  Catechism  of  the  Positive 
Religion.  'Tn  the  first,"  he  says,  "I  have  carefully  kept 
the  objective  method  in  the  ascendant ;  as  was  necessary 
when  the  course  of  thought  was  always  proceeding  from 
the  world  in  the  direction  of  man.  But  the  fulfillment  of 
this  preliminary  task,  by  the  fact  of  placing  me  at  the 
universal  point  of  view,  involves  henceforth  the  preva- 
lence of  the  subjective  method  as  the  only  source  of  com- 
plete systematization,  the  procedure  now  being  from  man 
outward  toward  the  world.  Thus  the  higher  logic  under 
which  man's  primitive  belief  arose  adapts  itself,  when 
regenerated  by  positivism,  to  his  final  constructions.  Its 
ultimate  position  is  indicated  in  the  principle  of  the  ascen- 
dency of  the  heart  over  the  intellect."^  This  language 
seems   to  assume  that   the  heart  which  has  been   well 


^  System  of  Positive  Polity,  Preface,  p.  xiL 


84  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

schooled  in  positivist  doctrines  can  be  trusted  to  impel 
in  the  right  direction.  Certainly  this  assumption  is 
needed  to  secure  Comte  from  the  charge  of  self-contra- 
diction. Such  a  charge  has  been  more  than  once  pre- 
ferred against  him.  It  was  urged  at  an  early  date  by 
Littre.  Though  an  ardent  disciple,  he  found  it  impos- 
sible to  follow  his  master,  believing  that  his  later  teach- 
ing, in  method,  spirit,  and  content,  was  irreconcilable 
with  the  earlier.  "All  that  which  Comte  produced,"  he 
says,  "after  1845  is  under  the  dominion  of  the  subjective 
method  and  often  of  mysticism."^  Doubtless  Comte  con- 
sidered himself  entirely  faithful  to  the  fundamental  pos- 
tulates with  which  he  set  out.  It  is  also  to  be  admitted 
that  these  postulates  were  repeated  to  the  end.  Still  it  is 
true  that  his  teaching,  after  he  began  to  pose  as  the  fabri- 
cator of  a  religion,  took  on  so  largely  a  changed  aspect 
as  to  seem  like  a  new  system.  There  was  a  substantial 
ground  for  the  division  which  occurred  among  French 
Positivists  by  the  refusal  of  one  wing  to  follow  the 
founder  in  his  second  role. 

As  the  positive  philosophy  contemplates  human  society 
as  the  supreme  subject  of  investigation,  so  the  positive 
religion,  as  formulated  by  Comte,  knows  of  no  higher 
object  of  worship  than  collective  humanity.  The  fact  of 
the  existence  of  a  transcendent  Deity  is  either  ignored  or 
discredited  by  him.  In  one  connection  he  gives  place 
to  the  shallow  assumption,  which  occurs  in  the  writings 
of  the  German  materialists,  that  the  admission  of  a 
supernatural  or  infinite  will  is  incompatible  with  the  idea 
of  a  stable  system  of  laws.=^  Again,  he  remarks,  that 
the  consensus  of  positive  philosophy  essentially  ex- 
cludes the  hypothesis  of  a  higher  Providence.^     On  the 


*  Auguste  Comte  et  la  Philosophie  Positive,  p.  58Q. 

'Catechism,  p.  218.  ^  System  of  Positive  Polity,  I.  51,  5a. 


POSITIVISM  8s 

Other  hand,  he  repudiates  all  connection  with  formal 
atheism  and  pronounces  it  foreign  to  his  teaching. 
"Atheism,"  he  says,  "even  from  the  intellectual  point  of 
view,  is  a  very  imperfect  form  of  emancipation;  for  its 
tendency  is  to  prolong  the  metaphysical  stage  indefinitely 
by  continuing  to  seek  for  new  solutions  of  theological 
problems  instead  of  setting  aside  all  inaccessible  re- 
searches on  the  ground  of  their  utter  inutility,"^  Prac- 
tically he  rules  out  the  thought  of  a  personal  God,  but 
a  sense  of  the  dogmatism  inherent  in  atheism  makes 
him  hesitate  to  assert  definitely  the  atheistic  negation. 

In  setting  up  humanity  as  the  object  of  worship  the 
founder  of  the  positive  religion  recognized  that  his 
divinity  needed  some  pruning  and  decorating.  Only  the 
meritorious  are  given  a  place  in  the  Great  Being,  that  is, 
in  the  collective  humanity  which  is  the  proper  object  of 
public  worship.  Among  the  objects  of  private  worship 
woman  holds  a  preferred  position.  She  is  the  best  rep- 
resentative of  the  Great  Being.  She  embodies  the  moral 
providence  of  the  race.  She  stands  to  man  as  his  guar- 
dian angel  and  household  divinity.  The  nearest  objects 
of  worship  for  the  man  are  the  mother,  the  wife,  and  the 
daughter,  while  the  woman  does  well  to  worship  the 
mother,  the  husband,  and  the  son.  In  religious  art  the 
woman  holding  a  child  in  her  arms  is  the  proper  symbol. 

A  singular  feature  in  the  positive  religion  is  the  sym- 
pathy manifested  for  fetichism.  Comte  is  very  emphatic 
in  acknowledging  the  close  association  between  it  and  his 
own  system.  "Each  in  its  manner,"  he  says,  "consecrates 
the  universal  supremacy  of  feeling;  and  they  are  only 
distinguished  morally  in  that  positivism  substitutes  the 
adoration  of  products  for  that  of  materials."^    Even  this 

*  System  of  Positive  Polity,  I.  36. 

*  System  of  Positive  Polity,  II.  118;  Catechism,  p.  365. 


86  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

much  of  distinction  seems  not  to  have  been  held  very 
tenaciously.  In  a  late  writing  Comte  felt  at  liberty  to 
speak  of  natural  objects,  such  as  the  sun,  the  planets,  and 
space,  as  holding  a  sympathetic  relation  to  the  human 
race,  and  actually  styled  the  earth  the  Grand  Fetiche} 

In  securing  the  practical  supremacy  of  the  positive 
religion  Comte  placed  great  dependence  upon  a  priest- 
hood the  members  of  which  are  to  be  subjected  to  a  most 
thorough  training,  and  first  at  the  age  of  forty-two  are 
to  attain  full  recognition  as  priests.  This  body  is  not  to 
interfere  directly  with  political  affairs,  but  will  neverthe- 
less exercise  a  potent  influence  upon  the  management  of 
the  state  by  giving  moral  and  intellectual  guidance  to 
the  rulers.  Its  general  point  of  view  will  fit  it  to  fulfill 
a  prominent  function  in  relation  to  the  division  of  labor.^ 
On  account  of  its  encyclopedic  training  it  will  be  qualified 
to  resume  the  medical  office,  and  indeed  will  treat  that 
office  ''as  the  inseparable  complement  of  its  principal 
function."^  Its  power  extends  to  the  passing  of  such 
sentence  upon  the  unworthy  as  shall  exclude  them  from 
the  benefits  of  human  society.'*  Within  the  priesthood 
"the  supreme  power  is  vested  in  the  high  priest  of 
humanity,  whose  natural  residence  will  be  Paris  as  the 
metropolis  of  the  regenerated  West.  He  is  the  sole  gov- 
ernor of  the  positive  clergy.  He  ordains  its  members, 
he  changes  their  residence,  he  revokes  their  commission, 
all  on  his  own  responsibility.  The  high  priest  of  hu- 
manity will  be,  more  truly  than  any  mediaeval  pope,  the 
only  real  head  of  the  Western  world. "^ 

The  priesthood  was  regarded  by  Comte  as  the  fit  instru- 


iLittr6,   Auguste  Comte  et  la  Philosophic   Positive,   pp.  573-577:  Mill, 
The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Comte,  pp.  174.  i75-  „.    ^- 

=  System  of  Positive  Polity.  IV.  634.  '  Ibid.,  IV.  66. 

*  Catechism,  p.  296.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  303,  359. 


POSITIVISM  87 

ment  for  bringing  about  that  intellectual  homogeneity  or 
uniformity  of  doctrine  upon  which,  as  has  been  observed, 
he  laid  immense  emphasis.  In  achieving  this  end  the 
priestly  body  was  not  expected  to  make  use  of  forcible 
repression.  At  the  same  time  it  was  not  put  under  obli- 
gation to  respect  any  radical  maxim  on  liberty  of  exam- 
ination and  of  speech.  Indeed,  Comte  expressly  taught 
that,  while  freedom  of  discussion  was  needed  to  secure  the 
triumph  of  positive  principles,  it  is  properly  made  sub- 
ject to  limitations  when  those  principles  have  come  into 
the  ascendant.  "Systematic  tolerance,"  he  declares, 
"cannot  exist,  and  never  has  existed,  except  in  relation 
to  opinions  regarded  as  indifferent  or  as  doubtful."^  In 
short,  Comte's  scheme  openly  and  explicitly  contem- 
plated the  control  of  the  race  through  the  instrumentality 
of  a  priesthood.  It  was  in  particular  this  aspect  of  posi- 
tivism which  led  John  Stuart  Mill  to  speak  of  it  as  "the 
completest  system  of  spiritual  and  temporal  despotism 
which  ever  yet  emanated  from  a  human  brain,  unless 
possibly  that  of  Ignatius  Loyola."^ 

Remark  has  often  been  made  on  the  colossal  vanity 
of  Comte ;  and  certainly  it  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  his 
own  estimate  of  his  system  should  ever  be  seconded  in 
a  sane  understanding.  The  positive  philosophy  is  remote 
enough  from  the  perfection  and  ultimateness  which  were 
ascribed  to  it  in  his  thought.  In  the  first  place,  it  is 
chargeable  with  superficiality  in  its  views  of  the  office  of 
philosophy  and  in  its  scrutiny  of  philosophical  problems. 
Making  philosophy  to  consist  in  a  sum  of  general  con- 
clusions drawn  from  the  subject-matter  of  the  various 
sciences,  it  slights  its  distinctive  vocation  to  examine  the 

'  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive,  IV.  39-47. 
*  Autobiography,  pp.  212,  213. 


88  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

notions  on  which  the  sciences  repose.^  While  repudiating 
metaphysics,  it  admits  the  conception  of  "property"  (or 
quahty),  which  has  an  obvious  metaphysical  implication. 
It  makes  free  use  of  the  terms  "phenomena"  and  "law" 
without  stopping  to  define  them.  Phenomena  are  treated 
by  it  as  though  they  were  given  outright;  whereas  it  is 
impossible  rationally  to  interpret  them  without  taking 
account  of  the  constructive  action  of  the  perceiving  mind, 
or  the  fact  that  the  mind  has  part  in  making  the  phe- 
nomena to  be  what  they  are.  It  denies  the  possibility  of 
any  direct  self-knowledge  or  introspective  study,  and 
thus  blocks  the  way  to  an  explanation  of  our  cognition 
of  psychical  facts.  According  to  Comte,  "our  knowledge 
of  the  human  mind  must  be  obtained  by  observing  other 
people.  How  we  are  to  observe  other  people's  mental 
operations,  or  how  interpret  the  signs  of  them  without 
having  learned  what  the  signs  mean  by  knowledge  of 
ourselves,  he  does  not  state. "^  That  he  should  so  limit 
the  office  of  psychology,  and  exalt,  as  he  did,  the  function 
of  phrenology,  must  be  regarded  as  a  very  poor  testi- 
monial to  philosophical  competency. 

In  the  second  place,  the  positivism  of  Comte  is  open  to 
criticism  as  resting  upon  an  arbitrary  historical  induc- 
tion. Doubtless  there  is  an  element  of  truth  in  the  doc- 
trine of  the  three  stages.  The  childish  mind,  as  also  the 
mind  of  the  maturer  individual  who  from  lack  of  train- 
ing is  but  little  above  the  plane  of  childish  conceptions, 
is  much  inclined  to  an  indiscriminate  anthropomorphism. 
Out  of  the  vivid  consciousness  of  its  own  agency  it 
derives  an  impulse  to  refer  events  in  the  world  to  agents 
like  itself  in  feeling  and  volition.  With  the  progress  of 
intelligence    and    experience    the    generalizing    faculty 


*  Compare  Fouill^e,  Le  Mouvement  Positiviste,  pp.  14,  15. 
2  Mill,  The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Comte,  p.  59. 


POSITIVISM  89 

comes  into  play,  and  an  enlarged  reference  is  made  to 
laws,  principles,  and  cosmic  powers  as  compared  with 
manlike  agents.  But  a  development  like  this,  resulting 
in  an  amendment  of  the  cruder  and  more  spontaneous 
anthropomorphism,  is  very  dififerent  from  Comte's  repre- 
sentation of  three  successive  and  mutually  exclusive 
stages.  Taken  in  the  broad  sense  in  which  the  repre- 
sentation is  made  by  him,  it  is  contradictory  to  the  facts. 
The  theological  is  by  no  means  a  past  and  forsaken  stand- 
point. According  to  Comte,  theistic  conceptions  are  of 
the  theological  type;  but  theism  never  had  before  such 
an  august  intellectual  constituency  as  it  has  today.  As 
for  metaphysics,  the  teaching  of  the  universities  in  every 
country  at  all  distinguished  for  mental  life  is  clear  evi- 
dence that  it  has  not  abandoned  the  field.  So  far  is  the 
positive  method,  as  defined  by  Comte,  from  being  regnant 
that  the  study  of  origins,  which  that  method  excludes 
as  impertinent,  never  commanded  greater  interest  than 
it  has  during  the  last  half  century.^  Judged  by  the  actual 
evolution  up  to  date  the  positive  method  has  failed  to 
establish  its  claim  to  finality.  It  has  not  been  installed 
as  the  exclusive  method,  and  even  if  it  had  been  that 
fact  would  fall  short  of  a  demonstration  that  it  is  to  be 
reckoned  the  final  method.  One  might  look  forward  to 
a  process  of  reconciliation  and  claim,  as  does  Fouillee,^ 
that  the  ideal  is  to  be  realized  in  a  synthesis  of  the  theo- 
logical, the  metaphysical,  and  the  positive.  In  building 
upon  the  doctrine  of  the  three  stages  Comte  was  resorting 
to  a  very  shaky  foundation  for  a  philosophy. 

In  the  third  place  positivism,  as  formulated  by  Comte, 
is  chargeable  with  an  artificial  and  fantastic  scheme  of 


1  Compare  Belot,  L'ld^e  et  la  Methode  de  la  Philosophic  Scientifique  chez 
Auguste  Comte,  Bibliotheque  du  Congres  Internationale  de  Philosophie. 
IV.  460,  461.  ^  Le  Mouvement  Positive,  p.  268. 


90  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

religion.  That  which  it  sets  forth  as  the  supreme  object 
of  worship  is  confessedly  neither  supreme  nor  actual. 
It  is  not  supreme,  for  humanity  appears  only  as  a  tran- 
sient product  in  a  perishing  world.  It  is  not  actual  for, 
according  to  Comte's  denial  of  personal  immortality,  the 
dead  are  extinct,  while  the  future  generations  do  not  yet 
exist.  Since  the  living  make  but  a  small  fraction  of  the 
great  whole,  the  object  of  worship  is  for  the  major  part 
a  mental  fiction.  And  even  if  the  object  were  thoroughly 
real  it  is  not  such  as  could  satisfy  the  deeper  religious 
sentiments.  These  find  no  adequate  object  in  a  merely 
relative  greatness  and  goodness.  They  demand  the  abso- 
lute. As  Edward  Caird  has  remarked,  "A  'relative' 
religion  is  not  a  religion  at  all;  it  is  at  best  a  morality 
trying  to  gather  to  itself  some  of  the  emotions  which  were 
formerly  connected  with  religious  belief."^  Without 
doubt  the  discourse  of  Comte  on  religion  contains  very 
excellent  maxims.  But  these  are  only  commonplaces  of 
Christianity.  Taken  as  a  whole  his  religion  is  a  paltry 
substitute  for  the  Christian  faith,  and  it  is  no  wonder 
that  its  existence  has  been  mostly  on  paper. 

Once  more,  the  positive  philosophy  of  Comte  labors 
under  a  serious  burden  of  self-contradiction.  As  was 
noticed,  he  justifies  his  transition  from  the  objective  to 
the  subjective  method  on  the  ground  that  his  preceding 
investigations  had  placed  him  at  the  universal  point  of 
view,  whereas  the  possibility  of  attaining  anything  more 
than  a  relative  and  fragmentary  outlook  upon  reality 
is  a  fundamental  postulate  of  his  system.  He  repudiates 
metaphysics  as  being  occupied  with  unreal  abstractions 
and  universals,  and  yet  centers  thought  and  worship 
upon  a  humanity  which,  as  defined  by  him,  is  mostly  out- 
side the  plane  of  the  actual;  a  mixture  of  the  abstract 

»  The  Social  Philosophy  and  Religion  of  Comte,  p.  139. 


POSITIVISM  91 

and  the  concrete ;  a  strange  sort  of  universal.  He  repudi- 
ates theology  as  belonging  to  a  vanquished  stage  of 
human  development,  and  yet  in  the  end  justifies  the 
fetichism  which  he  had  characterized  as  representing  the 
primary  form  of  theological  conceptions;  at  least  he  justi- 
fies a  fetichistic  devotion,  and  if  it  be  supposed,  as  his 
original  philosophy  required,  that  there  is  no  object  cor- 
responding to  the  devotion,  then  it  must  be  said  that  he 
justifies  the  paying  of  religious  respect  to  fictions  which 
are  known  to  be  fictions.  The  incongruities  are  marked, 
and  provoke  well-nigh  a  feeling  of  compassion  for  the 
man  who  could  believe  that  he  was  publishing  the  pro- 
gram of  the  final  philosophy  and  religion. 

II. — Representatives  of  Positivism  in  Germany 
AND  England 

A  biographer  of  Feuerbach  has  said  of  him,  "He  over- 
threw the  system  of  Hegel,  and  founded  positivism  in 
analyzing  the  essence  of  Christianity  and  the  essence  of 
religion."*  The  last  half  of  this  statement  may  be  ac- 
cepted as  containing  a  measure  of  truth.  While  the 
teaching  of  Feuerbach  was  not  precisely  parallel  to  that 
of  the  contemporary  French  positivist,  it  contained  points 
of  obvious  resemblance.  In  the  former  as  well  as  in  the 
latter  the  senses  were  emphasized  as  the  channels  of  all 
knowledge.  In  both  alike  the  human  species  was  re- 
garded as  the  great  reality.  In  both  also  humanity  was 
set  forth  as  the  object  of  religious  worship.  On  the  last 
point,  however,  a  difference  may  be  noticed.  The  fun- 
damental thesis  in  the  religious  philosophy  of  Comte 
was  that  humanity  should  consciously  be  accepted  as  the 
object  of  religious  veneration  in  place  of  the  transcen- 
dent Deity.     The  central  proposition  of  Feuerbach  was 

*  Albert  Levy,  La  Philosophie  de  Feuerbach,  Intro.,  p.  xxii. 


'92  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

that  humanity  is  actually  the  object  of  religious  venera- 
tion, since  men  are  only  objectifying  their  own  nature 
and  needs  when  they  present  their  prayers  and  ascriptions 
to  the  God  who  is  over  all,  "Man,"  he  says,  "projects 
his  being  into  objectivity,  and  then  again  makes  himself 
an  object  of  this  projected  image  of  himself  converted 
into  a  subject."^  Even  the  least  anthropomorphic  con- 
ception of  God  stands  within  the  objectifying  process. 
"The  God  free  from  anthropomorphisms,  impartial,  pas- 
sionless, is  nothing  else  than  the  nature  of  the  under- 
standing itself  regarded  as  objective."^  "God  as  a 
morally  perfect  being  is  nothing  else  than  the  realized 
idea,  the  fulfilled  law  of  morality,  the  moral  nature  of 
man  posited  as  the  absolute  being."^  Belief  in  Provi- 
dence is  simply  belief  in  the  divine  reality  and  signifi- 
cance of  man's  own  being.*  "In  prayer  man  turns  to 
the  omnipotence  of  goodness,  which  simply  means  that 
!in  prayer  man  adores  his  own  heart,  regards  his  own  feel- 
ings as  absolute."^  "The  beginning,  middle,  and  end  of 
religion  is  man."^  "Religion  is  a  dream,  in  which  our 
own  conceptions  and  emotions  appear  to  us  as  separate 
existences,  beings  out  of  ourselves."^ 

Had  Feuerbach  deliberately  set  to  work  to  write  a  sat- 
ire upon  religion  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that  he  could 
have  found  any  terms  better  suited  to  his  purj^ose  than 
those  which  he  has  actually  employed.  In  religion,  as 
he  makes  out,  man  walks  from  beginning  to  end  as  the 
helpless  victim  of  illusion.  He  thinks  that  he  is  cultiva- 
ting practical  relations  with  God,  while  all  the  time  he 
is  paying  respect  to  himself.  The  only  mitigation  of  this 
idolatry  which  Feuerbach  suggests  lies  in  an  arbitrary 


»The  Essence  of  Christianity  (1841),  pp.  52,  53.  « Ibid.,  p.  58. 

'Ibid.,  p.  73.  < Ibid.,  p.  144.  Mbid.,  p.  169.  Clbid.,  p.  239 

'  Ibid.,  p.  264. 


POSITIVISM  93 

ascription  of  divinity  and  infinitude  to  man.  "Con- 
sciousness," he  says,  "is  essentially  infinite  in  its  nature. 
In  the  consciousness  of  the  infinite  the  conscious  subject 
has  for  his  object  the  infinity  of  his  own  nature."^  In 
line  with  this  high-sounding  description  is  his  designation 
of  man  as  the  true  ens  realissimnm.^  Dowered  with  such 
attributes  man  might  be  regarded  as  somewhat  excus- 
able for  making  a  god  of  himself,  only  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  this  "most  real  being,"  who  has  in  the  fact  of  con- 
sciousness a  certificate  of  infinitude,  is  destined,  in  accor- 
dance with  Feuerbach's  denial  of  immortality,  speedily 
to  lose  consciousness  and  to  pass  into  the  estate  of  a 
practical  nullity. 

The  discourse  of  Feuerbach  is  so  purely  oracular,  so 
little  characterized  by  sober  argumentation,  that  to  pay  it 
the  tribute  of  serious  criticism  would  be  an  ill-placed  gra- 
tuity. It  is  enough  to  observe  that  his  conception  of 
religion  conducts  logically  to  the  wrecking  of  all  intellec- 
tual confidence.  If  in  his  deepest  and  most  inveterate 
impulsions  man  is  but  the  victim  of  illusion,  there  is  no 
testimony  of  his  nature  which  affords  any  reliable  ground 
of  inference. 

One  is  hardly  authorized  to  speak  of  a  positivist  school 
in  Germany;  but  a  number  of  writers  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  century  shared  in  the  views  of  Feuerbach.  The 
German  materialists,  as  has  been  observed,  were  much 
inclined  to  exalt  him  into  an  oracle  on  matters  religious 
and  theological.  An  admiring  biographer  gives  a  con- 
siderable list  of  his  followers,^  but  many  of  those  men- 
tioned cannot  be  regarded  as  disciples  in  any  strict  sense. 

In  England  John  Stuart  Mill  was  an  appreciative  stu- 
dent of  positivism.    For  a  period  he  maintained  a  friendly 


*  The  Essence  of  Christianity,  p.  sr.  '  Ibid.,  p.  6. 

^  Bolin,  Ludwig  Feuerbach,  sein  Werken  und  seine  Zeitgenossen. 


94  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

interchange  of  views  with  Comte.  He  was  very  largely 
in  sympathy  with  the  French  positivist's  conception  of 
the  proper  domain  of  human  knowledge,  and  also  with 
his  exaltation  of  the  claims  of  sociology.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  appears  above,  he  sharply  criticised  various  fea- 
tures in  Comte's  system,  and  considered  that  in  the  latter 
part  of  his  career  he  strayed  widely  from  the  path  of 
philosophical  sobriety.  He  may  be  said  to  have  figured 
more  largely  as  the  critic  than  as  the  disciple. 

Among  those  approaching  more  nearly  to  the  charac- 
ter of  disciples  a  prominent  rank  has  been  taken  by  R. 
Congreve,  J.  H.  Bridges,  and  Frederic  Harrison.  With 
some  measure  of  propriety  Marian  Evans  (George  Eliot) 
may  also  be  mentioned  among  the  English  followers  of 
the  French  philosopher.  Herbert  Spencer  wrote  of  her: 
*'She  has  been  more  a  disciple  of  Comte  than  of  mine; 
although  her  acceptance  of  Comte's  views  was  very  much 
qualified,  and  indeed  hardly  constituted  her  a  Comtist  in 
the  full  sense  of  the  word.  Still  she  had  strong  leanings 
to  the  'religion  of  humanity,'  and  that  always  remained 
a  point  of  difference  between  us."^ 

Frederic  Harrison  has  been  especially  brought  to  no- 
tice, as  a  champion  of  positivism,  by  his  controversy  with 
Herbert  Spencer.  In  the  course  of  this  controversy  he 
took  pains  to  indicate  that  he  was  not  committed  to  the 
entire  scheme  of  the  positivist  philosopher.  *'I  look,"  he 
said,  "upon  very  much  that  Comte  threw  out  for  the 
future  as  tentative  and  purely  Utopian."^  In  his  defini- 
tion of  religion  he  so  far  followed  Comte  as  to  make 
humanity  the  highest  object  of  reverence.  "The  final 
religion  of  enlightened  man,"  he  remarked,  "is  the  sys- 


*  Autobiography,  II.  430.  . 

2  The  Nature  and  Reality  of  Religion,  a  Controversy  between  Frederic 
Harrison  and  Herbert  Spencer,  p.  125. 


POSITIVISM  95 

tematized  and  scientific  form  of  the  spontaneous  religion 
of  natural  man.  Both  rest  on  the  same  elements — belief 
in  the  power  which  controls  his  life,  a  grateful  rever- 
ence for  the  power  so  acknowledged.  The  primitive 
man  thought  that  power  to  be  the  object  of  nature  affec- 
ting man.  The  cultured  man  knows  that  power  to  be 
humanity  itself,  controlling  and  controlled  by  nature  ac- 
cording to  natural  law."^  But,  while  thus  exalting 
humanity,  it  would  appear  that  Harrison  was  not  minded 
to  make  it  the  object  of  any  formal  worship.  "My 
friends  and  I,"  he  said,  "address  no  prayers  to  humanity 
as  'holy'  or  otherwise."^  Again  he  observed :  "I  mean  by 
religion  this  sense  of  social  duty,  pushed  to  its  full  ex- 
tent, strengthened  by  a  sound  view  of  human  nature,  and 
warmed  by  the  glow  of  imagination  and  sympathy.  It 
has  been  said  in  a  vague  way  that  religion  is  'morality 
touched  by  emotion.'  The  religion  of  humanity,  as  I 
conceive  it,  is  simply  morality  fused  with  social  devotion 
and  enlightened  by  sound  philosophy."^  This  contrasts 
favorably  with  the  fantastic  elements  in  the  scheme  of 
Comte.  Nevertheless,  there  is  very  little  hope  for  a 
religion  like  that  which  is  here  sketched.  It  differs  too 
little  from  pure  secularism  to  have  any  other  goal  than 
inanity  and  helplessness. 

^The  Nature  and  Reality  of  Religion,  p.  46.  *  Ibid.,  p.  124 

'Ibid.,  p.  133. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC   EVOLUTIONISM 

I. — Herbert   Spencer's   Evolutionary   Philosophy 

While  French  positivism  and  German  materialism 
were  initiated  apart  from  any  distinct  recognition  of  the 
modern  theory  of  evolution,  the  "synthetic  philosophy," 
as  Spencer  named  his  system,  made  that  theory  funda- 
mental from  the  start.  As  early  as  1851  he  had  taken 
note  of  Von  Baer's  statement  that  the  development  of 
every  organism  is  a  "change  from  homogeneity  to  hetero- 
geneity." In  the  years  which  intervened  between  this 
date  and  the  publication  of  Darwin's  epoch-making 
treatise  on  The  Origin  of  Species  (1859),  his  thinking, 
if  not  properly  Darwinian,  was  quite  emphatically  evo- 
lutionary. The  change  effected  by  contact  with  the 
teaching  of  the  great  naturalist  consisted  in  a  modifica- 
tion of  his  view  as  to  the  efficient  factors  in  the  evolution- 
ary process.  Hitherto  it  had  been  his  conviction  that  "the 
sole  cause  of  organic  evolution  is  the  inheritance  of 
functionally  produced  modifications."  Darwin  made  it 
plain  to  him  that  a  wide  sphere  must  be  accorded  to  the 
operation  of  natural  selection,  or  to  the  superior  chance 
for  survival  in  the  struggle  for  existence  which  pertains 
to  those  individuals  in  any  given  group  which  have  been 
gifted  by  nature  with  points  of  advantage.^  It  remained, 
however,  his  opinion  that  the  inheritance  of  characters 
acquired  by  use  has  been  a  great  factor  in  evolution,  and 
he  was  never  fully  satisfied  with  the  scope  which  Darwin 
conceded  to  this  factor.   On  the  whole,  aside  from  a  rein- 

'  Autobiography,  IT.  37- 

96 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTrONISM     9; 

forcement  of  his  confidence  in  the  legitimacy  and  scien- 
tific worth  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis,  he  seems  not 
to  have  received  from  Darwin  a  very  conspicuous  and 
effective  contribution  to  his  own  system. 

So  far  as  Spencer  endeavored  to  transcend  the  proper 
sphere  of  the  particular  sciences,  and  to  deal  with  reality 
in  general,  he  manifestly  owed  nothing  to  the  author  of 
The  Origin  of  Species ;  for  the  latter  was  chary  of  philo- 
sophical speculations,  and  never  undertook  to  speak  the 
authoritative  word  within  their  domain.  As  to  his  per- 
sonal faith,  Darwin  has  indicated  that  at  the  time  he 
wrote  his  great  work,  though  somewhat  troubled  by  the 
contemplation  of  the  pain  and  misery  incident  to  animal 
existence,  he  still  counted  himself  a  theist.  Later  his 
conviction  appears  to  have  been  somewhat  wavering  as 
respects  the  warrant  for  inferring  design  in  nature.  In  a 
letter  written  in  1879,  three  years  before  his  death,  he 
has  given  us  this  testimony:  "In  my  most  extreme  fluc- 
tuations I  have  never  been  an  atheist  in  the  sense  of  deny- 
ing the  existence  of  a  God.  I  think  that  generally  (and 
more  and  more  as  I  grow  older),  but  not  always,  an  ag- 
nostic would  be  the  more  correct  description  of  my  state 
of  mind."^ 

Among  philosophical  antecedents  English  empiricism 
and  sensationalism  exerted  the  largest  influence  upon 
Spencer.  His  interest  in  the  German  systems  was  not 
very  vital,  and  his  borrowing  from  them  took  place 
largely  through  the  instrumentality  of  an  English  inter- 
pretation. As  Professor  Ormond  has  remarked,  "The 
foundation  of  the  synthetic  philosophy  was  achieved  in 
a  union  of  Hume  with  Kantism  as  it  had  filtered  down 
through  the  medium  of  the  school  of  Hamilton."^ 

'  Autobiography  and  Selected  Letters,  edited  by  Francis  Darwin,  p.  cc 
bee  also  pp.  61.  62,  236.  *  Foundations  of  Knowledge,  p.  6. 


98  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

In  reviewing  the  philosophy  of  Spencer  it  will  be  suf- 
ficient  for  the  purposes  of  this  treatise  to  take  note  of  its 
agnosticism,  its  formal  attitude  toward  the  theistic  faith, 
and  the  bearing  of  its  exposition  of  evolution  upon  that 
faith. 

The  proper  subject-matter  of  religious  ideas  and 
theories,  according  to  a  fundamental  assumption  of 
Spencer,  is  ultimate  reality,  or  the  first  cause  which  we 
are  driven  to  postulate.  This  ultimate  reality  we  are 
compelled  to  regard  as  absolute  and  infinite.  The  sub- 
ject-matter of  religion,  therefore,  may  be  described  as  the 
absolute  and  the  infinite.  Now,  any  attempt  to  construe 
this  subject-matter  is  certain  to  miscarry,  as  bringing  us 
face  to  face  with  the  inconceivable  and  tangling  us  up 
with  manifold  contradictions.  To  explore  the  absolute 
and  infinite,  or  even  to  gain  a  first  installment  of  a  gen- 
uine apprehension  of  its  nature,  is  beyond  our  com- 
petency. It  results  obviously  that  religion  has  for  its 
domain  the  unknowable,  the  sphere  of  unqualified  mys- 
tery. Not  merely  does  it  impinge  upon  mystery,  at  some 
point,  but  its  proper  subject-matter  is  wholly  included  in 
the  region  of  absolute  mystery.  This  conclusion  is  ex- 
pressed with  sufficient  explicitness  in  the  following  sen- 
tences:  ''Religion  under  all  its  forms  is  distinguished 
from  everything  else  in  this,  that  its  subject-matter  is  that 
which  passes  the  sphere  of  experience."^  "The  mystery 
which  all  religions  recognize  turns  out  to  be  a  far  more 
transcendent  mystery  than  any  of  them  suspect — not  a 
relative  but  an  absolute  mystery."^  "Religion  and 
science  are  necessary  correlatives.  They  stand  respect- 
ively for  those  two  antithetic  modes  of  consciousness 
which  cannot  exist  asunder.  A  known  cannot  be  thought 
of  apart   from   an  unknown ;  nor  can  an  unknown  be 

1  First  Principles,  fifth  edition,  J4.  *lbid.,  S14. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM     99 

thought  of  apart  from  a  known.  And  by  consequence 
neither  can  become  more  distinct  without  giving  greater 
distinctness  to  the  other.  To  carry  further  a  metaphor 
before  used,  they  are  the  positive  and  negative  poles  of 
thought."^  With  the  foregoing  statements  it  is  appro- 
priate to  conjoin  the  declaration  that  it  is  permissible  to 
represent  the  inconceivable  object  of  religion  in  some 
form  of  thought,  provided  "we  treat  every  notion  we  thus 
frame  as  merely  a  symbol,  utterly  without  resemblance 
to  that  for  which  it  stands."^  We  may  add  also  the 
assertion  that,  in  respect  of  the  ultimate  power,  "we  lack 
the  faculty  of  framing  even  the  dimmest  conception  of 
it."3 

While  Spencer  thus  denies  to  religion  the  least  frag- 
ment of  a  valid  conception  of  its  proper  subject-matter, 
he  finds  an  excuse  for  its  continued  existence  in  a  pecul- 
iar fact  of  consciousness,  "In  the  very  denial,"  he  says, 
"of  our  power  to  learn  zvhat  the  absolute  is  there  lies 
hidden  the  assumption  that  it  is ;  and  the  making  of  this 
assumption  proves  that  the  absolute  has  been  present  to 
the  mind,  not  as  nothing,  but  as  something."^  We  have 
thus  a  consciousness  of  the  absolute,  indefinite,  to  be  sure, 
and  incapable  of  formulation,  but  positive  and  insistent, 
the  counterpart  of  our  sense  of  the  relative  and  the  con- 
ditioned. The  affirmation  of  this  vague  consciousness, 
which  is  not  permitted  to  count  for  real  knowledge,  is 
the  sole  modification  of  agnosticism  admitted  by  the 
Spencerian  system  in  relation  to  the  subject-matter  of 
religion. 

How  much  better  is  science  conditioned  than  religion 
as  respects  ability  to  claim  a  basis  in  the  knowable? 
Some  of  Spencer's  statements  might  be  taken  as  imply- 


^  First  Principles,  fifth  edition,  §  30  ^Ibid.,  5  31. 

'Principles  of  Psychology,  II.  503.  *  First  Principles,   §26 


loo  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

ing  that  the  former  has  very  Httle  occasion  to  boast 
against  the  latter.  Every  one  of  the  main  factors  with 
which  science  has  to  deal  is  declared  by  him  to  be  quite 
beyond  the  reach  of  intelligible  definition.  Space  and 
time  are  wholly  incomprehensible.  The  immediate 
knowledge  which  we  seem  to  have  of  them  proves,  when 
examined,  to  be  total  ignorance."^  "Matter  in  its  ulti- 
mate nature  is  as  absolutely  incomprehensible  as  space 
and  time.  Frame  what  suppositions  we  may,  we  find  on 
tracing  out  their  implications  that  they  leave  us  nothing 
but  a  choice  between  opposite  absurdities."^  "All  efforts 
to  understand  the  essential  nature  of  motion  do  but  bring 
us  to  alternative  impossibilities  of  thought."^  "While 
it  is  impossible  to  form  any  idea  of  force  in  itself,  it  is 
equally  impossible  to  comprehend  its  mode  of  exercise."* 
Consciousness  cannot  be  known  or  conceived  as  either 
infinite  or  finite  in  duration,  and  "the  personality  of 
which  each  is  conscious  is  a  thing  which  cannot  be  truly 
known  at  all."^ 

As  thus  dealing  with  symbols  which  have  no  trans- 
latable meanings,  science  might  seem  to  be  utterly  pov- 
erty-stricken in  respect  to  knowledge.  But  it  is  far  from 
Spencer's  intention  to  represent  science  as  a  mere  play 
with  the  unknown.  He  assigns  that  role  to  religion,  and 
gives  to  science  the  antithetic  office  of  investigating  the 
known  and  the  knowable.  This  antithesis  is  expressed 
in  one  of  the  passages  already  cited,  and  is  very  distinctly 
set  forth  in  the  following :  "Regarding  science  as  a  gradu- 
ally increasing  sphere,  we  may  say  that  every  addition  to 
its  surface  does  but  bring  it  into  wider  contact  with  sur- 
rounding nescience.  There  must  ever  remain,  therefore, 
two  antithetic  modes  of  mental  action.     Throughout  all 

» First  Principles,  5  15.  'Ibid.,  »  16.  3  Tbid.,  »  17.  «Ibid.,  »  18. 

*Tbid.,  S§  19,  20. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM   lol 

future  time,  as  now,  the  human  mind  may  occupy  itself, 
not  only  with  ascertained  phenomena  and  their  relations, 
but  also  with  that  unascertained  something  which  phe- 
nomena and  their  relations  imply.  Hence,  if  knowledge 
cannot  monopolize  consciousness — if  it  must  always  con- 
tinue possible  for  the  mind  to  dwell  upon  that  which 
transcends  knowledge — then  there  can  never  cease  to  be 
a  place  for  something  of  the  nature  of  religion."^  The 
import  of  such  language  is  quite  unmistakable.  Religion 
contrasts  with  science  as  the  sphere  of  nescience  with  the 
sphere  of  knowledge,  as  the  imagined  with  the  verified. 
Nor  is  there  any  considerable  ambiguity  as  to  the  way  in 
which  Spencer  deduces  this  conclusion.  Implicitly  or 
explicitly  he  makes  use  of  the  following  propositions : 
The  manifestations  of  the  ultimate  reality  do  not  make 
it  known  to  any  extent.  The  manifestations  (or  phe- 
nomena) may  be  known  and  their  relations  truly  specified. 
Religion  has  to  do  solely  with  the  ultimate  reality,  and 
therefore  its  sphere  is  the  unknown  and  the  unknowable. 
Science  has  to  do  with  the  manifestations,  and  there- 
fore its  sphere  is  the  known  and  the  knowable. 

The  grounds  of  Spencer's  doctrine  of  the  unknowable 
are  derived  in  large  part  from  the  speculations  of  Ham- 
ilton and  Mansel.  Appeal  is  made  to  Hamilton's  doc- 
trine that  to  think  means  to  condition,  and  that  conse- 
quently the  unconditioned,  whether  infinitely  great  or 
infinitely  little,  lies  entirely  beyond  the  sphere  of 
thought.^  The  like  doctrine  is  cited  from  Mansel,  and 
the  same  skeptical  believer  is  drawn  upon  for  the  demon- 
stration that  the  absolute  and  infinite,  as  having  a  possible 
existence  out  of  all  relations,  cannot  consistently  be  re- 
garded as  a  cause,  or  a  self-conscious  subject,  or  indeed 
as  the  bearer  of  any  intelligible  predicate.^   To  considera- 

'  First  Principles,  »  4.  ^Ibid.,  i  24.  ^  Ibid.,  i  13- 


102  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

tions  01  this  order  Spencer  adds  the  assumption  that 
knowledge  always  subsists  in  and  through  the  classifica- 
tion of  its  objects,  and  that  the  ultimate  reality,  as  being 
incapable  of  assignment  to  a  class,  is  plainly  unknowable. 
"The  first  cause,"  he  says,  "the  infinite,  the  absolute,  to 
be  known  at  all,  must  be  classed.  To  be  positively 
thought  of,  it  must  be  thought  of  as  such  or  such — as 
of  this  or  that  kind.  Can  it  be  like  in  kind  to  anything 
of  which  we  have  sensible  experience?  Obviously  not. 
. . .  The  unconditioned,  therefore,  as  classible  neither  with 
any  form  of  the  conditioned  nor  with  any  other  uncon- 
ditioned, cannot  be  classed  at  all.  And  to  admit  that  it 
cannot  be  known  as  of  such  or  such  a  kind,  is  to  admit 
that  it  is  unknowable."^ 

Agnosticism  of  so  radical  a  type  would  seem  to  be 
obliged  in  self-consistency  to  occupy  a  neutral  attitude 
toward  the  theistic  conception  or  the  doctrine  of  a  per- 
sonal God.  In  rare  instances  Spencer  has  given  a  token 
of  consent  to  this  attitude.  Opposing  Mansel's  declara- 
tion that  it  is  our  duty,  in  spite  of  metaphysical  difficul- 
ties, to  think  of  God  as  personal,  he  observed:  "Duty 
requires  us  neither  to  affirm  nor  to  deny  personality. 
Our  duty  is  to  submit  ourselves  with  all  humility  to  the 
established  limits  of  our  intelligence,  and  not  perversely 
to  rebel  against  them."^  But,  notwithstanding  this 
statement,  Spencer  cannot  be  said  to  have  maintained  an 
even  balance  between  the  supposition  of  a  personal 
God  and  the  contrary  supposition.  He  grants  a  place  to 
the  former  only  at  the  expense  of  reason,  only  in  virtue 
of  the  possibility  that  the  seeming  demands  of  rational 
thinking  on  this  subject  may  be,  after  all,  without  sub- 

1  First  Principles,  5  24. 

2  Ibid.,    I   31.      Compare  The   Nature  and  Reality  of  Religion,   a  Con- 
troversy between  Harrison  and  Spencer,  p.  97. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    103 

stantial  basis.  He  takes  pains  to  enforce  the  conclusion 
that  so  far  as  reason  may  be  credited  with  any  com- 
petency it  requires  in  our  thought  of  the  ultimate  reality 
the  rejection  of  every  distinctive  feature  of  personality. 
"A  consciousness,"  he  says,  "constituted  of  ideas  and 
feelings  caused  by  objects  and  occurrences  cannot  be 
simultaneously  occupied  with  all  objects  and  occurrences 
throughout  the  universe.  To  think  of  divine  conscious- 
ness men  must  refrain  from  thinking  what  is  meant  by 
consciousness."  Equally  abortive  must  be  the  attempt  to 
think  of  divine  intelligence.  "Intelligence,  as  alone  con- 
ceivable by  us,  presupposes  existences  independent  of  it 
and  objective  to  it.  It  is  carried  on  in  terms  of  changes 
primarily  wrought  by  alien  activities — the  impressions 
generated  by  things  beyond  consciousness,  and  the  ideas 
derived  from  such  impressions.  To  speak  of  an  intelli- 
gence which  exists  in  the  absence  of  all  such  alien  activi- 
ties is  to  use  a  meaningless  word."  In  like  manner  ref- 
erences to  the  divine  will  turn  out,  on  examination,  to 
be  empty  verbiage.  It  follows  that  the  higher  anthro- 
pomorphic characters  must  be  dropped  as  the  lower  have 
been.  "The  conception  [of  God]  which  has  been  enlarg- 
ing from  the  beginning  must  go  on  enlarging  until,  by 
disappearance  of  its  limits,  it  becomes  a  consciousness 
which  transcends  the  forms  of  distinct  thought,  though  it 
forever  remains  a  consciousness."^  A  plainer  declara- 
tion could  hardly  be  made  of  the  conviction  both  that 
rational  thinking  is  opposed  to  the  theistic  conception, 
and  that  the  evolutionary  process  must  eliminate  that 
conception.  Now,  inasmuch  as  Spencer's  interpretation 
of  evolution  discredits  the  supposition  that  he  thought  of 
it  as  working  for  the  final  instatement  of  a  false  type  of 
thought  or  consciousness,  he  appears  on  record,  not  as 

*  The  Nature  and  Reality  of  Religion,  pp.  26-28. 


104  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

holding  a  neutral  attitude  toward  theism,  but  one  dis- 
tinctly adverse. 

So  far  as  can  be  discovered,  this  adverse  attitude  was 
never  modified  by  Spencer.  The  change  which  took 
place  in  his  thought  of  religion  did  not  consist  in  the 
attainment  of  a  more  favorable  estimate  of  the  rational 
basis  of  theism.  It  consisted  simply  in  the  development 
of  a  more  tolerant  feeling  for  the  historical  embodiments 
of  religion  in  doctrines  and  institutions,  in  consideration 
of  the  needs  which  they  have  met.  His  revised  point  of 
view  has  been  expressed  in  these  terms :  "I  have  come 
more  and  more  to  look  calmly  on  forms  of  religious 
belief  to  which  I  had,  in  earlier  days,  a  pronounced  aver- 
sion. Holding  that  they  are  in  the  main  naturally 
adapted  to  their  respective  peoples  and  times,  it  now 
seems  to  me  that  they  should  severally  live  and  work 
as  long  as  the  conditions  permit,  and,  further,  that  sud- 
den changes  of  religious  institutions,  as  of  political  insti- 
tutions, are  certain  to  be  followed  by  reactions."^ 

For  a  complete  view  of  the  bearing  of  Spencer's  teach- 
ing on  theistic  faith  it  is  necessary  to  consider,  besides 
his  more  direct  statements,  the  exposition  which  he  has 
given  of  the  central  topic  of  his  philosophy.  The  ques- 
tion needs  to  be  asked  to  what  extent  his  theory  of  evo- 
lution contains  a  virtual  affirmation  or  negation  of  a 
personal  agent,  or  supreme  intelligence,  in  connection 
with  the  world  process.  This  question  invites  first  of  all 
to  a  glance  at  his  provision  for  initiating  the  evolutionary 
movement.  What,  then,  is  the  provision  which  he  has 
elected  for  this  momentous  function?  Simply  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  instability  of  the  homogeneous,  described  as 
a  necessary  inference  from  the  axiomatic  or  primordial 

1  Autobiography,  II.  547. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    105 

truth  of  the  persistence  of  force — an  instabihty  conse- 
quent upon  the  different  exposures  of  the  different  parts 
of  any  aggregate  to  incident  forces.  This  principle,  he 
maintains,  if  not  strictly  of  universal  validity,  is  so  nearly 
of  that  character  that  there  is  no  real  discount  on  its 
reliability  as  a  basis  of  evolutionary  theory.  We  may 
adopt  with  scientific  confidence  the  formula,  "The  abso- 
lutely homogeneous  must  lose  its  equilibrium,  and  the 
relatively  homogeneous  must  lapse  into  the  relatively 
less  homogeneous."  This  is  strictly  a  law  for  all  cog- 
nizable or  finite  magnitudes.  The  sole  possible  excep- 
tion is  to  be  located  beyond  that  range.  "One  stable 
homogeneity  only,"  says  Spencer,  "is  hypothetically  pos- 
sible. If  centers  of  force,  absolutely  uniform  in  their 
powers,  were  diffused  with  absolute  uniformity  through 
unlimited  space  they  would  remain  in  equilibrium.  This, 
however,  though  a  verbally  intelligible  supposition,  is 
one  that  cannot  be  represented  in  thought,  since  unlimited 
space  is  inconceivable."^  The  appeal  here  to  the  incon- 
ceivability of  unlimited  space  cannot  be  regarded  as  at 
all  effective  for  disposing  of  the  supposition  in  question, 
since  Spencer  could  not  venture  to  deny  that  the  alterna- 
tive notion  of  limited  space  is  equally  inconceivable,  and 
in  fact  has  said  as  much.  By  his  own  admission,  accord- 
ingly, a  serious  qualification  upon  the  principle  of  the 
instability  of  the  homogeneous  is  left  standing.  It  is 
seen  that  this  principle  must  have  preestablished  con- 
ditions to  work  upon — conditions  for  which  there  is  no 
natural  guarantee — or  assurance  will  be  wanting  that 
any  differentiation  will  result.  But,  passing  by  this  con- 
sideration, we  notice  the  fact  pertinent  to  the  connection, 
namely,  that  Spencer's  theory  of  origins  includes  no 
slightest  reference  to  intelligent  agency.    The  persistence 

*  First  Principles,  i  135- 


io6  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

of  force  being  premised  as  a  necessary  postulate,  the 
instability  of  a  material  aggregate  is  made  the  sufficient 
explanation  of  the  initiation  of  the  world  process. 

As  in  the  account  given  of  the  initiation  of  evolution, 
so  also  in  the  description  of  its  progress  up  to  organisms 
and  civilizations,  nothing  is  attributed  by  Spencer  to 
intelligent  agency,  purpose,  or  choice.  The  evolutionary 
process,  as  construed  by  him,  starts  from  a  basis  de- 
scribed in  the  terms  commonly  applied  to  matter,  and 
goes  forward  under  the  operation  of  a  causality  which  at 
every  point  is  defined  in  terms  appropriate  to  what  is 
known  as  matter.  No  hint  of  any  other  kind  of  causality 
appears  in  the  following  general  formula:  "Evolution  is 
an  integration  of  matter  and  a  concomitant  dissipation  of 
motion;  during  which  the  matter  passes  from  an  indefi- 
nite, incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite,  coherent  hete- 
rogeneity; and  during  which  the  retained  motion  under- 
goes a  parallel  transformation."^  The  implication  of 
this  formula  that  the  laws  of  matter  and  motion  furnish 
a  sufficient  account  of  all  change  and  progress  in  the  cos- 
mos comes  to  frequent  expression  in  the  writings  of 
Spencer.  Thus  it  is  remarked,  "Evolution  is  a  continu- 
ous redistribution  of  matter  and  motion;  and  a  process 
of  evolution  which  is  not  expressible  in  terms  of  matter 
and  motion  has  not  been  reduced  to  its  ultimate  form."^ 
It  follows,  of  course,  that  natural  selection  may  be  ex- 
pressed in  terms  of  matter  and  motion,  and  this  is 
asserted  in  the  following  sentence:  "In  recognizing  the 
continuance  of  life  as  the  continuance  of  a  moving 
equilibrium,  early  overthrown  in  some  instances  by  inci- 
dent forces  and  not  overthrown  in  others  until  after  they 
have  reproduced  the  species,  we  see  that  this  survival 
and  multiplication  of  the  select  becomes  conceivable,  in 

*  First  Principles,  J  145.  ^Principles  of  Biology,  I.  548. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    107 

purely  physical  terms,  as  an  indirect  outcome  of  a  com- 
plex form  of  the  universal  redistribution  of  matter  and 
motion."^  As  the  formula  of  evolution  w^as  meant  to  be 
all-embracing,  the  genesis  of  all  mental  activities  is 
obviously  understood  to  be  referable  to  matter  and 
motion.  "The  actions  of  all  organic  beings,"  says  Spen- 
cer, "including  those  of  our  own  species,  are  known  to 
us  only  as  motions,"  and  "the  initiator  or  primary  gen- 
erator of  motion  is  the  nervous  system."  The  same 
changes  which,  regarded  as  modes  of  the  ego,  are  ex- 
pressed in  terms  of  feeling,  are,  when  regarded  as  modes 
of  the  non-ego,  expressed  in  terms  of  motion.^  Mind 
may  be  presumed  to  be  the  subjective  face  of  the  same 
thing  of  which  nervous  action  is  the  objective  face^ ;  and 
it  is  to  be  understood,  according  to  the  tenor  of  Spencer- 
ian  representations,  that  the  objective  face  has  the  logi- 
cal priority.  Nerves  are  likewise  the  efficient  antecedents 
of  our  recognition  of  moral  distinctions.  By  continued 
transmission  and  accumulation  nervous  modifications 
have  become  faculties  of  moral  intuition.^ 

The  conclusion  is  unavoidable  that  in  the  exposition 
of  evolution,  which  occupies  so  large  a  place  in  the  "syn- 
thetic philosophy,"  the  theistic  conception  of  intelligent 
agency  back  of  the  world  has  no  place.  The  whole  line 
of  changes,  from  the  primordial  homogeneity  onward,  is 
treated  as  properly  definable  in  terms  of  matter  and 
motion.  No  causation  other  than  the  physical  comes  into 
view.  An  unknowable  power  is  indeed  postulated  as 
the  ultimate  reality,  but  this  power  is  not  permitted  to 
count  for  anything  which  cannot  be  described  in  material- 
istic terms.  And  what  practical  superiority  to  matter 
has  such  a  power,  in  spite  of  the  mystery  with  which  it 


*  Autobiography,  pp.  1 11;,  116.        ^  Principles  of  Psychology,  I.  5,  14. 
3  Ibid.,  I.  140.  ''"Data  of  Ethics,  i  45. 


io8  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

is  invested  ?  As  a  critic  of  the  Spencerian  philosophy  has 
said,  "The  recognition  of  an  unknowable  power  behind 
chemistry  and  physics,  yet  limited  to  the  laws  of  chem- 
istry and  physics,  is  equal  only  to  our  estimate  of  chem- 
istry and  physics."^ 

The  system  of  Spencer,  in  short,  is  antitheistic  In  tenor, 
and  barely  falls  short  of  being  a  negation  of  theistic 
belief.  The  concession  which  it  makes  to  theism  might 
be  stated  succinctly  in  this  form :  If  anyone  is  foolish 
enough  to  believe  that  the  world-ground  is  intelligent 
and  personal  he  is  not  strictly  prohibited  from  doing  so. 

11. — Comments  on  the  Spencerian  System 
A  review  of  Herbert  Spencer's  philosophy  cannot  fail 
to  bring  to  the  front  these  two  inquiries :  Does  he  furnish 
any  proper  justification  of  the  radical  agnosticism  which 
he  asserts?  Is  he  successful,  to  any  appreciable  degree, 
in  his  attempt  to  construe  the  universe  entirely  apart 
from  theistic  postulates? 

In  regard  to  the  agnostic  premises  which  Spencer  bor- 
rows from  his  English  predecessors,  it  is  a  very  common 
verdict  in  philosophical  circles  that  they  are  not  valid. 
Hamilton's  doctrine  that  to  think  is  to  condition,  and 
that  consequently  God  as  the  unconditioned  is  quite 
beyond  the  range  of  thought,  is  found  to  be  greatly  in 
need  of  confirmation.  If  to  condition  means  to  limit, 
then  it  must  be  said  that  there  is  no  warrant  for  attach- 
ing that  function  to  thought  universally.  In  uttering  the 
words  unconditioned,  infinite,  and  the  like,  Hamilton 
himself,  if  he  put  any  meaning  into  his  language,  made 
the  unlimited  the  object  of  his  thought.  So  far  was  his 
thinking  from  being  a  process  of  limitation  that  it  was 
explicitly  directed  to  the  end  of  excluding  limitations. 

*  Malcolm  Guthrie,  Spencer's  Data  of  Ethics,  pp.  108-110. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    109 

Only  through  confusing  the  power  of  thought  with  the 
abiHty  to  picture  can  any  plausibiHty  be  attached  to  the 
Hamiltonian  dictum.  The  picturing  faculty  is  indeed 
baffled  in  its  attempt  to  form  any  distant  image  of  that 
which  rejects  all  limitations;  but  thought,  as  not  being 
in  strict  bondage  to  the  space  category,  as  able  to  deploy 
itself  in  the  qualitative  range  as  well  as  in  the  quantita- 
tive, can  affirm  the  absence  of  limits  and  be  aware  of 
what  it  is  doing  in  making  the  affirmation.  The  un- 
limited, though  unpicturable,  is  not  inconceivable.  In 
fact,  it  is  the  correlate  of  the  limited  and  is  necessarily 
grasped  in  thought  along  with  the  limited.  Supposing, 
then,  Hamilton  to  mean  what  the  phrase  "to  condition" 
naturally  implies,  his  proposition  on  the  helplessness  of 
thought  to  apprehend  the  unconditioned  or  infinite  is 
simply  to  be  rejected  as  contradictory  to  the  known  facts 
of  our  mental  operations.  If  by  that  phrase  he  meant  to 
denote  the  assignment  of  definite  attributes,  and  held 
such  assignment  to  be  incompatible  with  the  proper  con- 
ception of  the  unconditioned  or  infinite,  he  was  again 
drawing  an  unwarranted  conclusion.  Attributes  do  not 
in  themselves  involve  of  necessity  any  limitation.  On  the 
contrary,  to  name  the  appropriate  attributes  of  the  un- 
conditioned and  the  infinite  amounts  simply  to  illus- 
trating the  truth  that,  from  every  available  point  of  view, 
the  subject  in  question  is  indeed  the  unconditioned  and 
the  infinite.  Thus  the  reasoning  of  Hamilton  falls  far 
short  of  being  a  philosophical  justification  of  agnos- 
ticism. 

With  all  its  subtlety  the  reasoning  of  Mansel  is 
equally  futile.  It  proceeds  on  the  basis  of  a  gratuitous 
definition  of  the  absolute  as  that  which  rejects  all  rela- 
tions. To  be  sure,  the  absolute  is  formally  defined  simply 
as  that  which  has  a  possible  existence  apart  from  all  re- 


no  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

lations.  But  in  the  argnment  it  is  treated  as  the  strictly 
unrelated,  that  which  is  intolerant  of  all  relations,  inter- 
ior and  exterior.  On  that  basis  the  conclusion  is  easily 
drawn  that  it  cannot  be  a  cause  or  a  self-conscious  sub- 
ject, or  indeed  aught  but  an  unmitigated  blank.  But  why 
set  up  such  an  absolute  as  that?  What  is  wanted  is  the 
independent  or  self-sufficient  being",  the  being  able  to 
account  for  the  universe  as  known  in  experience.  Must, 
now,  the  self-sufficient  be  a  blank?  The  very  contrary 
is  the  rational  supposition.  Variety  in  unity  is  the  mark 
of  all  affluent  being  that  is  known  to  us,  and  so  must  be 
supposed  to  be  characteristic  of  the  highest  conceivable, 
or  that  which  is  self-sufficient  and  independent.  To  sup- 
pose that  the  variety  contradicts  the  unity,  or  involves  a 
demand  to  select  one  element  to  serve  as  the  independent 
over  against  the  remaining  elements  viewed  as  dependent 
upon  it,  is  to  indulge  in  an  illegitimate  process  of  abstrac- 
tion. Every  perfection  that  can  be  named  is  to  be 
regarded  as  necessarily  implied  in  the  reality  of  the  self- 
sufficient  being.  It  is  only  by  separating  the  ontologically 
inseparable  and  playing  with  abstractions  that  trouble  is 
made  by  the  conception  of  an  absolute  which  is  charac- 
terized by  interior  relations,  that  is,  the  relations  of  per- 
fectly harmonious  attributes  and  activities.  As  regards 
exterior  relations,  what  the  true  absolute  rejects  is  merely 
the  enforced  or  imposed — in  other  words,  relations  not 
consequent  upon  its  own  creative  activity.  It  may  be 
objected,  it  is  true,  that  the  notion  of  creation  collides 
with  that  of  infinitude,  as  supposing  that  what  had  not 
previously  been  a  source  of  causal  energy  should  become 
such  and  so  improve  upon  its  own  state.  The  objection, 
however,  is  not  appalling.  Even  if  resort  is  not  made  to 
the  conception  of  an  eternal  exercise  of  creative  power^ 
there  remains  the  conception  of  a  being  whose  ability  to 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    iii 

create  is  unlimited,  incapable  of  being  exhausted  in  any 
conceivable  product;  and  to  deny  infinitude  to  such  a 
being  would  have  no  w^arrant  outside  of  an  artificial 
application  of  the  quantitative  category.  In  short,  what 
the  reasoning  of  Mansel  furnishes  is  rather  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  entanglements  which  are  entailed  by  a  strained 
definition  of  the  absolute  than  a  proof  that  no  valid  idea 
of  the  absolute  can  be  formed. 

It  was  noticed  that,  besides  quoting  the  representa- 
tions of  Hamilton  and  Mansel,  Spencer  found  a  reason 
for  excluding  the  absolute  or  unconditioned  from  the 
sphere  of  cognition  in  the  fact  that  it  is  incapable  of  classi- 
fication. The  assumption  seems  to  be  that  nothing  can 
be  known  except  through  a  relation  of  likeness  to  some- 
thing else.  But  why  may  not  a  thing  be  defined  to  the 
mind  through  relations  of  contrast  ?  Do  men  use  an  un- 
meaning phrase  when  they  speak  of  this  or  that  as  being 
sni  generis f  Must  intelligible  grounds  for  putting  a 
thing  with  other  things  count  for  knowledge,  and  intel- 
ligible grounds  for  putting  a  thing  by  itself  in  no  wise 
count  for  knowledge?  Certainly  the  act  of  distinguish- 
ing the  absolute  from  everything  else,  if  it  is  a  sane  pro- 
cedure, involves  some  knowledge  of  the  absolute.  More- 
over it  is  not  to  be  conceded  that  no  relations  of  likeness 
subsist  between  the  absolute  and  anything  else.  If  it  is 
appropriate  to  represent  the  highest  under  the  highest 
known  categories,  then  we  must  attribute  to  it  self-con- 
sciousness, intelligence,  and  will.  In  this  point  of  view 
the  absolute  stands  at  once  in  relations  of  likeness  and  of 
contrast  to  ourselves — as  possessing  attributes  that  be- 
long to  us,  but  possessing  them  on  a  scale  that  infinitely 
transcends  all  human  measures. 

While  Spencer's  agnosticism  is  chargeable  with  ill- 
founded  and  arbitrary  premises,  it  is  also  open  to  attack 


112  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

on  the  score  of  quite  obvious  inconsistencies.  In  many 
passages  he  speaks  of  the  ultimate  power,  which  by  hypo- 
thesis is  entirely  unknowable,  as  being  manifested;  in- 
deed, he  has  no  scruple  about  conjoining  the  two  phrases^ 
"unknowable  power"  and  "knowable  manifestations." 
Thus  he  remarks :  "Our  postulates  are :  an  unknowable 
power;  the  existence  of  knowable  likenesses  and  differ- 
ences among  the  manifestations  of  that  power;  and  a 
resulting  segregation  of  the  manifestations  into  those  of 
subject  and  object."^  Again  he  says:  "It  is  one  and  the 
same  ultimate  reality  which  is  manifested  to  us  subjec- 
tively and  objectively.  For,  while  the  nature  of  that 
which  is  manifested  under  either  form  proves  to  be  in- 
scrutable, the  order  of  its  manifestations  throughout  all 
mental  phenomena  proves  to  be  the  same  as  the  order  of 
its  manifestations  throughout  all  material  phenomena."^ 
What  better  is  such  language  than  a  conjunction  of  con- 
tradictory terms?  It  amounts  to  the  declaration  that 
manifestation  in  no  wise  manifests.  Had  the  declaration 
been  that  finite  realities  only  partially  manifest  their 
infinite  ground,  no  objection  could  be  made.  But  to 
assert  that  manifestations  do  not  in  the  slightest  degree 
fulfill  the  office  of  manifestation  is  to  indulge  in  a  bewil- 
dering use  of  speech. 

Consistency  fails  also  to  be  conserved  in  the  descriptive 
terms  which  Spencer  applies  to  the  unknowable.  It  is 
power ;  it  is  infinite ;  it  is  eternal ;  it  is  creative  in  the  sense 
of  being  that  from  which  all  things  proceed.  If  these 
terms  are  warrantable  the  unknowable  would  seem  to  be 
known  to  at  least  some  extent.  Moreover,  there  appears 
to  be  very  slight  occasion  to  confine  ourselves  to  these 
terms.  Why  should  so  much  prominence  be  given  to 
the  notion  of  power  ?    Why  should  that  aspect  of  reality 

1  First  Principles,  *  45.  »  Principles  of  Psychology,  I.  627 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    113 

be  selected,  and  be  projected  to  infinity,  while  other  as- 
pects which  are  vitally  related  to  the  worth  of  being  are 
neglected?  Why  not  also  raise  intelligence,  and  right- 
eousness, and  all  the  other  lofty  attributes  of  personality 
to  their  highest  terms,  and  count  them  characteristic  of 
the  ultimate  reality?  Spencer  assuredly  has  provided  no 
consistent  ground  for  vetoing  such  a  procedure.* 

Again,  the  consistency  of  the  Spencerian  agnosticism 
may  be  challenged  as  to  the  antithesis  which  it  affirms 
between  science  and  religion  as  dealing  respectively  with 
the  knowable  and  the  unknowable.  "Spencer  has  failed," 
says  Balfour,  "to  see  that,  if  the  certitudes  of  science  lose 
themselves  in  depths  of  unfathomable  mystery,  it  may 
well  be  that  out  of  these  same  depths  there  should  emerge 
the  certitudes  of  religion;  and  that  if  the  dependence  of 
the  knowable  upon  the  'unknowable'  embarrasses  us  not 
in  the  one  case  no  reason  can  be  assigned  why  it  should 
embarrass  us  in  the  other."^ 

Once  more,  Spencer  exhibits  a  very  scanty  degree  of 
consistency  in  at  once  admitting  the  necessity  of  religion 
and  denying  to  it  any  proper  means  of  sustenance.  His 
testimony  to  its  necessity  is  sufficiently  explicit.  "The 
universality  of  religious  ideas,"  he  says,  "their  independ- 
ent evolution  among  different  primitive  races,  and  their 
great  vitality,  unite  in  showing  that  their  source  must 
be  deep-seated  instead  of  superficial."  Referring  to  the 
religious  sentiment,  he  adds :  "Here  is  an  attribute  which, 
to  say  the  least,  has  had  an  enormous  influence — which 
has  played  a  conspicuous  part  throughout  the  entire  past 
as  far  back  as  history  records,  and  is  at  present  the  life 
of  numerous  institutions,  the  stimulus  to  perpetual  con- 
troversies, and  the  prompter  of  countless  daily  actions. 


*  Compare    Iverach,  Theism  in  the  Light  of  Present  Science  and  Phi« 
losophy,  p.  274.  ^The  Foundations  of  Belief,  p.  296. 


114  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Any  theory  which  takes  no  account  of  this  attribute  must, 
then,  be  extremely  defective."^  He  expresses  the  expec- 
tation that  this  sentiment  or  attribute  will  survive  and 
continue  to  demand  the  forming  of  conceptions  of  the 
ultimate  reality.^  But,  on  the  other  hand,he  requires 
the  religious  man  to  recognize  the  total  unlikeness  of  any 
conception  which  he  may  form  to  the  reality  for  which  it 
stands.  He  condemns  religion  to  extinguish  all  its  posi- 
tive convictions  as  false  lights,  and  to  acknowledge  that 
its  path  is  in  the  thick  darkness  of  an  absolute  mystery 
from  which  it  can  never  emerge.  In  this  way,  he  argues, 
it  will  gain  the  boon  of  a  reconciliation  with  science. 
Doubtless  in  a  sense  that  is  true;  for,  if  the  program 
should  be  strictly  carried  out,  there  would  not  be  enough 
of  religion  left  to  seriously  antagonize  science  or  any- 
thing else.  Religion  needs  something  more  than  the  bare 
postulate  of  an  absolute  about  whose  nature  and  purpose, 
if  purpose  there  be,  nothing  can  be  known.  It  cannot 
live  on  mystery  alone.  Pfleiderer  did  not  speak  too  em- 
phatically when  he  said,  "A  religion  of  nothing  but  mys- 
tery is  an  absurdity"^ ;  and  Frederic  Harrison  was  not 
guilty  of  intemperate  language  when  he  remarked,  in 
relation  to  the  Spencerian  scheme,  "It  would  be  difficult 
to  find  for  religion  a  lower  and  more  idle  part  to  play  in 
human  life  than  that  of  continually  presenting  to  man  a 
conundrum  which  he  is  told  he  must  continually  give 
up."^ 

The  second  of  the  proposed  inquiries — that  respect- 
ing the  success  of  Spencer's  attempt  to  construe  the  uni- 
verse apart  from  theistic  postulates — involves  an  in- 
spection of  certain  assumptions  and  prominent  features 


1  First  Principles,  §  4.        ^  Ibid.,  §  31.        ^  Philosophy  of  Religion,  II.  159. 
^  Nature  and  Reality  of  Religion,  a  Controversy  between  Harrison  and 
Spencer,  p.  117. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    115 

of  his  theory  of  evolution.  And  here  we  naturally  take 
note,  in  the  first  place,  of  his  characterization  of  the  per- 
sistence of  force  (otherwise  styled  the  conservation  of 
energy)  as  an  axiomatic  principle  or  datum  of  con- 
sciousness. Were  this  a  legitimate  description,  did  hu- 
man consciousness  as  such  attest  the  persistence  of  force, 
or  the  fact  of  the  "dynamic  equivalence  of  antecedents 
and  consequents  in  physical  change,"  it  would  be  a  marvel 
that  the  datum  should  so  often  have  been  ineffective. 
Why  should  naturalists  come  to  the  recognition  of  a 
truth  thus  attested  only  on  the  basis  of  a  careful  induction 
from  observed  facts  ?  "If  this  principle  lies  so  wondrous 
deep,  'deeper  even  than  demonstration,  deeper  even  than 
definite  cognition,'  then  let  Mr.  Spencer  explain  Newton's 
ignorance  of  it  and  the  general  skepticism  that  greeted  its 
enunciation  by  Mayer,  Joule,  and  Helmholtz."^ 

That  the  author  of  the  synthetic  philosophy  should 
wish  to  represent  the  principle  as  established  beyond 
question  is  intelligible  enough,  since  he  had  a  huge  task 
for  it  to  perform — making  it,  in  fact,  the  ground  from 
which  the  changes  constitutive  of  evolution  proceed  as 
"necessary  consequences."  The  task,  in  truth,  seems  to 
be  much  too  large  for  the  selected  agent.  Under  the 
closest  examination  the  persistence  of  force  cannot  be 
seen  to  explain  any  given  change  or  to  afford  a  ground 
for  predicting  any  specific  change.  It  is  not  a  formula 
which  in  any  wise  suggests  direction  of  movement.  It 
simply  implies  that  through  all  movement  and  change 
the  original  force  or  sum  of  energy  remains  intact.  On 
the  Spencerian  doctrine  of  the  unknown  nature  of  force 
the  formula  cannot  yield  any  further  inference.  As 
Malcolm  Guthrie  remarks :  "Since  we  cannot  know  the 


'James  Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  I.  216.     Compare  Bowne, 
Methodist  Review,  July,  1904, 


ii6  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

nature  of  the  original  force  or  energy,  we  can  get  no 
corollaries  from  it.  If  we  are  asked  to  draw  corollaries 
from  the  persistence  of  force,  and  we  know  not  force, 
the  stress  of  getting  the  corollaries  is  thrown  upon  the  per- 
sistence, and  the  only  corollaries  derivable  therefrom  are 
merely  that  if  one  kind  of  force  augments  another  will 
diminish,  and  vice  versa."'^  With  equal  incisiveness 
James  Ward  says :  "The  conservation  of  energy  is  not  a 
law  of  change,  still  less  a  law  of  qualities.  It  does  not 
initiate  events,  and  furnishes  absolutely  no  clue  to 
qualitative  diversity.  It  is  entirely  a  quantitative  law. 
When  energy  is  transformed  there  is  a  precise  equiva- 
lence between  the  new  form  and  the  old ;  but  of  the  cir- 
cumstances determining  transformation,  and  of  the  pos- 
sible kinds  of  transformation,  the  principle  tells  us  noth- 
mg.  2 

The  criticism  passed  upon  the  Spencerian  use  of  the 
principle  of  the  persistence  of  force  may  be  substantially 
duplicated  in  relation  to  the  famous  maxim  on  the  insta- 
bility of  the  homogeneous.  This  maxim  is  used  for  much 
more  than  it  is  worth,  and  the  ground  of  the  temptation 
thus  to  employ  it  is  quite  evident.  It  gives  an  aspect  of 
thoroughness  to  the  account  rendered  of  the  evolutionary 
process  to  represent  that  process  as  going  back  of  all 
differentiation  and  beginning  in  the  homogeneous ;  and, 
of  course,  if  the  homogeneous  is  to  serve  as  the  starting 
point  of  change,  it  must  be  unstable.  Thus  it  comes 
about  that  the  high-sounding  phrase,  the  "instability  of 
the  homogeneous,"  plays  a  great  role  in  the  synthetic 
philosophy.  The  phrase,  it  is  claimed,  gives  expression 
to  a  "universal  principle."^    Spencer  seems  to  have  found 


1  Spencer's  Unification  of  Knowledge,  pp.  46-49- 
'  Nattiralism  and  Agnosticism,  I.  214. 
»The  Factors  of  Organic  Evolution,  p.  71. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    117 

it  necessary,  however,  to  qualify  the  assumption  of  its  uni- 
versaHty,  as  was  noticed  in  another  connection.  The 
truth  is,  no  proof  can  be  given  that  the  homogeneous  is 
intrinsically  unstable.  On  the  contrary,  the  rational  sup- 
position is  that,  without  impact  from  without,  an  abso- 
lutely homogeneous  aggregate  of  being  would  be  incap- 
able of  inaugurating  any  change.  And  even  if  instability 
were  predicable  of  the  homogeneous,  this  principle  would 
account  only  for  the  fact  of  change  in  general,  without 
affording  any  insight  at  all  into  the  reasons  for  specific 
changes.  As  a  means  of  explaining  the  actual  universe 
the  maxim  of  the  instability  of  the  homogeneous  is  per- 
fectly barren  and  impotent. 

What  has  been  said  affords  means  of  judgmg  the  gen- 
eral formula  of  evolution  as  set  forth  by  Spencer.^  Like 
the  maxims  on  which  it  purports  to  be  founded,  it  is  bar- 
ren. Being  of  the  nature  of  vague,  external  description, 
it  affords  no  guidance  to  a  real  insight  into  the  evolution- 
ary movement.  "The  requirement  of  the  situation  is  not 
that  the  philosopher  should  tell  us  (truly  enough)  that 
evolution  involves  both  shrinkings  and  swellings,  both 
mixings  and  sortings,  both  variety  and  order,  but  that  he 
should  show  us  hozv  these  various  tendencies  are,  in  the 
various  types  of  evolutionary  process,  kept  in  that  peculiar 
balance  which,  each  time,  constitutes  an  evolution.  This 
is  what  Spencer  seems  not  to  have  done.'" 

Notwithstanding  the  generality  of  the  formula  which 
Spencer  employs  to  describe  the  evolutionary  process, 
the  formula  falls  far  short  of  covering  the  facts.  The 
purely  materialistic  terms  in  which  it  is  expressed  make 
it  of  impossible  application  to  wide  domains.  "Evolu- 
tion," as  has  been  well  said,  "may  be  applied  to  mind  as 

*See  p.  106. 

'Royce,  Herbert  Spencer,  an  Estimate  and  Review,  pp.  114,  115. 


Ii8  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

well  as  to  matter  in  the  sense  of  growing  complexity; 
but  what  shall  we  make  of  the  statement  that  there  is  an 
'integration  of  matter  and  concomitant  dissipation  of 
motion,  during  which  the  matter  passes  from  an  indefinite 
incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite  coherent  hetero- 
geneity, and  during  which  the  retained  motion  undergoes 
a  parallel  transformation'?  Thought  cannot  be  stated 
in  terms  of  matter  and  motion ;  there  is  a  gulf  between  the 
two.  No  doubt  brain  may  grow  more  and  more  complex 
as  mind  advances;  but  that  is  a  physiological  truth,  not 
a  truth  of  psychology.  Even  if,  then,  this  science  exem- 
plifies the  evolutionary  tendency  to  complexity,  it  does 
not  and  cannot  fulfill  Spencer's  formulated  law  of  evo- 
lution. The  case  is  no  less  clear  as  regards  sociology  and 
ethics."^ 

It  follows  that,  in  defining  philosophy  as  "completely 
unified  knowledge,"^  Spencer  has  implicitly  rendered  an 
adverse  judgment  on  the  philosophical  character  of  his 
own  system.  He  has  not  given  a  unified  view  of  reality. 
In  spite  of  the  formula  which  is  propounded  as  all-em- 
bracing he  presents  us  with  disparate  realms  respecting 
the  interconnection  of  which,  or  the  method  of  transition 
from  one  to  the  other,  no  intelligible  account  is  given. 
A  relation  of  analogy  or  general  resemblance  is  indeed 
established  between  the  purely  physical,  the  biological,  the 
psychological,  and  the  sociological,  in  so  far  as  in  each 
of  these  spheres  there  is  an  apparent  advance  from  sim- 
plicity to  complexity;  but  the  mystery  which  separates 
one  sphere  from  another  is  not  vanquished.  We  look  in 
vain  in  the  Spencerian  system  for  the  self-consistent, 
unified  representation  of  reality.  The  inadequacy  of  the 
physical  formulas,  which  have  such  a  controlling  place  in 


1  Mackintosh,  From  Comte  to  Benjamin  Kidd,  p.  84. 
'First  Principles,  5  37. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    119 

his  philosophy,  stands  effectually  in  the  way  of  success 
in  the  attempt  at  unification. 

We  find,  then,  that  Spencer's  endeavor  to  construe  the 
universe  apart  from  theistic  premises  was  essentially 
futile.  The  believer  in  an  absolute  which  is  more  than 
an  indefinable  somewhat,  which  in  the  height  and  fullness 
of  its  attributes  answers  to  the  conception  of  the  absolute 
person,  can  only  have  his  faith  strengthened  by  the  out- 
come of  the  Spencerian  philosophy.  The  scientific  con- 
clusion that  evolution  is  a  great  fact  may  be,  and  prob- 
ably is,  well  grounded;  but  evolution  theory,  if  we  may 
judge  by  the  system  under  review,  runs  into  vain  pre- 
tense when  it  assumes  to  dispense  with  tlie  need  of  divine 
intelligence  and  purposeful  action. 

III. — Features  of  Haeckel's  Evolutionism 
Haeckel's  scheme  for  construing  the  universe  was  so 
largely  indicated  in  connection  with  the  exposition  of 
materialistic  theories  that  only  a  few  supplementary 
statements  are  needed.  Moreover,  the  character  of  his 
adventures  in  the  domain  of  philosophy  is  not  such  as  to 
justify  lengthy  consideration.  Any  distinction  which  at- 
taches to  his  name  pertains  to  achievements  in  specific 
lines  of  scientific  investigation.  As  respects  a  philoso- 
phical justification  and  exposition  of  evolutionism,  his 
significance  is  exceedingly  slight. 

In  regard  to  form,  Haeckel's  disquisition  contrasts  with 
that  of  Spencer  as  giving  less  space  to  metaphysical 
elaboration.  While  the  latter  exhibits  a  certain  delight  in 
subtle  reasoning,  the  former  is  so  prodigal  of  dogmatic 
assertion  that  one  is  disposed  to  inquire  where  he  obtained 
his  diploma  to  practice  as  a  pope  in  the  world  of  philoso- 
phy. In  harmony  with  this  feature  Haeckel  treats  the 
question  of  theism  with  much  less  reser\^e  than  does  the 


120  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

English  expositor  of  evolution.  He  will  not  admit  the 
remotest  possibility  that  the  world-ground  can  be  per- 
sonal. With  a  mental  decision  which  can  more  properly 
be  termed  gnostic  than  agnostic,  he  turns  the  theistic  con- 
ception out  of  doors  as  being  absolutely  incompatible  with 
scientific  verities.  In  comparison  with  the  unrestrained 
expression  of  antipathies  indulged  in  by  Haeckel  the  atti- 
tude of  Spencer  toward  the  traditional  ideals  of  religion 
might  almost  be  described  as  polite. 

In  construing  the  primordial  being  or  substance, 
Haeckel,  as  has  been  indicated,  makes  it  a  composite,  con- 
stituted largely,  if  not  exclusively,  of  very  minute  par- 
ticles. Respecting  the  ether,  which  is  assumed  to  fill  up 
the  spaces  between  the  more  palpable  entities  which  are 
made  up  of  mass  atoms,  he  is  not  fully  decided.  "This 
extremely  light  and  attenuated  ether,"  he  says,  "causes 
by  its  vibrations  all  the  phenomena  of  light  and  heat, 
electricity  and  magnetism.  We  can  imagine  it  either  as 
a  continuous  substance  occupying  the  space  between  the 
mass  atoms  or  as  composed  of  separate  particles ;  in  the 
latter  case  we  might  perhaps  attribute  to  these  ether  atoms 
an  inherent  power  of  repulsion  in  contrast  with  the  im- 
manent attracting  power  of  the  mass  atoms,  and  the  whole 
mechanism  of  cosmic  life  would  then  be  reducible  to  the 
attraction  of  the  latter  and  the  repulsion  of  the  former."^ 
While  allowing  a  problematic  element  in  regard  to  the 
nature  of  the  ether  and  also  of  its  precise  relation  to  the 
mass  atoms,  Haeckel  is  positive  in  the  conviction  that  in 
these  forms  of  being  the  whole  sum  of  original  existence 
was  comprised,  and  that  from  this  ground  the  universe, 
as  known  in  experience,  was  derived  by  a  slow  process  of 
evolution.  "At  the  outset,"  he  afiirms,  "there  is  nothing 
in  infinite  space  but  mobile,  elastic  ether  and  innumerable 

*  Monism  as  Connecting  Religion  and  Science,  p.  21. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM   121 

separate  particles — the  primitive  atoms  scattered  through- 
out it  in  the  form  of  dust."^ 

A  pecuHarity  in  the  theory  of  Haeckel  is  his  claim  that 
the  atoms  possess  in  some  sort  a  psychical  character.  He 
denies,  indeed,  that  they  have  consciousness,^  but  holds 
that  they  are  characterized  by  sensation,  these  two  being 
"different  physiological  functions,  which  are  by  no  means 
necessarily  associated."  He  admits  that  most  chemists 
and  physicists  repudiate  the  notion  of  atomic  sensation. 
His  own  faith,  however,  in  this  notion  is  very  decided. 
"Every  shade,"  he  says,  "of  inclination,  from  complete 
indifference  to  the  fiercest  passion,  is  exemplified  in  the 
chemical  relation  of  the  various  elements  toward  each 
other,  just  as  we  find  in  the  psychology  of  man,  and  es- 
pecially in  the  life  of  the  sexes.  .  .  .  Even  the  atom 
is  not  without  a  rudimentary  form  of  sensation  and  will, 
or,  as  it  is  better  expressed,  of  feeling  and  inclination."^ 
"When  we  rub  together  sulphur  and  mercury,  two  totally 
different  elements,  the  atoms  of  the  finely  divided  matter 
combine  and  form  a  third  and  different  chemical  body, 
cinnabar.  How  would  this  simple  synthesis  be  possible 
unless  the  two  elements  feel  each  other,  move  toward  each 
other,  and  then  unite?"*  Thus  the  scientist,  who  is  so 
ready  to  lampoon  the  historical  embodiments  of  religious 
thoughts,  constructs  on  his  own  account  a  fantastic 
mythology. 

The  imputation  of  a  psychical  characteristic  to  the 
primitive  atoms  might  seem  to  have  a  certain  advantage 
over  the  purely  materialistic  theory  as  implying  a  less 
magical  genesis  of  mind  or  soul.  But  the  advantage 
amounts  to  very  little  so  far  as  the  system  of  Haeckel  is 


*  Monism,  p.  34. 

^The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  pp.  179,  180;  Wonders  of  Life,  pp.  zSg,  290. 

*The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  pp.  224,  225.         *  Wonders  of  Life,  p.  309. 


122  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

concerned.  He  gives  no  sort  of  an  explanation  of  how 
these  ultimate  and  irreducible  individuals,  called  atoms, 
which  are  assumed  to  be  dowered  with  sensation  but  to 
be  void  of  consciousness,  can  be  combined  into  a  unitary 
conscious  subject.  Furthermore,  he  as  good  as  ignores 
the  psychic  element  in  the  atoms,  assigning  to  it  no  intel- 
ligible function  in  the  production  of  the  thinking  con- 
scious self,  but  referring  all  to  physical  and  chemical 
agency.  "Consciousness,"  he  says,  "like  all  the  other 
mental  powers,  is  a  function  of  the  brain,  and  may  be  re- 
duced to  physical  and  chemical  processes  in  the  cells  of  the 
cortex."  Again,  in  a  passage  already  cited,  he  remarks, 
"The  soul  is  merely  a  collective  title  to  the  sum  total  of 
man's  cerebral  functions ;  and  these  are  just  as  much  de- 
termined by  physical  and  chemical  processes  as  are  any 
of  the  other  vital  functions,  and  just  as  amenable  to  the 
law  of  substance."^  In  short,  the  verbal  acknowledgment 
of  a  primitive  psychical  element  cannot  be  seen  to  modify 
appreciably  the  essential  materialism  of  Haeckel's  system. 
Haeckel's  substitute  for  a  personal  God  is  about  as 
strange  as  are  his  mythological  atoms  with  their  loves  and 
hates.  In  one  connection  he  says :  "Religion  in  its  rea- 
sonable forms  can  take  over  the  ether  theory  as  an  article 
of  faith,  bringing  into  contradistinction  the  mobile  cosmic 
ether  as  creating  divinity,  and  the  inert,  heavy  mass  as 
material  of  creation. "^  That  both  of  these  factors  may 
properly  enter  into  the  definition  of  God  is  indicated  in 
this  statement :  "We  might  represent  God  as  the  infinite 
sum  of  natural  forces,  the  sum  of  all  atomic  forces  and 
ether  vibrations."^  To  make  God  thus  a  sum,  a  being 
reached  by  the  addition  of  one  infinitesimal  entity  or  ac- 
tivity to  another,  has  its  difficulty  for  philosophical  think- 


1  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  p.  204  ^  Monism,  p.  24 

*Ibid.,  pp.  78,  79. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    123 

ing.  There  is  also  this  perplexing  fact,  that,  according 
to  the  judgment  of  Haeckel,  atomic  forces  and  ether 
vibrations  exhibit  very  largely  the  reverse  of  both  wisdom 
and  benevolence.  They  combine  to  make  a  world  which 
is  the  scene  of  an  "unceasing  and  terrible  war  of  exist- 
ence," a  world  in  which  it  is  impossible  to  detect  wise 
providence  or  moral  order.^  It  follows,  therefore,  with 
indisputable  logic  from  the  premises  of  Haeckel  that  his 
God  is  at  best  a  union  of  the  divine  and  the  diabolical,  so 
that  he  is  parading  a  transparent  abstraction  when  he  sets 
up  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good  as  the  object  of 
worship.  Possibly  an  inkling  of  the  shabbiness  of  the 
substitute  which  he  offered  for  Christian  theism  may  ex- 
plain the  small  ambition  which  he  has  exhibited  to  go 
forward  with  his  attempt  to  found  a  monistic  religion. 

IV. — Recent  Teachings  More  or  Less  Affiliated 
WITH  Agnostic  or  with  Antitheistic  Premises 

The  teaching  of  Albrecht  Ritschl  and  also  of  his  school, 
as  represented  by  Herrmann,  Kaftan,  Harnack,  Reischle, 
and  others,  deserves  no  association  with  antitheistic  specu- 
lation and  only  a  qualified  one  with  agnosticism.  The 
occasion,  therefore,  for  mentioning  that  teaching  in  this 
connection  is  not  very  cogent,  except  as  there  is  a  demand 
for  a  judicial  estimate  of  the  position  of  a  party  which  has 
been  the  subject  of  somewhat  diverse  judgments. 

The  challenge  of  Ritschl  was  directed  not  so  much 
against  the  trustworthiness  of  religious  or  theological  con- 
victions as  against  the  competency  of  metaphysics  to  make 
any  real  contribution  to  the  subject-matter  of  religion  or 
theology.  In  thus  limiting  the  office  of  metaphysics  he 
was  not  appropriating  the  platform  of  a  radical  phenome- 
nalism or  positivism.    With  Lotze,  he  qualified  the  Kan- 

^  Monism,  pp.  71-74;  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  pp.  272-274. 


124  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

tian  antithesis  between  phenomena  and  things-in-them- 
selves,  and  held  that  through  phenomena  we  have  a  real, 
though  partial,  knowledge  of  things.  He  also  credited 
to  metaphysics  a  useful  office  on  the  side  of  method.  In 
so  far  as  it  is  concerned  with  the  theory  of  knowledge  it 
furnishes  a  proper  conception  of  the  limitations  which  at- 
tach to  speculative  thinking,  and  thus  advises  against 
placing  too  large  a  dependence  upon  that  instrumentality. 
But  at  this  point  its  good  offices  come  to  an  end.  It  can 
furnish  nothing  better  than  a  general  conception  of  the 
world-ground,  a  conception  which  is  quite  incapable  of 
being  put  to  theological  use.  The  true  basis  for  theology 
is  not  contained  in  the  findings  of  pure  intellect  or  in 
judgments  of  truth;  it  is  found  rather  in  the  historical 
and  experiential,  in  revelation  accredited  to  the  indi- 
vidual by  the  response  which  it  calls  forth  in  his  emotional 
and  volitional  nature.  The  objects  of  faith  are  made  such 
by  the  worth  with  which  they  are  invested.  They  are,  in- 
deed, accounted  real,  but  confidence  in  their  reality  is 
based  in  the  sense  of  their  value.  Judgments  of  value 
constitute  thus  the  characteristic  function  of  the  religious 
man  and  furnish  the  one  available  ground  for  theological 
construction.  This  is  the  great  contention  of  the  Ritsch- 
lian  school.  While  not  entirely  uniform  in  their  concep- 
tions, the  members  of  that  school  make  much  account  of 
the  antithesis  between  the  theoretical  and  the  practical, 
between  judgments  of  truth  and  judgments  of  value,  and 
emphasize  the  latter  as  properly  controlling  the  subject- 
matter  of  theology. 

As  against  the  overplus  of  the  theoretical  element, 
which  often  has  cumbered  the  theological  domain,  the 
Ritschlian  point  of  view  is  doubtless  very  largely  in  the 
right.  Still  it  is  properly  subject  to  criticism  as  making 
a  somewhat  artificial  contrast  between  the  theoretical  and 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM   125 

the  practical,  between  the  demands  of  intellect  and  the  re- 
quirements of  the  emotional  and  volitional  nature.  In 
so  far  as  judgments  are  supposed  to  conform  only  to  the 
latter  class  of  demands,  a  species  of  agnostic  disparage- 
ment is  visited  upon  them.  Generally  speaking,  judg- 
ments do  not  belong  exclusively  to  the  one  domain  or  the 
other.  The  nature  of  man  requires  satisfaction  on  its 
intellectual  side,  and  necessarily  recognizes,  implicitly  or 
explicitly,  a  worth  in  that  which  renders  the  satisfaction. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  apparent  worth  of  objects  which 
appeal  to  the  emotional  and  volitional  nature  of  man  can- 
not to  be  altogether  independent  of  an  estimate  of  their 
truth  or  their  harmonious  relation  to  the  general  system 
of  reality.  From  this  point  of  view  metaphysical  inquiry 
becomes  pertinent.  Indeed,  it  is  in  constant  demand  as 
an  auxiliary  of  a  scientific  Christian  theology.  Even  if 
metaphysics  cannot  say  the  decisive  word  on  most  theo- 
logical questions,  it  has  a  highly  important  office  to  fulfill 
in  showing  that  no  datum  of  reason  stands  against  any 
essential  tenet  of  the  Christian  system.  While  it  is  no 
substitute  for  the  value  judgment,  it  is  capable  of  serving 
as  a  useful  supplement  thereto.  In  order  to  afford  a  firm 
basis  of  confidence  the  value  judgment  needs  to  furnish 
guarantees  that  it  is  not  merely  personal,  or  the  product 
of  an  eccentric  subjectivity.  In  supplying  such  guaran- 
tees the  best  work  will  not  be  done  short  of  thorough 
inquiry  in  the  field  of  metaphysics  as  well  as  in  that  of 
history.  Of  course,  the  religious  man  cannot  wait  for 
such  work,  but  directly  or  indirectly  he  may  reap  from  it 
no  inconsiderable  benefit.^ 


^  See  Ritschl,  Theologie  und  Metaphysik;  also  The  Christian  Doctrine  of 
Justification  and  Reconciliation;  Herrmann,  The  Communion  of  the  Chris- 
tian with  God;  Kaftan,  Das  Wesen  der  Christlichen  Religion:  Reischle, 
"Werturtheile  und  Glaubensurtheile;  Ecke.  Theologische  Schule  Ritschl's; 
Garvie,  The    Ritschlian  Theology;    Flugel,   Ritschl's   Philosophische  und 


126  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

A  party  among  French  Protestants  has  advocated  a 
conception  of  the  basis  of  Christian  theology  which  is  not 
unhke  the  RitschHan.  It  makes  faith,  in  the  sense  of 
Hducia,  the  central  element  in  religion,  emphasizes  expe- 
rience of  the  moral  and  religious  order  as  the  one  valid 
basis  of  doctrinal  construction,  and  insists  upon  the  sym- 
bolical character  of  all  the  terms  which  attempt  to  express 
the  objects  of  religious  thought  and  feeling.  The  stand- 
point of  the  party  may  be  judged  from  the  following 
statements  of  a  prominent  representative,  Auguste  Saba- 
tier :  "What  is  not  in  religious  experience  should  find  no 
place  in  religious  science  and  should  be  banished  from 
it.  .  .  .  Rational  truths  not  born  of  religious  feel- 
ing would  be  in  dogmatics  so  many  dead  weights  and 
heterogeneous  elements,  which  would  lead  to  the  greatest 
incoherence.  .  .  .  The  object  of  religious  knowl- 
edge only  reveals  itself  in  the  subject  of  the  religious 
phenomena  themselves.  .  .  .  God  only  reveals  him- 
self in  and  by  piety."^  "With  Schleiermacher  the  Protest- 
ant consciousness  finally  passed  the  strait  which  separates 
the  theology  of  authority  from  the  theology  of  experience. 
Religious  truth  could  no  longer  be  given  by  an  oracle; 
henceforth  it  must  spring  out  of  Christian  experience  it- 
self, and  never  cease  to  reproduce  itself  in  pious  souls, 
under  the  permanent  influence  of  the  Spirit  of  Christ. 
Holy  Scripture  could  no  longer  be  the  foundation  of  faith  ; 
it  became  an  auxiliary,  a  means  of  grace."^  "Religious 
knowledge  is  symbolical.  All  the  notions  it  forms  and 
organizes,  from  the  first  metaphor  created  by  religious 
feeling  to  the  most  abstract  theological  speculation,  are 

Theologische  Ansichten;  Pfleiderer,  Die  Ritschl'sche  Theologie;  Swing,  The 
Theology  of  Ritschl;  Orr,  The  Ritschlian  Theology  and  the  Evangelical 
Faith ;  Keirstead,  Metaphysical  Presuppositions  of  Ritschl,  American  Jour- 
nal of  Theology,  Oct.,  1905. 

1  Outlines  of  Philosophy  of  Religion,  pp.  273-308. 

^  Religions  of  Authority  and  the  Religion  of  the  Spirit,  p.  210. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM   127 

necessarily  inadequate  to  their  object.  .  .  .  Symbols 
are  the  only  language  suited  to  religion.  We  need  to 
know  that  which  we  adore;  but  it  is  not  less  necessary 
that  we  should  not  comprehend  it,  for  one  does  not  adore 
that  which  he  comprehends  too  clearly,  because  to  com- 
prehend is  to  dominate.  Such  is  the  twofold  and  con- 
tradictory condition  of  piety,  to  which  symbols  seem  to 
be  made  expressly  to  respond.  Piety  has  never  had  any 
other  language."^ 

The  general  theory  of  Sabatier,  like  that  of  Ritschl, 
doubtless  has  its  rights,  as  against  much  of  the  specula- 
tive elaboration  of  past  times.  Some  of  its  statements, 
however,  savor  of  a  one-sided  subjectivity.  As  respects 
the  degree  of  agnosticism  pertaining  to  his  scheme,  the 
verdict  must  depend  upon  the  sense  in  which  he  is  under- 
stood to  make  the  expressions  of  religious  truths  symboli- 
cal. If  the  symbols  are  construed  as  mere  arbitrary  signs, 
then  we  have  the  pronounced  agnosticism  of  Spencer. 
But  Sabatier  and  his  associates  seem  not  to  have  taken 
them  in  that  sense.  They  are  not,  therefore,  chargeable 
with  a  radical  agnosticism. 

In  Benjamin  Kidd's  exposition  of  social  evolution  ex- 
pressions occur  which  seem  to  savor  of  agnosticism,  in 
that  they  place  religion  outside  the  domain  of  reason. 
"There  can  never  be,"  he  says,  "such  a  thing  as  a  ra- 
tional religion.  The  essential  element  in  all  religious 
beliefs  must  apparently  be  the  ultra-rational  sanction 
which  they  provide  for  social  conduct.  When  the  fun- 
damental nature  of  the  problem  involved  in  our  social 
evolution  is  understood  it  must  become  clear  that  that 
general  instinct  which  may  be  distinguished  in  the  minds 
of  men  around  us  is  in  the  main  correct,  and  that  no  form 


*  Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion,  pp.  322,  327. 


128  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

of  belief  is  capable  of  functioning  as  a  religion  in  the 
evolution  of  society  which  does  not  provide  an  ultra- 
rational  sanction  for  social  conduct  in  the  individual.  In 
other  words,  a  rational  religion  is  a  scientific  impossi- 
bility, representing  from  the  nature  of  the  case  an  inher- 
ent contradiction  of  terms. "^ 

Such  language  might  seem  to  challenge  the  claim  of 
religion  to  respect.  But  it  was  quite  remote  from  the 
intention  of  Mr.  Kidd  to  have  his  words  taken  as  a  war- 
rant for  disparagement.  On  the  contrary,  he  maintains 
that  nothing  in  evolutionary  theory  or  modern  discovery 
tends  properly  to  diminish  our  estimate  of  the  value  and 
necessity  of  religion.  He  ascribes  to  it  a  utilitarian  func- 
tion of  immense  import,  and  criticises  the  account  which 
Spencer  gives  of  it  in  his  Sociology  as  being  beneath  the 
demands  of  the  subject.  "It  is  hard,"  he  says,  "to  follow 
the  author,  in  his  theories  of  the  development  of  religious 
beliefs  from  ghosts  and  ancestor  worship,  without  a  con- 
tinual feeling  of  disappointment,  and  even  impatience, 
at  the  triviality  and  comparative  insignificance  of  the 
explanations  offered  to  account  for  the  development  of 
such  an  imposing  class  of  social  phenomena. "^ 

A  large  part  of  the  explanation  of  the  ultra-rational 
character  assigned  to  religion  by  Mr.  Kidd  is  contained 
in  his  conception  of  the  office  of  reason.  What  reason 
has  to  do  is  simply  to  direct  man  in  the  path  of  self-inter- 
est. It  never  dictates  the  sacrifice  of  self.  There  is  in  it 
no  element  of  altruism.  Its  gaze  is  always  fixed  upon  the 
good  of  the  individual,  not  upon  that  of  society.  A  man 
becomes  the  servant  of  his  kind  only  through  the  con- 
straint of  a  power  in  conflict  with  his  reason,  and  that 
power  is,  above  all,  religion. 

In  this  representation  justice  is  not  done  to  reason,  and 

»  Social  Evolution,  pp.  io8,  109.  ^  Ibid,  pp.  22-24. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    129 

therefore  fails  also  to  be  done  to  religion.  Reason  is  shut 
up  to  the  contemplation  of  self-interest,  of  self-interest  in 
the  sense  of  immediate  gratifications  of  a  purely  self-re- 
garding order.  But  why  may  not  reason  take  the  larger 
view,  in  which  the  antithesis  between  the  interest  of  self 
and  the  interest  of  one's  fellows  is  for  the  most  part  over- 
come? Why  may  it  not  recognize  that  the  isolated  life 
is  barren  and  desolate,  that  withholding  impoverishes, 
that  giving  enriches,  that  no  investment  can  bring  such 
revenue  to  man's  spirit  as  expenditure  for  the  well-being 
and  happiness  of  others  ?  This  certainly  must  be  the  case 
if  wisdom,  righteousness,  and  benevolence  are  back  of  the 
world  system  in  which  man  is  inclosed.  Thus,  while  self- 
interest  is  far  from  being  the  only  motive  in  the  perform- 
ance of  social  offices,  there  is  no  essential  antagonism 
between  it  and  such  offices,  and  reason  is  not  tied  up  to 
the  one  as  against  the  other.  In  the  larger  view  reason  is 
seen  to  join  hands  with  altruism,  and  the  occasion  falls 
away  to  consider  religion  as  ultra-rational  or  as  the  source 
of  an  ultra-rational  sanction. 

The  very  subtle  treatise  of  F.  H.  Bradley,  entitled 
Appearance  and  Reality,  recalls  both  Hegel  and  Schel- 
ling.  An  affinity  with  the  thinking  of  the  former  is  ap- 
parent in  the  close  association  which  is  made  between 
reality  and  experience,  or  rather  in  the  identification  of 
all  reality  with  the  experience  of  absolute  spirit.  Thus 
it  is  said,  "Reality  is  sentient  experience.  To  be  real 
is  to  be  indissolubly  one  thing  with  sentience.  It  is  to  be 
something  which  comes  as  a  feature  and  aspect  within 
one  whole  of  feeling,  something  which,  except  as  an  in- 
tegral element  of  such  sentience,  has  no  meaning  at  all. 
.  .  .  Every  element  of  the  universe,  sensation,  feeling, 
thought,  and  will,  must  be  included  within  one  compre- 


130  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

hensive  sentience.  .  .  ,  There  is  but  one  reality,  and  its 
being  consists  in  experience.  In  this  one  whole  all  appear- 
ances come  together."^  The  point  of  affinity  with  Schel- 
ling  lies  in  the  conception  that  the  absolute  is  above  all 
contrasts,  being  that  in  which  all  distinctions,  if  not 
strictly  obliterated,  are  so  transformed  as  to  be  quite 
beyond  any  power  of  representation  with  which  we  are 
endowed.  "Spirit,"  says  Bradley,  "is  a  unity  of  the  mani- 
fold in  which  the  externality  of  the  manifold  has  utterly 
ceased.  ...  It  is  above  the  relational  form  and  has 
absorbed  it  in  a  higher  unity,  a  whole  in  which  there  is 
no  division  between  elements  and  laws.  .  .  .  Pure  spirit 
is  not  realized  except  in  the  absolute."^  "We  have 
no  knowledge  of  a  plural  diversity,  nor  can  we  attach 
any  sense  to  it,  if  we  do  not  have  it  somehow  as 
one."3 

Formally  considered,  Bradley's  teaching  is  not  emphati- 
cally agnostic.  In  fact, he  is  far  from  approving  the  Spen- 
cerian  talk  about  the  unknowable.  "The  unknowable," 
he  says,  "must  be  prepared  to  deserve  the  name  or  not. 
But,  if  it  actually  were  not  knowable,  we  could  not  know 
that  such  a  thing  existed."^  "To  say  that  reality  is  such 
that  our  knowledge  cannot  reach  it,  is  a  claim  to  know 
reality;  to  urge  that  our  knowledge  is  of  a  kind  which 
must  fail  to  transcend  appearance,  itself  implies  that 
transcendence.  For,  if  we  had  no  idea  of  a  beyond,  we 
should  assuredly  not  know  how  to  talk  about  failure  or 
success.  And  the  test  by  which  we  distinguish  them  must 
obviously  be  some  acquaintance  with  the  nature  of  the 
goal.  ...  I  am  so  bold  as  to  believe  that  we  have  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  absolute,  certain  and  real,  though  I  am  sure 
that  our  comprehension  is  miserably  incomplete.     But 


'Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  146,  159,  455.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  499- 

^  Ibid.,  p.  141.  *Ibid.,  p.  129. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    131 

I  dissent  emphatically  from  the  conclusion  that,  because 
imperfect,  it  is  worthless."^ 

Though  repudiating  a  sweeping  denial  of  our  com- 
petency to  know  the  absolute,  Bradley's  teaching  is  both 
agnostic  and  antitheistic  in  tendency.  It  is  chargeable 
with  both  characteristics  for  the  same  reason,  namely, 
a  denial  of  the  proper  applicability  to  the  absolute  of  the 
categories  by  which  personal  and  ethical  being  is  repre- 
sented to  our  minds.  Even  the  term  God  is  declared  to 
be  inapplicable,  as  standing  for  a  too  partial  and  figurate 
conception.  "We  may  say  that  God  is  not  God  till  he  has 
become  all  in  all,  and  that  a  God  which  is  all  in  all  is  not 
the  God  of  religion.  God  is  but  an  aspect,  and  that  must 
mean  but  an  appearance,  of  the  absolute."^  There  is  no 
propriety,  it  is  maintained,  in  calling  the  absolute  personal, 
or  good,  or  beautiful.  It  has  indeed  personality,  good- 
ness, and  beauty ;  but  it  is  not  any  one  of  these  any  more 
than  it  is  their  opposites.  It  is  to  be  considered  not  so 
much  personal  and  moral  as  super-personal  and  super- 
moral.  In  other  words,  if  we  catch  Bradley's  meaning 
we  are  only  authorized  to  assume  in  the  absolute  the  inde- 
finable grounds  of  that  which  comes  forth  in  the  realm 
of  appearances  as  personal,  moral,  and  beautiful.^  Being 
thus  forbidden  to  employ  the  highest  categories  which 
have  any  meaning  for  our  minds,  we  are  left  by  Bradley's 
speculation  with  exceedingly  scanty  means  for  represent- 
ing the  absolute.  The  primal  unity  of  Neo-Platonism  could 
not  make  a  more  dim  or  distant  object  for  our  thought. 

This  barren  outcome  may  be  regarded  as  the  product 
of  an  intemperate  effort  to  push  thought  beyond  the  plane 
of  all  distinctions.  Bradley  is  by  far  too  intolerant  of 
the  notion  of  an  intelligible  manifoldness  or  diversity  as 


*  Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  2,  3  ^  Ibid.,  p.  448. 

Mbid.,  pp.  173,  402,  488.  533. 


132  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

pertaining  to  ultimate  being.  He  exaggerates  the  logical 
demand  for  representing  the  real  and  ultimate  as  that 
which  is  above  all  difference,  or  at  least  above  all  nama- 
ble  difference.  The  greater  demand  lies  on  the  side  of 
so  construing  the  absolute  that  a  satisfactory  account  can 
be  given  of  the  manifold  in  the  universe,  and  especially 
of  the  diversities  of  which  we  are  immediately  cognizant 
as  self-conscious  personalities.  That  the  universe  con- 
tains that  which  appears  to  us  as  impersonal  affords 
small  occasion  for  positing  a  nonpersonal  ground,  since 
will  is  a  fundamental  element  in  the  conception  of  person- 
ality, and  the  energizing  of  a  personal,  infinite  will  is  the 
most  intelligible  account  that  can  be  given  of  that  impres- 
sion of  an  external  world  which  forms  part  of  the  experi- 
ence of  finite  personalities. 

It  might  be  expected  that  reference  would  be  made  in 
this  connection  to  Professor  Huxley,  since  he  both  in- 
vented the  term  "agnosticism"  and  declared  it  descriptive 
of  his  own  standpoint.  But  Huxley  was  little  concerned 
with  the  deeper  problems  of  speculation.  As  an  agnostic 
he  devoted  himself  principally  to  the  task  of  vexing  the 
theologians  on  questions  which  touch  the  province  of  bib- 
lical criticism ;  and  here  the  products  of  his  pen  were  not 
of  sufficient  import  to  claim  much  attention  from  any 
but  the  contemporary  generation.  In  so  far  as  he  battled 
to  secure  a  fair  hearing  for  science  he  is  deserving  of 
respect  and  praise.  But  the  spirit  which  he  manifested 
in  his  excursions  into  the  theological  domain  was  not 
particularly  scientific.  "In  his  temper  and  mental  habits, 
in  his  attitude  toward  what  he  believed  the  truth,  Huxley 
was  as  veritable  a  dogmatist  as  any  of  his  theological  an- 
tagonists."^ 

^  Schurman,  Agnosticism  and  Religion,  p.  12. 


AGNOSTIC  AND  ANTITHEISTIC  EVOLUTIONISM    133 

Other  names  associated  with  agnostic  or  antitheistic 
theories  might  be  mentioned;  but  most  of  them  do  not 
stand  for  any  distinctive  type  outside  of  those  already 
characterized.  Probably  the  teaching  of  E.  de  Roberty 
has  as  much  claim  to  peculiarity  as  any.  In  form  that 
teaching  is  very  largely  a  polemic  against  agnosticism, 
representing  Comte,  Spencer,  and  kindred  speculators  as 
fulfilling,  in  spite  of  their  antipathy  toward  theology  and 
metaphysics,  a  theological  and  metaphysical  role  in  their 
postulate  of  the  unknowable.  "Religious  faith  or  meta- 
physics and  the  beliefs  of  agnosticism,"  says  De  Roberty, 
"appear  to  us  as  perfectly  homologous  groups  of  sociolog- 
ical phenomena,  fulfilling  essentially  the  same  functions 
and  following  the  same  laws  of  metamorphosis.  .  .  .  The 
supernatural  and  the  unknowable  are  only  two  different 
names  applied  to  one  and  the  same  object.  .  .  .  The  un- 
knowable is  well-nigh  the  only  phantom  of  the  theological 
past  of  humanity  which  has  not  been  exorcised  by 
science."^  All  such  unreal  abstractions,  it  is  asserted,  as 
the  unknowable  and  the  absolute  should  be  discarded.  In 
their  place  it  suffices  to  speak  of  the  verifiable  and  the 
unveriiiable,  and  it  should  be  recognized  that  the  prov- 
inces to  which  these  terms  respectively  apply  are  of  chang- 
ing boundaries.  In  the  normal  mental  process  account 
will  be  taken  only  of  the  results  reached  by  the  concrete 
sciences  and  of  such  deductions  as  are  legitimated  by  these 
results. 

Evidently  the  tenor  of  De  Roberty's  teaching  implies 
that  the  subject-matter  of  theology  and  religion  lies  out- 
side the  range  of  scientific  deductions.  His  scheme,  there- 
fore, as  repudiating  an  attempt  to  construe  ultimate 
reality,  is  of  the  agnostic  type,  notwithstanding  its  seem- 
ing hostility  to  agnosticism.     Neither  is  it  consistent  or 

*  L'Inconnaissable,  pp.  24,  25,  56. 


134  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

profound  in  the  contempt  which  it  expresses  for  meta- 
physics. No  one  reasons  without  resort  to  metaphysical 
premises.  There  is  absolutely  no  safeguard  against  the 
mischief  of  a  faulty  metaphysics,  except  that  which  is  to 
be  found  in  a  sound  metaphysics.  As  Professor  James 
has  remarked,  "Metaphysics  means  only  an  unusually  ob- 
stinate attempt  to  think  clearly  and  consistently."^ 

1  Cited  by  H.  C.  King,  Theology  and  the  Social  Consciousness,  p.  36. 


CHAPTER  V 

PESSIMISM 

I. — The  Teaching  of  Schopenhauer 

As  a  form  of  philosophy  pessimism,  in  its  Occidental 
phase,  belongs  mainly  to  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  It  is  true  that  Arthur  Schopenhauer  (1788- 
1860),  the  pioneer  of  this  species  of  philosophy,  published 
his  principal  work.  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung, 
as  early  as  18 18.  But  exceedingly  scanty  attention  was 
given  to  the  work  till  the  middle  of  the  century.  Even 
after  that  date  the  confessed  disciples  of  the  pessimistic 
philosopher  were  relatively  few.  His  thinking,  however, 
has  commanded  considerable  attention  for  several  dec- 
ades. Naturally,  the  boldness  and  novelty  of  his  creed, 
the  mordant  character  of  his  diatribes,  and  the  real  acute- 
ness  of  his  exposition  of  various  themes  have  claimed  a 
measure  of  notice  from  a  generation  that  has  become 
rather  loose  in*  its  attachments  to  the  great  philosophical 
systems  of  the  past. 

With  a  wolfish  hunger  for  the  applause  of  the  very 
world  which  he  affected  to  despise,  Schopenhauer  com- 
bined an  enormous  vanity,  or  confidence  in  his  own  philo- 
sophical primacy.  This  made  it  impossible  for  him  to 
grant  to  contemporary  philosophers  anything  like  a  cor- 
dial recognition.  Of  Hegel  in  particular  he  spoke  uni- 
formly in  terms  of  bitter  contempt.  In  a  characteristic 
reference  to  the  Hegelian  system  he  described  it  as  "this 
most  miserable  of  all  the  meager  philosophies  that  ever 
existed."^    His  estimate  of  other  systems  belonging  to  his 

1  Religion  and  Other  Essays,  trans,  by  Saunders,  p.  68. 

135 


136  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

own  age  was  only  less  disparaging.  "As  far  as  Germany 
is  concerned,"  he  remarked,  "the  total  philosophical  in- 
competence of  the  first  half  of  the  century  following  upon 
Kant  is  plain." 

The  philosophies  of  Kant  and  Plato  and  the  early  sys- 
tems of  India  were  the  intellectual  products  of  the  past  to 
which  Schopenhauer  considered  special  deference  to  be 
due.  The  first  of  these  he  did  not  profess  to  follow 
throughout.  He  disagreed  with  prominent  features  of  the 
Kantian  ethics,  and  had  no  sympathy  at  all  with  the  Kant- 
ian partiality  for  the  theistic  conception.  But  his  formal 
estimate  of  Kant  was  high,  and  he  believed  that  he  stood 
in  substantial  agreement  with  the  Kantian  teaching  on 
a  number  of  topics,  notably  on  the  contrast  between  the 
real  and  the  ideal,  on  the  thing-in-itself,  on  the  a  priori 
forms  of  the  understanding,  on  the  opposition  between 
the  intelligible  and  the  empirical  character,  and  on  the 
coexistence  of  freedom  and  necessity.^ 

The  Platonic  teaching  which  specially  appealed  to 
Schopenhauer  was  the  doctrine  of  the  ideas.  These  he 
construed  as  the  immediate  and  only  adequate  objectifi- 
cation  of  the  ultimate  reality,  the  true  universals  which 
science  names  in  its  reference  to  species,  subsisting  above 
the  limitations  of  time  and  space,  always  existing  and 
never  becoming,  and  thus  standing  in  wide  contrast  with 
the  sense  world  which  is  ever  becoming  but  never  attains 
to  real  being.  As  related  to  the  things  of  the  phenomenal 
sphere,  the  ideas  are  the  perfect  patterns,  full  conformity 
to  which  is  nowhere  realized."^ 

Toward  the  philosophical  speculations  and  religious 
ideas  of  India  the  attitude  of  Schopenhauer  was  one  of 


'  Compare  Hecker,  Schopenhauer  und  die  Indische  Philosophie,  p.  6. 
■"  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,  third  edition,  I.  153,  201-209,  44  25, 
3^-33- 


PESSIMISM  137 

warm  appreciation.  He  spoke  of  the  Hindu  as  the 
"wisest  of  all  mythologies,"  and  characterized  the  Vedas 
as  "the  fruit  of  the  highest  human  knowledge  and  wis- 
dom." He  described  the  publication  of  the  Upanishads 
as  "the  greatest  gift  of  the  century."  He  confessed  that, 
if  the  outcome  of  his  own  philosophy  were  to  be  taken 
as  a  measure.  Buddhism  must  be  given  the  preference 
among  religions,  and  maintained  that  the  consideration 
for  the  welfare  of  animals  characteristic  of  both  Bud- 
dhism and  Brahmanism  showed  them  to  be  nearer  perfec- 
tion than  either  Judaism  or  Christianity.  He  saw  in 
the  kinship  between  certain  Christian  ideas  and  the  doc- 
trines of  Hinduism  evidence  that  the  former  were  shaped 
in  some  way  by  the  latter.^  In  practical  advertisement  of 
his  affiliation  with  the  Oriental  systems  he  named  his  dog 
Atman  and  kept  a  statuette  of  Buddha  in  his  chamber. 

Schopenhauer  interpreted  his  relation  to  Hindu  philos- 
ophy and  religion  to  be  one  of  simple  agreement  rather 
than  one  of  dependence.  It  is  not  improbable,  however, 
that  the  tone  and  content  of  his  thinking  received  some 
positive  impress  from  that  quarter,  since  already  before 
writing  his  principal  work  he  had  begun  to  make  acquaint- 
ance with  the  ancient  literature  of  India.  What  is  cer- 
tain is  that  in  his  system  elements  like  those  found  in 
the  Vedanta  philosophy,  or  the  orthodox  philosophy  of 
Brahmanism,  are  blended  with  points  of  view  that  are 
essentially  Buddhistic.  In  common  with  the  Vedanta 
philosophy  Schopenhauer  affirmed  one  sole  substance,  the 
all-one.  He  agreed  also  with  that  philosophy  in  regard- 
ing this  one  substance  as  impersonal.  He  agreed  like- 
wise with  it  in  following  out  these  pantheistic  premises 
to  a  denial  of  the  proper  conception  of  individual  souls. 


*Die  Welt  als  Wille,  I.  324,  419,  II.  186;  Religion  and  Other  Essays, 
pp.  112,  115. 


138  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

On  the  other  hand,  he  diverged  from  the  Vedanta  sys- 
tem in  emphasizing  will,  rather  than  intellect  or  reason, 
as  the  thing  of  supreme  theoretical  and  practical  interest. 
At  this  point  he  approached  Buddhism.  With  the  Bud- 
dhistic pessimism,  which  represents  the  world  system  as 
interwoven  with  misery,  he  was  in  full  accord.  He  also 
approved  the  Buddhistic  conception  of  salvation  as  con- 
sisting essentially  in  a  negation  of  the  will  and  a  recession 
into  an  absolute  quietism.  Doubtless,  a  complete  cor- 
respondence cannot  be  traced  between  the  thinking  of 
Schopenhauer  and  the  content  of  either  Brahmanism  or 
Buddhism,  but  with  approximate  fidelity  to  the  facts  his 
system  can  be  described  as  a  combination  of  the  two. 
"The  philosophy  of  Schopenhauer,"  says  Professor 
Hecker,  "is  emphatically  a  synthesis  of  Brahmanism,  in 
the  form  of  the  Vedanta,  and  Buddhism.  .  .  .  His  meta- 
physics is  the  pantheistic  Vedanta  doctrine  of  identity; 
his  ethics  the  annihilation  of  desire  taught  by  Buddha."^ 
The  basal  conceptions  of  Schopenhauer  are  indicated 
by  the  title  which  he  chose  for  his  principal  work,  The 
World  as  Will  and  Idea  [or  Representation].  Will  and 
its  phenomenal  expression  make  up,  in  his  view,  the  sum 
of  reality.  The  thing-in-itself  of  which  Kant  spoke  is 
simply  will.  This  it  is  which  is  back  of  all  phenomena, 
of  whatever  order.  Force  or  energy  is  not  a  name  for 
that  which  includes  will ;  on  the  contrary,  every  force  in 
nature  falls  properly  under  the  designation  of  will.  As 
thing-in-itself,  will  is  above  the  categories  of  space,  time, 
causality,  and  necessity.  The  sphere  of  these  categories 
is  the  sphere  of  the  phenomenal.  Here  they  have  full 
sway.  And  in  saying  this  we  affirm  their  application  to 
the  individual;  for,  as  related  to  the  thing-in-itself,  "the 
individual  is  only  phenomenon."    The  individual,  accord- 

^  Schopenhauer  und  die  Indische  Philosophie,  p.  254. 


PESSIMISM  139 

ingly,  falls  under  the  law  of  causality,  and,  being  deter- 
mined in  each  act  by  a  causal  antecedent,  must  be 
regarded  as  destitute  of  freedom  in  the  sense  of  alterna- 
tivity.  To  the  individual  the  world  stands  as  appearance. 
Matter  has  no  meaning  apart  from  the  percipient  indi- 
vidual. Materialism,  therefore,  is  at  fault  in  attempting 
to  explain  that  which  is  immediately  given  by  that  which 
is  mediately  given,  the  knowing  subject  by  the  appear- 
ance. Of  the  world  of  appearance  the  body  is  the  part 
which  holds  direct  relation  with  the  individual.  Every 
act  of  his  will  is  at  the  same  time  a  movement  of  his  body. 
In  fact,  "the  whole  body  is  nothing  else  than  the  objecti- 
fied will,  that  is,  the  will  brought  to  manifestation."^ 

As  appears  from  the  above,  the  formal  attitude  of 
Schopenhauer  toward  materialism  was  distinctly  hostile. 
Nevertheless  he  indulged  in  statements  which  have  a 
decided  resemblance  to  materialistic  postulates.  Not  only 
did  he  make  knowledge  purely  instrumental  to  will ;  he 
described  the  intellect  as  a  mere  function  of  the  brain. 
"The  intellect,"  he  declared,  "is  as  transitory  as  the  brain, 
whose  product,  or  rather  action,  it  is.  The  brain,  how- 
ever, like  the  entire  bodily  organism,  is  product  or  mani- 
festation of  the  will,  which  is  alone  permanent."^  Pre- 
dicating thus  only  a  perishing  intellect,  or  instrument  of 
knowledge,  for  the  individual  man,  Schopenhauer  evi- 
dently could  make  no  provision  for  the  thought  of  per- 
sonal immortality.  That  he  should  have  no  wish  to  make 
the  provision  was  dictated  by  his  radical  pessimism. 

As  Schopenhauer  conceived,  the  world  is  necessarily 
bad  because  the  source  from  which  it  proceeds  is  a  prin- 
ciple of  restless,  unsatisfied  striving.  This  tendency  be- 
longs to  will  as  such,  and  it  must  therefore  pervade  its 
concrete  forms.  Man  in  particular,  as  being  the  most  per- 

iDie  Welt  als  Wille.  I.  119.  2 Ibid.,  II.  224. 


140  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

feet  objectification  of  will,  is  full  of  needs  and  remote 
from  satisfaction.  An  imperious  impulse  drives  him  to 
strive  for  the  maintenance  of  the  life  which  is  not  worth 
having;  and  the  striving,  too,  is  without  any  assurance 
of  the  desired  result,  since  nature,  respecting  only  the 
species,  has  no  care  or  mercy  for  the  individual.  His  pur- 
suit of  positive  enjoyment  is  ever  an  illusion,  the  best  that 
can  be  attained  being  the  abridgment  of  pain.  Man  tires 
of  the  very  life  which  he  fights  desperately  to  sustain, 
until  at  length  its  insipidity  and  tediousness  paint  veri- 
table despair  upon  his  face.  His  life  is  like  bad  ware  with 
nothing  better  to  commend  it  than  a  false  glitter;  and  it 
runs  its  course,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  with  about 
as  little  understanding  of  its  purpose  and  meaning  as 
belongs  to  a  wound-up  clock.  Where  the  preponderance 
lies,  as  between  weal  and  woe,  is  strikingly  illustrated  by 
Dante.  When  he  wished  to  paint  hell  he  found  in  this 
world  no  lack  of  materials  for  concrete  delineations. 
When,  on  the  other  hand,  he  wished  to  paint  heaven,  he 
could  discover  no  suitable  materials,  and  proceeded  to 
report,  not  the  joys  of  paradise,  but  the  instruction  vouch- 
safed to  him  by  Beatrice  and  various  saints.  While  thus 
man  is  placed  in  a  world  which  is  lavishly  provided  with 
the  proper  furniture  of  hell,  he  is  not  even  permitted  to 
find  compensation  for  his  misery  in  the  thought  of  his 
nobility  and  good  desert ;  for  his  misery  is  an  authentic 
measure  of  his  worthlessness  and  guilt.  At  this  point 
the  pessimism  of  Schopenhauer  seems  to  pass  over  into  a 
kind  of  optimism,  since  he  asserts  the  perfect  reign  of 
justice  in  the  world.  And  in  truth  we  should  have  here  a 
gleam  of  optimistic  faith  had  the  reign  of  justice  been 
•.onceived  to  lead  on  to  anything  better  than  blankness 
and  nothingness.* 

»Die  Welt  als  Wille,  I.  325-415,  ii  54-63. 


PESSIMISM  141 

Inasmuch  as  the  source  of  misery  was  located  by  our 
pessimistic  philosopher  in  blindly  operating  will,  he 
naturally  located  the  remedy  in  the  negation  of  the  will. 
This  act  of  negation  he  considered  dependent  upon  knowl- 
edge. When  a  man  attains  to  an  enlightened  vision  of 
the  vanity  of  all  pursuit  after  enjoyment,  and  discovers 
that  desire  is  the  bitter  fountain  of  unrest  and  pain,  then 
he  is  prepared  to  choose  the  only  haven  of  peace,  the 
state  of  complete  quiescence.  Thus  he  gains  in  the  present 
a  relative  redemption  anticipatory  of  that  more  perfect 
emancipation  which  is  wrought  by  the  extinction  of  in- 
dividual existence  in  death. 

As  was  noticed,  Schopenhauer  found  in  Buddhism  the 
most  satisfactory  anticipation  both  of  his  pessimistic  view 
of  life  and  of  his  notion  of  salvation.  He  considered, 
however,  that  original  Christianity  afforded  a  fairly  close 
parallel  to  his  way  of  thinking,  the  other-worldliness  and 
cross-bearing  taught  by  Christ  being  interpreted  by  him 
as  genuine  tokens  of  a  pessimistic  standpoint.  Among 
Christian  ideas  he  valued  in  particular  those  which  relate 
to  the  facts  of  original  sin  and  redemption.  Judaism 
with  its  monotheistic  creed  he  thoroughly  contemned, 
but  conceded  that  in  its  doctrine  of  the  fall  it  had  served 
to  propagate  a  highly  important  truth.  Of  the  mystical 
element  in  religion  he  was  rather  tolerant.  Indeed,  he 
considered  that  those  who  have  an  ambition  to  pare  away 
all  the  mystery  of  religion  are  rendering  to  it  the  poorest 
sort  of  service.  Accordingly,  he  greatly  preferred  Augus- 
tine and  Luther  to  all  rationalizing  expounders  of  Chris- 
tianity. "Rationalism  in  the  form  of  modern  free  thought 
or  antisupernaturalism  was  to  Schopenhauer  about  the 
poorest  and  blindest  and  the  most  ignorant  of  all  phi- 
losophies."^ 

*  Caldwell.  Schopenhauer's  System  in  its  Philosophical  Significance,  p.  384. 


142  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

As  an  offset  to  the  one-sided  intellectualism  of  the 
HegeHan  system,  Schopenhauer's  philosophy,  with  its 
predominant  stress  upon  the  will,  may  have  been  adapted 
to  render  a  certain  service.  It  may  be  granted  also  that 
on  individual  points  it  reveals  a  very  good  insight.  But 
taken  in  its  entirety  it  has  very  scanty  claims  to  apprecia- 
tion. Not  only  is  it  bizarre  and  extreme,  it  is  also  bur- 
dened with  a  very  uncomfortable  list  of  self-contradic- 
tions. A  veritable  heap  of  inconsistencies  appears,  for 
instance,  in  the  place  and  function  assigned  to  the  intel- 
lect. On  the  one  hand,  the  intellect  is  regarded  as  the 
product  of  an  antecedent  world  running  through  various 
stages  of  organization  up  to  the  human  brain;  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  made  the  necessary  antecedent  of  the 
world  system,  since  only  through  the  forms  of  the  intel- 
lect does  the  world  have  existence  as  a  system-,  a  unity 
characterized  by  manifoldness  and  conformity  to  law.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  intellect  is  described  as  a  mere  function 
of  the  brain ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  brain,  as  known  only 
to  the  intellect,  is  made  a  phenomenon  to  the  intellect; 
in  other  words,  that  which  is  defined  as  having  the  place 
or  character  of  a  subject  is  made  a  phenomenon  to  that 
which  is  defined  as  having  the  character  of  a  function. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  intellect  is  denied  the  nature  of  a 
subject  proper,  since  it  is  made  a  mere  product  or  form  of 
activity  of  a  physical  organism ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
treated  as  a  proper  subject,  an  agent  equipped  with 
powers  of  discrimination,  comparison,  and  logical  pro- 
cedure in  system  building.  On  the  one  hand,  the  intellect 
holds  an  abject  position  as  a  mere  instrument  of  the  will; 
on  the  other  hand,  the  intellect  in  the  proper  course  of 
things  comes  to  a  mastery  over  the  will,  and  restrains  it 
even  to  the  point  of  complete  cancellation.*     On  the  one 

*  Compare  Kuno  Fischer,  Schopenhauer's  Leben,  Werke  und  Lehre. 


PESSIMISM  143 

hand,  as  being  the  product  of  irrational  will,  the  intellect 
would  seem  to  be  destitute  of  any  valid  claim  to  ration- 
ality;  on  the  other  hand,  Schopenhauer  philosophizes  with 
a  supreme  confidence  which  distinctly  implies  that  intel- 
lect, as  embodied  in  himself,  is  beyond  question  rational. 
Glaring  contradictions  are  also  observable  in  other  rela- 
tions. Thus  Schopenhauer  asserts  that  the  world  has 
moral  significance,  and  stigmatizes  the  opposite  view  as 
"the  greatest  and  most  pernicious  of  all  errors."^  But 
what  basis  is  there  in  his  fundamental  conception  for  at- 
tributing a  moral  significance  to  the  world?  According 
to  that  conception  the  one  reality,  of  which  the  world  is 
the  manifestation,  is  blind  aberrant  will,  which  exercises 
its  creative  function  so  badly  as  to  make  a  world  which 
may  be  described  as  the  worst  possible.  What  a  theater 
for  the  presentation  and  glorification  of  ethical  ideals! 
Who  can  draw  inspiration  for  righteousness  from  the 
contemplation  of  such  a  supreme  being?  What  can 
there  be  worth  working  for  under  such  an  administra- 
tion? Practical  extinction  of  self  and  the  abolition  of 
the  world,  says  Schopenhauer;  and  the  answer  is  not 
illogical  from  his  standpoint.  But  what  kind  of  a  moral 
world  is  that  which  thrusts  upon  men  the  one  task  of 
working  toward  its  own  abolition  and  the  throwing  of 
all  things  back  into  the  primitive  night  of  unconscious 
will?  What  wisdom,  benevolence,  or  righteousness  can 
be  discovered  in  this  imposition  of  painful  struggle  after 
nothingness?  The  fact  is  that  on  the  basis  of  the  rank 
pessimism  of  Schopenhauer  the  world  is  too  much  of  a 
madhouse  to  make  it  consistent  to  attempt  to  find  in  it 
any  ethical  meaning  or  any  ground  whatever  of  rational 
interpretation. 

It  was  noticed  that  Schopenhauer  construed  the  other- 


*  Essay  on  Human  Nature. 


144  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

worldliness  of  Jesus  and  his  doctrine  of  cross-bearing" 
as  equivalent  to  the  assertion  of  the  pessimistic  stand- 
point. The  legitimacy  of  the  interpretation  can  in  no 
wise  be  admitted.  Between  placing  at  the  center  of  the 
universe  a  blind  aberrant  power,  which  is  totally  regard- 
less of  the  weal  of  the  individual,  and  placing  there  the 
benignant  form  of  the  heavenly  Father  who  notes  the  fall 
of  the  sparrow,  who  numbers  the  very  hairs  upon  the 
heads  of  his  children,  and  whose  tender,  all-comprehend- 
ing care  makes  it  unnecessary  to  borrow  anxious  thought 
about  the  morrow,  there  is  an  enormous  difference.  The 
controlling  view  of  Jesus  was  so  emphatically  optimistic 
that  in  the  light  of  it  human  life  in  the  world,  in  spite  of 
all  demands  of  cross-bearing,  is  made  to  appear  rather  as 
a  cheerful  and  glorious  than  a  somber  and  dismal  thing. 
It  is  only  by  a  fundamental  caricature  that  the  message 
of  Jesus  can  be  made  tributary  to  pessimism. 

II. — Von  Hartmann  and  Other  Advocates  of 
Pessimism. 

In  1869,  or  nine  years  after  the  death  of  Schopen- 
hauer, Eduard  Von  Hartmann  published  a  system  of 
pessimistic  philosophy  under  the  title  Die  Philosophic 
des  Unbewussten.  This  was  supplemented  in  the  follow- 
ing years  by  numerous  other  writings.  While  influenced 
by  Schopenhauer,  and  earning  a  close  association  with 
him  on  the  score  of  his  radical  pessimism.  Von  Hart- 
mann was  not  in  an  emphatic  sense  a  disciple  of  his 
predecessor.  He  has  himself  taken  pains  to  publish  this 
fact.  Many  topics  are  enumerated  by  him  on  which 
he  claims  to  be  in  contrast  with  Schopenhauer.  The 
subjective  idealism  of  the  latter  which  reduces  the  world 
to  appearance,  his  monism  by  which  all  is  merged  in 
will,  his  scanty  regard  for  historical  development,  his 


PESSIMISM  145 

mained  and  inconsistent  treatment  of  teleology,  his  doc- 
trine of  the  intelligible  character  (itself  undetermined 
and  the  source  of  determination  to  the  individual  in  his 
empirical  character),  his  affiliation  in  his  theory  of  salva- 
tion with  a  radical  quietism — all  these  are  features,  says 
Von  Hartmann,  with  which  he  stands  in  disagreement.^ 
He  makes  plain  also  that  he  does  not  share  his  predeces- 
sor's unqualified  contempt  for  Hegelianism.  Indeed,  he 
expresses  high  appreciation  for  certain  aspects  of  Hegel- 
ianism, and  defines  his  own  philosophy  as  a  "synthesis 
of  the  philosophies  of  Hegel  and  Schopenhauer,  in  which 
a  decided  preponderance  is  given  to  the  former,  a  syn- 
thesis formed  under  the  guidance  of  Schelling's  doc- 
trine of  principles  as  contained  in  his  first  philosophy. "^ 
In  his  attitude  toward  the  Hindu  pantheism  Von  Hart- 
mann was  well-nigh  as  appreciative  as  Schopenhauer. 
Religion,  he  contended,  must  embrace  the  essence  of  the 
pantheism  of  the  East,  if  it  is  to  survive  and  be  a  world- 
power.^  Respecting  Christianity  he  spoke  often  in  very 
disparaging  terms.  He  declared  it  no  longer  a  vital 
factor  in  our  civilization.  Its  characteristic  forms,  he 
said,  are  all  outlived,  and  soon,  reduced  to  a  shadow  of 
its  mediaeval  greatness,  it  will  again  be  whit  it  was  ex- 
clusively at  the  start,  the  last  consolation  of  the  poor  and 
the  wretched.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  noticed  that 
he  was  not  content  to  be  rated  as  a  despiser  of  Chris- 
tianity. "I  have,  in  fact,"  he  said,  "the  greatest  respect 
for  the  Christian  religion  as  representing  one  of  the  most 
developed  stages  of  the  religious  consciousness,  and  in 
religion  as  a  whole  I  venerate  the  deepest  spring  and 
the  highest  summit  of  the  life  of  the  spirit."^     Like 


^  Erganziingsband  zu  ersten  bis  neunten  Auflage  der  Philosophic  des 
Unbewussten,  Vorwort  zur  zehnte  Auflage,  p   ix.  '  Ibid.,  p.  x. 

'Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  trans,  by  Coupland.  II.  270,  271; 
Religion  of  the  Future,  trans,  by  Dare,  p.  97.         *  Erganzungsband,  p.  xv. 


146  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

Schopenhauer,  he  made  place  for  a  mystic  element  in 
religion.  In  agreement  with  his  predecessor  also,  he 
considered  an  ultra-liberal  Protestantism  about  the 
poorest  apology  for  a  religion  that  could  be  found. 

The  system  of  Von  Hartmann  is  no  less  antitheistic 
than  that  of  Schopenhauer.  In  his  conception  of  ulti- 
mate or  absolute  being,  however,  the  former  differs  from 
the  latter  in  that  he  supposes  intellect  or  reason  to  coex- 
ist in  that  being  with  will.  The  absolute  is  indeed  uncon- 
scious, but,  as  is  illustrated  by  instinct,  purpose  may 
work  apart  from  consciousness.  Thus  it  operates  in  the 
absolute.  In  that  timeless  being  an  unconscious  ideation 
and  an  unconscious  willing  are  conjoined  in  inseparable 
unity.  Though  unconscious,  the  absolute  is  not  to  be 
esteemed  blind,  but  rather  clairvoyant. 

In  ascribing  intelligence  and  purposive  action  to  the 
absolute.  Von  Hartmann  would  seem  to  close  the  door 
against  error  on  its  part.  But,  in  pursuance  of  his  pes- 
simism, he  was  obliged  to  admit  that  the  world,  if  not 
the  worst  possible,  is  assuredly  vastly  worse  than  none. 
He  was  therefore  put  under  compulsion  to  construe  the 
origination  of  the  world  as  a  great  error.  And  this  he 
has  done.  He  characterizes  the  production  of  the  world 
as  an  "irrational  act,"  a  bare  activity  of  will  in  which 
reason  had  no  part.  The  misery  of  existence,  he  argues, 
makes  it  impossible  to  impute  creation  to  aught  but  the 
"mere  groundless  will."^ 

In  his  extravagant  estimate  of  the  misery  in  the  world 
Von  Hartmann  comes  very  near  to  the  standard  set  by 
his  predecessor.  He  affirms  that  in  all  relations  the  sum 
of  pain  greatly  exceeds  that  of  pleasure.  The  advance 
of  civilization  changes  the  balance  only  to  increase  the 


iThe  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  II.  367,  368,  III.  13  ■  Zur  Geschichte 
und  Begrundung  des  Pessimismus,  p.  67. 


PESSIMISM  147 

overplus  of  pain,  and  improvement  in  material  conditions 
is  no  source  of  happiness.  Civilized  peoples  are  more 
wretched  than  those  in  a  state  of  nature;  the  poor,  the 
low,  and  the  rude  are  happier  than  the  rich,  the  aristo- 
cratic, and  the  cultivated.  Stupidity  is  a  much  better 
title  to  happiness  than  cleverness.  "As  the  life  of  a 
fish  is  more  enviable  than  that  of  a  horse,  so  is  the  life 
of  an  oyster  than  that  of  a  fish,  and  the  life  of  a  plant 
than  that  of  an  oyster,  until,  finally,  on  descending-  be- 
neath the  threshold  of  consciousness,  we  see  individual 
pain  entirely  disappear."^  In  these  facts  the  teleological 
shaping  of  the  world  is  made  manifest.  The  design  of 
the  increasing  sum  of  misery  is  to  educate  the  intelli- 
gence of  men  and  to  discipline  their  feeling  up  to  the 
point  of  choosing  in  common  the  one  means  of  escape, 
the  cessation  of  conscious  individual  existence.  This  is 
the  ideal  goal.  The  one  appropriate  aspiration  for  the 
individual  is  "to  become  freed  from  the  painful  duty  of 
assisting  in  the  process  of  evolution,  to  plunge  itself 
again  into  the  Brahm  like  the  bubble  into  the  ocean,  to 
be  extinguished  like  a  light  in  the  wind."^ 

Of  Von  Hartmann's  philosophy  it  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  it  is  arbitrary  in  its  starting-point  and  farcical 
in  its  outcome.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the 
unconscious  has  any  competency  for  the  ideation  and 
purposive  action  with  which  it  is  credited.  These  are 
terms  which  derive  their  meaning  from  the  sphere  of 
conscious  experience,  and  it  is  a  perfectly  arbitrary  shift 
to  exploit  them  in  the  domain  of  the  unconscious.  More- 
over, as  was  observed.  Von  Hartmann  portrays  the  un- 
conscious as  a  blind  power  in  a  relation  of  capital  impor- 

'  The  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  III.  76,  77. 
'The  Religion  of  the  Future,  p.  112. 


148  PHILOSOPHICAL  THEORIES 

tance,  inasmuch  as  he  imputes  creation  to  mere  ground- 
less will.  And  here  the  inept  character  of  his  teleology 
is  brought  to  view.  If  the  unconscious  absolute  has 
acted  in  such  an  irrational  way  once,  why  may  it  not 
be  expected  to  act  in  a  kindred  way  a  second  time  ?  What 
guarantee  is  there  that,  after  the  race  has  been  led  by  a 
most  painful  discipline  to  elect  non-existence,  the  uncon- 
scious absolute  will  not  again,  by  an  irrational  and  pre- 
cipitate act,  inaugurate  a  new  stage  of  wretched  exis- 
tence? If  the  world  originated  as  Von  Hartmann  sup- 
poses, and  is  the  stupendous  piece  of  cosmic  tomfoolery 
which  he  makes  it  to  be,  it  is  surely  absurd  to  associate 
with  it  any  wise  design  or  to  feel  secure  of  any  desirable 
outcome.  Taken  seriously,  this  pessimistic  philosophy  is 
only  fitted  to  quench  the  last  gleam  of  hope  in  the  human 
spirit. 

Very  few  disciples  of  either  Schopenhauer  or  Von  Hart- 
mann have  won  any  distinction  in  philosophical  litera- 
ture. Of  the  recent  adherents  of  the  latter  the  most 
prominent  is  A.  Drews,  who  has  given  expression  to  his 
ambition  to  propagate  the  system  of  his  philosophical 
master  in  an  elaborate  compendium.^  Among  the  fol- 
lowers of  Schopenhauer,  Philipp  Mainliinder  is  perhaps 
as  noteworthy  as  any.  It  is  only  in  a  partial  sense,  how- 
ever, that  he  can  be  called  a  follower  of  that  philosopher. 
He  took  exceptions  to  Schopenhauer's  metaphysics  and 
was  by  no  means  at  one  with  him  in  ethical  theory. 
Indeed,  one  gains  the  impression  that  there  was  little 
in  his  predecessor's  system,  aside  from  its  rank  pessi- 
mism, that  was  adapted  to  take  captive  his  thinking.  That 
element  Mainlander  appropriated  in  full  measure.  While 
making  little  effort  to  paint  in  detail  the  miseries  of  life, 


>  Von  Hartmann's  philosophisches  System  im  Grundriss. 


PESSIMISM  149 

he  gave  very  emphatic  expression  to  the  judgment  that 
human  Hfe  is  worse  than  nothingness,  and  saw  in  the 
reduction  of  all  things  to  naught  the  complete  consum- 
mation of  redemption.  Like  Schopenhauer,  he  was 
appreciative  of  the  great  systems  of  India.  He  differed, 
however,  in  giving  a  formal  preference  to  the  teaching 
of  Christ  as  against  both  Brahmanism  and  Buddhism.  But 
this  is  no  token  of  real  friendliness  to  Christianity,  since 
Mainlander  obtained  a  basis  for  his  preference  only  by  a 
most  puerile  and  arbitrary  exegesis  wherein  Christ  is 
represented  as  inculcating  the  pessimism  which  identifies 
the  redemption  of  the  world  with  its  annihilation.^ 

Mainlander  gave  undisguised  expression  to  the  atheis- 
tic standpoint.  Herein  he  was  true  to  the  logic  of  pes- 
simism. As  the  writings  of  the  whole  school  attest,  the 
blotting  out  of  hope  for  humanity  and  the  negation  of 
God  belong  together.  So  long  as  the  thought  of  a  right- 
eous and  benevolent  God  survives  there  is  ground  for  ex- 
pecting something  far  better  than  extinction.  That 
thought  in  the  truly  filial  spirit  is  naturally  a  source  of 
healthful  and  happy  anticipation  of  an  inexhaustible 
good. 


*  Die  Philosophic  der  ErlCsting,  pp.  262-368. 


^ 


PART  II 

QUASI-SCIENTIFIC,  THEOLOGICAL, 

AND  ETHICAL  THEORIES 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  CHALLENGING   OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL 

I. — The  Different  Forms  of  the  Challenge 

Whoever  supposes  that  God,  as  infinite  Spirit,  is  not 
merely  immanent  in  the  world,  but  also  transcends  the 
world,  recognizes  in  one  sense  the  supernatural.  A 
supramundane  Deity,  in  so  far  as  he  is  supramundane, 
falls  outside  the  category  of  "nature,"  and  is  properly 
described  as  a  supernatural  being.  There  is  occasion, 
however,  for  a  further  discrimination  in  the  use  of  terms. 
A  question  may  be  raised  as  to  whether  the  transcendent 
Deity  ever  exercises  his  prerogative  to  introduce  into  the 
world  factors  not  included  in  the  complex  of  ordinary 
world  forces,  thus  giving  origin  to  events  which  those 
forces,  left  to  themselves,  would  never  produce.  The 
rendering  of  an  affirmative  answer  implies  the  occurrence 
of  extraordinary  events — extraordinary  not  in  the  sense 
of  being  necessarily  fuller  manifestations  of  wisdom  and 
power  than  other  events,  but  extraordinary  simply  in  the 
sense  that  they  are  not  classifiable  with  those  stated  man- 
ifestations of  wisdom  and  power  which  a  study  of  the 
world  reveals  as  belonging  within  the  compass  of  the 
regular  world  system.  In  common  terminology,  these 
extraordinary  events,  which  are  referable  to  a  specific  or 
exceptional  as  distinguished  from  an  ordinary  exercise  of 
divine  efficiency,  are  called  miracles.  Conceivably  events 
of  this  kind  may  take  place  either  in  the  physical  or  in  the 
psychical  domain,  either  in  the  sphere  of  sense-percep- 
tion or  in  that  of  the  inner  life  and  character.  How- 
ever, the  more  usual  association  of  the  term  "miracles"  is 

153 


154        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

with  the  former  sphere.  From  this  point  of  view  Domer 
defines  miracles  as  "sensuously  cognizable  events  not  com- 
prehensible on  the  ground  of  the  given  system  of  nature 
as  such,  but  essentially  on  the  ground  of  God's  free  action 
alone."^  In  the  following  discussion  the  ruling  concep- 
tion will  correspond  to  this  definition,  with  the  under- 
standing, however,  that  the  "given  system  of  nature" 
need  not  mean  anything  else  than  the  ordinary  mode  of 
divine  energizing. 

The  challenging  of  the  supernatural  might  be  under- 
stood to  include  a  denial  of  a  transcendent  Deity,  as  well 
as  a  denial  of  workings  on  the  part  of  that  Deity  which 
may  be  classed  as  extraordinary,  miraculous,  or  super- 
natural. It  is  only  the  latter  denial,  however,  that  will 
receive  direct  attention  under  the  present  theme,  reference 
to  the  former  being  introduced  only  as  dictated  by  the 
intrinsic  connection  between  the  two  forms  of  denial. 

In  reviewing  the  various  forms  of  the  challenge  to  the 
supernatural  we  may  properly  begin  with  the  views  of  the 
parties  which  have  occupied  our  attention  in  the  preced- 
ing pages.  A  general  measure  of  the  attitude  of  these 
parties  toward  miracles  may  be  found  in  the  degree  to 
which  their  thinking  compromised  or  expelled  the  theis- 
tic  conception,  though  account  will  also  need  to  be  taken 
of  differing  aptitudes  for  appreciating  the  element  of  mys- 
tery in  the  universe. 

The  post-Kantian  idealists  certainly  trespassed  against 
the  distinct  conception  of  divine  personality.  At  the  same 
time  they  were  appreciative  of  the  mystical  side  of  reality, 
and  criticised  the  bent  of  the  eighteenth  century  ration- 
alists to  make  a  prosaic  understanding  the  measure  of  the 
universe.  Accordingly,  while  they  provided  a  defective 
basis  for  faith  in  miracles,  they  seem  not  to  have  been 

•  Domer,  System  of  Christian  Doctrine,  S  55. 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  155 

animated  by  any  pronounced  spirit  of  antagonism  to  them. 
This  was  clearly  the  case  with  Hegel.  His  estimate  of 
the  evidential  value  of  the  supernatural  sensible  event  was 
indeed  quite  humble.  "Miracle,"  he  says,  "can  produce 
a  kind  of  verification  for  the  man  who  is  guided  by  his 
senses;  but  this  is  merely  the  beginning  of  verification, 
by  which  what  is  spiritual  cannot  be  verified."^  But, 
while  thus  rating  miracles  at  a  low  figure  in  relation  to 
spiritual  ends,  he  by  no  means  challenged  their  credibility. 
Spirit,  he  affirmed,  is  the  essential  miracle.  Both  by  its 
weakness  and  its  strength  it  is  capable  of  working  on 
nature.  "Terror  can  produce  death,  anxiety  illness,  and 
so  in  all  ages  infinite  faith  and  trust  have  enabled  the  lame 
to  walk  and  the  deaf  to  hear.  Modern  unbelief  in  occur- 
rences of  this  kind  is  based  on  a  superstitious  belief  in  the 
so-called  force  of  nature  and  its  independence  relatively 
to  spirit."^ 

The  leading  representatives  of  the  English  sensational 
school,  as  holding  in  general  a  negative  attitude  toward 
religion,  were,  of  course,  inclined  to  render  a  very  cold 
hospitality  to  the  idea  of  supernatural  events.  It  does  not 
appear,  however,  that  they  were  agreed  in  denying  their 
possibility,  or  even  the  possibility  of  a  credible  attestation 
of  them,  at  least  for  those  occupying  the  theistic  stand- 
point. Thus  John  Stuart  Mill  remarks:  "A  miracle  is 
no  contradiction  to  the  law  of  cause  and  effect;  it  is  a 
new  effect,  supposed  to  be  produced  by  the  introduction 
of  a  new  cause.  Of  the  adequacy  of  that  cause,  if  pres- 
ent, there  can  be  no  doubt ;  and  the  only  antecedent  im- 
probability which  can  be  ascribed  to  the  miracle  is  the 
improbability  that  any  such  cause  existed.  All,  therefore, 
which  Hume  has  made  out — and  this  he  must  be  con- 
sidered to  have  made  out — is  that  no  evidence  can  prove 

1  Philosophy  of  Religion,  II.  338.  'Ibid.,  IIT.  up. 


156        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

a  miracle  to  anyone  who  did  not  previously  believe  in  the 
existence  of  a  being  or  beings  with  supernatural  power; 
or  who  believes  himself  to  have  full  proof  that  the  char- 
acter of  the  being  whom  he  recognizes  is  inconsistent  with 
his  having  seen  fit  to  interfere  on  the  occasion  in  question. 
If  we  do  not  already  believe  in  supernatural  agencies  no 
miracle  can  prove  to  us  their  existence.  The  miracle 
itself,  considered  merely  as  an  extraordinary  fact,  may  be 
satisfactorily  certified  by  our  senses,  or  by  testimony,  but 
nothing  can  prove  that  it  is  a  miracle ;  there  is  still  another 
possible  hypothesis,  that  of  its  being  the  result  of  some 
unknown  natural  cause,  and  this  possibility  cannot  be  so 
completely  shut  out  as  to  leave  no  alternative  but  that  of 
admitting  the  existence  and  intervention  of  a  being 
superior  to  nature.  Those,  however,  who  already  believe 
in  such  a  being  have  two  hypotheses  to  choose  from,  a 
supernatural  and  an  unknown  natural  agency,  and  they 
have  to  judge  which  of  the  two  is  the  more  probable  in 
the  particular  case.  In  forming  this  judgment  an  impor- 
tant element  of  the  question  will  be  the  conformity  of  the 
result  to  the  laws  of  the  supposed  agent;  that  is,  to  the 
character  of  the  Deity  as  they  conceive  it."^  Mill  inti- 
mates a  preference  for  the  supposition  that  the  Deity 
works  only  through  general  laws,  but  he  offers  no  com- 
pelling ground  for  excluding  the  opposing  supposition. 

Professor  Huxley,  though  giving  sufficient  tokens  of 
a  disinclination  to  admit  the  verity  of  reported  miracles, 
was  in  substantial  agreement  with  Mill  on  the  lack  of 
any  decisive  warrant  for  excluding  the  possibility  of 
events  which  the  common  judgment  of  men  would  pro- 
nounce miraculous.  He  took  exception  to  Hume's  defi- 
nition of  miracle  as  an  infraction  of  the  laws  of  nature, 
and  contended  that  it  should  rather  be  defined  as  a  won- 


'  Logic,  Book  iii,  chap,  xxv,  $  2. 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  157 

derful  event.  He  denied  that  observation  of  what  cus- 
tomarily happens  is  a  certain  measure  of  what  is  possible 
under  the  rule  of  natural  laws.  "These  laws,  even  when 
they  express  the  results  of  a  very  long  and  uniform 
experience,  are  necessarily  based  on  incomplete  knowl- 
edge, and  are  to  be  held  as  grounds  of  more  or  less  justi- 
fiable expectation."^  Verbally,  in  this  instance,  Huxley 
may  have  excluded  the  wonderful  event  from  the  category 
of  the  miracle  proper  by  identifying  it  with  an  extraor- 
dinary effect  of  natural  laws ;  but  he  at  least  made  room 
for  the  possibility  of  events  as  extraordinary  as  the  sane 
believer  in  miracles  would  care  to  affirm.  Moreover,  in 
another  connection  he  has  placed  himself  on  record  as 
scouting  the  notion  of  a  scientific  veto  of  belief  in  a  super- 
natural being  to  whom  may  reasonably  be  imputed  a 
power  to  effect  results  in  nature  which  are  quite  beyond 
the  range  of  man's  abilities.  "Looking  at  the  matter," 
he  said,  "from  the  most  rigidly  scientific  point  of  view, 
the  assumption  that,  amidst  the  myriads  of  worlds  scat- 
tered through  endless  space,  there  can  be  no  intelligence 
as  much  greater  than  man's  as  his  is  greater  than  a  black 
beetle's,  no  being  endowed  with  powers  of  influencing  the 
course  of  nature  as  much  greater  than  his  as  his  is  greater 
than  a  snail's,  seems  to  me  not  merely  baseless,  but  imj>er- 
tinent.  Without  stepping  beyond  the  analogy  of  that 
which  is  known,  it  is  easy  to  people  the  cosmos  with  enti- 
ties, in  ascending  scale,  until  we  reach  something  practi- 
cally indistinguishable  from  omnipotence,  omnipresence, 
and  omniscience."^  Language  like  this  evidently  amounts 
to  an  admission  of  the  possibility  of  an  influence  on  the 
course  of  nature  distinctly  supernatural  in  its  mode  and 
measure. 


'Hume,  pp.  127-137. 

2  Essays  on  Some  Controverted  Questions,  pp.  26,  27. 


158        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

In  the  materialistic  school  the  notion  of  miracles  was 
treated  with  uncompromising  intolerance.  Biichner  con- 
sidered their  non-occurrence  so  nearly  axiomatic  that  he 
rated  the  bringing  forward  of  formal  disproof  as  an 
unjustifiable  waste  of  time  and  effort.^  With  characteristic 
dogmatism  Haeckel  remarked :  "We  can  at  once  set  aside 
all  mythological  stories,  all  miracles  and  so-called  revel- 
ations, for  which  it  is  claimed  that  they  have  come  to  us 
in  some  supernatural  way.  All  such  mystical  teachings 
are  irrational,  inasmuch  as  they  are  confirmed  by  no 
actual  experience,  but,  on  the  contrary,  are  irreconcilable 
with  the  known  facts  which  have  been  confirmed  to 
us  by  a  rational  investigation  of  nature."^  "It  is  our 
duty  and  task  to  attack  the  belief  in  miracles,  wher- 
ever we  find  it,  in  the  interest  of  the  race.  .  .  .  The 
struggle  against  superstition  and  ignorance  is  a  fight 
for  civilization.  Our  modern  civilization  will  only 
emerge  from  it  in  triumph,  and  we  shall  only  elimi- 
nate the  last  barbaric  features  from  our  social  and  politi- 
cal life,  when  the  light  of  true  knowledge  has  driven 
out  the  belief  in  miracles  and  the  prejudices  of  dual- 
ism."^ With  this  class  of  writers  the  absolute  exclusion 
of  miracles  followed  logically  from  their  categorical 
denial  of  God  and  of  freedom. 

For  positivism,  as  being  obligated  by  its  postulates 
to  repudiate  atheistic  metaphysics  as  well  as  theistic,  the 
agnostic  attitude  toward  miracles  was  obviously  the  only 
consistent  one,  at  least  as  respects  the  possibility  of  their 
occurrence.  It  was  noticed,  however,  that  Comte,  while 
he  criticised  dogmatic  atheism,  gave  some  tokens  of 
aversion  to  the  idea  of  a  supernatural  will  and  of  a  provi- 
dence higher  than  the  plane  of  humanity.    We  may  say, 


^  Kraft  und  Stoff,  p.  40.  *  Monism,  p.  61. 

^  Wonders  of  Life,  pp.  56,  70. 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  159 

then,  that  the  animus  of  the  Comtean  postivism  was  un- 
friendly to  the  basal  conceptions  which  support  faith 
in  miracles.  In  the  positivism  of  Feuerbach  miracles 
were  classed  with  all  other  religious  products  as  mere 
creations  of  the  human  spirit.  Imagination  and  feeling 
serve  as  their  fertile  source.  Seen  in  clear  daylight  they 
present  "absolutely  nothing  else  than  the  sorcery  of  the 
imagination,"^ 

An  adverse  attitude  toward  faith  in  the  supernatural 
is  implicit  in  the  philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer.  The 
primacy  which  he  assigns  to  mechanical  causation,  his 
exclusion  of  freedom,  and  his  denial  of  all  warrant  for 
ascribing  to  the  absolute  a  single  attribute  or  function  of 
personality,  leave  no  intelligible  ground  for  the  occur- 
rence of  miraculous  events.  Moreover,  in  treating  of 
the  world's  religions  he  finds  in  the  fact  that  they  exhibit 
common  features,  including  prophecies  and  miracles,  a 
ground  for  the  conclusion  that  they  have  had  in  common 
a  purely  natural  genesis.^  The  proper  bearing  of  the 
Spencerian  speculations  was  well  illustrated  by  John 
Fiske,  who  at  the  time  of  writing  his  Outlines  of  Cosmic 
Philosophy  was  well  intrenched  in  the  antitheistic  teach- 
ing of  Spencer.  In  this  treatise  he  characterizes  the  idea 
of  the  Infinite  Person  as  a  pseud-idea,  and  decries  the 
ascription  of  intentions  or  purposes  to  God  as  an  ill-con- 
sidered anthropomorphism.  From  this  standpoint 
miracles  are,  of  course,  excluded,  since  a  God  who  enter- 
tains no  purposes  could  have  no  motive  to  work  in  excep- 
tional modes.  It  is  not,  however,  by  the  efiicacy  of  such 
considerations  that  Fiske  looks  for  the  extirpation  of  faith 
in  miracles.  That  result  is  rather  to  be  brought  about 
gradually  by  the  study  of  the  sciences.  In  this  way  those 
scientific  habits  of  thought  will  be  engendered  which  will 

*The  Essence  of  Christianity,  p.  180.  'Sociology,  III.  33-36. 


i6o      SCIENTIFIC   AND    THEOLOGICAL    THEORIES 

stifle  theological  habits  of  thought  "as  easily  as  clover 
stifles  weeds."^ 

The  pessimistic  philosophers,  Schopenhauer  and  Von 
Hartmann,  in  their  repudiation  of  the  theistic  conception 
left  as  little  basis  for  the  occurrence  of  miracles  as  was 
provided  in  the  Spencerian  evolutionism.  At  the  same 
time,  like  the  post-Kantian  idealists,  they  were  sensitive 
to  the  presence  of  mystery  in  the  universe,  and  had  no 
pleasure  in  the  common  rationalism.  Accordingly,  they 
were  not  conspicuous  for  zeal  against  supernaturalistic 
tenets. 

Among  writers  less  definitely  associated  than  the  fore- 
going with  specific  philosophies  the  typical  forms  of  chal- 
lenge to  the  supernatural  have  been  conspicuously  repre- 
sented by  Paulus,  De  Wette,  Strauss,  Renan,  Matthew 
Arnold,  Theodore  Parker,  and  Otto  Pfleiderer.  Since  the 
mythical  hypothesis  of  Strauss  was  intimately  associated 
with  a  noted  movement  in  New  Testament  criticism,  there 
will  be  occasion  to  give  attention  to  that  hypothesis  in 
connection  with  a  subsequent  theme.  We  notice,  then, 
at  the  present  point  only  the  fact  that  Strauss  was  very 
liberal  in  ascribing  to  the  ideas  at  work  in  the  minds  and 
hearts  of  a  people  a  power  to  objectify  themselves  in 
forms  simulating  a  real  history.  On  this  basis  he  ex- 
plained the  stories  of  miracles  in  the  Gospels,  describing 
them  as  spontaneous  and  unpremeditated  products  of  the 
lively  ideas  in  the  minds  of  those  who  felt  the  attractive 
power  of  the  Christ. 

In  the  exposition  of  Paulus  (1761-1851)  reports  of 
miracles  are  identified  with  uncritical  interpretations  of 
natural  events.  The  biblical  writers,  or  those  from  whom 
they  received  their  matter,  did  not  intend  to  falsify  his- 

*  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  Part  iii,  chaps,  i  and  ii. 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  i6i 

tory ;  they  simply  misinterpreted  facts  in  accordance  with 
the  easy-going  method  of  the  time.  Thus  meteoric  phe- 
nomena were  construed  as  angelic  appearances ;  the  feed- 
ing of  the  five  thousand,  though  brought  about  simply 
by  the  liberality  of  Christ,  and  of  those  who  were  inspired 
by  his  example,  in  distributing  the  food  in  their  posses- 
sion, was  taken  as  evidence  of  a  marvelous  multiplication 
of  loaves;  the  coming  forth  of  Lazarus  when  he  was 
roused  from  his  stupor  by  the  loud  voice  of  Jesus  was  re- 
garded as  a  rising  from  the  dead ;  and  the  resuscitation  of 
Jesus  from  the  deep  swoon  into  which  he  had  fallen,  in 
consequence  of  his  experience  of  torture  upon  the  cross, 
was  thought  to  be  a  veritable  resurrection.^  With  Paulus 
it  was  a  fixed  maxim,  as  it  was  with  his  contemporary 
Wegscheider,  that  miracles  do  not  occur.  He  con- 
sidered, therefore,  that  a  principal  task  of  the  biblical 
historian  and  exegete  consists  in  explaining  them  away. 
That  he  executed  this  task  successfully  has  never  been  the 
verdict  of  any  large  body  of  scholars.  Some  of  his  ex- 
planations may  have  a  measure  of  plausibility,  but  in 
attempting  to  apply  his  naturalistic  exegesis  to  the  entire 
list  of  gospel  miracles  he  so  ran  into  obvious  artificialities 
as  very  largely  to  discredit  his  method. 

The  point  of  view  of  De  Wette  (1780-1849)  was  con- 
trasted with  that  of  Paulus  in  a  twofold  respect.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  was  less  decidedly  opposed  to  the  possible 
occurrence  of  miracles ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  much 
more  appreciative  of  the  religious  worth  of  the  biblical 
marvels.  While  Paulus  saw  in  stories  of  the  supernatural 
simply  accretions  which  needed  to  be  cut  away  with  the 
unsparing  knife  of  criticism,  De  Wette  saw  in  them  the 
symbolical  forms  which  serve  at  once  to  express  and  to 
satisfy  the  deep  sentiments  which  pertain  to  man  as  a  re- 

^  Das  Leben  Jesu. 


i62        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

ligious  being.  Accordingly,  he  was  unwilling  to  measure 
their  value  by  their  historicity.  A  large  proportion  of  them, 
especially  of  those  recounted  in  the  Old  Testament,  he 
considered  to  be  unable  to  meet  the  historic  test.  The 
books  with  which  they  are  incorporated  approach  the 
character  of  didactic  poetry.  A  sort  of  epic  cast  pertains 
to  the  Pentateuch.  "If  an  historical  narrative,"  says  De 
Wette,  "written  without  critical  investigation  of  facts, 
but  treated  so  as  to  suit  religious  and  poetical  ideas,  is  an 
epic  composition,  then  the  Pentateuch  may  be  called  the 
theocratical  epic  poem  of  the  Israelites  without  denying 
that  there  is  an  historical  basis  at  the  bottom.  This  epic 
treatment  shows  itself,  (i)  In  the  poetic  form  of  the 
narrative,  which  satisfies  the  poetic  sense,  not  only  by  its 
intuitiveness  and  spiritedness,  but  even  by  the  rhythmic 
elevation  of  the  style.  (2)  In  the  subject  matter,  and 
indeed  in  the  miraculous  events  and  the  supernatural  in- 
tercourse with  God;  for  the  epic  loves  the  miraculous. 
The  popular  legend  had  prepared  the  way  for  this  treat- 
ment."^ Respecting  the  miraculous  element  in  the  New 
Testament,  Be  Wette  preferred  to  speak  with  much 
reserve. 

Renan  treated  the  subject  of  miracles  with  dogm_atic 
intolerance.  If  he  did  not  deny  the  possibility  of  their 
occurrence  he  did  deny  the  existence  of  any  credible  evi- 
dence of  their  occurrence,  and  intimated  his  intention  to 
keep  up  the  denial  until  a  miracle  should  transpire  in  the 
face  of  such  tests  as  might  be  agreeable  to  his  mind. 
Among  the  requirements  of  a  proper  authentication  of  a 
supernatural  event,  he  reckoned  as  indispensable  its  being 
wrought  under  the  inspection  of  a  conclave  of  skeptics. 
This  requirement,  he  assumed,  has  never  been  met,  and  so 


» Introduction  to  the  Old  Testament,  trans,  by  Theodore  Parker,  SI  i45~ 
147- 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  163 

the  historian  must  refuse  all  serious  consideration  to  re- 
ports of  supernatural  occurrences.  "It  is  an  absolute  rule 
of  criticism,"  he  said,  "to  deny  a  place  in  history  to  narra- 
tives of  miraculous  circumstances;  nor  is  this  owing  to 
a  metaphysical  system,  for  it  is  simply  the  dictation  of 
observation.  Such  facts  have  never  been  really  proved. 
All  the  pretended  miracles  near  enough  to  be  examined 
are  referable  to  illusion  or  imposture.  Discussion  and 
examination  are  fatal  to  miracles.  In  other  words, 
miracles  only  exist  when  people  believe  in  them.  The 
supernatural  is  but  another  name  for  faith.  A  miracle 
never  takes  place  before  an  incredulous  and  skeptical  pub- 
lic, the  most  in  need  of  such  a  convincing  proof.  Credu- 
lity on  the  part  of  the  witness  is  the  essential  condition 
of  a  miracle."^ 

In  his  estimate  of  the  competency  of  mere  ideas  and 
feelings  to  generate  stories  of  miraculous  events  Renan 
stood  quite  on  a  level  with  Feuerbach  and  Strauss.  This 
appears  conspicuously  in  his  sketch  of  the  origin  of  belief 
in  the  resurrection  of  Jesus.  "To  acknowledge,"  he  says, 
"that  death  could  have  the  victory  over  Jesus,  over  him 
who  came  to  abolish  the  power  of  death,  this  was  the 
height  of  absurdity.  The  very  idea  that  he  could  suffer 
had  previously  been  revolting  to  his  disciples.  They  had 
no  choice,  then,  between  despair  and  heroic  affirmation. 
A  man  of  penetration  might  have  announced  during  the 
Saturday  that  Jesus  would  arise.  The  little  Christian 
society,  on  that  day,  worked  the  veritable  miracle ;  they 
resuscitated  Jesus  in  their  hearts  by  the  intense  love  which 
they  bore  toward  him.  They  decided  that  Jesus  had  not 
died.  The  love  of  these  passionately  fond  souls  was  truly 
stronger  than  death."  Preeminently  was  this  true  of 
Mary  Magdalene.    "Only  Mary  loved  enough  to  pass  the 

*The  Apostles,  pp.  37,  38. 


i64        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

bounds  of  nature  and  revive  the  shade  of  the  perfect  Mas- 
ter. The  glory  of  the  resurrection,  then,  belongs  to  Mary 
of  Magdala.  After  Jesus  it  is  Mary  who  has  done  most 
for  the  foundation  of  Christianity."^  At  this  point  one 
might  reasonably  ask  whether  the  denier  of  miracles  is 
not  on  record  as  asserting  a  stupendous  miracle  in  the 
person  of  the  Magdalene. 

While  Renan  assigned  to  feeling  and  imagination  the 
chief  function  in  originating  narratives  of  the  miracu- 
lous, he  was  not  above  insinuating  the  existence  of  an 
element  of  intentional  deception.  He  hinted  that  some 
in  the  company  of  the  disciples  could  have  told  what  had 
become  of  the  body  of  Jesus  had  they  not  been  un- 
willing to  dampen  a  newly  enkindled  faith.^  By  this 
insinuation  he  placed  these  disciples  in  line  with  that 
group  of  the  friends  of  Jesus  whom  he  has  represented 
in  his  Vie  de  Jesus  as  planning  the  fictitious  raising  of 
Lazarus. 

In  this  odious  insinuation  against  the  moral  integrity 
of  the  disciples  Matthew  Arnold  took  no  share.  "The 
good  faith  of  the  Bible  writers,"  he  said,  "is  above  all 
question ;  it  speaks  for  itself ;  and  the  very  same  criticism 
which  shows  the  defects  of  their  exegesis  and  of  their 
demonstrations  from  miracles  establishes  their  good 
faith. "^  Arnold  also  differed  from  Renan  in  the  measure 
of  his  reverence  for  Jesus.  He  never  could  have  followed 
the  French  critic  in  laying  a  soiling  hand  upon  the  his- 
toric picture  of  the  Master.  Uniformly  he  represented 
him  as  standing  high  above  the  heads  of  his  reporters, 
"inconceivably  great  and  wonderful."  It  is  to  be  observed 
also  that  Arnold,  while  himself  reckoning  miracles  an 
unnecessary  support  to  religious  faith,  grants  that  the 


iThe  Apostles,  pp.  ■;7,  6i.  *  Tbid.,  p   63. 

^Literature  and  Dogma,  p.  143. 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  165 

mass  of  men  have  found  in  the  conviction  of  their  occur- 
rence no  small  stimulus  to  faith.  He  considers,  neverthe- 
less, that  their  office  must  be  a  waning  one.  Belief  in  the 
historic  reality  of  the  supernatural  events  recorded  in  the 
Bible  cannot  endure  the  advance  of  the  scientific  temper 
and  the  light  which  is  derived  from  a  comparative  study 
of  the  vast  list  of  reputed  miracles.  "To  pick  Scripture 
miracles  to  pieces  one  by  one,"  he  said,  "is  an  odious  and 
repulsive  task ;  it  is  also  an  unprofitable  one,  for  whatever 
we  may  think  of  the  affirmative  demonstrations  of  them, 
a  negative  demonstration  of  them  is,  from  the  circum- 
stances of  tlie  case,  impossible.  And  yet  the  human 
mind  is  assuredly  passing  away,  however  slowly,  from 
this  hold  of  reliance  also.  It  is  what  we  call  the  time- 
spirit  that  is  sapping  the  proof  from  miracles — it  is  the 
Zeit-Geist  itself.  Whether  we  attack  them,  or  whether 
we  defend  them,  does  not  much  matter ;  the  human  mind, 
as  its  experience  widens,  is  turning  away  from  them. 
And  for  this  reason,  it  sees,  as  its  experience  widens, 
how  they  arise.  It  sees  that  under  certain  circumstances 
they  always  do  arise ;  and  that  they  have  not  more  reality 
in  one  case  than  in  another."^ 

Theodore  Parker  asserted  the  transcendence  as  well  as 
the  immanence  of  God.  He  also  asserted  an  all-inclusive 
divine  providence.  But  he  contended  that  the  exercise 
of  that  providence  is  quite  aside  from  miraculous  make- 
shifts. "God,  inasmuch  as  he  is  God,"  he  said,  "acts 
providentially  in  nature  not  by  miraculous  and  spasmodic 
fits  and  starts,  but  by  regular  and  universal  laws,  by  con- 
stant modes  of  operation.  ...  As  the  infinitely  perfect,  he 
must  accomplish  his  providential  purpose  by  the  laws 
which  belong  to  the  nature  and  constitution  of  things; 
that  is,  by  the  normal  and  constant  mode  of  operation 


*  Literature  and  Do^ma,  pp.  139,  130. 


i66        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

of  the  natural  powers  resident  in  those  things   them- 
selves."^ 

Substantially  the  same  theoretical  objection  as  that 
urged  by  Parker  may  be  detected  in  these  words  of 
Pfleiderer:  "As  we  have  recognized  the  order  of  nature 
as  the  revelation  of  the  divine  omnipotence,  we  cannot 
establish  such  an  opposition  between  the  one  and  the 
other  as  that  God  would  be  fettered  or  limited  by  the 
order  of  nature,  and  could  now  and  again  feel  a  need  to 
break  through  or  limit  this  fetter.  As  little  as  God  is 
confined  within  limits  by  the  moral  order  of  the  world, 
just  as  little  is  he  so  limited  by  the  natural  order.  Both 
are,  in  fact,  posited  wholly  and  equally  by  his  will,  and 
are  revelations  of  his  eternal  Logos — a  violation  of  which 
would  therefore  be  a  self-contradiction  of  God,  which  is 
excluded  by  his  eternal  perfection.  And  as  miracle  con- 
tradicts the  right  conception  of  God,  so  does  it  also  con- 
tradict the  connection  of  causes  and  effects  in  conformity 
with  law."^ 

In  explaining  the  genesis  of  stories  of  miracles,  Pflei- 
derer follows  quite  closely  in  the  wake  of  Strauss.  "Mir- 
aculous legends,"  he  says,  "arise  in  a  twofold  way — partly 
out  of  the  idealizing  of  the  real  and  partly  out  of  the 
realizing  of  the  ideal.  ...  It  is  quite  conceivable  on  psy- 
chological grounds  that  occurrences  which  have  made  a 
deep  and  lasting  impression,  not  merely  on  individuals  but 
on  whole  circles  of  religiously  excited  men,  become  invol- 
untarily idealised,  even  on  the  occasion  of  their  being  per- 
ceived by  the  first  eyewitnesses,  and  still  more  in  their 
recollection  of  them.  .  .  .  Thus  arise  the  relative  miracu- 
lous histories,  in  which  a  real  historical  background  is  to 


1  Sermons  of  Theism,  Atheism,  and  Popular  Theology,  Works,  XI.  io8, 
185;,  189,  192. 

2  Philosophy  and  Development  of  Religion,   Gifford  Lectures  for  1894, 

P-  293- 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  167 

be  presupposed,  but  which  was  overlaid  with  mystical 
accessories  by  the  idealizing  fantasy.  . . .  But  the  religious 
spirit  idealizes  not  merely  real  occurrences  of  the  external 
world ;  it  also  produces  of  its  own  spontaneity  ideas  and 
ideals  to  which  nothing  real  in  the  outer  world  corre- 
sponds, but  in  which  only  inner  living  experiences  of  the 
pious  soul,  its  struggles  and  triumphs,  its  beliefs  and 
hopes,  are  brought  to  expression."^ 

Though  denying  the  historic  character  of  the  reports 
of  miracles,  Pfleiderer  credits  them  with  an  important 
religious  office,  and  considers  it  out  of  place  to  treat  them 
with  unsympathetic  harshness.  "To  the  matured  faith," 
he  says,  "the  world  itself  is  the  one  great  miracle  of  the 
successive  realizing  of  the  divine  ideal ;  and  therefore  such 
faith  honors  in  all  miracle-legends  the  beautiful  symbol 
of  the  one  great  miracle  of  the  divine  government  of  the 
world  and  of  the  education  of  humanity,  that  heavenly 
treasure  which  mankind  could  not  hide  otherwise  than 
in  earthen  vessels.  Thus  for  us  too  the  words  of  Goethe 
hold  true,  that  'Miracle  is  faith's  own  dearest  child.'  "^ 

II. — Examination  of  the  Grounds  of  the 
Challenge 

Very  little  consideration  needs  to  be  given  to  objections 
to  miracles  in  so  far  as  they  proceed  from  an  antitheistic 
standpoint.  The  theistic  conception  is  too  firmly  in- 
trenched in  the  history  of  human  thought,  and  in  the 
demands  of  man's  religious,  ethical,  and  rational  life,  to 
be  exposed  to  any  real  danger  of  displacement.  At  any 
rate,  there  is  nothing  in  the  philosophies  which  have  been 
reviewed  that  approaches  to  an  adequate  ground  for  its 
relinquishment.     By  the  general  consent  of  philosophers, 

'Philosophy  and  Development  of  Religion,  pp.  295-297. 
^Ibid.,  pp.  297,  298. 


i68        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

no  less  than  of  theologians,  a  faulty,  superficial,  and  in- 
consistent metaphysics  underlies  the  negations  of  pessi- 
mism, positivism,  and  materialism.  The  Spencerian  argu- 
ment against  the  doctrine  of  divine  personality  is  far  from 
being  formidable.  On  the  one  hand,  as  has  been  indi- 
cated, it  rests  on  an  arbitrary  play  with  abstract  terms, 
on  an  antithesis  between  "absolute"  and  "personal"  manu- 
factured by  the  assignment  of  a  gratuitous  sense  to  the 
former  term.  On  the  other  hand,  it  runs  into  an  excess 
of  the  anthropomorphism  which  Spencer  affects  to  con- 
temn ;  since  it  makes,  intelligence,  self-consciousness,  and 
will,  as  they  are  conditioned  in  us,  the  measure  of  all  pos- 
sible intelligence,  self-consciousness,  and  will,  and  so  ex- 
cludes these  high  attributes  from  the  infinite — a  pro- 
cedure essentially  on  a  level  with  a  denial  of  the  infinite 
and  absolute  because  man's  experience  is  in  the  sphere  of 
the  finite  and  relative.  As  respects  the  Fichtean  objec- 
tions to  divine  personality,  it  was  found  that  theistic  faith 
has  no  serious  occasion  to  be  stumbled  by  them.  The 
same  answer,  in  fact,  applies  to  them  as  to  the  Spencerian 
objections.^ 

For  some  minds,  doubtless,  a  real  difficulty  in  the  way 
of  theistic  faith  is  involved  in  evolutionary  science,  with 
its  disclosure  of  the  enormous  reach  of  the  process  of 
struggle  and  destruction  in  the  past.  But  there  is  reason 
to  conclude  that  the  somber  feature  of  this  process  has 
been  overdrawn.  Already  scientific  conviction  has  begun 
to  admit  abatements.  Account  has  been  taken  of  an  altru- 
istic factor  in  the  evolutionary  movement  and  of  the 
affluent  provision  for  the  weal  of  sensitive  being  which  is 
disclosed  in  the  complex  system  of  nature  alongside  of  the 
harsher  aspects.  Enigmas  doubtless  remain;  but  to  in- 
terpret them  against  the  existence  of  a  benevolent  God 

*  See  part  i,  chap,  i,  sect.  iii. 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  169 

would  only  serve  to  enlarge  and  to  darken  the  element  of 
enigma.  It  would  be  going  in  the  face  of  the  better  and 
more  compelling  evidence.  Nature  is  but  a  dim  mirror 
compared  with  a  rational  spirit  luminous  with  unsullied 
righteousness  and  perfect  love.  Even  if,  then,  we  should 
grant  that  nature's  testimony  fails  to  give  full  assurance, 
we  have  a  mighty  supplement  to  that  testimony  in  the 
lofty  intuitions  of  Jesus  Christ,  and  in  the  firm  convictions 
of  all  that  vast  multitude  of  elect  spirits  who  have  tasted 
and  seen  that  the  Lord  is  good.  The  light  that  rises  on 
the  inner  world  furnishes  a  rational  ground  for  postpon- 
ing the  explanation  of  some  uncanceled  shadows  in  the 
outer  world. 

Theistic  faith,  then,  has  not  been  put  to  hazard  by  the 
special  conditions  of  nineteenth  century  thought.  A  little 
disturbance  may  have  occurred  pending  the  adjustment 
to  new  outlooks,  but  no  important  foundation  has  been 
displaced.  The  right  to  construe  God  as  self-conscious 
person  abides  in  undiminished  force.  Rather  we  may 
say,  the  obligation  thus  to  construe  him  abides;  for,  in 
the  words  of  Andrew  Seth,  "the  admission  of  real  self- 
consciousness  in  God  seems  demanded  of  us  if  we  are  not 
to  be  unfaithful  to  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  theory 
of  knowledge — interpretation  by  the  highest  category 
within  our  reach.  The  self-conscious  life  is  that  highest, 
and  we  would  be  false  to  ourselves  if  we  denied  in  God 
what  we  recognize  as  the  source  of  dignity  and  worth  in 
ourselves."^ 

The  theoretical  objection  to  miracles  urged  from  a  the- 
istic point  of  view  by  Theodore  Parker  and  Pfleiderer  rests 
on  an  assumption  that  needs  a  clearer  and  stronger  vindi- 
cation that  it  has  carried  at  their  hands.  The  assump- 
tion is  that  God  would  be  resorting  to  an  unworthy  make- 

*  Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  224. 


170        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 
shift  in  using  the  miracle,  the  proper  thought  of  his  per- 
fection requiring  that  he  should  realize  his  purposes  with- 
out interfering  with  the  established  order  of  nature  which 
he  himself  has  posited.     In  this  claim  there  is  at  once  a 
gratuitous  disparagement  of  the  miracle  and  a  gratuitous 
exaltation  of  the  order  of  nature.    The  miracle  seems  to  be 
rated  as  a  kind  of  afterthought,  an  event  which  is  violently 
intruded  into  the  divine  scheme.    But  it  is  not  to  be  thus 
considered.     Viewed  from  the  human  standpoint,  it  ap- 
pears, indeed,  outside  of  the  regular  sequence  of  events. 
This  does  not  imply,  however,  that  on  the  divine  side  it 
is  chargeable  in  the  least  degree  with  caprice  or  irregu- 
larity.   On  the  contrary,  if  we  give  a  suitable  extension  to 
the  conception  of  law,  and  include  under  that  term  the 
fixed  principles  of  divine  action,  we  may  affirm  that  the 
miracle  is  entirely  conformable  to  law,  since  it  occurs  only 
in  accordance  with  the  fixed  principles  of  the  divine  ad- 
ministration, only  in  accordance  with  the  eternal  plan  and 
purpose    of    the   all-wise    Administrator.     With    entire 
propriety  we  may  adopt  the  sentiment  of  Jean  Paul  Rich- 
ter,  Wunder  auf  Erden  sind  Natiir  im  Himmel;  that  is, 
we  may  think  of  the  wonderful  events  which,  in  the 
earthly  point  of  view,  fall  outside  the  regular  sequence, 
as  being  part  and  parcel  of  the  eternal   and   divinely 
ordered  scheme,  the  conditions  of  their  occurrence  being 
as  unequivocally  determined  by  divine  wisdom  as  are  the 
conditions  of  any  other  events  whatever.     Only  on  the 
ground  of  the  insight  that  no  valuable  purpose  can  be 
accomplished  by  the  events  which  men  classify  as  extra- 
ordinary or  miraculous  is  it  legitimate  to  rule  them  out  as 
unworthy  of  God.    But  who  has  such  insight  ?    Doubtless 
miracles,  in  the  sense  of  extraordinary  workings  in  the 
sphere  of  sense-perception,  are  not  the  highest  form  of 
the  verification    of    spiritual    truths.     Nevertheless,    as 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  171 

means  of  awakening  attention,  interest,  and  confidence 
they  may  serve  for  men  at  a  given  stage  as  an  efficient 
auxiliary  to  that  verification.  No  one  is  qualified  to  deny 
that  in  the  divine  process  of  educating  the  race  a  certain 
ideal  combination  of  the  extraordinary  with  the  ordinary 
may  be  adapted  to  reach  a  better  result  than  could  be 
attained  by  the  ordinary  alone.  The  conclusion,  there- 
fore, remains  open  that  God  as  a  practical  being,  having 
respect  to  the  actual  needs  of  men,  may  accord  a  certain 
sphere  to  miraculous  workings.  To  bind  him  to  respect 
impersonal  nature  to  that  extent  that  he  will  never  super- 
induce upon  it  any  new  factor,  after  the  analogy  of  man's 
free  working,  is  to  bind  him  to  treat  the  subordinate  part 
as  the  whole.  Impersonal  nature  is  only  the  theater 
on  which  the  kingdom  of  righteousness  is  being  unfolded, 
only  the  scaffolding  incident  to  the  erection  of  the  spirit- 
ual edifice.  Hence,  to  require  God  to  treat  it  strictly  as 
an  end  is  no  compliment  to  his  wisdom  and  benevolence. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  to  be  granted  that  the  miracle  does 
any  real  despite  to  the  system  of  nature.  That  supposition 
involves  an  imperfect  apprehension  of  the  divine  infini- 
tude. If  God  holds  all  things,  so  to  speak,  in  the  hollow 
of  his  hand,  and  his  energy  is  the  constant  ground  of  their 
being  and  interrelations,  it  stands  to  reason  that  he  can 
take  care  of  the  results  of  the  act  which,  from  the  human 
viewpoint,  is  outside  the  established  order.  It  is,  indeed, 
well-nigh  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  omnipotence  cannot 
make  special  adjustments  within  the  sphere  of  nature 
without  causing  a  wrench  to  the  natural  system.  If  men, 
within  the  measure  of  their  abilities,  can  manipulate  the 
forces  of  the  world  without  any  disastrous  result,  surely 
it  may  be  presumed  that  God  can  manipulate  those 
forces  on  a  greater  scale  without  any  real  damage  to  the 
world. 


172        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

Among  the  historical  objections  to  miracles  some  writers 
have  emphasized,  as  was  noticed,  the  fact  that  their  credi- 
bility is  being  excluded  by  the  spirit  of  the  age.    The  age, 
it  is  claimed,  is  scientific  in  animus,  and  scientific  habits 
of  thought  extinguish  faith  in  miracles  as  the  growing 
clover  chokes  the  weeds.    In  reply  it  may  be  said,  in  the 
first  place,  that  the  essential  hostility  of  the  age  to  the 
supposition  of  the  miraculous  has  not  been  established 
by  a  complete  historical  induction.    While  a  certain  per- 
centage of  scholarly  minds  have  been  inclined  to  retrench 
or  even  to  reject  belief  in  supernatural  occurrences,  faith 
in  a  miracle-working  God  has  remained  vital  in  great  mul- 
titudes of  intelligent  people.     In  the  second  place,  it  is 
legitimate  to  note  that  the  habit  of  mind  which  results 
from  certain  ranges  of  scientific  study  may  well  include  a 
faulty  tendency.     The  one  who  immerses  himself  in  the 
study  of  mechanically  working  forces,  or  in  the  investi- 
gation of  the  subhuman  forms  of  life,  or  in  the  minute 
inspection  of  the  physiological  side  of  man's  being,  stands 
in  some  danger  of  an  abnormally  reduced  appreciation 
for  the  higher  altitudes  and  the  grander  facts  in  man's 
nature  and  religious  history.    Truth  may  be  quite  as  much 
sacrificed  in  the  ultra-prosaic  as  in  the  ultra-poetic  view. 
A  superstitious  attitude  may  be  taken  toward  the  uni- 
formities of  nature  as  well  as  toward  a  power  supposed  to 
transcend  nature.     The  animus  begotten  by   a  narrow 
range  of   scientific   study   may   be   actually   unscientific 
before  the  proper  standard  of  openness  and  fealty  to  the 
entire  sum  of  facts.    If   so-called   theologians   may  be 
tempted  to  overlook  too  largely  one  side  of  reality,  so- 
called  scientists  may  be  tempted  to  make  too  scanty  ac- 
count of  another  side  of  reality.     To  contrast  the  two 
classes,  as  though  the  one  stood  for  the  method  of  mere 
assumption  and  the  other  for  the  method  of  complete 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  173 

induction,  is  as  rash  in  logic  as  it  is  objectionable  in  point 
of  manners.  Theology  may  conceivably  represent  quite 
as  searching  a  scrutiny  as  does  this  or  that  compendium 
of  inferences  which  has  been  labeled  "scientific."  We 
conclude,  then,  that  those  who  have  been  prophesying  the 
total  extinction  of  faith  in  miracles  by  the  advance  of  the 
scientific  spirit  need  to  give  further  proof  of  their  pro- 
phetic gift  before  serious  heed  to  their  forecasts  can  be 
made  obligatory.  Of  course,  the  spirit  of  the  age,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  normal,  must  work  against  a  heedless  over- 
extension of  the  province  of  the  supernatural ;  but  that  is 
a  result  quite  different  from  a  comprehensive  negation 
of  the  supernatural. 

The  discrimination  just  made  is  pertinent  in  connec- 
tion with  a  second  historical  objection,  namely,  that  based 
on  the  wideness  of  the  area  covered  by  stories  of  miracles, 
or  on  the  facility  with  which  narratives  of  this  order 
have  gained  a  place  in  the  annals  of  all  peoples.  This 
super-abundance,  it  is  alleged,  is  indicative  of  a  universal 
appetite  for  miracles,  and  in  the  force  of  this  appetite 
we  have  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  rise  and  currency 
of  stories  of  miracles.  A  measure  of  weight,  it  must  be 
conceded,  belongs  to  this  consideration.  But  it  is  quite 
overrated  when  it  is  treated  as  a  means  of  summarily 
dismissing  all  reports  of  miracles.  Suppose  the  fact  of 
genuine  miracles,  and  suppose  at  the  same  time  a  general 
predilection  in  the  various  peoples  of  the  world  for  tales 
of  miraculous  deeds,  what  would  be  the  result?  Mani- 
festly a  great  crop  of  unauthentic  marvels  alongside  the 
reports  of  real  miracles.  The  presence  of  the  latter  could 
not  abolish  the  ever-fruitful  source  of  the  former.  The 
unauthentic  marvels  would  be  quite  certain  to  ap]>ear, 
whatever  rivals  might  be  on  the  field.  Their  mere  pres- 
ence, therefore,  would  be  no  disproof  of  the  subsistence 


174        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

of  truthful  reports  of  miraculous  events.  As  the  wild 
growths  of  paganism  do  not  enforce  the  conclusion  that 
religion  in  general  has  no  substantial  claims,  so  the  exces- 
sive crop  of  marvels  does  not  disprove  the  occurrence  of 
true  miracles. 

What  the  known  fact  of  the  facile  multiplication  of 
stories  of  miracles  justifies  is,  not  a  sweeping  denial  of 
such  events,  but  simply  insistence  upon  the  appropriate 
tests.  These  can  fitly  be  made  very  severe.  Renan  was 
indeed  asking  too  much  when  he  required,  as  a  condition 
of  approval,  that  the  miracle  should  be  wrought  under 
the  inspection  of  a  conclave  of  skeptics.  There  is  no 
rational  guarantee  that  divine  sovereignty  will  wait  on 
such  a  conclave  and  respond  to  its  challenge.  The  grant- 
ing of  signs  on  demand  might  be  attended  with  mischie- 
vous results.  Not  thus,  it  may  warrantably  be  presumed, 
will  the  miracle  come.  If  it  comes  at  all  it  will  appear  not 
as  a  response  to  the  challenge  of  unbelief,  but  as  an  har- 
monious incident  in  the  fulfillment  of  a  lofty  providential 
vocation  by  the  servant  and  representative  of  the  divine 
kingdom.  Still,  while  the  dignity  of  the  divine  adminis- 
tration may  exclude  one  or  another  form  of  attestation, 
it  is  right  that  the  tests  applied  to  the  reports  of  miracles 
should  be  made  very  stringent.  It  is  an  important,  if  not 
an  absolute,  requirement  that  the  supernatural  events 
should  appear  to  have  been  associated  with  the  decisive 
epochs  in  the  unfoldment  of  the  kingdom  of  God  in  the 
world.  It  is  a  perfectly  normal  demand  that  they  should 
seem  to  have  been  dictated  by  motives  and  to  have  sub- 
served ends  that  are  worthy  of  a  God  of  wisdom,  love,  and 
righteousness.  With  entire  legitimacy  also  it  may  be 
asked  that  their  verity  should  be  approved  by  substantial 
testimony. 

The  application  of  this  last  test  to  the  gospel  miracles 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  175 

could  better  be  made  at  the  end  of  a  review  of  the  ap- 
proved results  of  New  Testament  criticism  than  in  this 
connection.  No  real  trespass,  however,  against  historical 
sobriety  will  be  involved  in  noting  here  these  facts :  that 
the  canonical  Gospels  contain  excellent  marks  of  a  re- 
strained zest  for  the  supernatural  in  ascribing  no  miracles 
to  John  the  Baptist  and  in  imputing  no  marvels  to  Jesus 
prior  to  his  public  ministry;  that  the  ancient  tradition 
which  represented  Mark  as  founding  his  Gospel  largely 
upon  the  testimony  of  Peter  is  thoroughly  credible;  that 
criticism  very  generally  approves  the  conclusion  that  both 
Matthew  and  Luke,  besides  drawing  to  a  considerable 
extent  from  Mark,  also  made  use  of  other  writings,  of  a 
comparatively  early  date,  wherein,  in  all  likelihood,  some 
references  to  miracles  were  contained;  and  that  conse- 
quently the  reports  of  miracles  in  the  Gospels  were  based 
largely  upon  apostolic  testimony.  The  merits  of  apostolic 
testimony  may  doubtless  be  called  in  question;  but  the 
day  is  not  likely  to  dawn  soon  when  devout  and  sober 
minds  will  agree  in  rating  as  a  poor  set  of  witnesses,  on 
the  facts  of  a  public  ministry,  the  men  whom  the  incom- 
parable Master  of  all  the  ages  chose  for  the  most  respon- 
sible work  of  the  ages. 

As  respects  all  other  legitimate  tests,  it  is  difficult  to 
conceive  how  a  judicial  mind  can  ask  for  a  better  com- 
pliance with  their  demands  than  that  exemplified  by  the 
gospel  miracles.  These  events  as  a  whole  evince  in  their 
spirit  and  aim  a  holy  benevolence,  and  thus  fulfill  a 
perennial  office  of  revelation  for  the  inspiring  and 
strengthening  of  men's  souls.  More  than  this,  they  are 
woven  as  a  congruous  factor  into  a  unique  fabric,  a  story 
of  marvelous  beauty  and  spiritual  wealth.  They  are  con- 
genially related  to  the  personality  in  whom  the  greatest 
sanity,  the  finest  balance  of  the  higher  attributes  of  man- 


176        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

hood,  was  combined  with  the  loftiest  type  of  self-conscious- 
ness that  ever  came  to  manifestation  within  the  limits  of 
the  human  race.  Now,  shall  marvelous  deeds  be  counted 
foreign  to  this  marvelous  personality?  Shall  he  in 
whom  tender  humanity  and  transcendent  lordship  were 
united  and  reconciled  be  denied  a  title  to  those  exhi- 
bitions of  good  will  and  might  which  are  contained  in  the 
gospel  miracles,  just  because  legendary  or  invented  mar- 
vels have  a  place  in  the  world?  This  would  be  nothing 
less  than  to  deny  the  inimitable  just  because  there  are  so 
many  common  products  in  existence.  As  Theodore 
Parker  admitted,  none  but  a  Jesus  could  fabricate  a 
Jesus.^  With  nearly  equal  propriety  it  may  be  said,  noth- 
ing but  the  historic  reality  could  have  bequeathed 
that  gospel  picture  in  which  the  marvelous  personality 
and  the  marvelous  deeds  are  so  happily  adjusted  to  one 
another. 

For  one  who  occupies  the  Christian  standpoint,  who 
heartily  believes  that  Jesus  Christ  is  central  to  a  great 
redemptive  economy,  it  is  not  illogical  to  admit  that  super- 
natural workings  entered  into  the  preparation  for  his 
coming  and  also  supplemented  his  finished  ministry.  It 
may  be  granted  that  the  attestations  for  these  are  not 
equal  to  the  evidences  which  certify  to  us  the  verity  of  the 
gospel  miracles;  it  may  even  be  admitted  that  a  legend- 
ary growth  may  have  gained  a  place  within  one  or  an- 
other part  of  the  biblical  domain ;  but  as  one  contemplates 
in  the  temper  of  a  redeemed  man  the  transcendent  impor- 
tance of  the  economy  which  is  centered  in  Christ  he  will 
find  it  agreeable  to  reason  to  believe  that  a  miracle-work- 
ing providence  has  met  special  demands  of  that  economy 
outside  of  the  theater  of  the  gospel  history. 

Notice  was  taken  of  Renan's  very  easy  method  of  dis- 

»The  Bible.  What  Tt  Is  and  What  It  Is  Not. 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  177 

posing  of  the  resurrection  of  Christ.  In  truth,  it  is  much 
too  easy  to  claim  any  considerable  amount  of  respect.  The 
disciples  of  the  preeminently  sane  Jesus,  chosen  by  him 
for  a  momentous  task,  were  not,  in  all  likelihood,  the 
volatile  enthusiasts  that  the  sketch  of  the  romancing  critic 
makes  them  to  have  been.  Moreover,  a  unique  complex 
of  mutually  supporting  factors  is  contained  in  the  evi- 
dence for  the  miracle  of  Christ's  resurrection.  Briefly 
stated,  these  closely  related  factors  are  as  follows :  ( i ) 
The  extraordinary  event  is  perfectly  consonant  with  the 
extraordinary  mission  ascribed  to  Christ  by  the  New 
Testament  from  beginning  to  end.  It  stands  forth  as  the 
appropriate  consummation  of  his  manifestation  as  Re- 
deemer, being  supremely  adapted  to  support  confidence 
in  his  saving  office  and  to  enkindle  a  salutary  hope  in 
men  as  respects  their  own  heirship  to  immortal  life.  (2) 
The  resurrection  of  Christ  is  made  credible  by  the  inti- 
mate relation  subsisting  between  its  pre-announcement  and 
an  indubitably  fulfilled  prophecy.  All  the  evangelists 
testify  that  Christ  foretold  to  the  disciples,  with  specifica- 
tion of  approximate  date  and  circumstances,  his  violent 
death.  Now  these  same  historians  who  record  this  line 
of  fulfilled  prophecy  associate  with  it  a  line  of  prophecy 
respecting  the  rising  of  the  Son  of  Man  from  the  dead. 
As  there  was  fulfillment  of  the  one  line  of  prophesying 
it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  there  was  fulfillment  of 
the  other  also.  He  who  foresaw  with  such  certainty  that 
he  must  pass  on  to  a  tragic  death  may  very  well  be  re- 
garded as  having  been  endowed  with  authentic  foresight 
when  he  spoke  of  the  resurrection  from  the  dead.  (3) 
The  victorious  confidence  with  which  the  disciples  took 
up  and  prosecuted  the  cause  of  their  crucified  Master  must 
be  referred  to  some  adequate  cause.  What  was  it  that 
turned  the  dark  night  of  their  grief  and  despair  into  a 


178        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

brilliant  day  of  joy  and  hope?  All  the  causes  which  a 
skeptical  fancy  has  conjured  up  seem  empty  and  futile 
compared  with  the  actual  reappearance  of  Christ  as  victor 
over  death  and  the  grave.  (4)  We  have  from  the  hand  of 
Paul  in  his  First  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians  testimony  to 
a  succession  of  appearances  of  the  risen  Christ.  And  this 
testimony  comes  from  no  mean  witness.  As  having  been 
formerly  a  special  agent  of  the  Pharisaic  and  priestly 
party  in  its  attempt  to  suppress  those  who  believed  on 
Jesus,  he  must  have  known  what  that  party  was  able  to 
offer  against  the  fact  of  the  resurrection.  He  was  on  the 
field  and  had  the  advantage  of  close  association  with  the 
bitter  opponents  as  well  as  with  the  friends  of  the  new 
religious  movement.  While  he  was  thus  furnished  with 
substantial  sources  of  information,  he  wrote  within  about 
twenty-five  years  of  the  crucifixion,  and  accordingly, 
under  circumstances  which  advised  to  carefulness  and 
sobriety  in  his  statements ;  for  at  that  time  many  of  those 
to  whom  he  referred  as  witnesses  of  the  reappearance 
of  Christ  were  still  at  hand.  It  must  therefore  be  con- 
sidered a  weighty  historical  testimony  which  we  have  in 
these  words  of  the  apostle:  "I  delivered  unto  you  first 
of  all  that  which  also  I  received,  how  that  Christ  died  for 
our  sins  according  to  the  Scriptures,  and  that  he  appeared 
to  Cephas ;  then  to  the  twelve ;  then  he  appeared  to  above 
five  hundred  brethren  at  once,  of  whom  the  greater  part 
remain  until  now,  but  some  are  fallen  asleep;  then  he 
appeared  to  James;  then  to  all  the  apostles."^  (5)  In 
speaking  of  the  burial  of  Christ,  Paul  makes  an  implicit 
reference  to  the  empty  tomb.  Herein  he  corroborates  an 
item  witnessed  to  by  all  the  New  Testament  writers  who 
give  any  detailed  account  of  the  resurrection.  A  question, 
therefore,  arises  as  to  the  ground  of  the  disappearance 

1 1  Cor.  XV.  3-7. 


CHALLENGING  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL  179 

of  the  body.  If  the  party  hostile  to  the  followers  of  Christ 
had  the  body  in  their  possession  they  could  not  have  neg- 
lected to  produce  it  for  the  confounding  of  the  hated  sect 
of  the  Nazarene.  On  the  other  hand,  to  charge  the  dis- 
ciples with  having  stolen  and  concealed  the  body  is 
to  make  choice  of  an  alternative  that  must  sink  under 
the  weight  of  its  own  absurdity;  for,  a  dead  body  under 
the  hand  of  the  disciples  and  a  lie  upon  their  consciences 
could  never  have  fitted  them  to  be  the  heroes  and  martyrs 
of  a  new  dispensation.  (6)  Each  of  the  evangelists  is 
in  agreement  with  Paul  in  teaching  that  the  risen  Christ 
appeared  not  merely  to  one  or  another  individual,  but  to 
the  entire  company  of  the  apostles.  Mark's  Gospel,  it  is 
true,  does  not  in  the  extant  conclusion  reach  to  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  appearance,  but  it  clearly  presumes  upon  the 
fact  of  the  appearance  sketched  in  the  appended  verses. 
Paul  mentions  two  visitations  of  Christ  to  the  whole 
group  of  the  apostles.  John  also  mentions  two  visitations, 
though  taking  note  that  Thomas  was  absent  from  the 
apostolic  company  on  the  occasion  of  the  first  of  these. 

Such  is  the  remarkable  historical  complex  which  stands 
forth  as  a  basis  for  faith  in  the  resurrection  of  Christ, 
The  basis  is  too  firm  to  be  overthrown  by  some  divergen- 
cies in  the  details  of  the  gospel  stories.  That  something 
of  this  sort  would  be  found  in  such  condensed  and  frag- 
mentary accounts  was  antecedently  probable.  A  criticism 
which  has  not  become  nearsighted  and  picayunish  by  too 
continuous  grubbing  in  small  details  will  not  magnify  the 
import  of  discrepancies  in  the  subordinate  particulars  of 
brief  and  independent  narratives.^ 

We  conclude,  then,  that  the  miracle  has  not  been  ban- 

*  For  a  fuller  elaboration  of  the  theme  see  the  author's  System  of  Chris- 
tian Doctrine,  pp.  581-590;  also  C.  W.  Rishell,  The  Foundations  of  the 
Christian  Faith,  pp.  523-558.  For  an  excellent  monograph  on  the  subject 
of  the  gospel  miracles  see  A.  B.  Bruce,  The  Miraculous  Element  in  the 
Gospels. 


i8o        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

ished  from  the  province  of  a  rational  faith.  At  the  same 
time  it  is  to  be  admitted  that  the  nineteenth  century  chal- 
lenge has  not  been  without  its  result.  It  has  undoubtedly 
served  to  promote  caution  in  the  scholarly  world  against 
giving  too  wide  an  extension  to  the  area  of  the  super- 
natural, as  also  against  an  imperfect  deistic  conception 
of  the  supernatural. 

It  may  have  occurred  to  the  reader  that  any  exercise 
of  a  power  of  initiation  proper,  as  being  outside  the  line 
of  natural  causation,  is  in  a  sense  a  supernatural  event. 
Of  course  there  has  been  no  design  to  ignore  this  truth  so 
greatly  emphasized  by  Bushnell;  but  in  the  present  dis- 
cussion it  has  been  convenient  to  take  the  term  "super- 
natural" in  a  more  restricted  significance. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  DENIAL  OF  THE  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY 

I. — Free  Religion 

In  Germany  congregations  which  made  "Free  Reh- 
gion"  their  shibboleth  were  instituted  about  1845  at  Halle, 
Magdeburg,  and  Konigsberg.  Kindred  societies  soon 
sprang  up  in  other  places,  the  number  being  ultimately 
increased  by  the  contemporary  "German  Catholic"  move- 
ment, which  was  started  under  the  leadership  of  Ronge 
and  Czerski.  The  platform  of  these  congregations 
(Freireligiose  Gemeinden)  included  from  the  start  eman- 
cipation from  the  trammels  of  confessionalism,  repudia- 
tion of  all  forms  of  traditional  authority,  the  exaltation 
of  reason  as  the  one  obligatory  standard,  and  the  approxi- 
mate reduction  of  religion  to  morality.  While  their  or- 
iginal principles  would  not  necessarily  exclude  a  certain 
partiality  for  Christianity  as  affording  the  richest  content 
of  any  historic  religion,  it  appears  that,  to  a  considerable 
extent  at  least,  the  congregations  have  come  to  disclaim 
any  preference  for  Christianity.  Recent  deliverances  in 
connection  with  the  Berlin  congregation  distinctly  reflect 
this  position.  Christianity  is  therein  brought  into  un- 
favorable comparison  with  Buddhism.  In  one  address  this 
very  frank  statement  is  made :  "Unquestionably the  scheme 
of  Free  Religion  of  our  time  stands  nearer  to  Buddhism 
in  its  views  than  to  Christianity."^  It  is  also  made  quite 
evident  that  the  tenor  of  thinking  in  the  Berlin  congrega- 
tion is  distinctly  antitheistic.  The  notion  of  a  God  who 
in  any  wise  transcends  the  world  is  scouted  in  various 

1  Buddha  und  Christus,  Vortrag  von  Professor  Albert  Gehrke,  Nov.  27, 
1904. 

181 


i82        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

addresses,  and  these  are  shown  to  be  fully  representative 
by  the  definition  of  religion  which  appears  in  the  pub- 
lished statement  of  principles.  According  to  that  defi- 
nition, religion  pays  no  respect  to  a  supernatural  being 
or  life,  and  signifies  only  an  harmonious  adjustment  to 
the  world  on  the  basis  of  personal  truthfulness  and  con- 
scientiousness.^ Naturally  a  very  scanty  radiance  illum- 
inates the  sanctuaries  which  are  thus  placarded  with  a 
veto  against  the  existence  of  a  personal  God  and  of  the 
v^hole  realm  of  the  supernatural.  It  is  to  be  hoped,  how- 
ever, that  in  power  to  meet  the  demands  of  religious 
sentiment  occasion  has  been  afforded  to  improve  the  de- 
scription which  was  given  by  Strauss  in  his  latest  book. 
*'I  have  attended,"  he  said,  "several  services  of  the  free 
congregation  in  Berlin,  and  found  them  terribly  dry  and 
unedifying.  I  quite  thirsted  for  an  allusion  to  the  biblical 
legend  or  the  Christian  calendar,  in  order  to  get  at  least 
something  for  the  heart  and  the  imagination,  but  nothing 
of  the  kind  was  forthcoming.  After  the  edifice  of  the 
church  has  been  demolished,  to  go  and  give  a  lecture  on 
the  bare,  imperfectly  leveled  site  is  dismal  to  a  degree  that 
is  awful. "2 

In  New  England  the  movement  which  issued  in  1867 
in  the  institution  of  the  Free  Religious  Association  en- 
listed at  its  beginning  the  support  of  a  number  of  men 
who  had  been  touched  by  the  breath  of  transcendentalism, 
and  who  combined  with  their  radical  opinions  a  good 
measure  of  religious  sensibility.  Accordingly,  it  was 
here  that  the  most  noteworthy  literary  products  of  Free 
Religion  were  evolved. 

A  very  potent  factor  in  preparing  the  platform  of  Free 
Religion  in  New  England  was  doubtless  furnished  by 


*Grundsatze   der  freireligiosen   Gemeinde   zu   Berlin,    adopted   in    1877, 
amended  in  1891.  *The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,  pp.  340,  341. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  1&3 

the  ministry  of  Theodore  Parker  between  1840  and  i860. 
In  the  eariier  years  of  his  ministry  Parker,  though  ex- 
pressing himself  betimes  with  a  freedom  which  shocked 
the  great  majority  of  his  Unitarian  brethren,  still  gave 
formal  assent  to  the  lofty  preeminence  and  exceptional 
claims  of  Christianity.  He  spoke  of  it,  indeed,  as  the 
"absolute  religion,"^  and  depicted  its  transcendent  and 
imperishable  worth  in  these  glowing  terms :  "That  pure 
ideal  religion  which  Jesus  saw  on  the  mount  of  his  vision, 
and  lived  out  in  the  lowly  life  of  a  Galilean  peasant; 
which  transforms  his  cross  into  an  emblem  of  all  that  is 
holiest  on  earth ;  which  makes  sacred  the  ground  he  trod, 
and  is  dearest  to  the  best  of  men,  most  true  to  what  is 
truest  in  them,  cannot  pass  away.  Let  men  improve 
never  so  far  in  civilization,  or  soar  never  so  high  on  the 
wings  of  religion  and  love,  they  can  never  outgo  the  flight 
of  truth  and  Christianity.  It  will  always  be  above  them. 
It  is  as  if  we  were  to  fly  toward  a  star,  which  becomes 
larger  and  more  bright  the  nearer  we  approach,  till  we 
enter  and  are  absorbed  in  its  glory,"^  In  harmony  with 
this  rating  of  Christianity,  Parker  rendered  to  Jesus  very 
exahed  tributes.  "This  Galilean  youth,"  he  affirmed, 
"strode  before  the  world  whole  thousands  of  years,  so 
much  of  divinity  was  in  him.  His  words  solve  the  ques- 
tions of  this  present  age.  In  him  the  godlike  and  the 
human  met  and  embraced,  and  a  divine  life  was  born."^ 
"I  look  on  Jesus  as  the  highest  product  of  the  human 
race.  I  honor  intellectual  greatness;  I  bend  my  neck  to 
Socrates,  and  Newton,  and  Laplace,  and  Hegel,  and  Kant, 
and  the  vast  minds  of  our  own  day.  But  what  are  they 
all  compared  with  this  greatness  of  justice,  greatness  of 


1  Christianity:  What  Tt  Ts,  and  What  It  Is  Not. 

'  Discourse  on  the  Transient  and  Permanent  in  Christianity. 

•Mbid. 


l84        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

philanthropy,  greatness  of  religion?"^  "Here  was  the 
greatest  soul  of  all  the  sons  of  men;  one  before  whom 
the  majestic  mind  of  Grecian  sages  and  of  Hebrew  seers 
must  veil  its  face.  His  perfect  obedience  made  him  free. 
So  complete  was  it  that  but  a  single  will  dwelt  in  him  and 
God,  and  he  could  say,  *I  and  the  Father  are  one.'  For 
this  reason  his  teaching  was  absolute ;  God's  word  was  in 
him."^  Sentences  alive  with  the  warmest  appreciation 
for  the  Scriptures  were  also  uttered  by  Parker.  Thus  he 
exclaimed :  "How  the  truths  of  the  Bible  have  blessed  us ! 
There  is  not  a  boy  on  all  the  hills  of  New  England ;  not  a 
girl  born  in  the  filthiest  cellar  which  disgraces  a  capital  in 
Europe,  and  crying  to  God  against  the  barbarism  of 
modern  civilization;  not  a  boy  or  girl  in  all  Christen- 
dom through,  but  their  lot  is  made  better  by  that  great 
book."3 

The  above  citations  present  one  side  of  Parker's  teach- 
ings. Somewhat  of  a  reverse  side  could  easily  be  brought 
into  evidence.  Even  in  the  earlier  part  of  his  career  he 
proceeded  as  a  free  lance,  and  commented  without  much 
restraint  on  the  limitations  and  on  the  defects  of  the  Bible, 
as  well  as  on  what  he  considered  the  enormities  of  the 
traditional  Christianity.  From  the  start  he  greatly  dis- 
counted the  notion  of  an  external  authority,  and  was 
enamored  of  the  theory  that  in  the  intuitions  of  the  human 
spirit  the  great  truths  of  religion  have  their  one  reliable 
and  sufficient  certificate.  Man's  inner  nature,  he  claimed, 
bears  unequivocal  testimony  to  such  fundamental  truths 
as  the  existence  of  God,  the  moral  law,  and  immortality. 
As  J.  W.  Chadwick  remarks:  "With  Parker,  God,  im- 
mortality, the  moral  law,  were  intuitional  certainties  of 


*  Thoughts  about  Jesus,  p.   281  in  volume  of  Parker's  "Views  of  Re- 
ligion," edited  by  J.  F.  Clarke. 

2  Christianity:  What  It  Is,  and  What  It  Is  Not. 

3  Discourse  on  the  Transient  and  the  Permanent  in  Christianity. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  185 

irrefragable  stability.  It  was  as  if  he  had  set  aside  a 
public  supernatural  revelation  only  to  substitute  for  it  a 
private  one  in  each  several  mind  and  heart. "^  By  rational 
induction,  he  contended,  from  premises  thus  furnished 
genuine  progress  in  religion  may  be  achieved,  whereas  a 
scrupulous  adherence  to  a  particular  set  of  written  oracles 
must  shackle  the  minds  of  men  and  restrain  from  a 
normal  advance. 

The  radical  and  confident  intuitionalism  of  Parker 
naturally  served  as  a  ground  for  diminishing  stress  upon 
any  standard  afforded  by  historical  Christianity.  In  the 
end  he  concluded  that  Christianity  cannot  with  propriety 
be  styled  the  absolute  religion.  This  conclusion  is  clearly 
stated  in  a  biographical  letter  written  shortly  before  his 
death.  The  statement  runs  as  follows :  "All  the  six  great 
historic  religions — the  Brahmanic,  Hebrew,  Classic,  Bud- 
dhistic, Christian,  Mohammedan — profess  to  have  come 
miraculously  from  God,  not  normally  from  man ;  and  spite 
of  the  excellence  which  they  contain,  and  the  vast  service 
the  humblest  of  them  has  done,  yet  each  of  them  must 
ere  long  prove  a  hindrance  to  human  welfare,  for  it  claims 
to  be  a  finality,  and  makes  the  whole  of  human  nature 
wait  on  an  accident  of  human  history — and  that  accident 
the  whim  of  some  single  man.  The  absolute  religion 
which  belongs  to  man's  nature,  and  is  gradually  unfolded 
thence,  like  the  high  achievements  of  art,  science,  litera- 
ture, and  politics,  is  only  distinctly  conceived  of  in  an 
advanced  stage  of  man's  growth ;  to  make  its  idea  a  fact 
is  the  highest  triumph  of  the  human  race."^  But,  while 
thus  distinctly  denying  the  finality  of  Christianity,  Parker 
still  expressed  his  partiality  and  ardent  esteem  for  the 
Christian  religion  and  the  Christian  Scriptures.    "To  me 

'Old  and  New  Unitarian  Belief,  p.  24. 

'  Letter  to  the  Members  of  the  Twenty-eighth  Congregational  Society  of 
Boston,  Apr.  19,  1859,  Works  XII.  298. 


i86        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

the  name  of  Christianity,"  he  said,  "is  most  exceeding 
dear,  significant  of  so  great  a  man  and  of  such  natural 
emotions,  ideas,  and  actions  as  are  of  priceless  value  to 
mankind.  ...  I  take  exquisite  delight  in  the  grand  words 
of  the  Bible,  putting  it  before  all  other  sacred  literature 
of  the  whole  ancient  world. ...  As  a  master  the  Bible  were 
a  tyrant ;  as  a  help,  I  have  not  time  to  tell  its  worth."^ 

The  ultimate  position  of  Parker  on  the  necessity  of 
transcending  the  Christian  system  has  often  been  asserted 
by  representatives  of  the  Free  Religious  Association. 
The  following  may  serve  as  typical  declarations :  ''Reli- 
gious is  a  higher  and  broader  word  than  Christian;  and  so 
is  human.  Jewish,  Brahman,  Buddhist,  Parsee,  Moham- 
medan— these  too  are  churches  of  the  one  living  God,  the 
Father  of  all.  With  advancing  light  thoughtful  men  in 
all  of  them  will  come  out  of  what  is  peculiar  and  special 
in  each,  and  so  local  and  temporary,  into  the  broad  ground 
of  universal,  spiritual  religion,  which  is  piety,  righteous- 
ness, humanity:  that  belief  in  God  and  man  which  is 
the  creed  of  all  creeds."^  "Buddha,  Pythagoras,  Jesus, 
Luther,  and  the  rest  are  children  of  their  times :  out  of 
Greece  and  Judaea  came  Christianity;  out  of  Christianity 
and  Brahmanism,  and  Parseeism  and  Judaism  and  Islam, 
and  all  the  grand  currents  of  this  century's  civilization, 
flows  the  vaster  wave  of  Universal  Religion."^  Unless 
all  exclusiveness  can  be  banished  from  the  word  Christian 
the  name  should  be  abandoned.  The  adherents  of  the 
religions  of  the  East  cannot  be  expected  to  surrender  their 
faith  in  favor  of  Christianity.  "They  will  hardly  adopt  a 
religion  that  degrades  Confucius  and  Buddha  into  the 
position  of  blind  heathen  guides,  unworthy  of  confidence, 


^Works,  XII.  334,  335. 

'Samuel  Longfellow,  Freedom  and  Fellowship  in  Religion,  a  Collection 
of  Essays  and  Addresses,  1875,  p.  91. 
^Samuel  Johnson,  Ibid.,  p.  124. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  187 

and  deifies  a  prophet  of  another  race;  but  they  will  receive 
a  religion  which  shall  count  Moses  and  Jesus  and  Confu- 
cius and  Buddha,  and  all  the  greatly  wise  and  good  in  the 
line  of  its  prophets,  giving  to  each  the  honor  due  for  the 
truth  he  saw  and  told,  and  for  the  good  his  life  achieved. 
Am  I  a  visionary — a  mere  dreamer — if  I  seem  to  see  that 
from  all  these  manifest  tendencies  will  come  forth  event- 
ually another  form  of  faith  and  worship,  which  shall  not 
be  Hinduism  nor  Buddhism  nor  Judaism  nor  Chris- 
tianity, nor  any  system  of  faith  now  existing,  but  a 
broader  religious  development  of  humanity,  in  which 
all  technical  distinctions  between  these  specific  forms 
of  religion  shall  be  obliterated,  and  nations  and  races 
shall  unite  in  a  spiritual  fellowship  whose  limits  shall 
be  commensurate  with  humanity  itself?  Nay,  not  a 
dreamer.  I  believe  that  I  am  but  reading  the  future 
by  the  light  of  past  history  and  of  present  social  and 
mental  forces."^  "In  the  soul  of  Jesus  the  great  aspira- 
tion of  the  Hebrew  race  became  purified  from  its  alloys 
and  stamped  forever  with  the  impress  of  his  superior 
spirit.  But,  being  essentially  Hebrew  still,  it  is  incapable 
of  expansion  into  the  aspiration  of  universal  humanity; 
and  Jesus,  though  endowed  with  that  sanity  of  genius 
which  is  madness  in  the  eyes  of  mediocrity,  is  no  longer 
in  the  van.  .  .  .  The  time  has  come  to  see  and  to  say  that 
the  Christian  confession  is  not  a  truth.  Jesus  was  not  the 
Christ  of  God.  The  Christ  prophesied  and  longed  for 
has  never  come,  and  will  never  come.  The  office  and  func- 
tion is  a  mythical,  an  impossible  one.  No  individual  man 
has  ever  stood,  or  ever  can  stand,  in  the  relation  of  Lord, 
King,  and  Saviour  of  the  whole  world.  It  would  be  an 
infinite  usurpation  for  any  man  to  occupy  that  office, 
either  in  a  temporal  or  spiritual  sense Man 

•  W.  J.  Potter,  Freedom  and  Fellowship  in  Religion,  pp.  220.  221. 


i88        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

does  not  need  to  be  Christianized;  he  does  need  to  be 
humanized."^ 

Judged  by  these  citations  Free  Rehgion  appears  on 
record  as  repudiating  any  special  affihation  with  Chris- 
tianity. Still  it  is  not  quite  true  to  the  historic  facts  to 
say  that  a  formal  repudiation  of  such  affiliation  has  taken 
place.  In  the  short-lived  organ  named  The  Examiner 
the  policy  was  advocated  of  cutting  away  parasitic 
growths  from  Christianity  in  place  of  taking  up  a  position 
outside  of  the  Christian  system.  And,  though  the  cur- 
rent seems  to  have  run  rather  strongly  in  the  direction  of 
the  latter  policy,  the  Free  Religious  Association  in  1894 
declined  to  award  it  a  formal  approval.  A  proposition 
in  favor  of  "avowed  independence  of  Buddhism,  Juda- 
ism, Christianity,  Mohammedanism,  or  any  other  religious 
creed  or  organization  that  is  by  nature  dogmatic,  based  on 
personal  leadership  or  limited  in  its  fellowship,"  was 
voted  down.  This  action  was  a  bitter  disappointment  to 
the  more  advanced  party.  F.  E.  Abbot,  in  particular, 
criticised  it  as  amounting  to  a  denial  of  the  very  principle 
for  the  advocacy  of  which  the  Free  Religious  Associa- 
tion had  been  founded.^  It  does  not  appear,  however, 
that  the  Association  was  moved  to  take  any  steps  toward 
an  adoption  of  the  proposition  which  was  rejected  in 
1894. 

II. — Theosophy  and  Kindred  Mysticisms 

In  Franz  von  Baader  (1765-1841)  Theosophy  had  a 
distinguished  representative  in  the  early  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  But  there  is  little  occasion  to  refer  to  his 
system  in  this  connection.  Like  his  philosophical  master, 
Jacob  Boehme,  he  considered  Christianity  to  be  the  true 


'  F.  E.  Abbot,  Freedom  and  Fellowship  in  Religion,  pp.  245,  2t;4,  259. 
'  Free  Church  Tracts,  originally  published  in  the  Free  Church  Record. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  189 

religion,  and  had  no  thought  of  offering  a  substitute  for 
it,  or  of  placing  it  on  a  parity  with  any  other  historic  faith. 
Theosophy  of  the  type  which  denies  the  primacy  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  undertakes  to  supersede  it  with  an  authorita- 
tive system  of  its  own,  first  claimed  attention  in  the  clos- 
ing decades  of  the  century.  Its  master  spirit  was  Madame 
H.  P.  Blavatsky.  In  the  Theosophical  Society  which  was 
founded  at  New  York  in  1875  it  obtained  a  principal 
instrument  of  advertisement  and  propagandism. 

It  accords  with  the  worshipful  attitude  of  this  recent 
Theosophy  toward  Oriental  wisdom  that  its  representa- 
tives should  give  scanty  consideration  to  the  Occidental 
philosophies.  With  no  one  of  them  do  they  seem  to  have 
made  close  connection.  Schopenhauer  is  given  honorable 
mention  by  several  of  them^ ;  but  it  is  easy  to  divine  that 
the  principal  reason  for  their  reference  to  him  is  not  so 
much  their  hearty  appreciation  of  the  specific  contents 
of  his  philosophy  as  a  sense  of  kinship  with  him  in  their 
estimate  of  Eastern  philosophy  and  religion. 

Were  we  to  accept  the  claims  of  the  Theosophists,  we 
should  need  to  conclude  that  the  anxious  quest  after  truth 
should  no  longer  burden  humanity,  since  their  system 
has  at  once  the  character  of  ultimate  science  and  of  ulti- 
mate religion.  "Theosophy,"  says  Madame  Blavatsky,  "is 
divine  knowledge  or  science,"  and  its  chief  aim  is  "to 
reconcile  all  religions,  sects,  and  nations  under  a  common 
system  of  ethics,  based  on  eternal  verities.  .  .  .  The  Wis- 
dom-Religion was  ever  one,  and  being  the  last  word  of 
possible  human  knowledge  was,  therefore,  carefully  pre- 
served. It  preceded  by  long  ages  the  Alexandrian  The- 
osophists,  reached  the  modem,  and  will  survive  every 


'Blavatsky,  Isis  Unveiled,  I.  55-60:  H.  S.  Olcott,  Theosophy,  Religion, 
and  Occult  Science,  p.  15;  J.  D.  Buck,  The  Nature  and  Aim  of  Theosophy, 
P-  15- 


190        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

other  religion  and  philosophy,"^  "Our  work  is  a  plea 
for  the  recognition  of  the  Hermetic  philosophy,  the 
ancient  universal  Wisdom-Religion,  as  the  only  possible 
key  to  the  absolute  in  science  and  theology."^  "Theos- 
ophy,"  says  W.  O.  Judge,  "is  that  ocean  of  knowledge 
which  spreads  from  shore  to  shore  of  the  evolution  of 
sentient  beings;  unfathomable  in  its  deepest  parts,  it 
gives  the  greatest  minds  their  fullest  scope,  yet  shallow 
enough  at  its  shores,  it  will  not  overwhelm  the  under- 
standing of  a  child.  .  .  .  Embracing  both  the  scientific 
and  the  religious,  Theosophy  is  a  scientific  religion  and 
a  religious  science."^ 

While  asserting  superiority  to  the  historic  religions  as 
commonly  understood,  Theosophy,  or  the  Wisdom-Reli- 
gion, assumes  to  be  identical  with  those  religions  viewed 
as  to  their  inner  essence,  or  taken  in  that  esoteric  character 
in  which  they  have  been  known  from  the  beginning  to 
the  enlightened  few.  From  this  point  of  view  tolerance 
can  be  exercised  toward  Christianity  as  containing,  back 
of  its  dogmatic  formularies  and  ceremonies,  the  very  core 
of  theosophic  wisdom.  "True  Theosophy,"  says  a  promi- 
nent exponent,  "is  esoteric  Christianity  as  truly  as  it  is 
esoteric  Buddhism,  and  belongs  equally  to  all  religions, 
exclusively  to  none."*  Another  exponent  speaks  of  oc- 
cultism— meaning  by  this  term  theosophic  theory  and 
practice — as  knitting  together  apparently  divergent  sys- 
tems. "Judaism,  Christianity,  Buddhism,  and  the  Egyp- 
tian theology  are  thus  brought  into  one  family  of  ideas,"^ 

But,  in  spite  of  formal  statements  which  seem  to  recog- 
nize Christianity  as  standing  on  a  parity  with  other  great 
religions  of  the  world,  it  is  easy  to  discover  in  theosophical 


iThe  Key  to  Theosophy,  pp.  i,  3,  7.  ^  Isis  Unveiled,  Preface,  p.  vii. 

^The  Ocean  of  Theosophy,  p.  i. 

••Mrs.    Anne    Besant,    Esoteric    Christianity   and   the   Lesser   Mysteries, 
Preface,  p.  x.  ^A.  P.  Sinnett,  The  Occult  World,  p.  6. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  191 

writings  an  antichristian  tone,  a  tendency  to  disparage  the 
worth  and  historical  significance  of  Christianity  as  com- 
pared with  the  ancient  rehgions  of  India  and  the  far  East. 
It  is  not  advisable,  perhaps,  to  emphasize  the  acknowl- 
edged purpose  of  the  Theosophical  Society  to  antago- 
nize the  work  of  Christian  missionaries  in  the  Orient,^ 
since  the  society  could  rejoin  that  its  design  has  been  only 
to  oppose  an  exoteric  imperfect   form  of  Oiristianity. 
Leaving  aside  this  item,  we  may  notice  several  indications 
of  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  Theosophists  to  make  sec- 
ondary account  of  Christianity,  and  to  award  an  unmis- 
takable primacy  to  Oriental  philosophy  and  religion.     In 
the  first  place,  they  exhibit  a  decided  inclination  to  borrow 
from  Oriental  stores,  rather  than  from  the  stock  supplied 
by  a  Christian  civilization,   such  metaphysical,  psycho- 
logical, and  theological  terms  as  they  have  occasion  to 
use.    In  the  second  place,  as  will  be  shown  presently,  they 
are  partial  to  tenets  which  are  characteristic  of  Oriental 
speculation    and    are    foreign    to    catholic    Christianity. 
Again,  they  suppose  the  living  oracles  or  personal  medi- 
ums of  the  higher  wisdom  in  the  present  to  be  located 
principally   in   the   East,    and   especially   on    "the   high 
plateau  of  the   Himavat."    Once  more,   they  distinctly 
affirm  that  the  Oriental  systems  were  the  primary  source 
of  all  true  religion,  and  that  Christianity  has  held  to  them 
a  dependent  relation.     "What  has  been  contemptuously 
termed     paganism,"     says     Madame    Blavatsky,     "was 
ancient  wisdom  replete  with  Deity;  and  Judaism  and  its 
offspring,  Christianity,  and  Islamism  derived  whatever 
inspiration  they  contained  from  this  ethnic  parent.     Pre- 
Vedic  Brahmanism  and  Buddhism  are  the  double  source 
from  which  all  religions  sprang. "^     "Buddha,"  remarks 

*  Blavatsky,  Isis  Unveiled,  Preface,  pp.  xli,  xlii. 
'Ibid.,  II.  639. 


192        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

Judge,  "is  the  last  of  the  great  avatars,  and  in  a  larger 
circle  than  is  Jesus  of  the  Jews,  for  the  teachings  of  the 
latter  are  the  same  as  those  of  Buddha  and  tinctured  with 
what  Buddha  had  taught  to  those  who  instructed  Jesus." ^ 
Another  statement  of  the  same  writer  indicates  how  de- 
cided is  his  preference  for  Eastern  wisdom.  "Real  psy- 
chology," he  says,  "is  an  Oriental  product  today."^  An 
equal  disposition  to  face  to  the  East  is  very  distinctly  ex- 
hibited in  these  words  of  Olcott :  "We  are  giving  to  India 
the  knowledge  and  advantage  of  many  practical  things  re- 
lating to  our  lower  needs  and  nature.  In  return  she  offers 
us  the  wisdom  acquired  by  thought  and  experience  on 
a  higher  plane."^  Even  Mrs.  Besant,  though  manifesting 
a  larger  appreciation  for  Christianity  than  most  of  her 
school,  gives  it  the  characteristic  of  a  derived  product. 
The  far  East  was  a  principal  source,  though  Egypt  also 
made  contributions.  In  his  youth  Jesus  received  the  ele- 
ments of  true  wisdom  from  the  Essene  community  in  the 
southern  Judaean  desert.  "When  at  the  age  of  nineteen  he 
went  on  to  the  Essene  monastery  near  Mount  Serbal,  a 
monastery  which  was  much  visited  by  learned  men  travel- 
ing from  Persia  and  India  to  Egypt,  and  where  a  mag- 
nificent library  of  occult  works — many  of  them  Indian 
of  the  Trans-Himalayan  regions — had  been  established. 
From  this  seat  of  mystic  learning  he  proceeded  later  to 
Egypt,  He  had  been  fully  instructed  in  the  secret  teach- 
ings which  were  the  real  fount  of  life  among  the  Essenes, 
and  was  initiated  in  Egypt  as  a  disciple  of  that  one  sub- 
lime lodge  from  which  every  great  religion  has  its 
founder,"^  Thus  the  unequivocal  statements  of  Theoso- 
phists  indicate  tliat  they  claim  only  a  secondary  associa- 


*The  Ocean  of  Theosophy,  p.  120.  'Ibid.,  p.  136. 

'Theosophy,  Religion,  and  Occult  Science,  p.  27. 
*  Esoteric  Christianity,  p.  130. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  193 

tion  with  Christianity,  their  more  direct  ahgnment  being" 
with  the  Oriental  systems,  and  especially  with  Brahman- 
ism  and  Buddhism. 

That  Orientals  should  be  gratified  with  the  homage 
rendered  by  their  Western  brethren  may  readily  be  in- 
ferred. It  would  seem,  however,  that  for  the  most  part 
they  have  actually  a  much  less  vital  appreciation  of  the 
wisdom  which  belongs  to  them  by  direct  inheritance  than 
that  which  warms  the  breasts  of  their  Occidental  advo- 
cates. Speaking  to  a  native  audience  in  Bombay  in  1879, 
Mr.  Olcott  had  occasion  to  remark :  "Since  we  landed  on 
your  shores  we  have  met  hundreds  of  educated  Hindus, 
Parsis,  and  men  of  other  sects.  Out  of  all  these  we  have 
found  few — so  few  that  we  might  almost  reckon  them 
upon  the  fingers — who  really  know  what  Aryan,  Zend, 
Jain,  and  Buddhistic  philosophies  teach. "^  The  pundits, 
he  discovered,  were  ready  to  applaud  his  flattering  words, 
but  when  summoned  to  put  on  exhibition  the  riches  of 
the  ancient  literature  of  India  they  remained  provokingly 
quiescent.^  On  the  whole,  the  practical  faith  of  the 
Hindus  in  their  own  historic  greatness  must  have  seemed 
to  the  ardent  apostle  of  Theosophy  to  have  been  lament- 
ably weak.  That  he  was  led  by  his  experience  to  charge 
himself  with  having  cherished  a  highly  colored  illusion 
we  have  not  ascertained. 

In  explaining  their  confident  possession  of  absolute 
truth  recent  Theosophists,  like  the  Gnostics  of  old,  make 
large  account  of  a  secret  tradition.  This  tradition, 
which  affords  the  key  to  the  mysteries  of  the  universe,  is 
the  property  of  a  brotherhood  composed  of  men  who, 
through  a  good  improvement  of  the  discipline  of  succes- 
sive incarnations,  have  reached  a  specially  advanced  stage 


^  Theosophy,  Religion,  and  Occult  Science,  pp.  71,  72. 

'Ibid.,  pp.  127,  128.    Compare  Sinnett.  The  Occult  World,  p.  37. 


194        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

of  evolution.  These  men,  variously  styled  Elder  Brothers, 
Humanity's  Teachers,  Hierophants,  Adepts,  Initiates, 
and,  in  the  Indian  tongue,  Mahatmas  (that  is.  Great 
Souls),  have  extraordinary  faculties  for  acquiring  and 
communicating  knowledge.  Though  possessing  physical 
bodies  of  the  ordinary  type,  they  are  not  fettered  by 
them.  By  means  of  the  subtle  astral  body,  which  indeed 
pertains  to  each  individual  but  is  efficiently  controlled  by 
the  adept  alone,  they  can  practically  annihilate  space  and 
time  in  their  movements,  and  work  great  marvels.  "The 
adept,"  says  Madame  Blavatsky,  "can  control  the  sen- 
sations and  alter  the  conditions  of  the  physical  and  astral 
bodies  of  other  persons  not  adepts;  he  can  also  govern 
and  employ,  as  he  chooses,  the  spirits  of  the  elements."^ 
It  would  appear  also  that  his  sources  of  knowledge  are 
substantially  unlimited.  Not  only  does  he  have  access 
to  the  correct  philosophical  and  religious  traditions  which 
from  time  immemorial  have  been  handed  down  in  the 
brotherhood  of  which  he  is  a  member ;  he  is  also  favored 
with  direct  vision  of  the  authoritative  record  of  truth. 
"All  things,"  says  our  foremost  oracle  of  Theosophy, 
"that  ever  were,  that  are,  or  that  will  be,  having  their 
record  upon  the  astral  light,  or  tablet  of  the  universe,  the 
initiated  adept,  by  using  the  vision  of  his  own  spirit,  can 
know  all  that  has  been  known,  or  can  be  known. "^  Like 
estimates  of  the  wonderful  faculties  of  the  adept  are  com- 
mon in  theosophical  writings.  "A  Mahatma,"  says  Mrs. 
Besant,  "is  the  perfected  flower  of  humanty,  the  ideal 
man,  the  promise  of  the  future  realized  today.  In  him 
the  spiritual  nature  is  developed  and  works  unrestrain- 
edly through  the  mental  and  physical,  so  that  he  has 
become  the  master  of  all  the  forces  in  nature  and  can 
utilize  them  at  will.     Holding  this  position  of  royalty 

Usis  Unveiled,  II.  590.  Mbid.,  TI.  588. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  195 

over  nature,  he  becomes  the  servant  of  humanity,  dedi- 
cating himself  with  perfect  self-devotion  to  the  good  of 
mankind."^  The  power,  says  Judge,  over  space,  time, 
mind,  and  matter  which  belongs  to  the  great  initiate 
exists  germinally  in  all  men.  "The  difference  lies  solely 
in  the  fact  that  we  have  in  general  not  developed  what 
we  possess  the  germ  of,  while  the  Mahatma  has  gone 
through  the  training  and  experience  which  have  caused 
all  the  unseen  human  powers  to  develop  in  him,  and  con- 
ferred gifts  that  look  godlike  to  his  struggling  brother 
below. "^ 

From  the  above  it  is  quite  evident  that  Theosophy,  or 
the  Wisdom-Religion,  is  a  religion  of  authority,  in  which 
the  prerogative  of  infallible  guidance  belongs  to  an  in- 
visible hierarchy,  that  is,  to  a  company  entirely  unknown 
in  its  true  character  to  men  generally.  This  mystic  com- 
pany is  active,  but  prefers  to  keep  in  the  background, 
using  for  visible  instruments  in  the  execution  of  its  be- 
nevolent purpose  such  responsive  men  and  women  as  are 
found  in  the  Theosophical  Society.  An  eminent  form  of 
the  gracious  working  of  the  hidden  Brothers  consists  in 
the  rendering  of  aid  for  the  composition  of  theosophical 
writings.  "There  are  passages,"  says  Madame  Blavatsky, 
"entirely  dictated  by  them  and  verbatim,  but  in  most 
cases  they  only  inspire  the  ideas  and  leave  the  literary 
form  to  the  writers."^  We  are  invited  to  believe  that 
she  herself  was  greatly  aided  by  inspiration  from  this 
source,  and  even  relieved  in  part  of  the  task  of  writing. 
"The  assistance,"  says  Sinnett,  "she  derived  from  the 
Brothers  by  occult  agency,  throughout  the  composition 
of  the  book,  was  so  abundant  and  continuous  that  she  is 
not  so  much  the  author  of  Tsis'  as  one  of  a  group  of 


*  Exposition  of  Theosophy,  p.  19.  ^The  Ocean  of  Theosophy,  p.   12 

^The  Key  to  Theosophy,  p.  290. 


196        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

collahoratcurs  by  whom  it  was  actually  produced.  .  .  . 
Quantities  of  actual  manuscript  in  other  handwritings 
than  her  own  were  produced  while  she  slept.  In  the 
morning  she  would  sometimes  get  up  and  find  as  much 
as  thirty  slips  added  to  the  manuscript  she  had  left  on  her 
table  overnight."^  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  the 
portions  supplied  in  this  way  have  not  been  specified; 
but,  as  expressing  the  unadulterated  wisdom  of  the 
Mahatmas,  they  ought  to  be  subject  to  discovery  by  the 
higher  criticism  of  the  age. 

Viewed  as  to  its  doctrinal  content,  recent  Theosophy 
is  essentially  a  reproduction  of  the  old  Brahmanical 
pantheism.  It  denies  the  personality  of  God,  and  in  the 
declarations  of  at  least  some  of  its  exponents  reduces  the 
world  to  an  empty  appearance.  On  these  points  Madame 
Blavatsky  remarks :  "We  reject  the  idea  of  a  personal, 
or  extra-cosmic  and  anthropomorphic,  God.  .  .  .  We 
believe  in  a  universal  divine  principle,  the  root  of  all, 
from  which  all  proceeds,  and  within  which  all  shall  be 
absorbed  at  the  end  of  the  great  cycle  of  being.  .  .  . 
The  esoteric  doctrine  teaches  that  the  one  infinite  and 
unknown  essence  exists  from  all  eternity,  and  in  regular 
and  harmonious  successions  is  either  passive  or  active. 
In  the  poetical  phraseology  of  Manu  these  conditions  are 
called  the  'day'  and  the  'night'  of  Brahma.  .  .  .  No  one 
creates  the  universe.  Science  would  call  the  process 
evolution ;  the  pre-Christian  philosophers  and  Orientalists 
called  it  emanation ;  we,  Occultists  and  Theosophists,  see 
in  it  only  the  universal  and  eternal  reality  casting  a 
periodical  reflection  of  itself  on  the  infinite  spatial  depths. 
This  reflection  which  you  regard  as  the  objective  ma- 
terial universe  we  consider  as  a  temporary  illusion  and 


'  The  Occult  World,  pp.  159,  160. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  197 

nothing  else.  That  alone  which  is  eternal  is  real."^ 
"As  to  the  absolute,"  remarks  Judge,  "we  can  do  no  more 
than  say.  It  is.  None  of  the  great  teachers  of  the  school 
ascribe  qualities  to  the  absolute  although  all  qualities 
exist  in  it.  Our  knowledge  begins  with  differentiation, 
and  all  manifested  objects,  beings,  or  powers  are  only 
differentiations  of  the  Great  Unknown.  The  most  that 
can  be  said  is  that  the  absolute  periodically  differentiates 
itself,  and  periodically  withdraws  the  differentiated  into 
itself."2 

In  accordance  with  these  pantheistic  postulates  man  is 
represented  as  being  identical  in  the  highest  part  of  his 
being  with  the  absolute  essence.  His  constitution,  how- 
ever, in  the  view  of  the  Theosophist,  is  decidedly  com- 
plex. He  is,  in  fact,  a  sevenfold  entity.  Taken  in  as- 
cending order  the  constituents  which  make  up  his  being 
are  (i)  body,  (2)  vitality,  (3)  astral  body,  (4)  animal 
soul,  (5)  human  soul,  (6)  spiritual  soul,  (7)  spirit  or 
Atma.^  The  first  four  of  these  are  dissoluble.  On  the 
disintegration  of  the  physical  body  the  departed  one 
finds  a  corporeal  vehicle  in  the  astral  body,  which  consists 
of  matter  of  very  fine  texture,  electrical  and  magnetic 
in  its  essence.  But  this  form  of  embodiment  is  also 
temporary.  The  astral  body  perishes,  its  dissolution  tak- 
ing place  in  seven  successive  stages,  as  though  it  con- 
sists of  seven  concentric  shells.  When  the  purgatorial 
process  has  been  completed,  and  all  that  belongs  to  the 
sphere  of  mortality  has  been  cast  off,  the  individual  enters 
devachan,  or  heaven,  where  he  remains  for  a  period 
proportioned  to  his  merits.  On  the  expiration  of  this 
period  he  becomes  a  subject  for  reincarnation.     And  so 


*The  Key  to  Theosophy,  pp.  6r,  63,  84  j  Isis  Unveiled,  II.  264 
^  The  Ocean  of  Theosophy,  pp.  14,  15. 
'Judge,  The  Ocean  of  Theosophy,  p.  31. 


igS        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

"the  ever-whirling  wheel"  carries  him  on,  through  the 
long  series  of  births  and  deaths,  until  he  reaches  nirvana, 
or  the  state  which  ensues  when  the  differentiated  is 
merged  in  the  one  infinite  essence.  In  the  prominence 
given  to  this  notion  of  reincarnation,  as  in  its  acosmistic 
pantheism,  Theosophy  appears  as  a  copy  of  Hindu  think- 
ing. It  may  be  noticed,  however,  that  the  Occidental 
Theosophist  is  inclined  to  rebel  against  the  idea  of  incar- 
nation in  animal  forms,  and  to  accept  the  maxim,  *'Once 
a  man  always  a  man."^ 

In  relation  to  modem  spiritism,  or  so-called  "Spiritual- 
ism," the  type  of  Theosophy  which  is  here  reviewed 
adopts  a  disparaging  tone.  It  admits  in  large  part  the 
reality  of  spiritualistic  phenomena,  but  denies  that  they 
are  to  be  explained  as  the  products  of  the  agency  of 
spirits.  The  real  causes  are  the  astral  body  of  the 
medium  which,  as  being  detached,  appears  as  the  so-called 
spirit,  or  the  astral  shell  of  a  deceased  person,  or  possibly 
a  picture  reflected  on  an  invisible  mass  of  electrical  and 
magnetic  matter.  Mediumship  is  unhealthy,  since  the 
medium,  for  the  exercise  of  his  office,  must  be  in  a  pas- 
sive state,  and  thus  exposed  to  the  working  of  misleading 
and  pernicious  influences.  Judged,  too,  by  the  charac- 
ter of  the  messages  which  are  communicated  through 
mediums,  their  office  must  be  rated  at  a  very  humble 
figure.  In  truth,  the  emptiness  and  contradictory  char- 
acter of  the  messages  discredit  the  claims  of  Spiritualism 
to  be  a  valid  instrument  of  revelation.^  That  deceiving 
messages,  as  well  as  enlightening,  may  come  from  the 


*  Judge,  The  Ocean  of  Theosophy,  p.  67. 

2  Blavatsky,  The  Key  to  Theosophy,  pp.  27,  28:  Isis  Unveiled,  I.  70, 
490,  U.  588;  Besant,  Exposition  of  Theosophy,  p.  23;  The  Ancient  Wisdom, 
p.  95:  Judge.  The  Ocean  of  Theosophy,  pp.  43,  44,  149-153;  Olcott,  The- 
osophy, Religion,  and  Occult  Science,  pp.  252,  253;  George  Wyld,  Theos- 
ophy or  Spiritual  Dynamics,  second  edition,  pp.  10-12,  30. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  199 

spirit  world  has  sometimes  been  admitted  by  Spiritualists 
themselves.^ 

Doubtless,  as  representing  a  predilection  for  the  mystic 
or  occult,  Spiritualism  has  a  certain  bond  of  association 
with  Theosophy.  This  was  recognized  by  Madame  Bla- 
vatsky^ ;  nevertheless,  in  common  with  her  associates,  she 
passed  ultimately  a  very  disparaging  verdict  upon  medi- 
umistic  performances. 

References  to  "Christian  Science,"  so  called,  rarely 
occur  in  theosophical  writings.  This  may  be  explained 
in  part  by  the  fact  that  the  prophet  of  the  new  medico- 
religious  dispensation  had  not  secured  a  large  amount 
of  public  attention  at  the  time  when  the  theosophical 
movement  was  started,  the  scriptures  of  that  dispensa- 
tion, as  embodied  in  Mrs.  Mary  Baker  G.  Eddy's  Science 
and  Health,  being  first  issued  in  1875,  the  year  which 
marked  the  organization  of  the  Theosophical  Society. 
On  the  score  of  its  contents  Mrs.  Eddy's  teaching  might 
properly  have  elicited  rather  frequent  remark  from  such 
admirers  of  Oriental  pantheism  as  the  Theosophists  have 
been  for  the  most  part.  Her  system,  however,  stands  in 
contrast  with  theirs  on  various  points.  In  the  first  place, 
the  former  gives  to  the  transcendent  powers  which  are 
assumed  to  be  available  for  man's  use  a  much  closer 
association  with  the  healing  of  disease  than  is  affirmed 
by  the  latter.  In  the  second  place,  Mrs.  Eddy  differs 
from  the  more  prominent  representatives  of  Theosophy 
in  her  formal  attitude  toward  the  Christian  oracles.  While 
she  finds  in  the  Bible  whatever,  in  the  application  of  her 
peculiar  exegesis,  she  chooses  to  put  into  it,  she  claims 
that  it  was  the  only  text-book  which  served  to  introduce 


*  Robert  Dale  Owen,  Address  in  Boston,  May  30,  1867. 
'The  Key  to  Theosophy,  p.  196. 


20O       SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

her  into  the  great  truths  of  her  system/  Again,  she 
differs,  in  a  measure,  from  the  leading  representatives  of 
Theosophy  on  divine  personaHty.  While  she  has  penned 
words  which  seem  to  reduce  God  to  an  impersonal  prin- 
ciple, she  is  still  on  record  as  admitting  that  God  is 
^'infinite  Person.'"  Once  more,  the  Christian  Science 
scheme  of  Mrs.  Eddy  is  contrasted  with  the  scheme  of  the 
Theosophists  in  that  the  former  is  comparatively  void 
of  references  to  the  future  life,  while  in  the  latter  the 
theme  of  eschatology  commands  a  position  of  overshad- 
owing importance. 

On  the  side  of  resemblance  Christian  Science,  as  ex- 
pounded by  Mrs.  Eddy,  agrees  with  Theosophy  in  claim- 
ing to  be  a  perfectly  authoritative  system,  lying  in  the 
whole  sum  of  its  teachings  beyond  any  possible  improve- 
ment. Madame  Blavatsky  never  spoke  with  a  tone  of 
more  absolute  confidence  than  that  which  pervades  every 
utterance  of  the  author  of  Science  and  Health.  Indeed, 
the  claim  of  the  former  to  be  on  good  terms  with  the 
Mahatmas,  and  thus  to  be  in  condition  to  give  out  por- 
tions of  that  higher  wisdom  which  has  ever  been  the  pos- 
session of  the  elect  spirits  of  the  race,  falls  noticeably 
below  the  position  arrogated  by  the  latter.  No  mystic 
brotherhood  stands  in  the  background  to  share  with 
Mrs.  Eddy  the  honor  of  being  the  oracle  of  absolute 
truth.  God  alone  prepared  her  "for  the  reception  of  a  final 
revelation  of  the  absolute  principle  of  scientific  being  and 
healing."  Common  mundane  factors  were  out  of  the 
field.  "No  human  pen  or  tongue,"  she  says,  "taught 
me  the  science  contained  in  this  book.  Science  and  Health ; 
and  neither  tongue  nor  pen  can  overthrow  it."  It  is  im- 
perishable because  it  is  the  unadulterated  truth.  "Be- 
tween Christian  Science  and  all  forms  of  superstition  a 

*  Science  and  Health,  1902,  pp.  110,  126.  'Ibid.,  p.  116. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  201 

great  gulf  is  fixed,  as  impassable  as  that  between  Dives 
and  Lazarus.  .  .  .  Science  is  immortal  and  coordinate 
neither  with  the  premises  nor  with  the  conclusions  of 
mortal  beliefs."  And  the  authentic  compendium  of 
Christian  Science,  Mrs.  Eddy  is  careful  to  affirm,  is  to 
be  found  precisely  in  her  writings.  "A  Christian  Scien- 
tist requires  my  work,  Science  and  Health,  for  his  text- 
book, and  so  do  all  his  students  and  patients.  Why  ?  Be- 
cause it  is  the  voice  of  truth  to  this  age,  and  contains  the 
whole  of  Christian  Science,  or  the  science  of  healing 
through  mind.  Its  thorough  perusal  serves  as  a  means 
or  occasion  of  restoring  the  sick."^ 

Again,  Christian  Science  resembles  the  later  Theos- 
ophy,  as  has  been  intimated,  in  its  distinct  kinship  with 
Brahmanical  pantheism.  This  feature  has  been  noted  by 
a  theosophical  writer.^  As  is  well  known,  Brahmanical 
pantheism  is  of  the  acosmistic  or  world-denying  type. 
It  admits  of  only  one  reality,  the  absolute  Spirit  or  Self. 
The  world — all  that  passes  under  the  name  of  matter — 
is  empty  appearance,  illusion  pure  and  simple.  Now,  this 
is  the  cardinal  doctrine  of  Mrs.  Eddy,  the  tenet  which  is 
reiterated  with  tireless  persistence.  She  falls  not  a 
whit  below  Sankara  or  any  other  representative  of  Brah- 
manical pantheism  in  stress  on  the  unity  of  substantial 
being,  or  on  the  sole  ontological  reality  of  the  one  infi- 
nite Spirit.  Statements  like  these  proceed  from  her  pen : 
"God  is  the  only  Spirit.  .  .  .  Christian  Science  reveals 
incontrovertibly  that  mind  is  all-in-all,  that  the  only 
realities  are  the  divine  mind  and  idea.  .  .  .  God  is  the  only 
intelligence  of  the  universe,  including  man.  .  .  .  Spirit  is 
infinite.     There  is  but  one  Spirit,  because  there  can  be 


•Science  and  Health,  1902,  pp.  83,  84,  107,  no,  202,  446,  456. 
'  Short  Lessons  in  Theosophy,  compiled  by  Miss  S.  C.  Clark  from  the 
teachings  of  W.  J.  Colville,  pp.  9,  10. 


202        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

but  one  Infinite.  .  .  .  Soul  or  Spirit  signifies  Deity,  and 
nothing  else.  There  is  no  finite  soul  or  spirit.  Those 
terms  mean  only  one  mind,  and  cannot  be  rendered  in  the 
plural.  .  .  .  This  belief  that  there  is  more  than  one  mind, 
is  as  pernicious  to  divine  theology  as  are  ancient  mythol- 
ogy and  pagan  idolatry."^  With  equal  definiteness  the 
associated  doctrine  of  the  nothingness  of  matter  is  as- 
serted. "Matter  will  finally  be  proven  to  be  nothing  but 
a  mortal  belief.  .  .  .  Matter  and  death  are  but  mortal 
illusions."^  Disease,  of  course,  shares  the  unreality  of 
matter.  "Every  sort  of  sickness  is  a  degree  of  insanity; 
that  is,  sickness  is  always  hallucination."^  In  addition 
to  these  two  points  of  close  afiiliation  with  Brahmanical 
pantheism  a  third  may  be  mentioned.  Brahmanism  in 
its  soteriological  theory  emphasizes  the  value  of  a  special 
kind  of  knowledge.  The  illusion  of  a  multifold  world 
and  all  the  evil  entailed  thereby,  as  it  teaches,  can  be 
remedied  only  by  the  knowledge  of  the  identity  of  the 
individual  with  the  absolute  self.  Similarly,  Mrs.  Eddy 
puts  a  premium  on  the  efficacy  of  a  special  kind  of  knowl- 
edge. While  will  is  not  denied  by  her  to  the  one  infinite 
Spirit,  it  is  treated  in  its  human  character  as  a  subject 
for  mere  disparagement,  and  the  stress  is  put  upon  the 
mental  contemplation  and  grasp  of  the  principles  of  the 
science  which  finds  through  herself  its  authoritative  ex- 
pression. "Will-power,"  she  says,  "is  not  science,  and 
its  use  is  to  be  condemned.  .  .  .  Human  will  is  an  animal 
propensity,  not  a  faculty  of  soul.  Hence  it  cannot  govern 
man  aright."* 

Along  with  these  points  of  intimate  correspondence 
to  Brahmanical  pantheism  Mrs.  Eddy's  teaching  exhibits, 
no  doubt,  a  measure  of  unlikeness.     For  instance,  she 


'  Science  and  Health.  1902,  pp.  73,  109,  330,  334,  466,  469. 

•  Ibid.,  pp.  125,  289.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  407.  4o8.  ■•  Ibid.,  pp.  14S.  49°- 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  203 

seems  not  to  have  been  quite  in  line  with  that  system  in 
her  conception  of  the  relation  of  man  to  the  one  Mind 
or  Spirit.  Instead  of  predicating  identity  between  the 
two,  she  prefers  to  represent  man  as  holding  to  the  one 
Spirit  the  relation  of  an  idea  in  which  that  Spirit  eternally 
comes  to  expression.^  But  whatever  differences  may  be 
specified  are  quite  overbalanced  by  the  pronounced  agree- 
ments. Whether  consciously  or  unconsciously,  Mrs. 
Eddy  has  incorporated  into  the  foundations  of  her  sys- 
tem the  characteristic  teachings  of  Brahmanical  panthe- 
ism. Her  formal  attitude  toward  pantheism  is  doubt- 
less hostile;  but  that  results  from  the  association  which, 
in  her  narrow  use  of  the  term,  she  makes  between  pan- 
theism and  materialism. 

Christian  Science  in  its  practical  code  pays  a  just  trib- 
ute to  ethics,  emphasizing  in  particular  the  worth  of  un- 
selfish love.  But  when  examined  as  to  its  ability  to  pro- 
vide a  logical  and  consistent  basis  for  ethical  theory  it 
appears  decidedly  open  to  criticism.  It  is  difficult  to 
see  how  man,  under  Mrs.  Eddy's  definition  of  his  rela- 
tion to  the  one  Spirit,  can  have  the  autonomy  needed  for 
real  moral  agency.  Then,  too,  it  is  not  apparent  how  he 
can  be  a  subject  for  responsibility,  merit,  or  blame,  so 
long  as  sin  is  made  an  illusion  of  mortal  mind,  which, 
as  being  itself  unreal,^  cannot  be  supposed  to  harbor  the 
least  approach  to  reality.  That  sin  is  an  illusion  of  this 
sort  is  very  distinctly  asserted.  "Whatever  indicates  the 
fall  of  man,"  says  Mrs.  Eddy,  "or  the  opposite  of  God, 
or  God's  absence,  is  a  mortal  belief.  .  .  .  Matter  and  its 
belief — sin,  sickness,  and  death — are  states  of  mortal 
mind  which  act,  react,  and  then  come  to  a  stop.  They 
are  not  ideas,  but  illusions.  .  .  .  Man  is  incapable  of  sin, 


'Science  and  Health,  pp.  303    470,  475. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  114. 


204        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

sickness,  and  death,  inasmuch  as  he  derives  his  essence 
from  God,  and  possesses  not  a  single  original  or  unde- 
rived  power.  Hence  the  real  man  cannot  depart  from 
holiness;  nor  can  God,  by  whom  man  was  evolved, 
engender  the  capacity  or  freedom  to  sin."^  Thus  the 
long  tragedy  which  sin  is  supposed  to  have  enacted  in 
the  world  turns  out  to  have  been  only  a  deceptive 
dream.^ 

III. — Secularism  and  Ethical  Culture 

The  French  writer  Guyau,  in  his  Non-Religion  of  the 
Future,^  figures  as  a  prophet  of  Secularism,  though  he 
seems  neither  to  have  appropriated  the  term  nor  to  have 
written  as  the  exponent  of  any  organized  secularist  move- 
ment. 

In  predicting  the  disappearance  of  religion  Guyau 
does  not  ignore  the  powerful  dominion  which  it  has  ex- 
ercised over  the  human  race  in  the  past  and  its  sub- 
stantial universality.  In  accord  with  recent  anthropo- 
logical investigation,  he  says :  "After  the  labors  of  Herr 
Roskoff,  M.  Reville,  and  M.  Girard  de  Rialle,  it  is  im- 
possible to  maintain  that  there  exist  nowadays  on  the 
surface  of  the  earth  whole  peoples  absolutely  without 
religion  or  superstition,  which  among  noncivilized  peo- 
ple amount  to  the  same  thing.'"*  But  this  fact,  that  re- 
ligion appears  to  be  rooted  in  human  nature,  does  not 
argue,  in  the  opinion  of  Guyau,  its  permanence,  since 
human  nature  itself,  instead  of  being  unchanging,  falls 
under  a  law  of  evolution.  "To  show,"  he  says,  "the  deep 
roots  that  religion  has  sent  down  into  the  depths  of  the 


*  Science  and  Health,  pp.  282,  283,  457,  476.  _,  ,    ^^   t>i.-i         u 

»  For  a  succinct  estimate  of  Christian  Science  see  G.  T.  Ladd,  Philosophy 
of  Religion,  L  167.  . 

'  L'lrreligion  de  I'Avenir.    The  citations  are  from  the  English  translation. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  22. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  205 

human  mind,  is  not  to  demonstrate  the  perpetuity  of  re- 
hgion,  for  the  human  mind  itself  is  incessantly  changing. 
.  .  .  The  eighteenth  century  hated  religion  and  wished 
to  destroy  it.  The  nineteenth  century  endeavors  to  un- 
derstand religion  and  cannot  reconcile  itself  to  seeing  so 
charming  an  object  of  study  disappear.  The  historian's 
device  is,  'What  has  been,  will  be';  he  is  naturally  in- 
clined to  model  his  conception  of  the  future  on  his  knowl- 
edge of  the  past.  A  witness  of  the  futility  of  revolutions, 
he  sometimes  forgets  that  complete  evolution  is  possible : 
an  evolution  which  transforms  things  to  their  very  roots 
and  metamorphoses  human  beings  and  their  beliefs  to 
an  extent  that  renders  them  unrecognizable."^ 

As  specific  causes  of  the  ultimate  elimination  of  reli- 
gion Guyau  makes  account  of  the  progressive  overthrow 
of  the  beliefs  and  customs  on  which  religion  depends 
and  of  the  dissolving  agency  of  private  judgment.  "The 
elements,"  he  remarks,  "which  distinguish  religion  from 
metaphysics  and  from  ethics,  and  which  constitute  a 
positive  religion,  properly  so  called,  are,  in  our  judg- 
ment, essentially  caducous  and  transitory,  and,  if  so,  we 
reject  the  religion  of  the  future  as  we  should  reject  an 
alchemy  of  the  future,  or  an  astrology  of  the  future.  .  .  . 
The  reign  of  sensibility  over  intelligence  is  not  perpetual ; 
sooner  or  later  the  positions  of  the  two  must  be  reversed. 
.  .  .  The  perpetuity  of  religious  sentiment  depends  upon 
its  legitimacy.  Born,  as  it  is,  of  certain  beliefs  and  cus- 
toms, its  fate  is  one  with  theirs.  .  .  .  There  exists  in  the 
bosom  of  every  great  religion  a  dissolving  force,  namely, 
the  very  force  which  served  in  the  beginning  to  consti- 
tute it  and  to  enable  it  to  triumph  over  its  predecessor: 
the  right  of  private  judgment.  It  is  upon  this  force,  this 
right,  that  one  may  count  for  the  ultimate  establishment, 

*  L'lrreligion  de  I'Avenir,  pp.  15-17. 


2o6        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

after  the  gradual  decomposition  of  every  system  of  dog- 
matic belief,  of  a  final  absence  of  religion."^ 

What  is  to  take  the  place  of  the  vanquished  religion  ? 
According  to  Guyau,  philosophy,  free  individualistic 
speculation  in  the  domains  of  metaphysics  and  ethics — a 
speculation  that  will  be  all  the  more  energetic  because  re- 
ligion will  be  out  of  the  way.  "Human  beliefs,"  says  our 
author,  "when  they  shall  have  taken  their  final  form  in 
the  future,  will  bear  no  mark  of  dogmatic  and  ritualis- 
tic religion,  they  will  be  simply  philosophical. "^  "The 
day  when  positive  religion  shall  have  disappeared,  the 
spirit  of  curiosity  in  matters  of  cosmology  and  metaphys- 
ics, which  has  been  more  or  less  paralyzed  by  an  effort 
to  dwell  within  the  unyielding  limits  of  indomitable 
formulas,  will  be  more  vivacious  than  ever  before.  There 
will  be  less  of  faith  but  more  of  free  speculation,  less 
of  contemplation  but  more  of  reasoning,  of  hardy  induc- 
tion, of  an  active  outleap  of  thought."^  "Metaphysical 
speculations  will  tend  to  become,  like  the  highest  aesthetic 
products,  a  luxury;  they  will  be  sought  for  their  own 
sakes,  and  for  the  general  elevation  of  mind  that  they 
bestow,  rather  than  for  guidance  in  particular  matters 
of  conduct.  The  destiny  of  the  world  will  interest  us 
quite  apart  from  any  question  of  our  own  destiny,  and 
our  voyages  into  the  unknown  will  be  prompted  not  by 
selfishness  but  by  disinterested  curiosity."* 

Though  proclaiming  so  emphatically  the  destined  dis- 
appearance of  religion,  Guyau  makes  place  for  a  sort  of 
religion  in  the  line  of  admiration  for  the  cosmos  and  of 
devotion  to  social  ideals.  He  says :  "To  be  non-religious 
is  not  to  be  anti-religious.  More  than  that,  the  non-reli- 
gion of  the  future  may  well  preserve  all  that  is  pure  in 


*  L'lrreligion  de  TAvenir,  pp.  lo,  12,  230,  231.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  364. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  13.  *  Ibid.,  p.  427. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  207 

the  religious  sentiment:  an  admiration  for  the  cosmos 
and  for  the  infinite  powers  which  are  there  displayed;  a 
search  for  an  ideal  not  only  individual,  but  social,  and 
even  cosmic,  which  shall  overpass  the  limits  of  actual 
reality.  .  .  .  Non-religion,  as  we  here  understand  it,  may 
be  considered  as  a  higher  degree  simply  of  religion  and 
of  civilization,"^ 

In  England  Secularism  assumed  in  the  latter  part  of 
the  nineteenth  century  an  organized  form.  Here  George 
Jacob  Holyoake  served  as  the  prime  mover.  As  repre- 
sented by  him,  Secularism,  while  not  formally  atheistic, 
is  practically  so.  On  the  one  hand,  he  says,  "I  never 
shared  that  notion  of  atheism  so  positive  and  dogmatic 
as  to  declare  that  no  other  hypothesis  of  the  universe  is 
possible  to  be  entertained.  The  ideas  of  the  infinite  and 
universal  can  never  be,  or  at  least  have  never  been,  so 
sharply  defined  and  permanently  conceived  as  to  war- 
rant us  in  declaring  theism,  under  any  form,  to  be  im- 
possible."^ On  the  other  hand,  he  makes  this  statement : 
"I  recognize  in  nature  but  the  aggregation  of  matter.  .  .  . 
I  can  conceive  of  nothing  beyond  nature,  distinct  from  it 
and  above  it.  The  language  invented  by  Pope,  to  the 
effect  that  Sve  look  through  nature  up  to  nature's  God,' 
has  no  significance  for  me,  as  I  know  nothing  besides 
nature  and  can  conceive  of  nothing  greater."^ 

The  supreme  end  contemplated  in  Secularism  is  earthly 
good,  and  for  the  reaching  of  this  end  it  makes  large 
account  of  material  means.  "It  seeks,"  writes  Holyoake, 
"to  supply  the  material  and  social  conditions  under  which 
whatever  of  good  exists  in  human  nature  may  manifest 
itself  unchecked.     It  would  place  the  intellect  under  the 


*  L'Trreligion  de  I'Avenir,  pp.  10,  11. 

2  The  Trial  of  Theism,  p.  146.  '  Ibid.,  p.  200. 


2o8        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

dominion  of  true  ideas,  and  show  to  others  that  virtue, 
is  an  advantage  as  well  as  a  duty.  .  .  .  Secularism  teaches 
the  good  of  this  life  to  be  a  rightful  object  of  primary 
pursuit,  inculcates  the  practical  sufficiency  of  natural 
morality  apart  from  atheism,  theism,  or  the  Bible,  and 
selects  as  its  method  of  procedure  the  promotion  of  human 
improvement  by  material  means. "^ 

In  admitting  the  propriety  of  a  sense  of  awe  before 
the  cosmos,  Holyoake  made  room  for  a  quasi-religious 
sentiment.  A  more  recent  expositor  of  Secularism  seems, 
to  entertain  very  scanty  tolerance  even  for  this  much  of 
approach  to  religion.  The  movement  in  progress  in  the 
industrial  and  scientific  world  involves,  according  to  J. 
M.  Bonham,  "the  ultimate  dissipation  of  all  worshipful 
feeling."  In  the  conflict  which  is  going  on  between, 
idealism  and  a  crass  realism  the  issue  is  not  at  all  doubt- 
ful. "This  contest  involves  the  constant  challenge  of 
sacred  idealism  and  sacred  authority,  and  nothing  in  it 
warrants  the  belief  that  it  will  cease  so  long  as  any 
sacred  authority  and  any  reverence  for  ideals  remains."^ 
In  harmony  with  this  point  of  view,  Bonham  takes  ex- 
ception to  the  conclusion  of  Leslie  Stephen,  that  the 
religious  instincts  of  mankind  will  survive  and  demand 
some  form  of  expression.  They  will  be  attenuated,  he 
holds,  to  the  point  of  practical  extinction.^  A  religion- 
less  race  sitting  on  the  ash  heap  of  an  utterly  prosaic  real- 
ism— such  is  the  engaging  picture  which  this  writer 
manufactures  from  his  secularist  postulates. 

Secularism  would  not  seem  to  be  a  very  promising 
subject  for  a  ritual.  Nevertheless  it  has  exercised  its 
talent  in  that  direction,  having  devised  formularies  for 


1  The  Trial  of  Theism,  pp.  221,  222. 

'Secularism,  its  Progress  and  its  Morals,  pp.  360,  362,  363. 

Mbid.,  pp.  148-155- 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  209 

the  naming  of  infants,  for  marriage,  and  for  burial,  in 
all  of  which  it  has  not  disdained  to  utilize  suggestions 
from  the  Anglican  models.  Guyau  has  taken  notice  of 
this  borrowing  and  has  characterized  it  in  this  rather 
caustic  fashion:  "Secularism  is  a  purely  atheistic  and 
utilitarian  religion,  which  has  borrowed  all  it  could  from 
the  ritual  of  the  English  Church.  This  contradiction 
between  the  outer  form  and  the  inner  void  resulted  in  a 
positive  parody."^ 

In  passing  from'  Secularism  to  the  "Ethical  Culture" 
movement  we  enter  a  much  warmer  atmosphere  as  re- 
spects appreciation  of  the  worth  of  religion.  This  move- 
ment was  initiated  in  the  eighth  decade  of  the  century 
under  the  leadership  of  Felix  Adler,  From  New  York, 
where  the  first  Ethical  Society  was  founded,  the  move- 
ment spread  in  various  directions.  Kindred  societies 
were  established  in  Chicago,  Philadelphia,  and  Saint 
Louis;  also  in  London,  in  various  cities  of  the  German 
empire,  in  Vienna,  in  Buda-Pesth,  and  in  Venice.  Fur- 
thermore, independent  societies,  differing  in  some  meas- 
ure from  those  which  received  the  initial  incentive  from 
Felix  Adler,  have  arisen  in  London  and  Cambridge. 

A  general  aim  rather  than  a  precise  platform  binds 
the  Ethical  Societies  together.  "No  one  man,"  says  an 
exponent,  "is  authorized  to  speak  for  the  Ethical  Move- 
ment beyond  giving  his  personal  opinions  and  convic- 
tions concerning  it.  The  attitude  of  one  group  of  men 
might  meet  with  disapproval  from  another  group.  Yet 
it  should  be  said  that  a  few  years  ago  the  societies  in 
America,  which  have  grown  out  of  the  parent  organiza- 
tion in  New  York  city,  formed  an  Ethical  Union  in  this 


1  The  Non-Religion  of  the  Future,  p.  365.    Compare  C.  M.  Davies,  Hetero- 
dox London,  II.  185. 


210        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

country,  with  the  following*  statement  as  a  section  of  the 
constitution:  'The  general  aim  of  the  Ethical  Move- 
ment as  represented  by  this  Union  is  to  elevate  the  moral 
life  of  its  members  and  that  of  the  community;  and  it 
cordially  welcomes  to  its  fellowship  all  persons  who  sym- 
pathize with  this  aim,  whatever  may  be  their  theological 
or  philosophical  opinions.'  "^  The  purpose  of  the  move- 
ment is  further  defined  in  this  comparative  view  from  the 
pen  of  Stanton  Coit:  "An  Ethical  Society,"  he  says, 
"differs  from  Christian  Churches  in  being  broader  in  its 
fellowship.  It  excludes  no  one  because  of  skepticism  as 
to  the  existence  and  personality  of  God  or  the  divinity 
of  Christ.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  let  it  be  distinctly 
known  that  we  are  not  as  a  society  agnostic.  We  do 
not  deny  the  possibility  of  knowing  the  existence  of 
God.  ...  As  a  society  we  are  not  pledged  to  any  theory 
of  the  origin  of  the  universe,  or  of  conscience  itself,  or 
to  any  theory  as  to  the  limits  of  human  knowledge.  .  .  . 
But,  though  thus  different  from  all  Christian  Churches, 
it  does  not  follow  that  we  approach  any  nearer  to  non- 
Christian  religious  organizations  that  have  recently 
sprung  up  than  we  do  to  the  Christian  Churches.  We 
are  quite  as  distinct  from  positivism,  secularism,  and 
socialism."^ 

In  emphasizing  the  sufficiency  of  morality  the  ad- 
herents of  the  Ethical  Movement  take  a  high  view  of 
what  is  meant  by  morality,  a  view  akin  to  that  of  Kant 
and  Fichte,  in  which  the  moral  law  is  invested  with  super- 
eminent  sanctions,  so  that  it  may  be  accounted  the  most 
august  and  indisputable  thing  in  the  universe.  Morality 
in  this  sense,  it  is  claimed,  includes  the  very  core  of  re- 
ligion.   It  coincides  with  religion  in  emphasizing  man's 


*  W.  L.  Sheldon,  An  Ethical  Movement,  1896,  p.  xiii. 

'  Ethics  and  Religion,  a  Collection  of  Essays,  pp.  287-290. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  211 

relationship  to  the  universal  and  absolute,  and,  while 
it  cannot  subscribe  to  the  dogmas  of  religion  taken  in 
their  literal  sense,  it  can  tolerate  them  ag  symbolical  ex- 
pressions of  great  truths.  These  are  points  of  view  which 
find  recurring  expression  in  the  words  of  the  spokes- 
men of  the  Ethical  Movement.  Thus  Adler  says :  "The 
authority  of  conscience  is  founded  on  human  nature  it- 
self. The  imperative  which  we  cannot  disown  comes 
from  within.  The  distinction  between  the  right  and  the 
wrong  is  as  aboriginal  as  that  between  the  true  and  the 
false."^  "Religion  is  that  which  brings  man  into  touch 
with  the  infinite:  this  is  its  mission.  If  we  put  aside 
the  materialistic  explanations  of  morality,  and  see  the 
majesty,  the  inexplicable  augustness  of  it,  we  shall  find 
that,  in  the  moral  life  itself,  in  the  moral  experience  it- 
self, we  possess  religion.  Religion  is  at  the  core  of  it, 
for  religion  is  the  connection  of  man's  life  with  the  abso- 
lute, and  the  moral  law  is  an  absolute  law."^  "All  that 
is  best  and  grandest  in  dogma  is  due  to  the  inspiration 
of  the  moral  law  in  man.  The  time  will  come  when  the 
tenets  of  faith  will  no  longer  be  narrowly  understood  as 
now;  and  while  their  influence  will  still  be  great,  they 
will  cease  to  be  harmful  and  confining,  they  will  be 
used  as  rare  imagery  to  deck  the  sublime  meanings  which 
they  symbolize;  not  as  vessels  that  contain  the  abso- 
lute truth,  but  as  choice  and  beautiful  vases,  fit  to 
hold  the  ever-fresh  and  ever-blooming  flowers  of  the 
ideal. "^  To  the  same  effect  William  Salter  remarks : 
"A  higher  is  unfolded  to  us  in  the  very  nature  of 
morality:  it  is  given  to  vis  in  our  very  constitution 
as  rational  beings.  .  .  .  We  cannot  go  beyond  the  law  of 
right;  God  is  not  more  ultimate;  human  reason  is  but 


1  Life  and  Destiny,  p.  78.  2  The  Religion  of  Duty,  p.  94. 

'  Creed  and  Deed,  p.  60. 


212        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

that  in  us  which  perceives  it."^  "The  moral  nature  is 
that  by  which  we  transcend  ourselves  and  enter  into  an 
ideal  region."^  "Ethics  is  a  pure  concern  of  man  with 
man,  it  is  often  said;  it  is  religion  that  binds  us  to  the 
higher  order  of  things.  Yet  ethics  is  nothing  but  the 
response  which  man  and  man  make  to  the  higher  order  of 
things;  for  the  reason  of  justice  is,  not  that  another 
wants  it  and  I  choose  to  give  it,  but  that  he  ought  to 
have  it  and  I  ought  to  give  it.  The  duty  is  absolute,  not 
conditioned  on  our  will  or  thought,  but  given  to  us  in  and 
by  the  nature  of  things.  Ethics  realized  in  its  meaning 
is  religion."^  In  a  similar  strain  a  prominent  representa- 
tive of  the  Ethical  Movement  in  Germany,  G.  von 
Gizycki,  says:  "Our  moral  duties  do  not  bind  by  con- 
tract, but  are  unconditional.  .  .  .  The  divine  dwells  in  us, 
and  everything  great,  good,  and  holy  in  the  idea  of  God 
arises  out  of  our  own  heart;  moral  consciousness  is  the 
spring  of  all  that  has  value  in  religion."* 

On  the  question  of  divine  personality  the  exponents  of 
the  movement  under  review  are  disinclined  for  the  most 
part  either  to  negation  or  to  affirmation.  Salter  has,  in- 
deed, characterized  the  thought  of  a  personal  Deity  as 
an  illusion.^  Most  of  his  school,  however,  seem  to  have 
taken  a  position  of  greater  reserve.  The  points  main- 
tained by  all  are  the  existence  of  an  infinite  and  ultimate 
power  which  makes  for  righteousness  and  the  location 
of  the  one  great  proof  of  the  reality  of  such  a  power  in 
man's  moral  constitution.  The  following  statement  of 
Adler  is  quite  representative:  "I  believe  that  there  is  a 
higher  Being,  an  ultimate,  divine  Reality  in  things.  In 
the  attempt  to  describe  this  Being  language  faints,  im- 


1  Ethical  Religion,  pp.  65,  70.  ^Ibid.,  p.  7.  '  Ibid.,  p.  18. 

*  Ethics  and  Religion,  a  Collection  of  Essays,  pp.  172,  195. 

*  Ethical  Religion,  pp.  12,  39 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  213 

agination  grows  dizzy,  thought  is  paralyzed.  On  moral 
grounds,  and  in  the  last  analysis  on  moral  grounds  only, 
I  assume  the  existence  of  such  a  Being.  All  I  can  say 
by  way  of  description  is,  that  there  really  exists  that 
which  corresponds  to  the  moral  ideal,  that  there  is  a 
Power  back  of  the  effort  toward  righteousness,  which 
gives  effect  to  it  beyond  our  finite  power."^ 

Though  questioning  the  possibility  of  the  impersona- 
tion of  the  complete  moral  ideal  in  a  single  individual, 
the  representative  writers  of  the  Ethical  Societies  speak 
of  Jesus  in  terms  of  tender  respect,  and  accord  to  him 
a  certain  primacy  among  all  who  have  taught  and 
wrought  in  human  history.  Scanty  justice,  says  Adler, 
is  done  to  the  greatest  of  the  Hebrew  prophets  when  he 
is  described  as  simply  a  "moralist,"  for  that  term  does 
not  properly  call  attention  to  "his  depth,  his  spiritual 
wealth,  his  real  greatness,  to  the  'virtue  that  went  out 
from  him.'  "^  Referring  to  the  need  of  giving  a  central 
place  to  the  theme  of  "the  kingdom  of  God,"  Salter  re- 
marks: "In  this  sense  we  are  still  on  the  foundation  of 
the  prophets,  Jesus  himself  being  the  corner  stone. "^  The 
ideal  of  self-denial,  says  W.  L.  Sheldon,  was  manifested 
in  marvelous  beauty  and  completeness  in  Jesus.  "In  the 
picture  of  the  human  Christ  we  see  an  absolute  self-sur- 
render. Jesus  was  humility  itself.  I  watch  the  suffering 
Christ  on  the  cross  after  all  the  agony  he  had  undergone, 
without  one  thought  about  himself,  anxious  only  to 
achieve  the  purpose  to  which  he  had  consecrated  his  life 
and  to  show  the  human  race  the  true  way  of  conquering 
evil.  And  I  say  to  myself,  what  wonder  that  men  have 
clung  to  the  crucifix!  This  human  Jesus  did  conquer 
evil ;  he  showed  mankind  how  to  subdue  the  wild,  erratic. 


*  The  Religion  of  Duty,  pp.  39,  40.  *  Ibid.,  p.  77. 

'  Ethical  Religion,  p.  199. 


214        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

self-asserting  spirit  which  exists  in  every  one  of  us.     He 
hung  there  upon  the  cross  a  conqueror."^ 

While  those  who  make  "ethical  culture"  their  shibbo- 
leth do  not  take  the  Bible  as  an  authority  to  which  they 
are  in  any  wise  bound  to  submit,  they  are  free  to  acknowl- 
edge and  to  laud  the  wealth  of  its  contents.  "Purity  of 
diction,"  writes  Adler,  "power  of  striking  antithesis, 
simple  yet  sublime  imagery,  a  marvelous  facility  in  the 
expression  of  complex  states  of  feeling,  and  those  the 
deepest  of  which  the  human  soul  is  capable,  are  but  a 
few  of  the  obvious  features  that  distinguish  the  golden 
age  of  Hebrew  literature.  Never,  perhaps,  has  the  sym- 
bolism of  nature  been  used  with  such  supreme  effect  to 
express  the  unspeakable  emotions  that  are  deep  down 
in  the  heart  of  man.  Such  music  as  that  which  swells 
through  the  pages  of  Isaiah's  prophecies  cannot  be  for- 
gotten ;  such  ringing  rhythmic  periods,  in  which  the  elo- 
quence of  conviction  bursts  forth  into  the  rounded  fulness 
of  perfect  oratory,  can  never  fail  to  touch  and  inspire."^ 
"The  Bible,"  says  Salter,  "glows  with  the  idea  of  right- 
eousness as  no  other  book  does  that  has  become  the 
property  of  the  Western  world,  and  to  those  who  have 
the  wit  to  distinguish  substance  from  form  it  is  still,  and 
may  always  be,  a  means  of  moral  inspiration."^  In  his 
suggestive  book.  An  Ethical  Sunday  School,  W.  L.  Shel- 
don provides  for  a  large  use  of  the  Bible.  Referring  to 
the  needs  of  the  younger  pupils,  he  makes  this  very  sig- 
nificant remark :  "I  have  been  reluctant  to  employ  series 
of  tales  from  other  literatures,  as,  for  instance,  from 
Homer,  or  the  fairy  tales  from  German  sources,  or  even 
the  beautiful  legends  concerning  King  Arthur  and  the 
Knights  of  the  Round  Table — partly  for  the  reason  that 

i.An  Ethical  Movement,  p.  117.  '.Creed  and  Deed,  p.  222. 

^"Ethical  Religion,  p.  255. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  215 

they  would  tend  to  run  together  in  the  minds  of  the  Httle 
ones  with  the  stories  from  the  Bible.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  Bible  tales,  on  the  whole,  are  so  much  superior  in 
their  moral  import  to  the  legends  in  other  classic  litera- 
ture that  it  has  seemed  better  to  let  the  Scripture  tales 
stand  out  boldly  by  themselves  in  the  minds  of  the 
young.  "^ 

IV. — A  Word  on  the  Superior  Claims  of 
Christianity 

The  types  of  thought  which  have  been  considered  may 
be  regarded  as  embracing  successively  these  four  propo- 
sitions :  ( I )  The  highest  attainable  religion  is  not  to  be 
identified  with  Christianity,  but  rather  is  to  be  com- 
pounded from  the  best  religious  products  that  can  be 
discovered  anywhere  in  the  world.  (2)  To  assert  a  dis- 
tinct primacy  for  Christianity  is  quite  illegitimate;  in- 
deed, that  honor  may  with  better  right  be  awarded  to 
the  great  religions  of  the  East.  (3)  Religion  expresses 
no  permanent  need  of  human  nature,  and  is  destined  to  be 
outgrown.  (4)  Morality  at  its  best  takes  up  all  that  is  of 
value  in  religion,  so  that  the  specifically  religious  may 
properly  cease  to  be  a  matter  of  any  emphasis.  These 
propositions  constitute  the  more  significant  contentions  of 
Free  Religion,  Theosophy,  Secularism,  and  the  Ethical 
Movement,  respectively. 

The  second  proposition,  it  is  true,  does  not  fully  cover 
the  peculiarities  of  the  theosophical  scheme.  In  that 
scheme  the  doctrine  of  adepts,  the  doctrine  that  religion 
in  its  perfect  form  has  been  the  property  of  highly  de- 
veloped and  illuminated  men,  and  has  been  handed  down 
by  them  in  its  completeness  and  purity  through  all  the 
ages,  holds  an  important  place.     But  it  is  impossible  to 

'  Ethical  Religion,  p.  39. 


2i6        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

treat  seriously  a  doctrine  like  this  which  throws  con- 
tempt on  the  researches  of  the  most  distinguished  an- 
thropologists and  students  of  comparative  religion.  Noth- 
ing but  an  intemperate  appetite  for  the  queer  can  secure 
a  moment's  hospitality  for  the  Mahatma  vagary.  Even 
if  the  existence  of  beings  so  wonderfully  gifted,  and  so 
wonderfully  indisposed  to  make  any  fruitful  employment 
of  their  gifts,  could  be  credited,  there  is  not  a  scrap  of 
satisfactory  evidence  of  any  real  connection  with  them. 
Madame  Blavatsky,  certainly,  has  furnished  no  convin- 
cing proof  of  such  connection.  For  years  after  her  re- 
puted novitiate  in  Thibet  she  figured  as  a  common  spirit- 
ualistic practitioner.  Either,  then,  she  had  not  learned 
that  Spiritualism  was  unacceptable  to  the  hidden  sages, 
or  she  knowingly  chose  a  false  and  condemned  path.  The 
conclusion  is  scarcely  to  be  avoided  that  the  effective  de- 
mand for  exchanging  Spiritualism  for  Theosophy  lay  in 
the  ambition  of  the  restless  devotee  of  occultism  to  figure 
in  a  more  imposing  role.  The  supposition  of  communi- 
cation with  superior  sources  of  illumination  is  adapted  to 
elicit  from  sober-minded  people  only  the  smile  of  in- 
credulity.^ 

Turning  now  to  the  first  of  the  propositions  named, 
we  notice  that  there  is  very  little  promise  of  vitality  in 
a  religion  formed  simply  by  the  process  of  compounding 
selected  teachings.  As  the  nutritive  elements  of  the  soil 
cannot  be  made  to  minister  to  life  and  movement  by  being 
merely  brought  together,  and  can  fulfill  that  function 
only  when  taken  up  by  a  living  organism  already  present, 
so  religious  truths  cannot  be  combined  into  a  living 
whole  by  a  mere  process  of  juxtaposition.     A  living 


1  Compare  Arthur  Lillie,  Madame  Blavatsky  and  her  Theosophy;  Ed- 
mund Garrett,  Isis  Very  Much  Unveiled,  Being  the  Story  of  the  Great 
Mahatma  Hoax. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  217 

religion,  sufficiently  comprehensive  in  its  fundamental 
principles,  can  be  hospitable  toward  truths  found  any- 
where in  the  limits  of  the  accessible  universe;  but  the 
simple  compiling  of  the  truths  will  not  make  a  religion 
endowed  with  victorious  energy. 

The  comparative  inefficiency  of  a  compiled  religion 
has  received  a  measure  of  historical  illustration.  In  the 
era  of  the  French  Revolution  the  so-called  Theophilan- 
thropists  undertook  to  make  a  new  religion  by  the  process 
of  selecting  good  maxims  from  all  available  sources.  The 
result  was  a  collection  of  very  eligible  teachings.  But 
was  there  any  power  of  conquest  or  satisfying  efficacy 
in  the  religion  thus  formed  ?  The  very  scantiest  amount. 
In  fact,  propagation  of  the  eclectic  faith  went  on  so  poorly 
that  one  of  its  leading  representatives  is  said  to  have 
asked  Talleyrand  what  he  should  do  to  win  the  merited 
success.  The  subtle  diplomatist  replied,  *T  should  advise 
you  to  get  yourself  crucified,  and  to  rise  from  the  dead  on 
the  third  day." 

The  trouble  with  a  religion  made  by  the  intellectual 
method  of  searching  out  and  assorting  acceptable  teach- 
ings is  its  vague,  abstract,  and  distant  character.  The 
hungry  heart  of  humanity  craves  something  more  than 
worthy  ideas  respecting  the  divine.  It  requires  that  the 
thought  of  God  should  be  supplemented  by  practical  attes- 
tations that  he  is  not  merely  a  beautiful  ideal,  but  a  God 
who  is  with  the  race  and  for  the  race,  a  Being  who  has 
disclosed  great  and  benevolent  purposes  and  given  as- 
surance of  their  certain  fulfillment.  In  other  words, 
no  religion  is  qualified  to  meet  the  actual  demand  which 
does  not  take  on  the  forms  of  a  sacred  history.  A  super- 
latively rich  and  well-authenticated  sacred  history  must 
in  the  very  nature  of  the  case  arm  a  religion  with  incom- 
parable efficiency  for  the  task  of  capturing  and  molding 


2i8        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

the  minds  and  hearts  of  men.  It  is  seen,  then,  to  be 
worthy  of  an  infinitely  wise  and  benevolent  providence 
to  adopt  this  potent  expedient,  this  method  of  historic 
attestation  in  working  out  the  proper  religious  destiny 
of  mankind.  The  rational  demand  harmonizes  with  the 
claim  of  Christianity  to  have  won  its  place  in  the  world 
in  and  through  a  sacred  history  which  brings  into  effec- 
tive contact  with  men  the  highest  and  best  that  is  con- 
ceivable. 

That  Christianity  in  its  historic  form  embraces  every- 
thing that  is  capable  of  finding  a  place  in  an  ideal  system 
need  not  necessarily  be  assumed ;  for  Christianity  rightly 
understood  is  not  a  completely  finished  fact.  In  its  funda- 
mental principles  it  is  indeed  unchanging.  Here  the  ideal 
is  at  the  same  time  the  real.  But  in  drawing  out  the  logi- 
cal inferences  from  these  principles,  and  in  securing  for 
them  a  practical  realization  through  all  the  complex  life 
of  human  society,  there  is  abundant  opportunity  for  a 
progressive  movement.  In  this  movement  the  fruits  of  uni- 
versal experience  can  be  appropriated  without  the  slight- 
est incongruity.  The  divine  sufficiency  of  Christianity 
is  not  denied  but  rather  illustrated  by  its  capacity  to 
assimilate  whatever  of  good  is  contained  within  the  hori- 
zon of  human  achievement.  Only  the  soundness  of  its 
central  principles  could  enable  it  to  possess  in  full  meas- 
ure this  capacity.  There  is,  accordingly,  the  very  slightest 
need  to  think  of  parting  company  with  Christianity  for 
the  sake  of  adding  to  one's  store  of  religious  riches.  The 
hesitation  of  the  Free  Religious  Association  to  make 
a  formal  declaration  of  independence  of  historical 
Christianity  had  weighty  grounds,  more  weighty  prob- 
ably than  some  of  its  members  were  conscious  of  enter- 
taining. 

In  considering  the  preference  of  modern  Theosophists 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  219 

for  the  great  religions  of  the  East  there  is  occasion  to 
weigh  only  the  merits  of  Brahmanism  and  Buddhism, 
since  it  is  with  these  two  Oriental  systems  that  the  the- 
osophical  mind  has  been  so  enamored  as  practically  to 
rate  them  above  Christianity.  The  repudiation  of  this 
estimate  does  not,  of  course,  involve  a  denial  that  very 
worthy  elements  may  be  found  in  both  Brahmanism  and 
Buddhism.  The  challenge  to  the  theosophical  judgment 
properly  takes  the  form  of  the  contention  that  there  are 
glaring  defects  in  both  these  religions  which  rationally 
exclude  the  possibility  of  placing  them  on  a  level  with 
Christianity. 

Brahmanism  stands  for  one  of  the  most  radical  and 
overgrown  systems  of  sacerdotalism  that  the  world  has 
ever  seen.  This  feature,  too,  does  not  appear  a  mere 
attachment  or  artificial  appendage.  The  sacred  books  of 
the  religion  are  deeply  permeated  with  the  notion  of  the 
deified  rank  of  the  Brahman,  and  respect  to  that  rank  as 
expressed  in  the  caste  system  has  been  for  ages  a  most 
conspicuous  characteristic  of  the  civilization  of  India. 
With  extravagance  in  priestly  assumption  a  kindred  ex- 
travagance in  magnifying  the  virtue  of  ceremonies 
manipulated  by  the  priest  has  been  closely  associated. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  in  Brahmanism  the  cere- 
monial vies  with  the  ethical  and  overslaughs  it  at  vari- 
ous points.  Very  sane  maxims  are,  indeed,  found  in  the 
Brahmanical  scriptures  on  the  superior  worth  of  the 
ethical;  but  maxims  and  representations  of  a  precisely 
contrary  import  are  also  found.^  The  natural  result  is 
a  compromising  of  the  supremacy  which  belongs  of  right 
to  the  ethical  as  against  everything  in  the  sphere  of  ritual. 
Along  with  these  grave  defects  another  must  be  charged 
against  Brahmanism.     In  its  representation  of  the  Su- 

*  Vasishtha,  chap,  xxvii;  Baudhayana,  iv.  6;  Laws  of  Manu,  ii.  79. 


220        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

preme  Being  it  gives  place  to  conceptions  that  are  gro- 
tesquely inadequate  to  the  thought  of  God  as  the  absolute 
and  perfect.  Take  that  picture  of  Brahma  as  alternating 
between  active  and  passive  conditions,  projecting  the 
world  in  one  state,  withdrawing  the  world  into  himself 
in  another  state,  living  now  in  the  day,  and  now  in  the 
long  deep  night  in  which  all  diversities  are  submerged 
and  lost.  How  is  it  possible  that  anyone  should  imagine 
that  such  a  doctrine  is  comparable  to  the  thought  of  God 
as  the  ever-living,  the  light  which  cannot  be  invaded  or 
superseded  by  darkness,  the  sleepless  wisdom  and  love, 
the  pure  intelligence  and  holy  will  that  work  ceaselessly 
to  lead  on  the  universe  stage  by  stage  toward  the  highest 
possible  goal  ?  Plainly,  Theosophy  is  convicted  of  making 
an  extremely  bad  bargain  in  so  far  as  it  puts  aside  au- 
thentic Christianity  for  Brahmanism. 

In  the  preference  awarded  to  Buddhism  an  equally  ill- 
founded  judgment  is  apparent.  What  element  of  high 
worth  does  Buddhism  contain  which  is  not  also  char- 
acteristic of  Christianity?  The  former  profoundly  em- 
phasizes the  duty  of  compassion  and  good  will  toward 
all.  The  latter  is  not  at  all  behind  in  its  emphasis  upon 
this  duty,  and  at  the  same  time  provides  a  vastly  more 
logical  basis  for  the  energetic  and  persistent  fulfillment 
of  the  duty.  Buddhism  is  quietistic  in  its  ideal.  Sup- 
pression of  desire  is  central  to  its  conception  of  salva- 
tion. In  consistency,  therefore,  the  fully  saved  man  must 
be  disburdened  of  all  active  solicitude  for  his  fellows. 
A  negative,  cloistral,  quiescent  benevolence,  as  opposed 
to  a  striving  and  world-conquering  good  will,  is  the  logi- 
cal outcome  of  Buddhistic  postulates.  If  Buddhism  has 
ever  made  any  considerable  exhibition  of  active  benevol- 
ence, that  achievement  is  rather  to  be  imputed  to  the 
spirit  and  practical  maxims  of  the  founder  than  to  a  con- 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  221 

sistent  carrying  out  of  its  fundamental  conceptions  of 
the  ideal  state  of  the  individual.  Furthermore,  its  de- 
ficiency at  this  point,  as  compared  with  Christianity,  is 
enhanced  by  its  conception  of  man  as  a  candidate  for 
quite  the  reverse  of  a  vital  immortality.  The  end  to  be 
attained,  as  it  represents,  is  entrance  into  nirvana;  and 
nirvana,  whatever  amelioration  of  its  significance  may 
have  been  brought  in  ultimately,  seems  to  have  meant 
in  original  Buddhism  just  simply  extinction  of  personal 
subsistence,  the  reduction  of  the  individual  to  the  state 
of  the  blown-out  flame  of  a  lamp.^  Retrenching  thus 
the  significance  of  human  personality.  Buddhism,  in  its 
most  authentic  form,  offers  a  less  inspiring  motive  to 
work  for  the  best  development  of  humanity  than  does 
Christianity  with  its  conception  of  men  as  called  to  be 
the  immortal  children  of  a  divine  household.  It  must 
be  charged  also  against  Buddhism  that  it  is  far  less 
adapted  than  the  religion  of  Christ  to  sustain  the  proper 
intensity  of  ethical  life.  In  the  aim  of  the  former,  es- 
cape from  pain  takes  the  foremost  place.  The  misery  of 
unsatisfied  desire  is  emphasized  as  the  great  evil  to  be 
vanquished.  Only  a  secondary  stress  falls  upon  the  vile- 
ness  and  demerit  of  sin.  For  this  deficit,  too,  there  is 
no  means  of  repair  in  the  religion  of  Gautama;  on  the 
contrary,  it  is  closely  related  to  a  distinctive  shortcoming. 
As  taking  a  negative  attitude  toward  the  thought  of  God, 
Buddhism  lacks  the  great  means  of  vitalizing  the  con- 
sciousness of  sin  which  resides  in  a  pure  theistic  system, 
with  its  stress  upon  responsibility  to  a  holy  and  trans- 
cendent Person.  Nor  is  this  the  whole  extent  of  the 
damage  resulting  from  the  failure  of  original  Buddhism 


>  Oldenberg,  Buddha:  His  Life,  his  Doctrine,  his  Order,  pp.  264-274: 
Hopkins,  Religions  of  India,  p.  321;  Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  American 
edition,  Vol.  IX.  Part  ii,  p.  275;  Vol.  X,  Part  i,  pp.  63,  279,  280. 


222        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

to  take  any  account  of  the  idea  of  God.  The  devotees 
of  the  system  could  not  permanently  leave  that  void  un- 
filled. Neglect  to  make  a  suitable  recognition  of  the 
Divine  Being  only  helped  to  give  free  course  to  fanciful 
and  superstitious  representations  of  the  higher  powers. 
Notwithstanding,  then,  all  the  beautiful  sayings  which 
may  be  gathered  from  Buddhistic  literature,  there  are 
such  marked  defects  in  the  Buddhistic  system  that  it 
requires  very  peculiar  eyesight  to  see  in  it  a  proper  rival 
of  Christianity. 

The  Theosophic  assumption  of  the  obligations  of 
Christianity  to  Buddhism  require,  as  a  ground  of  cre- 
dence, vastly  better  evidence  than  has  ever  been  afforded. 
The  fact  can  indeed  be  cited  that  a  few  writers  outside 
the  theosophical  school  have  supposed  the  reality  of 
such  obligations.  Thus  Rudolph  Seydel  points  to  a 
series  of  parallelisms  between  the  Gospels  and  certain 
Buddhist  writings,  and  draws  the  inference  that  the 
former  borrowed  from  the  latter.  Furthermore,  Ernst 
von  Bunsen  and  Arthur  Lillie  have  rendered  support  to 
the  notion  that  Christianity  drew  largely  from  Essenism, 
which  on  its  side  found  in  Buddhism  a  principal  source. 
But  judicial  scholarship  finds  very  slight  occasion  to  take 
serious  account  of  these  verdicts.  Suppose  some  paral- 
lelisms are  discoverable  between  the  Gospels  and  Bud- 
dhist narratives;  it  still  remains  true  that  the  Gospels 
in  their  sharp  contrast  to  Buddhistic  teaching  on  funda- 
mental themes  evince  a  high  degree  of  independence. 
The  parallels,  too,  are  not  so  significant  as  Seydel  assumes 
them  to  be.  It  may  be  contended  that  some  of  the 
Oriental  sources  on  which  he  depends  were  probably  of 
later  origin  than  the  Gospels,  and  that  the  points  of  re- 
semblance are  not  so  precise  as  to  necessitate  the  sup- 
position of  borrowing  from   either  side.     As   respects 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  223 

the  notion  that  Buddhistic  teaching-  was  transmitted 
through  Essenism  to  Christianity,  the  following  state- 
ment may  be  accounted  a  sober  estimate  of  the  evidence : 
"When  we  consider  that  in  all  the  Palestinian  Jewish 
literature  there  is  not  a  trace  of  distinctively  Buddhist 
teaching,  when  we  bear  in  mind  that  the  name  of  Buddha 
is  not  once  associated  with  the  Essenes,  when  we  see 
scholars  most  competent  to  pronounce  on  the  question, 
like  Zeller,  Lightfoot,  Schurer,  Ginsberg,  Edersheim,  and 
Conybeare,  denying-  even  a  remote  connection  of  Essen- 
ism with  Buddhism,  we  are  amply  justified  in  setting 
down  the  theory  in  question  as  an  absolute  failure."* 
The  supposition  that  Jesus  was  closely  associated  with 
the  Essenes  is  stamped  by  Harnack  as  an  unhistoric 
vagary  in  these  terms:  "Jesus  could  not  have  had  any 
relations  with  the  Essenes.  Were  that  so,  he  would  have 
belonged  to  the  pupils  who  show  their  dependence  on 
their  teachers  by  proclaiming  and  doing  the  opposite  of 
what  they  have  been  taught.  The  Essenes  made  a  point 
of  the  most  extreme  purity  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  and  held 
severely  aloof  not  only  from  the  impure  but  even  from 
those  who  were  a  little  lax  in  their  purity.  It  is  only 
thus  that  we  can  understand  their  living  strictly  apart, 
their  dwelling  in  particular  places,  and  their  practice  of 
frequent  ablutions  every  day.  Jesus  exhibited  complete 
contrast  with  this  mode  of  life :  he  goes  in  search  of  sin- 
ners and  eats  with  them.  So  fundamental  a  difference 
alone  makes  it  certain  that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
Essenes.  His  aims  and  the  means  which  he  employed 
divide  him  off  from  them.  If  he  appears  to  coincide  with 
them  in  many  of  his  individual  injunctions  to  his  dis- 


^  C.  F.  Aiken,  The  Dhama  of  Gotama  the  Buddha  and  the  Gospel  of 
Jesus  the  Christ,  pp.  195,  196.  See  also  Edmund  Hardy,  Der  Buddhismus 
nach  aelteren  Pali-Werken  Dargestellt. 


224        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

ciples,  these  are  accidental  points  of  contact,  as  his  mo- 
tives were  quite  other  than  theirs."^ 

The  assumption  of  Secularism  that  with  the  progress 
of  society  religion  will  fade  out  of  sight,  until  finally  it 
shall  be  practically  extirpated  from  human  feeling  and 
practice,  has  every  appearance  of  being  rather  a  wish 
than  an  induction,  so  flimsy  are  the  grounds  that  can  be 
cited  in  its  behalf.  As  John  Fiske  has  remarked,  "None 
can  deny  that  religion  is  the  largest  and  most  ubiquitous 
fact  connected  with  the  life  of  mankind  upon  earth."^ 
Universally  art  and  literature  and  the  biographies  of 
men  testify  to  the  incomparable  power  of  the  religious 
incentive.  Are  we  to  be  told,  then,  that  this  incen- 
tive is  to  be  eradicated,  that  the  future  of  man  is  to 
stand  in  complete  contrast  with  his  past?  Yes,  says 
Guyau,  for  man  is  capable  of  being  evolved  into  some- 
thing quite  unlike  his  former  self.  Yes,  says  Bon- 
ham,  for  all  reverence  for  ideals  is  destined  to  be  extir- 
pated from  the  human  breast.  But  why  should  anyone 
care  to  push  antireligious  credulity  to  the  extreme  of 
such  assertions?  We  rightly  judge  of  what  man  is  in- 
trinsically by  what  he  has  shown  himself  to  be  through- 
out his  history.  To  suppose  that  he  can  be  evolved  or 
desiccated  into  something  quite  unlike  himself  is  to  deal 
very  unkindly  with  logic  and  common  sense.  Doubt- 
less within  limited  areas  seasons  of  a  relative  religious 
dearth  may  occur.  But  to  take  such  instances  of  dearth 
as  a  prophecy  of  universal  secularism  is  far  from  being 
warranted.  According  to  the  ample  testimony  of  his- 
tory, the  minds  and  hearts  of  men  cannot  endure  to  be 


>  What  is  Christianity?  first  edition,  p.  32.  Compare  Wellhausen, 
Israelitische  und  Jiidische  Geschichte,  p.  2g.i;:  H.  J.  Holtzmann,  Lehrbuch 
der  neutestamentlichen  Theologie,  I.  118;  W.  Bousset,  Jesus,  p.  35. 

'Through  Nature  to  God,  p.  189. 


DENIAL  OF  FINALITY  OF  CHRISTIANITY  225 

permanently  impoverished,  and  in  the  absence  of  normal 
religious  satisfactions  will  gravitate  into  the  vagaries 
and  excesses  of  superstition.  Nor  can  intellectual  culture 
neutralize  the  natural  result  of  religious  impoverishment ; 
for  intellectual  culture  is  powerless  to  abolish  the  deep 
requirements  of  the  emotional  life ;  and,  besides,  the  intel- 
lect has  demands  for  religious  conceptions  in  forming 
a  tolerable  theory  of  the  universe. 

In  relation  to  the  Ethical  Societies,  it  may  be  conceded 
that  no  slight  occasion  has  been  given  for  the  putting 
forth  of  their  contention.  Beyond  question,  scanty  jus- 
tice has  sometimes  been  rendered  to  morality.  All  too 
frequently  it  has  been  placed  by  the  incautious  advocate 
of  the  claims  of  piety  in  disparaging  contrast  with  reli- 
gion, where  the  contrast  ought  to  have  been  drawn  be- 
tween a  superficial  and  a  profound  morality,  or  at  most 
between  a  superficial  morality  and  a  thoroughly  ethical 
religion.  A  practical  protest  against  such  misleading 
discourse  was  quite  in  order. 

But  the  Ethical  Societies,  it  strikes  us,  have  erred  in 
attempting  to  bring  morality  to  the  front  at  the  expense 
of  religion.  If  the  latter  is  a  debtor  to  the  former,  the  for- 
mer must  in  the  long  run  acknowledge  profound  obliga- 
tions to  the  latter.  The  true  relation  between  the  two  is 
presented  in  ideal  form  in  the  consciousness  of  Jesus. 
How  intense  his  scorn  of  a  religiosity  which  makes  small 
account  of  the  demands  of  righteous  dealings  with  one's 
fellows !  How  scathing  his  rebuke  of  the  man  who  links 
ceremonial  scrupulosity  with  any  species  of  inhumanity 
or  moral  laxity!  How  like  a  flame  of  fire  his  words 
burn  through  the  pretenses  of  those  who  would  claim 
a  monopoly  of  merit  on  the  score  of  their  orthodoxism ! 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  how  vital  his  sense  of  all  the 


226        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

higher  rehgious  truths  and  relationships !  What  strength, 
peace,  and  radiance  the  thought  of  the  heavenly  Father 
brings  into  his  spirit!  What  inspiration  for  labor  and 
hardihood  for  suffering  he  gains  from  his  far-reaching 
vision  of  the  kingdom  of  God  in  its  destined  unfoldment 
to  a  transcendent  and  imperishable  glory!  Truly  in  the 
consciousness  of  Jesus  the  proper  relation  between 
morality  and  religion  has  received  an  ideal  exemplifica- 
tion, and  our  best  discretion  will  be  manifested  in  an 
earnest  attempt  to  realize  the  model  which  is  here  set 
before  us. 


CHAPTER  III 

DENIAL  OF  THE  TRANSCENDENT  SONSHIP  OF  JESUS 

CHRIST 

I. — The  Principal  Instances  of  Denial 

A  CURRENT  of  dissent  from  the  catholic  conception  of 
the  divinity  of  Christ  was  started  in  England  before  the 
close  of  the  first  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century.  This 
current  ran  in  the  first  instance  in  the  direction  of  Arian- 
ism,  its  course  being  mainly  through  the  territory  of 
English  Presbyterianism.  It  is  understood  that  Nathaniel 
Lardner  and  Richard  Price,  among  others,  subscribed  to 
the  Arian  doctrine.  Toward  the  end  of  the  century  a 
transition  began  to  be  made  to  the  humanitarian  con- 
ception of  Christ.  Among  the  early  champions  of  this 
conception  Joseph  Priestley,  Thomas  Belsham,  and  Theo- 
philus  Lindsey  were  conspicuous.  The  competing  view 
persisted  for  a  time,  but  its  constituency  was  so  reduced 
before  the  end  of  the  fourth  decade  of  the  nineteenth 
century  that  a  New  England  Unitarian  could  write  home, 
"There  are  only  three  or  four  Arian  societies  in  Eng- 
land."^ In  Ireland  at  the  same  time  the  Arian  element, 
though  on  the  wane,  was  relatively  stronger. 

The  antitrinitarian  movement  was  initiated  in  this 
country  twenty  or  thirty  years  later  than  in  England. 
Very  soon  after  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century 
Arianism  was  held  and  propagated  in  an  unobtrusive 
manner  by  several  prominent  ministers  in  eastern  Massa- 
chusetts. In  this  somewhat  vague,  mildly  assertive  type 
it  went  on  winning  adherents.  The  development  oc- 
curred within   the   Congregational   body,   the  breaking 

*  Life  of  Ezra  Stiles  Gannett,  by  William  C.  Gannett,  p.  177. 

227 


228        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

away  of  King's  Chapel  from  its  Episcopalian  moorings 
in  1787,  under  the  leadership  of  James  Freeman,  being 
an  exceptional  instance.  By  communication  with  Eng- 
land, as  well  as  by  the  force  of  inner  tendencies,  an  in- 
centive was  given  toward  a  transition  to  a  modified 
Socinian  teaching ;  in  other  words,  a  humanitarian  teach- 
ing stripped  of  the  Socinian  prescription  of  worship  of 
the  exalted  Christ.  The  transition  proceeded  by  degrees, 
from  the  last  years  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but  seems 
not  to  have  made  very  large  headway  up  to  the  time  of 
the  crisis  in  181 5  which  hastened  the  formation  of  an  in- 
dependent communion,  A  letter  of  Channing  written  in 
that  year  expressed  the  judgment  that  those  who  held  to 
the  simple  humanity  of  Jesus  Christ  formed  only  a  small 
proportion  of  the  Unitarians  with  whom  he  was  as- 
sociated.^ The  balance,  however,  was  soon  changed. 
"Stuart  said  to  Channing  as  early  as  18 19,  'The  younger 
men  are  nearly  all  outstripping  you.'  Even  Professor 
Ware  at  the  Divinity  School  was  soon  after  teaching 
that  to  him  Christ  seemed  a  man.  There  were  doubtless 
several  like  him,  and  more  every  year.  Probably  few 
who  were  over  forty  years  old  at  the  time  of  the  disclos- 
ure in  181 5  died  other  than  Arians.  Probably  there  were 
few  under  forty  then  who  did  not  at  least  grow  doubtful, 
if  not  certain,  the  other  way."^  The  drift  indicated  in 
this  statement  fell  little  short  of  its  perfect  goal  by  the 
end  of  the  century.  Writing  in  1894,  J.  W.  Chadwick 
testified :  "Today  the  pure  humanity  of  Jesus  is  the  prevail- 
ing doctrine  of  the  Unitarian  body.  It  would  be  hard  to 
find  among  us  an  Arian  thinking  of  Jesus  as  the  creator  of 
all  worlds,  himself  created  before  time  began  to  be.  It 
would  be  only  less  hard  to  find  a  true  Socinian  thinking 


'  Life  of  W.  E.  Channing,  by  W.  H.  Channing,  p.  196. 
2  W.  C.  Gannett,  Life  of  E.  S.  Gannett,  p.  183. 


DENIAL  OF  TRANSCENDENT  SONSHIP  229 

of  Jesus  as  a  human  being  exalted  to  the  rank  of  God. 
But  there  are  not  a  few  who  still  think  of  him  as  a  per- 
fect man ;  and  more  who  speak  of  him  as  such,  without 
thinking  much  about  it.''^  Serious  thinking,  our  wit- 
ness intimates,  must  serve  to  engender  doubts,  not,  in- 
deed, respecting  the  rare  excellence  of  Jesus,  but  respect- 
ing his  unblemished  human  perfection ;  and  so  Unitarian 
thinking  must  logically  pass  on  to  the  denial  that  the  ideal 
has  yet  been  fulfilled  in  any  individual  among  the  sons  of 
men. 

In  the  view  of  Channing  and  his  associates  in  the  early 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century  Jesus  possessed  an  exalted 
dignity,  was  intrusted  with  a  thoroughly  exceptional 
mission,  and  was  armed  with  a  complete,  divinely  attested 
authority.  "His  character,"  wrote  Channing,  "has  in  it 
nothing  local  or  temporal.  It  can  be  explained  by  noth- 
ing around  him.  His  history  shows  him  to  us  a  solitary 
being,  living  for  purposes  which  none  but  himself  com- 
prehended, and  enjoying  not  so  much  as  the  sympathy 
of  a  single  mind."^  "We  believe  firmly  in  the  divinity 
of  Christ's  mission  and  office,  that  he  spoke  with  divine 
authority,  and  was  a  bright  image  of  the  divine  perfec- 
tions. We  believe  that  God  dwelt  in  him,  manifested 
himself  through  him,  taught  men  by  him,  and  communi- 
cated his  Spirit  to  him  without  measure.  We  believe 
that  Jesus  Christ  was  the  most  glorious  display,  expres- 
sion, and  representative  of  God  to  mankind,  so  that  in 
seeing  and  knowing  him  we  see  and  know  the  invisible 
Father.  In  Christ's  words  we  hear  God  speaking;  in  his 
miracles  we  behold  God  acting;  in  his  life  and  character 
we  see  an  unsullied  image  of  God's  purity  and  love."^ 

Not  a  few  of  those  who  in  the  next  generation  after 


iQld  and  New  Unitarian  Belief,  p.  160.  2  Works,  III.  121 

3  Ibid.,  V.  394. 


230        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

Channing  embraced  the  humanitarian  doctrine  were  able, 
in  spite  of  their  revised  creed,  to  make  a  pretty  close 
approach  to  his  conception  of  the  dignity  and  worth  of 
Christ's  person.  Taking  a  high  view  of  human  capaci- 
ties, and  strongly  emphasizing  the  thought  of  divine  im- 
manence, they  placed  Christ  in  such  vital  relation  with 
the  divine  and  conceived  him  to  be  so  largely  receptive 
of  the  Father's  fullness,  that  he  was  made  to  appear  quite 
as  sufificient  for  man's  spiritual  needs  as  the  middle  being 
of  Arianism,  who  indeed  was  formally  rated  higher,  but 
seemed  to  be  less  closely  conjoined  both  with  God  and 
with  man. 

This  point  of  view  was  represented  by  James  Free- 
man Clarke.  He  saw  in  Jesus  the  ideal  of  manhood 
close-linked  with  divinity.  In  the  unconsciousness  of 
sin  characteristic  of  the  Man  of  Nazareth  he  recognized  a 
valid  sign  of  inward  stainlessness.^  This  qualified  him 
for  perfect  communion  with  the  Father.  "In  all  that 
he  said  and  did  he  spoke  from  the  knowledge  of  God ; 
he  acted  from  the  life  of  God.  Here  was  one,  then,  at 
last,  to  whom  God  was  not  an  opinion,  but  a  reality; 
through  whose  life  flowed  the  life  of  God  in  a  steady 
current.  .  .  .  The  Word  thus  'became  flesh  and  dwelt 
among  us.'  The  word  of  the  Lord  came  to  the  prophets, 
but  it  dzvelt  in  Christ.  ...  In  him  truly  'dwelt  the  fulness 
of  the  Godhead  bodily."^ 

In  like  manner  F.  H.  Hedge  strongly  emphasized  the 
vital  connection  of  Christ's  humanity  with  divinity,  not 
indeed  postulating  in  strictness  a  divine-human  person- 
ality, yet  conceiving  of  such  a  close  relation  between 
manhood  and  Godhead  that  he  was  not  disposed  to  quar- 
rel with  the  terms  of  the  Chalcedonian  creed.^     As  com- 


•  Sermon,  1859.  •  Orthodoxy,  its  Truths  and  Errors,  chap.  viii. 

3  Ways  of  the  Spirit  and  Other  Essays,  pp.  77,  78. 


DENIAL  OF  TRANSCENDENT  SONSHIP  231 

pared  with  Arianism  he  regarded  the  Nicene  doctrine 
as  embodying  a  great  truth,  since  the  former  made  a  dis- 
junction between  God  and  man,  while  the  latter  accentu- 
ated their  union.  Indeed,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  describe 
the  Council  of  Nicaea,  because  of  its  service  to  this  truth, 
as  "one  of  the  most  important  assemblies  that  was  ever 
convened  on  this  earth.''^  But,  while  making  this  appar- 
ent approximation  to  the  catholic  Christology,  Hedge 
took  pains  to  indicate  that  he  had  not  really  moved  on 
to  the  ground  of  that  Christology.  His  view  of  the  incar- 
nation of  the  divine  in  Christ  was  closely  akin  to  that 
which  Schelling  proclaimed  in  his  Vorlesungen  ilber 
die  Methode  des  akademischen  Studiums.  Incarnation, 
as  he  conceived,  is  a  process  in  which  Christ,  though  he 
is  at  the  summit,  does  not  stand  alone.  "Divine  sonship 
is  not  exhausted  in  Christ.  Humanity  is  the  son  of  God, 
humanity  in  esse  or  in  posse.  This  is  the  truth  which 
Jesus  represents,  which  he  illustrates  by  a  supreme  in- 
stance."^ 

With  Clarke  and  Hedge  we  may  associate  the  English 
Unitarian  James  Martineau.  Though  starting  with  the 
materialistic  necessitarian  scheme  of  Priestley  and  Bel- 
sham,  he  soon  threw  off  its  fetters  and  began  to  shape 
his  conception  of  the  person  and  work  of  Christ  accord- 
ing to  the  suggestions  of  an  idealistic  philosophy.  Less 
stress  was  placed  upon  the  notion  of  an  authoritative  dek- 
gate,  and  more  upon  that  of  the  unique  medium  for  mani- 
festing, under  finite  conditions,  the  mind  and  heart  of 
the  Infinite.  The  following  words  testify  how  strongly 
he  could  put  this  point  of  view :  "Christ  standing  in  soli- 
tary greatness,  and  invested  with  unapproachable  sanc- 
tity, opens  at  once  the  eye  of  conscience  to  perceive  and 
know  the  pure  and  holy  God,  the  Father  that  dwelt  in 

1  Ways  of  the  Spirit  and  Other  Kssays,  pp.  350,  351. 
*  Unitarian  Affirmations,  p.  16 


232        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

him  and  made  him  so  full  of  truth  and  grace.  Him  that 
rules  in  heaven  we  can  in  no  wise  believe  to  be  less  perfect 
than  that  which  is  most  divine  on  earth;  of  anything 
more  perfect  than  the  meek  yet  majestic  Jesus  no  heart 
can  ever  dream.  And  accordingly,  ever  since  he  visited 
our  earth  with  blessing,  the  soul  of  Christendom  has 
worshiped  a  God  resembling  him."^  That  this  conviction 
remained  in  the  mind  of  Martineau  with  but  little  abate- 
ment is  evidenced  by  these  words  penned  near  the  end  of 
his  career:  "In  Christ's  life  of  communion  with  God  re- 
hgious  experience,  as  known  to  us,  reaches  its  acme,  and 
the  ideal  relation  between  the  human  and  the  divine  is 
realized.  If  in  any  other  instance  the  elevation  has  been 
reached,  it  has  not  been  historically  presented  so  as  to 
single  itself  out  as  a  revelation  to  us  of  what  we  are 
meant  and  called  to  be.  If  ever  something  higher  is  set 
before  us  it  will  be  time  enough  to  quit  the  step  on  which 
we  stand.  But  some  objective  personalization  of  our 
spiritual  sonship  to  God  is  essential  to  hold  us  in  brotherly 
unity  together,  and  carry  a  religious  inspiration  into 
morals."^  In  common  with  Hedge,  Martineau  thought 
of  Christ  as  the  supreme  instance  of  a  divine-human  reali- 
zation. "The  incarnation  is  true,  not  of  Christ  exclusively, 
but  of  man  universally  and  God  everlastingly.  He  bends 
into  the  human  to  dwell  there,  and  humanity  is  the  sus- 
ceptible organ  of  the  divine."^ 

How  far  Unitarianism  in  the  present  conforms  to  the 
teaching  of  these  eminent  representatives  of  the  preceding 
generations  it  is  difficult  to  determine.  That  in  part  it 
has  fallen  to  a  lower  plane  in  its  conception  of  Christ  has 
been  made  evident  by  one  and  another  exponent  of  con- 
temporary thinking. 

1  Studies  of  Christianity,  edited  by  W.  R.  Alger,  p.  194. 
'  Letter  of  June  5,  1895,  cited  by  J.  E.  Carpenter,  in  James  Martineau, 
Theologian  and  Teacher,  pp.  593,  594.  '  Ibid-,  p.  404. 


DENIAL  OF  TRANSCENDENT  SONSHIP  233 

At  the  beginning  of  its  history  American  UniversaHsm 
was  not  distinguished  by  any  special  antagonism  to  the 
cathohc  Christology.  John  Murray's  trinitarianism  may 
have  been  of  the  Sabelhan  type,  but  his  most  distinguished 
colaborer,  Elhanan  Winchester,  is  not  known  to  have 
renounced  the  common  orthodox  theory  of  the  divine  tri- 
unity.  Scarcely,  however,  had  the  line  been  crossed  into 
the  nineteenth  century  before  a  decided  transition  was 
inaugurated.  Hosea  Ballou  criticised  the  doctrine  of 
the  Trinity  in  1805.  Within  a  dozen  years  from  that 
time,  as  we  are  informed  by  the  historian  of  the  denomi- 
nation, the  number  of  Trinitarians  in  the  Universalist 
ministry  had  been  reduced  to  two.^ 

Antitrinitarian  sentiment,  more  commonly  of  the 
humanitarian  type,  has  had  representatives  outside  of  the 
domains  which  have  been  considered  in  the  foregoing 
sketch.  A  sporadic  manifestation  of  it  has  occurred  in 
Germany.  There  is  reason,  however,  to  doubt  the  war- 
rant for  the  assertion  which  is  sometimes  put  forth 
respecting  its  wide  prevalence  in  that  country.  Doubt- 
less among  the  numerous  adherents  of  the  Ritschlian 
school,  as  well  as  in  the  more  limited  ultra-liberal  school, 
advocates  of  the  pure  humanitarian  conception  of  Christ 
are  to  be  found.  But  the  more  representative  theologians 
of  the  Ritschlians,  however  unwilling  they  may  be  to 
commit  themselves  distinctly  to  the  formulas  of  the  tra- 
ditional Christology,  have  not  declared  for  the  proper 
humanitarian  conception.  Their  Christology  is  of  a 
somewhat  agnostic  type,  which  makes  room  for  a  tran- 
scendent factor  in  Christ,  and  even  affirms  the  presence  of 
such  a  factor,  though  stopping  short  of  an  attempt  to 
construe  it  closely.     To  go  further  would  involve  a  de- 

'  Richard  Eddy,  UniversaHsm  in  America,  II.  104. 


234        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

parture  from  the  example  of  the  founder  of  their  school ; 
for  Albrecht  Ritschl  refused  to  deal  with  the  metaphysical 
side  of  Christology.  He  considered  it  sufficient  to  main- 
tain that  the  practical  worth  of  divinity  pertains  to  Christ 
as  reflecting  the  divine  attributes  and  asserting  over  the 
race  an  unlimited  moral  lordship.  "An  authority,"  he 
said,  "which  excludes  all  other  standards  or  subordinates 
them  to  itself,  which  at  the  same  time  fundamentally 
directs  all  human  trust  in  God,  has  the  worth  of  divi- 
nity."i 

In  the  Christological  discussions  of  Professor  Julius 
Kaftan  quite  emphatic  recognition  is  given  to  a  tran- 
scendent factor  in  Christ.     He  notices  that  in  the  self- 
consciousness  of  Christ  there  was  an  extraordinary  ele- 
ment, not  merely  as  respects  official  standing,   but  as 
respects  relationship  to  God,  a  sense  of  oneness  with  the 
Father  which  was  the  spring  of  life  and  activity.     He 
affirms  that  the  distinction  between  him  and  his  disciples 
reaches  beyond  the  fact  that  he  is  the  head  of  the  body 
to  which  they  pertain  as  members.    "His  significance  lies 
precisely  in  this,  that  he  is  the  mediator  between  God 
and  men,  inasmuch  as  he  belongs  with  God  and  again 
with  men.    In  order  to  be   that  he   must  have  stood 
in  a  relation  to  God  which  in  an  emphatic  sense  was 
peculiar  to  himself."^     This  lofty,  peculiar  relation  to 
the  divine  on  the  part  of  Christ  is  the  needful  basis  o£ 
the  exceptional  claims  of  Christianity.  "The  effort  is  ever 
being  renewed  to  bring  him  into  the  line  and  sink  him 
to  the  plane  of  a  religious  hero,  without  at  the  same  time 
giving  up  the  absolute  character  of  Christianity.     These 
attempts  will  not  succeed,  for  Christianity  is  the  absolute 
religion  only  in  case  it  stands  in  unique  connection  with 

'  Die  Christliche  Lehre  von  der  Rechtfertigung  und  Versohnung,  III.  376 
2  Dogmatik,  5S  41-47- 


DENIAL  OF  TRANSCENDENT  SONSHIP  233 

the  absolute  God.  And  it  does  this  only  on  condition 
that  this  connection  is  given  in  Jesus  Christ.  He  who 
will  have  the  one  will  be  brought  to  the  inner  conviction 
that  he  cannot  let  go  the  other.  He  who  knows  Chris- 
tianity as  the  absolute  religion  will  not  be  able  perman- 
ently to  forbear  agreeing  with  the  church  in  confessing 
Jesus  Christ  as  Lord."^ 

The  representations  of  Professor  Max  Reischle  involve 
the  like  contention  that  the  Christ  of  history  stands  in 
a  unique  relation  to  God  and  man  and  furnishes  a  basis 
for  faith  which  cannot  be  superseded.  If  it  be  alleged, 
he  says,  that  Christ  as  historically  conditioned  can  have 
only  a  relative,  not  an  absolute,  significance,  it  is  to  be 
replied  that  this  is  no  ascertained  truth,  but  a  dogmatic 
assumption,  based  in  a  pantheistic  or  naturalistic  evolu- 
tionary world-view.^ 

Adolf  Harnack,  while  careful  to  respect  the  agnostic 
phase  of  the  Ritschlian  Christology,  gives  sufficiently 
definite  hints  of  faith  in  a  peculiar  and  transcendent  son- 
ship  pertaining  to  Christ.  "Jesus  is  convinced,"  he  says, 
"that  he  knows  God  in  a  way  in  which  no  one  ever  knew 
him  before.  In  this  consciousness  he  knows  himself  to 
be  the  called  and  instituted  of  God,  to  be  the  Son,  and 
hence  he  can  say,  My  God  and  my  Father,  and  in  this 
invocation  he  puts  something  which  belongs  to  no  one 
but  himself. "3  "No  one  who  accepts  the  Gospel,  and 
tries  to  understand  him  who  gave  it  to  us,  can  fail 
to  affirm  that  here  the  divine  appeared  in  as  pure  a 
form  as  it  can  appear  upon  earth,  and  to  feel  that  for 
those  who  followed  him  Jesus  was  himself  the  strength 
of  the  Gospel."^ 


1  Zeitschrift  fur  Theologie  und  Kirche,  Nro.  i,  1807. 
Ubid.,  Nro.  3,  1897.  ^ 

^  What  is  Christianity?  p.  128.  •*  Ibid.,  146. 


zzd       SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

One  who  is  attached  to  the  forms  in  which  the  catholic 
creeds  affirm  the  divine  nature  and  relationship  of  Christ 
will  be  much  inclined  to  charge  the  Ritschlian  teaching 
with  a  deficit.  But  it  is  apparent  from  the  citations  made 
that  leading  exponents  of  that  teaching  assign  to  Christ 
the  practical  worth  of  divinity,  and  at  least  do  not  nega- 
tive the  supposition  of  a  unique  metaphysical  relation 
between  him  and  the  Father. 

II. — The  Denial  in  the  Light  of  New  Testament 
Attestations 

The  conclusion  that  large  portions  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment ascribe  to  Christ  a  transcendent  sonship,  a  filial 
relation  and  lordship  which  ascend  to  an  incalculable 
height  above  the  human  plane,  is  not  in  the  present  the 
property  of  any  special  wing  of  Christian  scholars. 
Critics  whose  respect  for  traditional  theories  imposes 
upon  them  scarcely  any  restraint  show  themselves  in 
numerous  instances  about  as  free  to  proclaim  this  con- 
clusion as  are  those  who  pay  the  greatest  deference  to 
the  theological  inheritance  from  the  past.  Very  recently 
one  of  the  former  class  has  penned  words  like  the  follow- 
ing: "However  imperfect  their  methods  of  interpreta- 
tion may  appear  to  modem  minds,  it  would  be  wrong  to 
charge  the  Greek  apologists  and  fathers  with  seriously 
mistaking  the  trend  of  New  Testament  teaching.  And 
the  great  ecumenic  creeds  rest  upon  patristic  Christology. 
These  creeds  are  a  consistent  development  of  certain 
ideas  that  unquestionably  hold  an  important  place  in  New 
Testament  literature.  .  .  .  The  chief  factors  in  the  con- 
struction of  Christological  dogma  were  an  honest  inter- 
pretation of  the  Scriptures  and  an  equally  honest  interpre- 
tation of  the  facts  of  Christian  experience."^     Not  less 

'  Nathaniel  Schmidt,  The  Prophet  of  Nazareth,  pp.  4,  6. 


DENIAL  OF  TRANSCENDENT  SONSHIP  237 

significant  is  the  admission  of  Beyschlag,  as  proceeding 
from  one  who  gave  full  demonstration  of  his  strong 
preference  for  the  simple  humanitarian  conception  of 
Christ's  person,  "The  author  of  the  Apocalypse,"  he 
says,  "like  Paul  and  the  author  of  the  Epistle  to  the 
Hebrews,  regarded  Christ  as  a  preexistent  intermediate 
being  between  God  and  the  world,  God  and  humanity, 
related  to  b  deog-  as  his  unique  image,  and  to  the  world 
and  humanity  as  a  personal  archetype,  and  who,  after 
mediating  the  creation  of  the  world,  appeared  among  his 
brethren  in  the  fullness  of  the  times  as  a  child  of  man 
and  offspring  of  David,  in  order  to  gain  an  eternal 
kingship  over  them  by  his  life,  death,  and  resurrection — 
in  a  word,  the  author  of  the  Apocalypse  united  the  Logos 
idea  with  the  idea  of  Messiah  realized  in  Jesus."*  That 
the  Christology  of  the  fourth  Gospel  is  not  at  all  below 
that  which  Beyschlag  here  ascribes  to  the  Pauline  Epis- 
tles, to  Hebrews,  and  to  the  Apocalypse  is  much  too  com- 
mon a  verdict  in  the  liberal  school  of  critics  to  make  it 
appropriate  to  cite  specific  instances.^  There  is,  there- 
fore, very  slight  occasion  to  attempt  any  formal  proof 
that  the  thought  of  the  transcendent  sonship  of  Christ 
is  imbedded  in  extensive  portions  of  the  New  Testament. 
The  section  of  the  New  Testament  relative  to  which 
our  theme  imposes  upon  us  a  spyecific  inquiry  is  that  con- 
tained in  the  Synoptical  Gospels.  Not  infrequently  the 
confident  affirmation  is  made  that  it  is  only  a  purely 
human  consciousness  in  Christ  that  is  attested  by  these 
Gospels.  This  cannot  be  admitted.  It  is  surely  some- 
thing more  than  a  purely  human  consciousness  which 
comes  to  manifestation  in  this  mighty  declaration :    "All 

•  New  Testament  Theology,  II.  380. 

'  See,  among  others,  H.  J.  Holtzmann,  Lehrbuch  der  neutestamentlichen 
Theologie;  Otto  Pfleiderer,  Urchristenthum ;  Julius  Grill,  Untersuchungen 
uber  die  Entstehung  des  vierten  Evangeliums;  Paul  Wemle,  The  Begin- 
nings of  Christianity. 


238        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

things  have  been  dehvered  unto  me  of  my  Father:  and 
no  one  knowetli  the  Son,  save  the  Father;  neither  doth 
any  know  the  Father,  save  the  Son,  and  he  to  whomsoever 
the  Son  willeth  to  reveal  him."^  And  in  many  other 
sayings  of  Christ  there  are  kindred  suggestions  of  a 
sense  of  thoroughly  extraordinary  position  and  relation- 
ship. He  reminds  the  Pharisees  that  it  is  appropriate  to 
think  of  the  Messiah  not  merely  as  David's  son,  but  also 
as  David's  Lord.^  He  so  identifies  himself  with  the 
kingdom  of  heaven  as  to  allow  of  no  antithesis  between 
relation  to  it  and  relation  to  himself.  He  proclaims  those 
blessed  who  are  persecuted  for  his  sake.^  He  represents 
that  confession  or  denial  of  him  before  men  shall  earn 
confession  or  denial  before  the  Father  and  the  angels.* 
He  pictures  the  awards  of  the  great  day  of  judgment  as 
apportioned  according  as  affection  or  despite  has  been 
shown  to  himself.^  In  the  parable  of  the  vineyard  he 
represents  servants  of  the  owners  as  being  sent  to  receive 
the  fruits,  and  last  of  all  the  beloved  Son,  thus  placing 
himself  on  a  distinctly  higher  plane  than  the  prophetical 
messengers  of  Israel.^  While  emphasizing  the  impossi- 
bility of  forecasting  the  day  of  judgment,  he  notes  that 
the  day  is  hidden  from  the  knowledge  of  men,  angels, 
and  the  Son,  indicating  by  this  order  of  subjects  his 
consciousness  that  the  Son's  prerogative  stands  above  that 
of  the  whole  creaturely  universe.'^  He  declares  himself 
greater  than  the  temple,^  lord  of  the  sabbath,^  qualified 
to  forgive  sins.^^  He  offers  to  gather  the  weary  and 
heavy  laden  to  himself  for  peace  and  rest."  He  promises 
to  be  in  the  midst  where  two  or  three  are  gathered  in 

'Matt.  xi.  27:  Luke  X.  22.  'Matt   xxii    45  •  Luke  xx^  44-  . 

'Matt    V.  II.  ■'Matt.  x.  32,  33;  Mark  viii.  38     Luke  xn.  8,  9,  ix    26. 

"Matt.  XXV.  34-46.  6  Matt.  xxi.  33-39;  Luke  xx.  9-15. 

7  Matt.  xxiv.  26:  Mark  xiii.  32.  «  Matt   xu.  6. 

"Matt.  xii.  8:  Mark  ii.  28;  Luke  vi    5.  __  . 

>«Matt.  ix.  2-6;  Mark  ii.  4-10;  Luke  v.  20-24,  vn    47.  Matt.  xi.  2» 


DENIAL  OF  TRANSCENDENT  SONSHIP  239 

his  name/  and  to  supply  speech  and  wisdom  to  his  disci- 
ples when  they  shall  be  called  to  answer  before  adver- 
saries.^ He  claims  to  be  endowed  with  all  authority  in 
heaven  and  earth.^  He  describes  the  angels,  whom  Jew- 
ish thought  made  the  retinue  of  Jehovah,  as  sent  forth  at 
his  behest  and  serving  as  his  messengers.*  He  represents, 
finally,  that  all  nations  are  to  be  gathered  before  him  and 
to  receive  at  his  hands  the  awards  of  eternity.^  Now, 
who  among  men,  who  that  is  able  to  demonstrate  his 
sanity  by  any  approach  to  the  unique  balance  of  the  finest 
human  traits  which  was  exemplified  in  Christ,  would 
ever  think  of  coming  before  his  fellows  with  such  sen- 
tences upon  his  lips  ?  The  Synoptical  Gospels,  then,  not- 
withstanding their  relative  engrossment  in  a  narrative 
as  distinguished  from  a  theological  function,  make  for 
faith  in  a  transcendent  element  in  the  consciousness  of 
Christ,  Occasionally  confession  is  made  of  this  fact  even 
by  a  representative  of  a  Christological  theory  to  which 
the  fact  seems  in  no  way  to  be  congenially  related.  Thus 
Wernle,  though  rejecting  the  divinity  of  Christ  in  terms 
that  might  be  regarded  as  savoring  of  rudeness,  finds 
in  the  Synoptical  Gospels  evidences  which  compel  him 
to  impute  to  the  subject  of  these  biographies  a  conscious- 
ness which  passes  beyond  human  measures.  Referring 
to  the  lofty  assumptions  of  Christ  in  forgiving  sins  and 
claiming  obedience,  he  says :  "Now,  it  is  clear  that  a  self- 
consciousness  that  is  more  than  merely  human  speaks 
from  these  words.  And  this  is  the  mystery  of  the  origin 
of  Christianity.  What  we  need  to  do  above  all  is  to 
accept  it  as  a  fact — a  fact  which  demands  a  patient  and 
reverent  hearing."^  The  suggestion  is  not  far  to  seek 
that    congruity    of    thinking    requires    correspondence 

I  Matt,  xviii.  20.  '  Luke  xxi.  15.  ^  Matt,  xxviii.  18. 

*  Matt.  xxiv.  30,  31.  '  Matt.  xxv.  31-46. 

8  The  Beginnings  of  Christianity,  I.  39. 


240        SCIENTIFIC  AND  THEOLOGICAL  THEORIES 

between  self-consciousness  on  the  one  hand  and  person- 
ality and  essential  relations  on  the  other.  Acknowledg- 
ment of  the  transcendent  sonship  of  Christ  would  seem, 
on  the  premise  admitted  by  Wemle,  to  be  in  order. 

Since  to  the  modem  mind  the  proper  Arian  view  of 
the  Son  has  become  almost  universally  distasteful,  theo- 
logical thinking  which  aims  to  be  faithful  to  the  New 
Testament  cannot  well  escape  from  interpreting  the 
transcendence  of  Christ  in  a  way  which  is  at  least  closely 
akin  to  the  Athanasian  or  Nicene  rendering.  Room 
may  be  made  for  an  aspect  of  subordination  in  the  Son 
of  God ;  but  the  endeavor  must  be  to  construe  him  as  the 
eternally  filial,  the  counterpart  of  the  Father,  the  one  who 
dwelt  in  the  bosom  of  the  Father  before  the  ages,  and 
manifested  him  through  a  perfect  filial  record  at  the  full- 
ness of  time. 


CHAPTER  IV 

UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS 

I. — Specimen  Theories 

The  diversities  disclosed  in  a  review  of  ethical  treatises 
of  the  last  century  relate  much  more  largely  to  theoretical 
questions  about  the  sources  and  nature  of  moral  obli- 
gation than  to  conclusions  respecting  the  content  of  the 
moral  ideal.  The  great  majority  of  these  treatises,  in 
whatever  way  they  may  deal  with  the  theoretical  ques- 
tions, agree  in  accepting  substantially  the  altruistic  Chris- 
tian ideal  of  sympathy  and  service,  the  ideal  which  en- 
joins a  loving  regard  for  the  good  of  the  general  body 
alongside  of  the  pursuit  of  individual  interests.  Stanch 
utilitarians  like  Jeremy  Bentham,  advocates  of  a  quali- 
fied utilitarianism  like  Leslie  Stephen,  critics  as  little  re- 
spectful of  Christian  traditions  as  Strauss  and  Feuerbach, 
positivists  like  Comte,  materialists  like  Biichner,  advocates 
of  a  materialistic  evolutionism  like  Spencer  and  Haeckel, 
and  pessimists  of  the  type  of  Schopenhauer,  all  have  ap- 
proached quite  near  to  the  commonly  recognized  Christian 
standard  of  conduct  as  respects  the  relation  of  man  with 
man. 

In  a  few  instances,  however,  the  content  itself  of  the 
moral  ideal  which  commands  general  assent  in  the 
Christian  world  has  been  challenged.  To  some  extent  this 
has  been  done  in  the  name  of  Secularism,  as  appears  in 
the  adverse  remarks  of  Bonham  on  the  law  of  equal  love 
to  the  neighbor,  and  especially  in  his  contemptuous  repudi- 
ation of  the  obligation  to  love  one's  enemies.^     But  the 

•  Sectilarism,  its  Progress  and  its  Morals,  pp.  197-204. 

241 


242  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

most  conspicuous  examples  of  a  radical  disparag-ement 
of  the  moral  ideal  of  Christianity  were  furnished  by  Max 
Stirner  and  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  the  former  writing  near 
the  middle  of  the  century,  and  the  latter  in  the  closing 
decades. 

In  the  book  entitled  Der  Einzige  und  sein  Eigenthum} 
Stirner  figures  as  the  advocate  of  an  egoism  to  which  no 
other  bounds  are  set  than  those  which  pertain  to  limited 
power.  In  his  view  might  is  the  sole  and  sufficient  basis 
of  right.  Respect  either  for  God  or  for  man  does  not 
come  in  as  a  modifying  factor.  In  deferring  to  the 
human  genus,  Feuerbach,  he  says,  has  done  no  better  than 
to  make  an  exchange  of  gods.  "My  affair  is  neither 
divine  nor  human,  but  solely  my  own.  ...  I  am  my  own 
genus,  without  norm,  without  law,  without  model,  .  .  . 
What  care  I  for  the  common  weal?  The  common  weal 
as  such  is  not  my  weal,  but  only  the  extreme  point  of 
self-renunciation.  ...  I  am  entitled  to  everything  over 
which  I  can  exercise  mastery.  I  have  a  right  to  over- 
throw Zeus,  Jehovah,  God,  if  I  can.  .  .  .  No  majesty,  no 
holiness,  nothing  which  I  know  how  to  master  makes  a 
limit  for  me."^ 

If  not  more  radical  than  Stirner  in  his  repudiation  of 
current  ethical  standards,  Nietzsche  has  gone  quite  be- 
yond him  in  the  volume  and  violence  of  the  literary  war- 
fare which  he  has  waged  against  those  standards.  As 
Fouillee  has  remarked,  "In  all  his  works  he  takes  the 
romantic  attitude  of  a  Faust  in  revolt  against  all  law, 
all  morality,  all  social  life."^ 

Though  rating  Schopenhauer  more  than  any  other  as 
his  philosophical  master,  Nietzsche  contemns  utterly  the 


*  The  title-page  indicates  that  "Max  Stirner  "is  another  name  for  Kaspar 
Schmidt. 

'  Pages  14,  72,  213,  221,  248  in  Universal-Bibliothek,  Vol.  CCCXII. 
'  Nietzsche  et  I'lmmoralisme,  Preface. 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        243 

Buddhistic  quietism  in  which  the  ethical  speculation  of 
Schopenhauer  eventuated.  The  fundamental  character- 
istic of  life,  as  he  conceived,  is  will  to  power.  In  its  very- 
essence  life  is  aggressive  force.  It  reaches  with  un- 
sparing hand  after  mastery,  and  makes  a  perfectly 
normal  manifestation  of  itself  in  mastering  everything 
that  is  too  feeble  to  resist.  The  man  of  might  may  in- 
deed render  courtesy  and  respect  toward  those  whom  he 
has  discovered  to  be  his  peers,  but  no  obligation  of  sym- 
pathy for  the  inferior  crowd  rests  upon  him.  The 
morality  of  sympathy  is  the  morality  of  slaves,  which  in 
their  impotence  they  have  concocted  against  the  lordship 
of  the  regal  souls  who  are  competent  to  exercise  sover- 
eignty. It  is  the  attempt  of  the  lamb  to  censure  the  eagle. 
All  altruistic  morality  is  guilty  of  using  false  measures, 
and  is  linked  with  weakness  and  decadence.  "What  is 
good?  All  that  to  which  the  feeling  of  power,  the  will 
to  power,  the  power  itself,  in  man  gives  heed.  What  is 
bad  [schlecJit]  ?  All  that  which  springs  out  of  weak- 
ness. What  is  weal?  The  feeling  that  power  is  on  the 
increase,  that  opposition  to  it  is  vanquished."^ 

Occupying  this  point  of  view,  Nietzsche,  it  is  evident, 
must  regard  Christianity  as  a  proper  object  of  abhor- 
rence. As  the  religion  of  sympathy,  he  contends,  it 
works  toward  abasement.  It  is  intrinsically  opposed  to 
manly  development.  Its  idea  of  God  is  one  of  the  most 
corrupt  that  ever  found  place  in  the  world.  In  short, 
"Christianity  is  an  insurrection  of  all  that  creeps  on 
the  ground  against  the  high."^  Thus  even  Voltaire's 
antipathy  to  Christianity  is  quite  outdone.  In  his  mad 
deification  of  egoistic  force  Nietzsche  is  led  to  assail  the 
Christian  ideal  with  a  species  of  demoniacal  fury."^ 

»  Der  Antichrist,  «  2.  ^bid,  5  43. 

•''  See  in  particular  his  Also  Sprach  Zarathustra;  Jenseits  von  Gut  tuj-d 
Bose;  Zur  Genealogie  der  Moral;  Gotzen-Damening ;  Der  Antichrist. 


244  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

The  theories  of  Stirner  and  Nietzsche  are  too  eccen- 
tric to  claim  serious  attention.  We  make  haste,  there- 
fore, to  consider  certain  phases  of  utihtarian  and  evo- 
lutionary ethics. 

The  strict  utilitarian  platform  was  promulgated  in 
England  in  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  by 
Jeremy  Bentham,  whose  zeal  for  it  was  specially  stimu- 
lated by  his  conviction  that  it  was  adapted  to  afford  an 
excellent  basis  for  practical  politics  and  civic  reform. 
"Nature  has  placed  mankind,"  says  Bentham,  "under  the 
governance  of  two  sovereign  masters,  pain  and  pleasure. 
It  is  for  them  alone  to  point  out  what  we  ought  to  do, 
as  well  as  to  determine  what  we  shall  do.  On  the  one 
hand  the  standard  of  ri^ht  and  wrong,  on  the  other  the 
chain  of  causes  and  effects,  are  fastened  to  their  throne ; 
they  govern  us  in  all  we  do,  in  all  we  say,  in  all  we  think. 
.  .  .  The  principle  of  utility  recognizes  this  subjection, 
and  assumes  it  for  the  foundation  of  that  system  the  ob- 
ject of  which  is  to  rear  the  fabric  of  felicity  by  the  hands 
of  reason  and  of  law."^  This  principle,  Bentham  re- 
marks, may  be  charged  with  being  Epicurean;  but 
properly  understood  that  term  involves  no  discredit. 
"Epicurus,  it  is  true,  is  the  only  one  among  the  ancients 
who  had  the  merit  of  having  known  the  true  source  of 
morality;  but  to  suppose  that  his  doctrine  leads  to  the 
consequences  imputed  to  it  is  to  suppose  that  happiness 
can  be  the  enemy  of  happiness  itself."  Again,  it  may  be 
alleged  that,  if  the  principle  of  utility  is  to  be  enthroned, 
each  individual  will  constitute  himself  a  judge  of  his  own 
interest,  and  will  proceed  at  once  to  discard  an  obligation 
which  is  regarded  as  in  conflict  with  that  interest.  In 
reply  it  is  to  be  affirmed  both  that  a  man  must  be  per- 
mitted to  act  as  judge  of  his  own  interest,  and  that  his 

1  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation,  Works,  I.  i. 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        245 

investment  with  this  prerogative  does  not  afford  him  a 
reasonable  ground  for  treating  his  engagements  with 
indifference.  "He  who  is  not  a  judge  of  what  is  suitable 
for  himself  is  less  than  an  infant,  is  a  fool.  The  obliga- 
tion which  binds  men  to  their  engagements  is  nothing 
but  the  feeling  of  an  interest  of  a  superior  class,  which 
outweighs  an  inferior  interest.  Men  are  not  always  held 
by  the  particular  utility  of  a  certain  engagement ;  but  in 
the  case  in  which  the  engagement  becomes  burthensome 
to  one  of  the  parties  they  are  still  held  by  the  general 
utility  of  engagements — by  the  confidence  that  each  en- 
lightened man  wishes  to  have  placed  in  his  word,  that  he 
may  be  considered  as  trustworthy,  and  enjoy  the  advan- 
tages attached  to  probity  and  esteem."^ 

It  follows  from  the  premises  of  Bentham  that  conduct 
is  to  be  measured  solely  by  reference  to  its  effect  upon 
the  sum  total  of  pleasure.  Motives  are  not  in  themselves 
a  proper  measure,  but  are  to  be  reckoned  good  or  bad 
according  as  they  make  for  pleasure  or  pain.^  Morality 
depends  upon  consequences.  In  wisely  calculating  the 
consequences  of  conduct  in  respect  of  the  aggregate  of 
pleasure,  and  in  conforming  conduct  to  the  calculation, 
a  man  fulfills  his  complete  function  as  a  moral  agent.  It 
is  to  be  noticed,  however,  that  the  pleasure  which  is  to 
claim  supreme  regard  is  not  simply  that  of  the  individual. 
This  much  is  implied  in  Bentham's  use  of  the  formula, 
"the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number,"  as 
affording  the  test  of  right  and  wrong. 

John  Stuart  Mill,  in  common  with  the  other  eminent 
exponents  of  the  sensational  or  associational  philosophy 
in  England,  gave  assent  to  the  general  idea  of  Bent- 
ham's  utilitarianism.  He  defines  that  idea  in  the  fol- 
lowing explicit  terms:  "The  creed  which  accepts,  as  the 

1  Works,  L  12.  Hbid.,  L48. 


246  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

foundation  of  morals,  utility,  or  the  greatest  happiness 
principle,  holds  that  actions  are  right  in  proportion  as 
they  tend  to  promote  happiness,  wrong  as  they  tend  to 
produce  the  reverse  of  happiness.  By  happiness  is  in- 
tended pleasure  and  the  absence  of  pain;  by  unhappi- 
ness,  pain  and  the  privation  of  pleasure."^  That  the  ulti- 
mate aim  of  conduct  must  be  happiness  is  regarded  by 
Mill  as  quite  obvious.  'There  is  in  reality,"  he  says, 
"nothing  desired  except  happiness.  Whatever  is  desired 
otherwise  than  as  a  means  to  some  end  beyond  itself, 
and  ultimately  to  happiness,  is  desired  as  a  part  of  hap- 
piness, and  is  not  desired  for  itself  until  it  has  become 
so."2 

Mill  joined,  however,  with  his  general  acceptance  of 
the  creed  of  utilitarian  morals  a  token  of  departure. 
This  may  be  recognized  in  the  following  statement :  "It 
must  be  admitted  that  utilitarian  writers  in  general  have 
placed  the  superiority  of  mental  over  bodily  pleasures 
chiefly  in  the  greater  permanency,  safety,  uncostliness, 
etc.,  of  the  former — that  is,  in  their  circumstantial  advan- 
tages rather  than  in  their  intrinsic  nature.  And  on  all 
these  points  utilitarians  have  fully  proved  their  case;  but 
they  might  have  taken  the  other,  and,  as  it  may  be  called, 
higher  ground,  with  entire  consistency.  It  is  quite  com- 
patible with  the  principle  of  utility  to  recognize  the  fact 
that  some  kinds  of  pleasure  are  more  desirable  and  more 
valuable  than  others.  It  would  be  absurd  that,  while  in 
estimating  all  other  things  quality  is  considered  as  well 
as  quantity,  the  estimation  of  pleasures  should  be  sup- 
posed to  depend  on  quantity  alone."  No  intelligent  being 
would  care  to  be  simply  an  animal  for  the  sake  of  the 
animal's  pleasures.    "It  is  better  to  be  a  human  being  dis- 


1  Utilitarianism,  p.  91  in  the  "Ethics  of  John  Stuart  Mill,"  edited  by- 
Charles  Douglas,  1897.  *Ibid.,  pp.  154.  iSS- 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        247 

satisfied  than  a  pig  satisfied ;  better  to  be  Socrates  dissatis- 
fied than  a  fool  satisfied."^  As  his  language  implies, 
Mill  supposed  that  in  taking  this  view  he  still  remained 
faithful  to  the  utilitarian  platform.  But  this  cannot  well 
be  granted.  To  make  qualitative  distinctions  among 
pleasures,  to  rate  one  as  of  higher  order  than  another, 
not  merely  in  extent,  or  in — what  is  the  same  thing — 
intensity,  is  to  assume  another  standard  of  worth  than 
mere  pleasure.  It  may  be  much  to  the  credit  of  Mill  that 
he  admitted  this  order  of  distinctions,  but  he  did  not  do 
so  as  a  consistent  utilitarian,^ 

In  the  latter  half  of  the  century  the  utilitarian  theory 
was  brought  into  conjunction  with  the  doctrine  of  evo- 
lution. A  conspicuous  example  of  this  conjunction  is 
presented  in  the  teaching  of  Herbert  Spencer.  He  was 
not,  indeed,  fully  satisfied  with  the  scheme  of  Bentham. 
It  seemed  to  him  to  be  a  mistake  to  make  happiness  the 
direct  aim  in  conduct.  He  thought  that  moral  science 
is  competent  to  go  beyond  a  mere  generalization  of  the 
results  of  actions.  It  can  determine  what  kinds  of  action 
must  necessarily  produce  happiness,  and  thus  is  qualified 
to  lay  down  laws  which  should  be  obeyed  irrespective  of 
any  direct  estimation  of  pleasure  or  pain.^  At  the  same 
time,  Spencer  approved  the  Benthamite  notion  that  the 
ultimate  standard  for  estimating  actions  lies  in  their 
bearing  upon  happiness.  He  criticised  Aristotle  for  seek- 
ing to  define  happiness  in  terms  of  virtue  instead  of  de- 
fining virtue  in  terms  of  happiness.  "The  implied  be- 
lief," he  said,  "that  virtue  can  be  defined  otherwise  than 
in  terms  of  happiness  is  allied  to  the  Platonic  belief  that 


^  Ethics  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  pp.  93,  97. 

'  Compare  Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  II.  317,  330;  Paulsen, 
System  der  Ethik,  I.  247;  T.  H.  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  170. 

3  Letter  to  Mill,  cited  by  C.  M.  Williams,  A  Review  of  the  Systems  of 
Ethics  Founded  on  the  Theory  of  Evolution,  pp.  35,  36. 


248  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

there  is  an  ideal  or  absolute  good,  which  gives  to  particu- 
lar and  relative  goods  their  property  of  goodness."^ 

Conduct  was  furthermore  estimated  by  Spencer  ac- 
cording to  its  bearing  on  life,  good  conduct  being  that 
which  is  favorable  to  the  totality  of  life  in  one's  self, 
one's  offspring,  and  one's  fellows.^  In  this  use  of  terms 
the  philosopher  doubtless  had  no  design  to  infringe  on 
the  utilitarian  principle,  it  being  regarded  by  him  as  an 
understood  maxim^  that  pleasure-giving  actions  are  iden- 
tical with  life-favoring  actions. 

In  accordance  with  his  thoroughgoing  evolutionary 
scheme  Spencer  conceived  of  morals  as  a  result  pure  and 
simple  of  a  cosmic  process.  The  human  race  was  evolved 
out  of  a  non-moral  base,  and  in  the  human  race  by  a  long- 
continued  process  of  selection  certain  forms  of  moral 
belief  were  instated,  and  these  were  transmitted  through 
the  medium  of  nervous  modifications  with  accumulating 
strength.  "J^^t  in  the  same  way,"  writes  Spencer,  "that 
I  believe  the  intuition  of  space,  possessed  by  any  living 
individual,  to  have  arisen  from:  organized  and  consoli- 
dated experiences  of  all  antecedent  individuals  who  be- 
queathed to  him  their  slowly  developed  nervous  organi- 
zations, so  do  I  believe  that  the  experiences  of  utility, 
organized  and  consolidated  through  all  past  generations 
of  the  human  race,  have  been  producing  corresponding 
nervous  modifications,  which,  by  continued  transmis- 
sion and  accumulation,  have  become  in  us  certain  facul- 
ties of  moral  intuition — certain  emotions  responding  to 
right  conduct,  which  have  no  apparent  basis  in  the  indi- 
vidual experiences  of  utility."^ 

In  the  order  of  evolution,  according  to  Spencer,  egoism 
precedes  altruism;  but  the  latter  follows  closely  in  the 
wake  of  the  former,  and  mounts  up  through  ascending 

»  Data  of  Ethics,  $  13.  *  Ibid.,  J  8.  » Ibid.,  i  45- 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        249 

Stages.  "As  there  has  been  an  advance  by  degrees  from 
unconscious  parental  altruism  to  conscious  parental  altru- 
ism of  the  highest  kind,  so  has  there  been  an  advance  by 
degrees  from  the  altruism  of  the  family  to  social  altru- 
ism."^ Supposing  that  this  growth  of  altruistic  impulses 
and  habits  is  to  proceed,  Spencer  pictures  as  the  goal  of 
evolution  an  ideal  society  in  which  individual  and  general 
interests  will  be  thoroughly  harmonized,  and  the  conflict 
between  duty  and  inclination  will  be  abolished. 

Taking  as  emphatic  a  view  as  did  Spencer  of  the  all- 
comprehending  reach  of  evolution,  Huxley  differed  from 
him  in  his  frank  admission  that  the  cosmic  process  affords 
no  intelligible  explanation  of  the  validity  of  moral  dis- 
tinctions. An  examination  of  that  process  may  serve 
in  a  measure  to  reveal  how  diverse  moral  products  arise; 
but  an  account  of  the  genesis  of  the  products  is  quite 
another  thing  than  the  justification  of  the  approval  of 
one  order  as  against  another.  "The  propounders," 
writes  Huxley,  "of  what  is  called  'the  ethics  of  evolution' 
adduce  a  number  of  more  or  less  interesting  facts  and 
more  or  less  sound  arguments  in  favor  of  the  conclusion 
that  the  moral  sentiments  arose,  in  the  same  way  as  other 
natural  phenomena,  by  a  process  of  evolution.  I  have 
little  doubt,  for  my  own  part,  that  they  are  on  the  right 
track;  but  as  the  immoral  sentiments  have  no  less  been 
evolved,  there  is,  so  far,  as  much  natural  sanction  for 
the  one  as  the  other.  The  thief  and  the  murderer  follow 
nature  as  much  as  the  philanthropist.  Cosmic  evolution 
may  teach  us  how  the  good  and  the  evil  tendencies  of  man 
may  have  come  about;  but  in  itself  it  is  incompetent  to 
furnish  any  better  reason  why  what  we  call  good  is  pref- 
erable to  what  we  call  evil  than  we  had  before.  Indeed, 
the  predominant  cosmical  method  is  so  far  from  affording 

»  Data  of  Ethics,  S  76. 


250  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

insight  into  ethical  demands  that  it  seems  itself  to  be 
distinctly  counter  to  those  demands.    The  practice  which 
is  ethically  best  involves  a  course  of  conduct  which,  in 
all  respects,  is  opposed  to  that  which  leads  to  success  in 
the  cosmic  struggle  for  existence.     In  place  of  ruthless 
self-assertion  it  demands  self-restraint ;  in  place  of  thrust- 
ing aside,  or  treading  down,  all  competitors,  it  requires 
that  the  individual  shall  not  merely  respect  but  shall  help 
his  fellows;  its  influence  is  directed  not  so  much  to  the 
survival  of  the  fittest  as  to  the  fitting  of  as  many  as  pos- 
sible to  survive.     It  repudiates  the  gladiatorial  theory  of 
existence.  .  .  .  Let  us  understand,  once  for  all,  that  the 
ethical  progress  of  society  is  realized  not  in  imitating  the 
cosmic  process,  still  less  in  running  away  from  it,  but 
in  combating  it."*     Such  a  view  of  the  intrinsic  heartless- 
ness  of  nature  evidently  affords  a  very  scanty  basis  for 
optimism.     Huxley  confesses  as  much.     "The  theory  of 
evolution,"  he  says,  "encourages  no  millennial  expecta- 
tions."    The  upward  road  may  be  pursued  for  a  long 
period,  but  sooner  or  later  the  downward  route  must  be 
commenced.    Meanwhile  men  will  make  the  most  of  their 
opportunities  not  by  any  direct  attempt  to  fulfill  hedonist 
maxims,  but  rather  by  casting  aside  the  notion  that  es- 
cape from  pain  and  sorrow  is  the  proper  object  of  life."^ 
With  Leslie  Stephen  we  find  about  the  same  qualifi- 
cation of  the  utilitarian  theory  as  appears  in  the  com- 
ments of  Spencer.     In  his  own  exposition  of  the  nature 
and  genesis  of  morals  he  makes  much  account  of  social 
instincts  and  needs — a  point  of  view  which  had  been 
emphasized  by  Darwin.^     By  way  of  summarizing  his 
main  contentions  Stephen  remarks :  "Morality  is  a  prod- 
uct  of  the   social   factor;   the   individual   is   moralized 


1  Evolution  and  Ethics,  Romanes  Lecture  of  1893,  pp.  31-34-. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  36,  37.  ^  Descent  of  Man,  Vol,  I,  chap.  lii. 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        251 

through  his  identification  with  the  social  organism;  the 
conditions,  therefore,  of  the  security  of  morahty  are  the 
conditions  of  the  persistence  of  society;  and  if  we  ask 
from  the  scientific  point  of  view  what  these  conditions 
are,  we  can  only  reply  by  stating  that  the  race  is  depend- 
ent upon  the  environment,  by  tracing,  so  far  as  we  are 
able,  the  conditions  under  which  it  has  been  developed, 
and  trying  to  foresee  the  future  from  the  past."^  That  in 
the  naturalistic  scheme  of  Stephen  any  better  outcome 
is  guaranteed  than  that  which  is  outlined  in  the  somber 
sketch  of  Huxley  is  not  apparent. 

Haeckel  in  his  brief  dogmatic  references  to  the  origin 
of  morality  lays  the  whole  stress  on  physiological  and 
social  antecedents.  His  principal  propositions  are  con- 
tained in  the  following  sentences :  "The  notion  of  duty 
can  be  traced  to  a  long  series  of  phyletic  modifications 
of  the  phenomena  of  the  cortex.  .  .  .  Morality,  whether 
we  take  it  in  the  narrower  or  broader  sense,  can  always 
be  traced  to  the  physiological  function  of  adaptation, 
which  is  closely  connected  through  nutrition  with  the 
self-maintenance  of  the  organism.  .  .  .  Social  habits  be- 
come moral  habits,  and  their  laws  are  afterward  taught  as 
sacred  duties,  and  form  the  basis  of  the  juridical  order. 
The  morals  of  nations  are  nothing  more  than  social  in- 
stincts, acquired  by  adaptation,  and  passed  on  from  gen- 
eration to  generation  by  heredity. "^ 

The  ethical  teaching  of  Guyau,  while  proceeding  no 
less  than  the  foregoing  theories  from  the  naturalistic 
standpoint,  is  distinguished  by  a  special  effort  to  recon- 
cile egoism  and  altruism.  Both,  he  maintains,  are  based 
in  the  very  nature  of  life,  in  its  intrinsic  tendency  at  once 
to  sustain  and  to  enlarge  itself.  This  is  the  fundamental 
tendency  to  which  even  the  pursuit  of  happiness  is  subor- 

1  The  Science  of  Ethics,  p.  454.  2  The  Wonders  of  Life,  chap,  xviii. 


252  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

dinate.  Comparing  this  point  of  view  with  that  of  the 
hedonist  school,  Guyau  remarks:  "We  are  far  distant 
from  Bentham  and  the  utiUtarians,  who  everywhere  try 
to  avoid  pain,  who  see  in  pain  the  irreconcilable  enemy; 
it  is  as  if  one  would  not  breathe  too  strongly  for  fear  of 
too  great  expenditure.  Even  in  Spencer  there  is  still 
too  much  utilitarianism.  Besides,  he  too  often  looks  at 
things  from  the  outside,  and  does  not  see  in  the  unselfish 
instincts  anything  but  a  product  of  society.  There  is, 
we  believe,  in  the  heart  of  individual  life  itself  an  evolu- 
tion corresponding  to  the  evolution  of  social  life  which 
makes  the  latter  possible,  and  which  is  the  cause  of  it  in- 
stead of  the  result.  .  .  .  Life,  like  fire,  only  maintains  itself 
by  communicating  itself,  and  this  is  none  the  less  true 
with  regard  to  the  intelligence  than  with  regard  to  the 
body.  It  is  as  impossible  to  shut  up  the  intelligence  as 
to  shut  up  flame;  it  exists  in  order  to  radiate.  We  find 
the  same  force  of  expansion  in  sensibility.  We  need  to 
share  our  joy;  we  need  to  share  our  sorrow.  It  is  our 
whole  nature  which  is  sociable.  Life  does  not  know  the 
absolute  classifications  and  divisions  of  the  logicians 
and  metaphysicians;  it  cannot  be  entirely  selfish  even  if 
it  wished  to  be.  We  are  open  on  all  sides,  encroaching 
and  encroached  upon.  This  springs  from  the  funda- 
mental law  which  biology  teaches  us  :  Life  is  not  only  nu- 
trition; it  is  production  and  fecundity.  To  live  is  to 
spend  as  well  as  to  gain."^ 

As  might  be  expected,  all  these  advocates  of  naturalis- 
tic ethics  deny  freedom  in  the  sense  of  alternativity.  In 
justification  of  this  denial  they  commonly  contend  that  an 
act  which  does  not  stand  to  antecedent  character  or  feel- 
ing in  the  relation  of  an  effect  pure  and  simple  must  be 


1  A  Sketch  of  Morality  Independent  of  Obligation  or  Sanction,  trans,  by 
Gertrude  Kapteyn,  pp.  88,  209,  aro. 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        253 

rated  as  characterless  or  destitute  of  moral  significance. 
With  equal  unanimity  these  writers  make  no  place  for  a 
divine  sanction  of  obligation.  If  they  do  not  say  with 
Nietzsche  that  the  adoption  of  any  point  of  view  by  theo- 
logians is  a  sure  sign  of  its  falsity,  they  do  hold  that 
theological  conceptions  cannot  afford  any  valid  assistance 
in  construing  the  subject  of  morals.  Guyau,  with  frank 
atheistic  irreverence,  declares,  "God  has  become,  and  will 
become  more  and  more,  useless."^  Even  Leslie  Stephen 
is  at  pains  to  argue  that  the  theistic  postulate  is  not  of  the 
slightest  use  in  interpreting  the  ethical  side  of  life.^ 

II. — Points  of  Failure  in  the  Theories 

In  making  qualitative  distinctions  between  different 
kinds  of  pleasures.  Mill,  as  was  noticed,  virtually  chal- 
lenged the  utilitarian  principle  that  pleasure  is  the  sole 
and  sufficient  measure  of  conduct.  Why  did  Mill  admit 
such  distinctions?  In  all  probability  because  his  knowl- 
edge of  his  own  inner  life  and  his  acquaintance  with  his 
fellows  made  it  apparent  to  him  that  large  account  is 
actually  taken  of  qualitative  differences  in  pleasures, 
that  men  repeatedly  distinguish  one  gratification  as 
higher,  and  worthier,  and  holier  than  another,  and  not 
merely  as  larger  and  more  intense.  In  his  revision  of 
the  utilitarian  theory  he  was  simply  qualifying  an  ex- 
travagant assumption  out  of  deference  to  well-attested 
facts.  For,  as  Ladd  has  remarked,  "It  is  a  fundamental 
and  indisputable  fact  that  men  estimate  the  different  con- 
scious states  of  the  self  as  differing  in  value  according 
to  a  standard  which  is  not  merely  quantitative.  In  other 
words,  goods  differ,  as  estimated  in  human  conscious- 
ness, not  only  in  degrees,  but  also  in  excellence  or  worth. "^ 

1  A  Sketch  of  Morality,  p.  60.  ^  The  Science  of  Ethics,  pp.  454,  455. 

'  Philosophy  of  Conduct,  p.  41. 


254  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

Equally  indisputable  is  the  fact  that  in  making  these 
qualitative  distinctions  men  are  ruled  by  a  sense  of  obli- 
gation. Their  moral  sense  requires  them  to  rate  one 
form  of  pleasure  as  superior  to  another.  And  this  evi- 
dently means  the  rejection  by  the  moral  sense  of  the 
notion  that  pleasure  in  itself  affords  a  complete  norm. 
If  the  quality  of  the  pleasure  must  be  looked  after — its 
altruistic  character,  its  intellectuality,  its  nobility,  its 
spirituality,  its  holiness,  its  godlikeness — then  obviously 
the  conceptions  by  which  quality  is  measured  must  have 
a  place  in  the  norm  of  conduct  enthroned  in  the  moral 
sense. 

No  doubt  the  utilitarian  is  right  in  contending  that 
contemplated  pleasure  is  both  actually  and  legitimately 
a  great  motive-power  in  conduct.  What  is  to  be  chal- 
lenged is  the  assumption  that  pleasure,  or  happiness, 
either  is  or  ought  to  be  the  sole  motive-power.  It  must 
plainly  come  into  the  account  in  any  complete  vision  of 
things.  No  one  who  believes  in  a  rational  world  order 
can  believe  that  conduct  and  happiness  are  indifferently 
related.  Good  conduct,  he  is  compelled  to  hold,  must  in 
the  long  run  eventuate  in  happiness;  holiness  must  ulti- 
mately minister  to  blessedness.  In  other  words,  if  the 
world  scheme  is  rational  and  moral,  one  real  value  which 
is  open  to  pursuit  therein  must  harmonize  with  another 
real  value.  The  mistake  of  the  utilitarian  consists  in 
substituting  the  notion  of  a  single  value  for  the  notion  of 
harmoniously  related  values ;  or — if  one  prefers  that  form 
of  expression — in  emphasizing  one  element  of  value  to 
the  neglect  of  other  elements.  Happiness  is  assuredly  a 
value ;  but  to  the  normal  man  nobility,  righteousness,  and 
conformity  to  the  personal  and  social  ideal  are  also  values. 
He  pursues  them  as  desirable  and  obligatory  in  them- 
selves, and  not  merely  because  of  their  subserviency  to 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        255 

happiness,  though  he  feels  that  they  must  be  harmoni- 
ously related  to  the  latter  value,  and  that  he  would  be 
lacking  in  appreciation  of  them  if  he  could  admit  that 
they  were  intrinsically  suited  to  despoil  him  of  that  value. 
The  ultra  assumption  of  naturalistic  evolutionism,  that 
morality  has  been  evolved  from  a  nonmoral  ground,  en- 
counters substantially  the  same  criticism  as  that  which 
stands  against  the  attempt  to  get  intelligence  from  a  non- 
intelligent  ground.  As  Spencer,  Haeckel,  and  other 
naturalistic  evolutionists  were  far  from  success  in  this 
attempt,^  so  they  fail  to  justify  their  assumption  of  the 
derivation  of  morality  from  the  play  of  nonmoral  cos- 
mic forces.  The  failure  is  indeed  a  double  one,  since 
morality,  besides  implying  sensibility  of  a  special  kind, 
is  conditioned  upon  intelligence.  To  get  the  moral  agent, 
then,  out  of  forces  that  are  described  as  acting  simply  in 
mechanical  and  chemical  ways  has  a  look  of  sheer  magic. 
The  derivation  is,  in  fact,  a  mere  pretense.  This  is  well 
illustrated  in  Spencer's  Data  of  Ethics.  One  looks  in 
vain  for  any  suggestion  of  the  ethical  in  the  original 
factors  of  the  universe  as  pictured  by  him.  Nor  does 
one  find  in  his  representations  of  the  biological  process, 
for  the  greater  part  of  its  course,  any  valid  suggestions 
of  the  ethical.  As  an  acute  critic  of  the  Synthetic 
Philosophy  has  remarked:  "We  continually  find  in  Mr. 
Spencer's  exposition  that,  notwithstanding  his  attempt 
to  affiliate  ethics  upon  the  biological  law,  it  is  only  in 
the  increased  correlation  of  subjective  individuals  that 
ethics  arises,  and  it  is  only  the  modification  of  the  indi- 
vidual by  society,  and  the  mental  and  emotional  growths 
in  the  individual  consequent  on  the  action  of  the  social 
environment,  that  constitute  the  groundwork  of  ethics."^ 


*  See  part  i,  chap,  ii,  sect,  ii,  v;  chap,  iv,  sects,  ii,  iii. 
'Malcolm  Guthrie,  On  Spencer's  Data  of  Ethics,  p.  57. 


256  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

Society  is  thus  in  reality  offered  as  the  explanation  of 
ethics.    But  the  explanation  is  itself  very  much  in  need  of 
being  explained.     Society  is  only  an  aggregate  of  indi- 
viduals, and,  unless  the  individuals  as  such  possess  an 
ethical  groundwork,  v^hat  means  has  society  of  working 
moral  effects?     "Mr.  Spencer,  indeed,  supposes  men  to 
have  been  scared  into  moral  obligation  by  the  baton  o£ 
the  primitive  policeman,  the  ostracism  of  primitive  so- 
ciety, and  the  hell  of  the  primitive  priest.    How  a  society 
could  exist  to  deal  out  these  political,  social,  and  religious 
sanctions,  unless  it  rested  on  a  moral  basis,  the  evolutionist 
does  not  explain.     And  one  may,  therefore,  be  pardoned 
for  seeing  here  only  another  of  the  countless  attempts  to 
derive  morality  from  ideas  and  institutions  which  presup- 
pose it."^    Society  is,  of  course,  a  potent  agent  in  develop- 
ing the  moral  aptitudes  of  the  individual,  but  society  no 
more  explains  the  existence  of  the  moral  nature  in  man 
than  schools  explain  the  existence  of  the  mathematical 
faculty.    Far  from  giving  an  intelligible  account  of  moral- 
ity, naturalistic  evolutionism  serves  only  by  its  futile  ef- 
forts to  emphasize  the  great  truths  that  it  is  utterly  vain  to 
attempt  to  graft  morality  upon  a  primitively  nonmoral 
subject,  and  that  the  rational  explanation  of  the  moral  sub- 
ject is  to  be  found  in  a  moral  background  to  the  creaturely 
universe.  It  was  noticed  that  Guyau  qualified  the  function 
of  society  in  the  production  of  morality,  and  emphasized, 
as  the  prime  source  of  the  moral  sentiments,  the  impul- 
sions which  belong  to  individual  life  as  such.     To  this 
extent  he  improved  upon  the  platform  of  some  of  the 
representatives  of  the  naturalistic  school.     On  the  other 
hand,  however,   in  assimilating  morality  to  a  kind   of 
vegetative  working  of  life  potencies  he  is  remote  from  a 
satisfactory  exposition. 

»  J.  G.  Schurman,  The  Ethical  Import  of  Darwinism,  pp.  147-149. 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        257 

A  cardinal  objection  to  all  the  theories  which  are  here 
considered  lies  in  their  fatalism  or  unqualified  necessi- 
tarianism. The  weighty  character  of  this  objection  has 
been  urged  in  another  connection.^  It  only  remains, 
accordingly,  to  notice  here  the  plea  that  is  offered  for  the 
superior  congruity  of  the  necessitarian  hypothesis  with 
the  assignment  of  moral  quality  to  actions.  The  plea 
is  that  actions  are  characterless  save  as  they  are  the  out- 
flow of  the  antecedent  character  of  the  individual,  save 
as  they  are  in  the  strict  sense  determined  by  that  char- 
acter. To  this  allegation  a  reply  may  be  made  in  the 
first  place  by  way  of  counter  charge.  It  may  be  said,  and 
justly  said,  that  very  little  moral  character  belongs  to  the 
action  of  a  mere  instrument ;  that  it  makes  no  appreciable 
difference  whether  the  instrument  is  conscious  or  not, 
so  long  as  it  is  only  an  instrument ;  that  the  action  of  a 
man  absolutely  determined  by  a  character  given  to  him, 
or  wrought  by  a  series  of  absolutely  determined  choices, 
is  the  action  of  an  instrument  pure  and  simple,  an  instru- 
ment of  the  Creator  or  the  cosmos  or  whatever  else  may 
be  regarded  as  the  ultimate  ground  of  determinations; 
that  consequently  such  an  action,  whatever  aesthetic  im- 
press may  attach  to  it,  is  in  the  proper  point  of  view  of 
morals  essentially  characterless.  In  the  second  place, 
positive  illustration  may  be  given  of  the  arbitrariness  of 
the  necessitarian  in  assuming  that  an  action  must  be 
strictly  determined  by  antecedent  character  in  order  to 
be  saved  from  falling  under  the  category  of  the  indif- 
ferent or  characterless.  Antecedent  character  may  be 
a  mighty  persuasive  even  where  it  is  not  strictly  determin- 
ing, and  so  may  come  to  manifestation  in  the  general 
run  of  habitual  actions.  Moreover,  an  action  may  serve 
to  realize  an  increment  of  character  in  the  direction  of 


•  Part  i,  chap,  ii,  sect.  ii. 


2S8  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

good  or  of  evil.  Every  time  the  individual  performs,  in 
the  face  of  competing  alternatives,  an  action  above  his 
ordinary  level,  he  gives  himself  an  improved  character 
through  that  very  action,  which  is  thus  quite  remote  from 
being  characterless — is,  in  fact,  penetrated  through  and 
through  with  moral  quality  as  a  character-forming  action. 
In  the  reverse  case  the  individual  lowers  his  character. 
Here  lies  the  intelligible  account  of  progress  in  character 
and  of  responsibility  for  the  outcome.  Give  a  man  a  real 
part  in  forming  his  moral  disposition,  and  you  have  a 
rational  ground  for  making  him  chargeable  with  its  pro- 
gressive improvement  or  deterioration.  Deny  him  that 
part,  and  you  forfeit  the  theoretical  warrant  for  making 
him  chargeable.  You  reduce  him  from  the  plane  of  the 
moral  agent  to  that  of  the  thing  affording  a  more  or 
less  aesthetic  impression.  You  affront  his  moral  con- 
sciousness by  turning  its  most  fundamental  attesta- 
tions into  illusions.  This,  we  contend,  is  much  too 
great  a  price  to  pay  for  an  abstract  notion  of  the  law 
of  causation — a  notion  unwarrantably  intolerant  of  the 
fact  of  creative  efficiency.  The  necessitarian  might  bet- 
ter modify  his  imperious  abstraction  than  disparage  the 
standing  deliverances  of  man's  moral  consciousness  as 
illusions.  While  it  may  be  a  dictate  of  reason  that  no 
change  can  be  wrought  without  an  expenditure  of  effici- 
ency, it  may  still  be  true  that  personality  has  the  unique 
distinction  of  being  able  to  use  efficiency  in  more  than 
one  way  under  given  conditions. 

Reference  was  made  to  the  very  inhospitable  treat- 
ment awarded  by  the  theories  under  review  to  the  theis- 
tic  conception.  In  some  instances  that  conception  has 
even  been  charged  with  a  disturbing  effect  upon  ethics, 
as  implying  that  right  and  wrong  are  made  such  by  the 
determinations  of  an  infinite  will.    Spencer  assumes  that 


UTILITARIAN  AND  NATURALISTIC  ETHICS        259 

this  is  the  common  postulate  of  theological  parties.*  It 
hardly  needs  to  be  said  that  the  assumption  is  grossly 
unhistoric.  Duns  Scotus,  it  is  true,  has  been  followed 
by  some  extreme  advocates  of  divine  sovereignty  in  mak- 
ing the  bare  will  of  God  the  ultimate  standard ;  but  more 
commonly  the  view  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  that  the  will  of 
God  is  conditioned  by  his  intellectual  and  moral  nature, 
has  been  followed.^  In  recent  times  the  conclusion  of 
the  "Angelic  Doctor"  has  claimed  a  substantially  undis- 
puted supremacy,  being  held  even  by  the  most  resolute 
champions  of  divine  sovereignty,  like  Charles  Hodge.^ 
The  theological  claim,  accordingly,  is  not  that  the  bare 
will  of  God  makes  right  and  wrong,  but  rather  that  the 
perfect  norm  of  righteousness  has  its  ultimate  ground 
in  the  nature  of  God — in  his  absolutely  perfect  intel- 
ligence and  ethical  disposition. 

Keeping  in  mind  this  interpretation  of  the  relation  of 
divine  personality  to  the  moral  standard,  we  cannot  ad- 
mit that  the  thought  of  God  has  any  such  insignificant 
value  for  ethics  as  is  assumed  by  naturalistic  evolutionists. 
The  essential  content  of  the  moral  ideal  may,  indeed,  be 
discovered  with  reasonable  confidence  by  an  examina- 
tion of  human  experience  and  an  analysis  of  human 
nature ;  but  the  connections  of  that  ideal  are  by  no  means 
a  matter  of  indifference.  If  in  the  regress  of  our  thought 
we  come  to  a  blindly  working  energy,  a  force  operating 
under  the  law  of  absolute  necessity,  we  are  put  under 
constraint  to  mar  the  ideal  itself  by  cutting  out  from  it 
the  element  of  freedom,  since  that  which  has  in  itself  no 
capacity  of  freedom  cannot  be  supposed  to  generate  the 
free.  Then,  too,  if  freedom  must  be  reckoned  an  illu- 
sion, the  title  of  moral  distinctions  to  be  placed  under  any 

»  Data  of  Ethics,   $  18. 

^  See  the  author's  History  of  Christian  Doctrine,  I.  336,  II.  93-95,  310, 
3II'  ^  Systematic  Theology,  part  i,  chap,  v,  5  9. 


26o  ETHICAL  THEORIES 

more  honorable  category  may  easily  be  called  in  question. 
Thus  a  great  advantage  in  rounding  out  and  safeguard- 
ing the  moral  ideal  comes  from  making  free  personality 
the  ultimate  ground.  No  other  ground  is  congenially 
related  to  the  thought  of  man  as  a  free  person.  Also  in 
the  forecast  the  theistic  conception  affords  a  very  de- 
cided advantage.  The  significance  of  the  moral  ideal 
depends  in  no  small  degree  upon  its  prospective  theater. 
What  guarantees  the  suitable  theater?  Not  simply  the 
law  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  if  that  law  means  only 
that  those  forms  of  life  are  entitled  to  survive  which 
are  best  adapted  to  meet  the  conditions.  Under  deterio- 
rating cosmic  conditions  it  might  come  about,  as  Huxley 
observes,  that  lichens  would  be  the  fittest  to  survive,  and 
so  would  be  entitled  to  the  field  as  opposed  to  all  higher 
forms.  But  lichens  are  not  favorable  subjects  for  illus- 
trating the  moral  ideal,  and  naturalistic  evolutionism  in 
its  failure  to  furnish  guarantees  that  any  better  subjects 
will  be  afforded  in  perpetuity  cannot  be  regarded  as  giv- 
ing high  honor  to  that  ideal.  It  is  a  chilling  and  dis- 
couraging theory  as  compared  with  the  Christian  theistic 
conception  of  an  all-wise  and  holy  God,  who  makes  it 
his  great  purpose  to  lead  forward  a  countless  host  of  im- 
mortal children  in  the  ways  of  moral  excellence  and  pure 
blessedness. 


PART  III 
CRITICAL  THEORIES 


CHAPTER  I 

CRITICISM  OF  THE  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS 

I. — Assumptions  and  Conclusions  of  Strauss 

David  Friedrich  Strauss^  whose  name  was  made 
famous  by  the  pubH cation  of  his  Hfe  of  Jesus  (Leben 
Jesu)  in  1835,  derived  first  of  all  from  Schelling  some- 
what of  an  impulse  in  speculative  thinking.  As  his  ref- 
erences indicate,  he  was  not  a  little  impressed  by  the  con- 
ception entertained  by  this  philosopher  respecting  the  in- 
carnation as  progressively  accomplished  in  the  human 
race,  instead  of  being  achieved  once  for  all  in  an  extra- 
ordinary personality.  His  thought  was  also  directed  by 
Schelling  to  that  conception  of  the  myth  according  to 
which  it  is  not  so  much  the  product  of  conscious  invention 
as  the  result  of  a  pronounced  inclination  to  the  pictorial 
form,  for  the  expression  of  truth,  the  form  to  which  the 
mind  naturally  resorts  at  the  stage  where  it  finds  difficulty 
in  resting  in  the  conceptual  or  ideal.  ^ 

Further  on  the  philosophical  premises  of  Strauss  were 
largely  shaped  by  contact  with  the  Hegelian  system. 
Quite  manifestly  he  took  from  this  system  an  emphatic 
conception  of  ideas  as  the  great  factors  in  history,  the  de- 
termining forces  back  of  the  chain  of  events,  ever  unfold- 
ing according  to  a  law  of  inner  necessity,  and  finding 
even  in  the  greatest  of  personalities  not  so  much  masters 
as  instruments.  There  is  indication  also  that  the  Hegel- 
ian method  of  fusing  contrasts  into  unity  wrought  to 
some  extent  upon  his  thinking.  This  appears  in  his  re- 
mark that  things  which  are  approved  to  the  higher  phil- 

1  Streitschriften,  1S37,  Heft  III,  pp   65.  67;  Leben  Jesu,  fourth  ed.,  S  8. 

263 


264  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

osophical  insight  appear  as  absurdities  to  the  understand- 
ing (Verstand),  or  the  faculty  which  is  tied  up  to  ab- 
stract thinking.  "That  God  is  one  with  the  world,"  he 
says,  "and  still  different  from  it,  that  the  will  is  free,  and 
still  implicated  in  the  higher  necessity  of  the  world's 
development,  that  the  evil  is  in  itself  the  good,  and  yet 
antithetic  thereto — these  are  absurdities  for  the  under- 
standing with  its  readiness  to  recognize  here  simply  an 
either,  or,  and  can  be  grasped  only  from  the  higher  stand- 
point of  the  philosophically  reborn."^  As  is  intimated 
by  the  first  clause  in  this  citation,  Strauss  modified  the 
conception  of  divine  personality  after  the  manner  of 
Hegel,  giving  to  that  conception  a  pantheistic  tinge,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  characteristic  of  pantheism  to  implicate 
God  with  the  world  or  to  make  the  latter  necessary  to  the 
subsistence  of  the  former.  The  speculative  thinking  of 
the  age,  he  observes,  represents  that  God  has  the  charac- 
ter of  self-conscious  Spirit  through  a  process  of  self- 
objectivation  in  the  world  and  return  into  himself.  He 
is  not  person  alongside  of  or  over  other  persons.  The 
personality  of  God  must  not  be  thought  of  as  single- 
personality,  but  as  all-personality,  and  as  such  realized 
through  a  world-process.  This  does  not  mean  that  God 
attains  completeness  in  time.  "He  is  ever  finished  and 
perfect,  but  he  is  this  only  because  and  in  so  far  as  he  has 
created  from  eternity  and  continues  to  create ;  his  eternal 
ingoing  into  himself  is  conditioned  upon  his  eternal  out- 
going from  himself."^  The  point  of  view  embraced  in 
this  phraseology  is  given,  it  is  true,  in  the  name  of  con- 
temporary philosophy  and  speculative  theology ;  but  there 
is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  it  was  the  point  of  view  of 
Strauss  himself.  Up  to  the  time  of  writing  his  Glaubens- 
lehre  he  was  in  close  affinity  with  the  underlying  con- 

1  Streitschriften,  III.  23.  ^  Glaubenslehre,  1840-41,  H  33.  48. 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     265 

captions  of  the  Hegelian  system.^  It  would  be  going  too 
far,  however,  to  suppose  that  he  was,  or  conceived  him- 
self to  be,  in  complete  accord  with  Hegel.  We  find  him 
expressing  the  conviction  that  Hegel  would  not  have  ap- 
proved his  Leben  Jesu,  it  being  quite  contrary  to  the  mind 
of  the  philosopher  to  subject  the  great  characters  of  an- 
tiquity to  the  gnawing-away  action  of  critical  doubts.^ 
Furthermore,  Strauss  has  noticed  that  Hegel  in  some  of 
his  references  to  Christology  may  be  understood  to  con- 
cede that  Christ  exemplified  the  union  of  the  divine  and 
the  human  in  a  more  special  sense  than  he,  for  his  part, 
was  willing  to  acknowledge.^  Again,  he  indicated  his 
opinion  that  Hegel,  at  least  as  construed  by  his  followers, 
was  overtolerant  of  the  notion  of  the  possibility  of 
miracles.'* 

From  whatever  sources  Strauss  had  obtained  his 
speculative  outfit,  he  has  made  it  evident  that  he  came 
to  the  task  of  New  Testament  criticism  with  certain 
fixed  philosophical  presuppositions  which  could  not  fail 
to  have  a  very  decided  effect  upon  the  execution  of  that 
task.  Among  these  presuppositions  none  was  more  con- 
fidently asserted  than  the  impossibility  of  admitting  that 
the  divine  efficiency  ever  is  intruded  into  the  creaturely 
sphere  so  as  to  work  specific  results  in  that  sphere.  Speak- 
ing of  the  laws  universally  governing  events,  Strauss 
remarks :  "To  these  laws  it  belongs  before  all,  that,  in 
conformity  as  well  with  correct  philosophical  ideas  as 
with  all  accredited  experience,  the  absolute  causality 
never  breaks  in  upon  the  chain  of  conditioned  causes 
in  single  acts,  seeing  that  it  rather  manifests  itself  only 
in  the  production  of  finite  causes  and  of  their  interwork- 
ing."^     The  opposing  view,   which  assumes  a  positive 

^  Compare   Zeller,    David   Friedrich    Strauss   in  his    Life  and   Writings 
Eng.  trans.,  pp.  71,  72.  2  streitschriften,  III.  61,  62. 

^  Ibid.,  III.  76-94.  *  Glaubenslehre,  §  17.  *  Leben  Jesu,  J  16. 


266  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

intervention  or  miraculous  working,  involves,  he  main- 
tained, the  inclosing  of  God  in  a  temporal  scheme.  "A 
God  who  now,  and  then  again  at  another  time,  works  a 
miracle,  who  accordingly  uses  a  certain  kind  of  activity 
at  one  time  and  refrains  from  it  at  another,  would  be  a 
being  under  subjection  to  time,  and  consequently  no  ab- 
solute being;  the  doing  of  God,  therefore,  is  rather  to 
be  construed  as  an  eternal  act,  which  on  its  own  side  is 
simple  and  like  to  itself,  and  only  on  the  side  of  the 
world  appears  as  a  series  of  divine  acts  following  one 
after  another."^  With  this  speculative  exclusion  of  the 
miracle  Strauss  coupled  objections  to  the  notion  of  special 
revelations  in  any  form.  "The  acceptance,"  he  claimed, 
"of  an  immanent  relation  between  God  and  the  world  is 
incompatible  with  the  theory  of  a  special  revelation. 
When  all  have  a  share  in  the  revelation  it  cannot  pertain 
exclusively  to  individuals."^  In  another  connection  he 
urged  that  a  direct  or  supernatural  revelation,  while,  on 
the  one  hand,  it  supposes  an  interference  that  is  contra- 
dictory of  the  proper  conception  of  the  divine  nature, 
on  the  other  hand  is  in  conflict  with  the  legitimate  notion 
of  man.  "A  revelation,"  he  said,  "that  is,  an  immediate 
working  of  the  Highest  Being  upon  the  human  spirit, 
leaves  to  the  latter  nothing  but  absolute  passivity;  for 
the  Highest  Being  is  absolutely  active,  but  the  necessary 
correlate  of  absolute  activity  is  absolute  passivity.  It 
follows  at  once,  then,  from  this  side  that  the  conception 
of  revelation  is  an  impossible  one."^  Thus  Strauss 
started  out  with  a  speculative  foreclosure  against  the 
ideas  of  miracle  and  special  revelation.  From  the  begin- 
ning to  the  end  of  his  literary  career  he  was  dogmati- 
cally intolerant  of  these  ideas. 


1  Leben  Jesu  fur  das  Deutsche  Volk  bearbeitet,  1864,  5  24. 

2  Streitschriften,  III.  47,  3  Qlaubenslehre,  5  19- 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     267 

Another  presupposition  was  entertained  by  Strauss 
with  equal  pertinacity,  namely,  that  relative  to  the  in- 
validity of  the  catholic  theory  of  incarnation.  That 
theory,  he  argued,  wrongly  supposes  that  the  idea  of  the 
union  of  the  human  and  the  divine  can  be  adequately 
realized  in  a  single  individual.  "That  is  not  the  way  in 
which  the  idea  is  realized,  to  pour  all  its  fullness  into  one 
exemplar,  and  to  deal  parsimoniously  with  all  the  rest, 
to  express  itself  perfectly  in  that  one  and  ever  in  all  the 
rest  only  imperfectly ;  but  rather  it  loves  to  spread  out  its 
riches  in  a  multiplicity  of  mutually  supplementary  exem- 
plars, in  the  succession  of  individuals  that  posit  and  cancel 
one  another."^  No  specimen  of  a  class  can  by  itself  ex- 
emplify the  ideal.  ''Could  the  species  be  realized  fully  in 
a  single  individual  it  would  not  take  the  trouble  to  break 
itself  up  into  a  plurality  of  individuals,  and  to  run  through 
a  course  of  temporal  development;  but  it  would  exist 
only  in  identity  with  that  individual  as  a  generic  indi- 
vidual ;  just  as  God,  if  he  could  be  immediately  a  single 
personality,  would  be  relieved  of  the  entire  enormous  ap- 
paratus of  world-creation  and  world-history  for  the 
bringing  forth  of  personalities."^ 

Harboring  these  presuppositions,  Strauss  had  only  to 
consider,  as  respects  the  supernatural  elements  in  the 
Gospels,  the  most  eligible  way  for  disposing  of  them.  In 
making  choice  here  he  felt  obliged  to  repudiate  for  the 
most  part  the  supposition  of  conscious  invention  or  fraud. 
This  method  of  accounting  for  the  biblical  marvels 
seemed  to  him  to  imply  that  religion  is  a  matter  for  pri- 
vate manufacture,  a  kind  of  artificial  device  which  a  cun- 
ning schemer  may  fashion  and  attach  to  a  people.  To 
construe  the  matter  thus,  he  held,  is  quite  superficial  and 
warped.     Far  from  creating  the  religion  of  a  people,  the 

1  Leben  Jesu,  J  151.  2  Glaubenslehre,  §  66. 


268  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

individual  representative  is  rather  to  be  accounted  the 
organ  through  which  its  more  potent  impulses  and  senti- 
ments come  to  expression.  In  the  true  view  it  must  be 
seen  that  the  marvels  of  sacred  history  are  not  so  much 
thrust  upon  a  people  as  evolved  out  of  its  own  inner  lif e.^ 
But  how  are  they  evolved?  Does  the  poetizing  faculty 
of  the  people  take  natural  events  and  by  an  uncritical 
exaggerating  rendering  turn  them  into  supernatural 
events,  as  was  claimed  by  Paulus?  No,  replied  Strauss; 
at  least  the  major  part  of  the  explanation  must  be  sought 
elsewhere.  This  naturalistic  interpretation  is  discredited 
by  the  arbitrary  shifts  to  which  its  exponents  are  forced 
to  resort.^  For  many  of  the  miracles  of  the  Gospels  it  is 
impossible  to  find  a  probable  historic  basis,  a  substratum 
of  fact  which  might  be  transmuted  into  a  supernatural 
event  under  the  action  of  a  lively  fancy.  Large  account 
must,  therefore,  be  made  of  subjective  agency,  and  the 
miracles  recorded  in  the  Gospels  must  be  regarded  as 
the  product  of  the  ideas  which  had  gained  lodgment  in 
the  religious  consciousness  of  the  people,  the  congenial 
forms  under  which  the  hoped-for  and  the  expected  were 
given  a  standing  in  the  sphere  of  the  real.  In  other 
words,  the  naturalistic  explanation,  if  not  entirely  ex- 
cluded, must  be  reduced  to  small  dimensions,  and  the 
primacy  be  given  to  the  mythical  hypothesis,  the  theory 
of  the  creative  working  of  ideas,  whereby  the  subjective 
is  made  to  take  on  the  guise  of  objective  history. 

In  his  formal  definition  Strauss  says:  "We  rate  as 
gospel  myths  any  narrative  related  directly  or  indirectly 
to  Jesus,  which  is  not,  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  not,  to  be 
accounted  an  expression  of  fact,  but  a  precipitate  of  an 
idea  of  his  earliest  disciples."^     In  its  pure  form  as  he 


»  Streitschriften,  III.  41,  42.  '  Leben  Jesu,  {{  18,  28,  35,  etc. 

3  Ibid.,  I  15. 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     269 

goes  on  to  state,  the  myth  contains  the  whole  substance 
of  the  narrative;  in  its  modified  form  it  is  attached  to 
a  substratum  of  real  history.  The  myth-making  faculty 
which  was  operative  in  the  gospel  narratives  was  set  to 
work  first  of  all  by  Messianic  expectation.  As  the  Mes- 
siah was  to  crown  the  prophetical  succession  in  which 
Moses  stood,  it  was  deemed  necessary  that  he  also  should 
do  mighty  works.  As  the  countenance  of  the  great  law- 
giver was  glorified  by  the  divine  presence,  so  it  was 
deemed  fitting  that  the  Messiah  should  appear  in  a  scene 
of  transfiguration.  Thus  anticipation  put  its  own  fashion 
upon  the  Christ,  wrought  to  make  him  seem  to  have  been 
and  to  have  done  actually  what  was  called  for  by  the  ideal 
of  his  ofiice.  As  a  second  cause  which  contributed  effi- 
ciently to  the  rise  of  myths,  we  have  to  note  the  extraor- 
dinary impression  which  was  made  by  the  personality, 
the  working,  and  the  fate  of  Jesus.  From  this  source 
came  both  pure  myths  and  mythical  attachments  to  his- 
toric incidents. 

Among  the  tests  of  the  mythical,  or,  to  speak  some- 
what more  broadly,  the  unhistorical  character  of  narra- 
tives, Strauss  numbered  the  following:  contravention  of 
the  laws  which  universally  govern  events;  disagreement 
of  a  narrative  with  itself  and  with  other  narratives ;  dis- 
course of  a  more  poetic  and  elevated  description  than 
suits  the  actors  or  the  situation ;  marked  conformity  be- 
tween the  content  of  a  story  and  the  views  of  the  circle 
within  which  it  originated.^  By  the  first  of  these  tests 
all  accounts  of  supernatural  or  miraculous  events  were 
decisively  excluded  for  Strauss  himself,  since  it  was  a 
fixed  postulate  with  him  that  miracles  do  not  and  cannot 
occur.  Apart,  then,  from  a  wish  to  accommodate  himself 
to  the  standpoint  of  others,  he  had  very  slight  occasion 

*  Leben  Jesu,  S  16. 


270  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

to  apply  any  further  tests  to  this  order  of  events.  But, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  made  large  use  of  the  discrepan- 
cies between  the  narratives  of  the  several  evangelists,  as 
means  of  challenging  their  historical  character. 

The  way  in  which  Strauss  applied  his  critical  maxims 
and  the  conclusions  which  he  drew,  in  long  succession, 
on  the  pages  of  his  Leben  Jesu,  gave  his  contemporaries 
the  impression  that  his  method  was  supremely  adapted 
to  turn  the  subject-matter  of  the  Gospels  into  a  set  of  dis- 
solving views.  Nor  was  this  impression  seriously  at  fault. 
While  the  critic  did  not  assail  the  reliability  of  every- 
thing, he  took  no  pains  to  point  out  and  to  emphasize  the 
historical  residuum.  In  this  way  he  gave  his  readers  oc- 
casion to  think  that  his  interest  in  the  historicity  of  the 
Gospels  was  near  the  vanishing  point.  Moreover,  he  as 
moich  as  asserted  that  he  set  very  little  store  by  the  actual 
facts  in  the  life  of  Jesus,  that  to  him  the  matter  for  real 
concern  was  the  religious  ideas  which  by  their  efficient 
working  had  fashioned  for  themselves  the  forms  of  the 
supposed  history.  At  the  publication  of  his  Leben  Jesu 
he  endeavored  to  excuse  the  destructive  aspect  of  his 
work  by  declaring  himself  well  affected  toward  the  ideal 
significance  of  the  gospel  narratives,  and  by  expressing 
a  purpose  to  pay  his  debt  to  Christian  dogmas  by  under- 
taking an  elaboration  of  that  significance.^  But  for  this 
constructive  effort  he  showed  very  little  appetite.  When 
his  Christliche  Glaubenslehre  came  forth  (1840-41)  it 
was  found  to  be  well  suited  to  fulfill  for  Christian  dog- 
mas the  same  unfriendly  office  which  the  Leben  Jesu 
had  fulfilled  for  the  gospel  history.  What  was  really 
aimed  at  in  the  later  work  was  to  show  that  the  histori- 
cal evolution  had  found  its  logical  consummation  in  the 
disintegration  of  dogmas.     Not  even  the  tenets  which 

'Vorrede;  also  i  144. 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     271 

the  ordinary  rationalism  took  under  its  protection  were 
spared,^ 

In  the  controversial  writings  which  Strauss  issued, 
in  response  to  strictures  upon  the  method  and  results  of 
his  criticism,  a  somewhat  better  tribute  was  paid  to  the 
historical  elements  in  the  Gospels  than  the  reader  would 
be  likely  to  discover  in  his  primary  work.  Especially  is 
this  true  of  the  Sendschreiben  addressed  by  him  to  Ull- 
mann,  one  of  the  most  courteous  of  his  opponents.  He 
declares  here  that  he  regards  the  discourses  of  Jesus  (re- 
ported in  the  Synoptical  Gospels)  as  in  the  main  faith- 
fully transmitted,  and  that  to  a  portion  also  of  the  deeds 
and  fortunes  ascribed  to  the  hero  of  these  writings  he 
is  ready  to  apply  the  titles  "certain"  or  "credible."  Rela- 
tive to  the  person  of  Jesus  he  remarks :  "To  me  also  he 
is  the  greatest  religious  personality  which  history  has 
brought  to  view.  In  his  greatness,  too,  his  natural  en- 
dowment had,  in  my  opinion,  the  largest  share.  .  .  .  His 
power  over  the  minds  of  men,  with  which  very  likely  also 
a  physical  power  of  healing  was  combined,  which  we  may 
explain  somewhat  after  the  analogy  of  magnetic  force, 
effected  cures  which  must  appear  as  miracles.  His  stand- 
point at  the  highest  height  of  religious  self-consciousness 
was  expressed  in  lofty  sayings,  even  as  his  pure  human 
sense  was  revealed  in  edifying,  and  his  originality  in 
ingenious,  discourse.  His  fortune,  like  his  person,  was 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  his  life  extraordinary. "^ 

In  the  second  Life  of  Jesus — Leben  Jesu  fiir  das 
deutsche  Volk  bearbeitet — which  Strauss  published  for 
popular  circulation  nearly  thirty  years  after  the  first  Life, 
he  gave  more  specific  attention  to  the  demand  for  an  esti- 
mate of  sources.     This  part  of  his  work,  however,  has 

*  Compare  Zeller,  Life  and  Writings  of  Strauss,  p.  75;  Hausrath,  Strauss 
und  die  Theologie  seiner  Zeit,  II.  16—31. 

*  Streitschriften,  III.  145,  152,  153. 


272  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

little  significance,  since  he  appropriated  in  the  main  the 
result  of  Baur's  criticism.  It  will  suffice  to  note  that 
among  the  Synoptical  Gospels  he  gave  the  preference  to 
Matthew  as  respects  originality  and  authority,  and  that 
he  radically  disparaged  the  historicity  of  the  fourth  Gos- 
pel, denying  its  apostolic  authorship  and  its  intent  to  give 
an  objective  statement  of  the  facts  of  Christ's  life.  This 
was  substantially  his  attitude  toward  the  fourth  Gospel 
from  the  start,  except  that  he  was  temporarily  inclined 
to  a  more  favorable  consideration,  and  permitted  this 
phase  in  his  thinking  to  color  the  third  edition  of  the 
Leben  Jesu.  In  the  later  work  there  was  more  of  formal 
attention  than  in  the  preceding  to  the  positive  side  of  the 
life  of  Jesus ;  but  to  the  one  who  was  looking  for  a  con- 
crete and  intelligible  picture  of  the  Master  the  gain  could 
not  appear  very  large.  Moreover,  such  gratification  as 
might  have  been  experienced  on  this  score  was  pretty 
well  offset  by  the  severer  thrust  which  was  now  made  at 
the  gospel  historians.  As  Strauss  himself  was  careful 
to  state,  in  the  later  Life  of  Jesus  he  took  much  larger 
account,  than  in  the  earlier  Life,  of  the  operation  of  con- 
scious invention — bcwusstcr  unci  absichtlicher  Dichtimg 
— in  the  production  of  the  gospel  stories.^  It  may  be 
noticed  also  that,  while  in  the  earlier  treatise  Strauss 
deemed  it  not  incredible  that  Jesus  may  have  applied  to 
himself  the  idea  of  preexistence  which  is  known  to  have 
been  attached  by  Jewish  thought  to  the  Messiah  not  far 
from  his  time,  in  the  later  treatise  the  critic  bluntly  de- 
clared that  one  who  should  lay  serious  claim  to  a  previous 
life,  and  to  a  knowledge  of  aught  that  transpired  therein, 
would  advertise  himself  for  a  fool  if  not  for  a  deceiver.^ 
Two  years  before  his  death,  which  occurred  in  1874, 


1  See  S  25. 

»  Leben  Jesu,  i  64;  Leben  Jesu  fur  das  deutsche  Volk,  i  33. 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     273 

Strauss  thought  it  worth  while  to  send  forth  another  mes- 
sage to  the  German  people.  This  bore  the  title,  The  Old 
Faith  and  the  New,  a  Confession.  As  has  been  indicated 
in  another  connection,  the  new  faith  to  which  the  veteran 
litterateur  confessed  adherence  was  that  of  a  material- 
istic monism.  What  needs  in  particular  to  be  noticed 
here  is  that  in  this  closing  manifesto  Strauss  took  pains 
to  brush  away  for  the  most  part  such  grounds  of  confi- 
dence in  our  ability  to  reproduce  the  life  of  Jesus  as  he 
had  left  standing  in  his  previous  writings.  He  asserted 
that  we  know  far  too  little  respecting  the  Man  of  Naza- 
reth to  warrant  the  cherishing  of  any  religious  dependence 
upon  him.  "It  is  an  idle  notion,"  he  said,  "that  by  any 
kind  of  operation  we  could  restore  a  natural  and  har- 
monious picture  of  a  life  and  a  human  being  from  sources 
of  information  which,  like  the  Gospels,  have  been  adapted 
to  suit  a  supernatural  being,  and  distorted,  moreover, 
by  parties  whose  conceptions  and  interests  conflicted  with 
each  other's.  To  check  these  we  ought  to  possess  in- 
formation concerning  the  same  life,  compiled  from  a 
purely  natural  and  common-sense  point  of  view ;  and  in 
this  case  we  are  not  in  possession  of  such.  Every  en- 
deavor of  the  most  recent  delineators  of  the  life  of  Jesus, 
however  grandiloquently  they  may  have  come  forward, 
and  pretended  to  be  enabled  by  our  actual  sources  of  in- 
formation to  depict  a  human  development,  a  natural 
germination  and  growth  of  insight,  a  gradual  expansion 
of  Jesus's  horizon,  discloses  the  true  character  of  their 
essays  as  apologetic  devices  devoid  of  all  historical  value. 
But  not  only  does  the  manner  of  Jesus's  development  re- 
main enveloped  in  impenetrable  obscurity;  it  is  by  no 
means  very  apparent  into  what  he  developed  and  ulti- 
mately became.  To  mention  only  one  more  fact  after  all 
we  have  said,  we  cannot  even  be  certain  whether  at  the 


274  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

last  he  did  not  lose  his  faith  in  himself  and  his  mission. 
.  .  .  The  Jesus  of  history,  of  science,  is  only  a  problem; 
but  a  problem  cannot  be  an  object  of  worship,  or  a  pattern 
by  which  to  shape  our  lives. "^  This  certainly  is  very 
frigid  in  tone  compared  with  the  following  words  in  the 
closing  paragraph  of  the  Leben  Jesu  for  the  German 
people,  written  only  eight  years  earlier:  "Among  those 
who  have  helped  to  perfect  the  ideal  of  humanity  Jesus 
stands  in  any  case  in  the  first  line.  He  has  introduced 
into  it  features  which  before  were  wanting  or  had  re- 
mained undeveloped;  other  features  which  stood  in  the 
way  of  its  universal  validity  he  has  restricted;  through 
the  religious  cast  which  he  has  imparted  to  it  and  through 
the  incorporation  of  it  with  his  own  person  he  has  given 
to  it  a  higher  consecration  and  the  most  living  warmth ; 
while  the  religious  communion  which  emanated  from  him 
has  procured  for  this  ideal  the  widest  dissemination 
among  mankind." 

The  critical  radicalism  in  which  Strauss  ended  had 
been  rivaled,  not  to  say  surpassed,  soon  after  the  publi- 
cation of  the  first  Leben  Jesu,  by  a  representative  of  the 
Hegelian  left,  Bruno  Bauer.  This  eccentric  critic  differed 
from  Strauss  in  denying  that  the  Judaism  antecedent  to 
the  rise  of  Christianity  harbored  any  potent  Messianic 
expectations.  The  Messiah,  he  contended,  was  the  prod- 
uct of  the  Christian  consciousness  and  was  rather  carried 
over  from  the  Christian  domain  into  Judaism  than  bor- 
rowed from  the  latter  source.^  As  for  the  Gospels, 
Bruno  Bauer  was  less  disposed  than  Strauss  to  recognize 
in  them  an  historical  basis.  Tradition,  he  said,  was  no 
real  source  of  their  subject-matter.    All  that  they  contain 

1  The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,  Eng.  trans.,  S  28. 

*  Kritik  der  evangelischen  Geschichte  der  Synoptiker,  1841,  Band  I, 
Beilage. 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     275 

— reputed  deeds  and  discourses  alike — was  the  offspring 
of  free  invention.  The  evangelists  took  various  features 
or  characteristics  pertaining  to  the  Christian  brother- 
hood and  to  its  situation  in  the  world,  and  embodied 
these  in  the  person  and  history  of  the  one  who  was  recog- 
nized as  the  founder  of  the  brotherhood.  They  did  this 
as  individual  writers,  but  yet  as  writers  who  were  so 
far  the  exponents  of  the  demands  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness of  the  circle  to  which  they  belonged  that  they 
could  not  fail  to  find  a  cordial  response.  What  we  have, 
then,  in  the  Gospels  is  not  so  much  history,  serving  as  a 
basis  for  dogmas,  as  dogmas  or  abstract  conceptions 
turned  into  history.  "We  have  shown,"  says  Bauer  in 
his  estimate  of  his  own  critical  achievement,  "that  all 
that  which  constitutes  the  historical  Christ,  what  is  said 
of  him  and  what  we  know  of  him,  belongs  to  the  world 
of  conception  (Vorstellung),  and  indeed  of  Christian 
conception,  and  consequently  has  nothing  to  do  with  a 
man  belonging  to  the  real  world.''^  Very  naturally  the 
excursions  of  this  critic  have  rarely  commanded  the 
tribute  of  serious  consideration.  A  criticism  which,  if 
it  does  not  formally  deny  the  existence  of  Jesus  Christ, 
reduces  him  to  the  merest  cipher,  so  far  as  any  recog- 
nizable influence  in  the  world  is  concerned,  has  outlawed 
itself  in  the  sight  of  all  sober  judges. 

II. — Grounds  of  Exception  to  the  Criticism   of 

Strauss 

"The  true  criticism  of  dogma,"  Strauss  has  said,  "is 
its  history."^  It  would  not  be  altogether  unfair  to  apply 
a  kindred  maxim  to  his  own  critical  performances,  and 
to  say  that  in  their  outcome  a  striking  judgment  upon 

*  Kritik    der   evangelischen    Geschichte    der   Synoptiker,    {    91. 
^  Glaubenslehre,  J  6. 


276  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

them  has  been  rendered.  Of  course,  it  would  be  arbi- 
trary to  assume  that  the  great  body  of  his  critical  work 
was  immediately  discredited  by  the  plunge  which  he 
took  in  his  latest  years  into  the  abyss  of  materialism  and 
negation.  Yet  this  dismal  transition  cannot  be  wholly 
put  out  of  sight  in  the  estimate  which  is  to  be  formed  of 
the  competency  of  Strauss  to  deal  successfully  with  the 
deeper  problems  which  belong  to  the  history  and  phi- 
losophy of  religion.  It  may  properly  serve  to  raise  a 
question  as  to  the  intellectual  poise,  comprehensiveness, 
and  health  of  this  would-be  leader  of  the  thought  of  his 
age.  That  he  was  highly  gifted  is  not  to  be  denied.  He 
was  keen  in  analyzing  the  matters  that  came  under  his 
review,  and  was  the  master  ol  a  clear  and  incisive  style. 
But  he  was  not  a  speculative  mind  of  the  larger  mold, 
not  a  creative  thinker.  He  was  not  broad  enough  to  be 
secure  against  one-sidedness,  and  a  veritable  pathologi- 
cal element  came  to  manifestation  near  the  end.  The 
eccentricity  of  his  intellectual  career  taken  as  a  whole, 
while  it  does  not  directly  refute  his  theory  of  the  gospel 
history,  prepares  us  to  find  in  it  a  deficit  on  the  side  of 
judicial  balance. 

The  a  priori  exaggerating  character  of  the  treatment 
which  Strauss  applies  to  the  Gospels  is  clearly  manifest. 
As  was  noticed,  he  issued  an  uncompromising  prohibition 
of  all  miracles  and  special  revelations.  Among  the 
grounds  urged  for  this  dogmatic  sentence  the  most  plausi- 
ble consists  in  the  plea  that  any  interference  with  the 
eternal  order  would  bring  God  under  the  time  category 
and  would  contradict  his  absoluteness.  To  this  plea  it  is 
to  be  replied,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Spencerian  handling 
of  the  notion  of  the  absolute,  that  it  is  a  poor  compliment 
to  the  absoluteness  of  God  to  suppose  that  it  debars  him 
from  the  prerogatives  of  free  personality.     Inability  to 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     277 

act  outside  of  the  given  world  scheme  implies  a  falling 
short  of  the  highest  conceivable  potency.  We  pass,  then, 
under  the  constraint  of  a  narrow  definition  of  the  abso- 
lute, and  accept  something  less  than  the  real  absolute, 
when  we  deny  to  God  the  prerogative  to  act  creatively, 
or  to  initiate  a  new  series  in  the  physical,  moral,  or  in- 
tellectual world.  Doubtless  the  adjustment  of  such  action 
to  the  timeless  life  of  God  makes  a  puzzle  for  beings  like 
ourselves  who  naturally  think  of  events  under  the  time 
category.  But  the  puzzle  is  not  peculiar  to  the  supposition 
of  miraculous  agency.  If  the  world  is  not  at  a  perfect 
standstill,  if  it  passes  through  actual  transitions,  how 
shall  the  all-seeing  God  not  recognize  the  transitions? 
And  is  it  any  easier  to  suppose  that  intellect  can  recognize 
transitions  without  an  experience  of  time,  than  it  is  to  sup- 
pose that  will  can  initiate  new  events  without  a  like  ex- 
perience? Assuredly  the  former  difficulty  is  on  a  level 
with  the  latter,  and  we  must  not  only  negate  miracles 
and  special  revelations,  but  also  all  change  and  progress 
in  the  world,  in  order  to  protect  God  from  the  experience 
of  time.  If  this  is  too  much  for  our  sanity,  then  very 
likely  the  best  we  can  do  is  to  suppose  that  things  which 
to  our  view  stand  in  a  temporal  order  stand  for  God's 
contemplation  and  activity  simply  in  a  logical  order.  But 
in  a  logical  order  miracles  and  special  revelations  may 
find  quite  as  congenial  a  place  as  any  other  events,  namely, 
as  antecedents  to  the  perfect  unfoldment  of  the  kingdom 
of  righteousness.  That  a  logical  order  obtains  in  the 
divine  sphere,  Strauss  himself  assumed  in  declaring  that 
God's  ingoing  into  himself  is  conditioned  upon  his  out- 
going from  himself. 

The  other  objections  that  were  mentioned  require  very 
little  consideration.  Manifestly  we  are  assailed  with 
purely  verbal  reasoning  when  we  are  asked  to  believe 


278  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

that  an  immediate  working  of  God  upon  the  human 
spirit  could  reduce  the  latter  to  absolute  passivity,  since 
God  is  absolutely  active,  and  the  necessary  correlate  of 
absolute  activity  is  absolute  passivity.  It  is  only  neces- 
sary to  ask,  what  is  to  prevent  God  from  so  wisely  ad- 
justing his  action  to  the  human  spirit  that  this  subject 
shall  be  at  once  both  active  and  acted  upon?  The  com- 
bination certainly  is  entirely  conceivable.  The  God  who 
knew  enough  to  fashion  the  human  spirit  in  all  likeli- 
hood knows  enough  to  be  able  to  influence  it  without 
canceling  its  characteristic  functions.  With  equal  deci- 
sion we  may  challenge  the  assumption  of  Strauss  that  an 
immanent  relation  between  God  and  the  world  shuts  out 
the  fact  or  the  possibility  of  special  revelation.  If  God 
is  so  immanent  in  the  world  that  he  is  swallowed  up  and 
lost  in  it,  then,  of  course,  the  alleged  result  will  follow. 
But  if  he  is  not  thus  swallowed  up,  if  he  retains  directive 
intelligence,  then  it  m.ay  suit  his  wise  purpose  to  select 
some  men  to  bear  his  message  to  others,  and  to  these 
select  agents  he  may  make  revelations  that  exceed  in  some 
respects  those  which  fall  to  men  generally. 

In  questioning  the  ideal  character  assigned  to  Jesus 
in  Christian  thought,  Strauss,  as  was  observed,  denied 
that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  known  order  of  the  universe  to 
suppose  that  the  ideal  should  be  adequately  represented 
in  an  individual.  To  this  contention  it  may  be  conceded 
that  under  the  conditions  of  a  special  historical  environ- 
ment, and  within  the  limits  of  a  brief  period,  a  complete 
illustration  of  the  ideal  of  character  on  all  sides  could 
hardly  occur.  But  this  is  not  saying  that  the  essential 
content  of  the  ideal,  the  ideal  as  respects  all  cardinal 
excellencies,  cannot  be  possessed  and  also  exhibited  within 
those  limits.  The  contrary  conclusion  is  the  one  which 
seems  to  be  voiced  by  the  accumulated  evidence  of  the 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     279 

centuries.  The  character  of  Jesus  does  not  suffer  in  the 
least  from  comparison  with  the  noblest  personalities 
which  investigation  of  the  ethnic  literatures  has  brought 
to  light.  As  for  those  who  have  borne  the  badge  of 
discipleship,  the  best  in  any  one  of  them  cannot  soberly 
be  rated  as  anything  higher  than  an  approximation  to 
the  ideal  spirit  in  Jesus.  Who  stands  in  competition  with 
him  as  respects  tender,  serene,  and  lofty  union  with  the 
heavenly  Father?  Who  can  inspire  anyone  to  improve 
on  the  model  of  loving  service  of  men  which  is  presented 
in  him?  Who  has  ever  rivaled  his  combination  of  in- 
tolerance of  sin  with  compassion  for  the  sinner?  Who 
has  ever  known  how  in  equal  degree  to  unite  simplicity 
with  grandeur?  To  take  Jesus  for  the  ideal  means,  in 
short,  little  else  than  to  accept  the  historical  demonstra- 
tion. Men  simply  find  it  impossible  out  of  all  the  re- 
sources furnished  by  the  annals  of  the  past  to  paint  in 
the  abstract  an  ideal  which  can  take  precedence  of  that 
which  stands  forth  in  concrete  form  in  the  gospel  story. 
No  theory  about  the  necessary  imperfection  of  the  indi- 
vidual can  be  permitted  to  contradict  the  well-attested 
fact  that  in  Jesus  Christ  the  real  and  the  ideal  found 
their  identity.  The  theory  in  question  is  but  an  induc- 
tion from  the  ordinary,  and  cannot  cover  an  instance 
that  has  superior  claims  to  be  regarded  as  unique. 

It  was  noticed  that  in  his  final  message  Strauss  spoke 
of  Jesus  as  a  mere  problem.  This  language  is  not  a  little 
suggestive.  Why  should  one  who  has  so  powerfully 
affected  the  course  of  history  be  accounted  a  perfectly 
unsolved  problem?  Is  not  such  a  conclusion  a  virtual 
judgment  on  the  criticism  of  Strauss?  A  valid  criticism 
surely  ought  to  make  of  Jesus  something  better  than  a 
mere  enigma.  If  this  is  the  proper  outcome  of  the  par- 
ing-down process  indulged  in  by  the  critic,  that  process 


28o  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

is  very  much  in  need  of  justification.  Either  Strauss 
was  needlessly  unkind  to  his  own  work,  or  the  natural 
issue  of  his  work  was  critical  bankruptcy.  In  any  case 
his  course  is  suggestive  of  the  difficulty  of  carrying  nega- 
tions so  far  as  he  did  in  his  primary  treatise  without  re- 
ducing Jesus  to  a  mere  enigma  or  unsolved  problem. 

With  the  disallowance  of  the  presuppositions  of 
Strauss  much  of  the  force  of  his  attack  upon  the  historicity 
of  the  Gospels  is  annulled.  When  once  standing  room  is 
given  to  faith  in  an  extraordinary  person,  and  in  the  ful- 
fillment by  him  of  an  extraordinary  mission,  there  is 
such  self-evidencing  power  in  the  gospel  content  that  it 
mightily  commends  itself  in  spite  of  the  discrepancies 
which  appear  in  the  records.  Strauss  overrates  the 
damaging  effect  of  these  discrepancies.  Men  who  are 
familiar  with  courts  of  justice,  or  with  practical  life  in 
general,  are  well  aware  that  in  matters  which  have  any 
degree  of  complexity  even  the  most  competent  witnesses, 
however  sure  they  may  be  of  the  main  facts,  will  differ 
noticeably  in  respect  of  details.  The  general  story  of  the 
evangelists,  therefore,  is  not  justly  subject  to  challenge 
on  the  score  of  the  variations  in  their  reports.  Indeed, 
there  is  a  certain  incongruity  in  admitting,  so  far  as 
Strauss  did  for  the  greater  part  of  his  career  as  a  critic, 
a  faithful  transmission  of  the  discourses  of  Jesus,  and  at 
the  same  time  questioning  so  largely  the  report  of  his 
doings.  Minds  that  were  retentive  and  honest  enough 
to  reproduce  so  well  the  spoken  words  might  properly 
be  trusted  more  fully,  were  not  certain  sweeping  assump- 
tions interposed,  to  give  a  substantially  faithful  account 
of  the  Master's  deeds.  In  the  particular  way  also  in 
which  Strauss  disposed  of  the  marvelous  deeds  there  is 
a  certain  incongruity.  Lively  expectations  of  what  the 
Messiah  would  do,  he  said,  gave  rise  very  largely  to  the 


CRITICISM  OF  GOSPEL  HISTORY  BY  STRAUSS     281 

reports  of  the  miracles.  But,  if  the  miracles  were  not 
actually  wrought,  how  did  it  happen  that  the  expectant 
minds  were  not  turned  away  in  chill  and  disappointment, 
and  made  hopelessly  skeptical  as  to  the  identity  of  Jesus 
with  the  Messiah?  Strauss  supposes,  indeed,  that  Jesus 
by  a  natural  exercise  of  influence  healed  demoniacs. 
This,  however,  was  a  function  which  was  not  counted 
beyond  the  reach  of  contemporary  exorcists.  Had  Jesus's 
demonstration  of  his  power  stopped  at  this  point,  had  he 
not  merely  refused  to  respond  to  a  captious  demand  for 
signs,  but  also,  as  Strauss  avers,  declined  altogether  to 
work  marvels,  he  would  rather  have  disappointed  than 
satisfied  the  expectations  entertained  respecting  the  Mes- 
siah. To  the  extent  of  this  disappointment  the  expecta- 
tions would  have  wrought  against  faith  in  him  and 
abridged  the  impression  made  by  his  personal  attractions. 
Thus  the  explanation  of  the  reputed  miracles  of  Jesus 
through  the  force  of  Messianic  expectations  becomes 
very  largely  self-defeating. 


CHAPTER  II 

CRITICISM  OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT  BY  BAUR 

I. — Main  Contentions  of  Baur 

Ferdinand  Christian  Baur,  who  occupied  the  chair 
of  historical  theology  at  the  University  of  Tubingen  from 
1826  to  his  death,  in  i860,  was  one  of  the  marked  char- 
acters of  the  century  in  respect  of  scholarly  ability  and 
achievement.  Though  the  senior  of  Strauss,  in  the  his- 
tory of  criticism  he  naturally  is  placed  subsequent  to  the 
author  of  the  famous  Leben  Jesu,  since  a  defect  in  the 
miethod  of  the  latter  served  very  largely  to  define  for  him 
his  critical  task.  Strauss  had  failed  to  preface  his  treat- 
ment of  the  gospel  history  with  a  close  scrutiny  of  the 
Gospels  for  the  purpose  of  determining  their  inter-rela- 
tions and  the  relative  authority  of  each.  This  task  of 
examining  and  rating  documents  Baur  undertook  with 
great  energy  to  accomplish  in  relation  not  only  to  the 
Gospels  but  to  the  New  Testament  books  in  general.  He 
considered  that  by  this  means  alone  can  one  gain  ah 
authentic  picture  of  the  way  in  which  Christianity  was 
developed  from  its  primary  content. 

The  presuppositions  entertained  by  Baur,  though  not 
set  forth  by  him  very  definitely,  are  commonly  acknowl- 
edged to  have  been  very  much  of  a  factor  in  the  process 
of  his  criticism.  In  the  shaping  of  them  the  Hegelian 
philosophy  wrought  conspicuously.  From  this  source 
was  borrowed  a  conception  which  was  controlling  in  the 
early  Tubingen  criticism,  the  conception,  namely,  that 
the  logical  movement  of  thought  includes  in  succession 
thesis,  antithesis,  and  synthesis;  in  other  words,  that  a 


BAUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT  283 

thought  content  is  given  first  of  all  in  simple  immediate- 
ness,  then  is  parted  into  antagonistic  elements,  then 
reaches  a  higher  unity  in  the  reconciliation  of  the  ele- 
ments. This  point  of  view,  if  not  formally  paraded  by 
Baur,  w^as  certainly  exemplified  in  his  work  with  a  fidelity 
worthy  of  the  most  loyal  Hegelian.  He  was  also  quite 
near  to  Hegel  in  his  disposition  to  put  the  stress  rather 
upon  the  intrinsic  demands  of  the  thought  process  than 
upon  the  directive  force  of  uniquely  endowed  personali- 
ties. 

Baur's  affiliation  with  Hegelianism  appears,  further- 
more, in  his  approximation  to  a  pantheistic  conception 
of  God  and  of  his  relation  to  the  universe.  In  a  treatise 
on  religious  philosophy  published  in  1835  he  gives  a 
relatively  full  exposition  of  Hegel's  notion  of  divine 
personality.  He  represents  the  philosopher  as  teaching 
that  God  attains  to  self-realization  only  by  a  process  of 
incarnation  in  nature  and  in  man,  "that  it  is  only  the 
finite  spirit  in  which  the  absolute  Spirit  determines  it- 
self to  self-conscious  Spirit."  He  mentions  the  objection 
that  this  view  puts  the  personality  of  God  in  the  mist, 
and  so  is  poorly  accommodated  to  the  religious  needs  of 
men ;  but  he  declines  to  give  any  deciding  weight  to  the 
objection.  He  declines  also  to  find  in  the  thought  of  a 
conditioned  self-consciousness  in  God  a  serious  stumb- 
ling-block. That  thought,  he  observes,  does  not  imply 
the  limitation  of  divine  self-consciousness  to  human 
history,  since  world-evolutions  in  an  unending  series 
may  have  preceded  that  which  is  known  to  us,  and  some 
class  of  beings  may  ever  have  been  at  hand  in  which  the 
absolute  Spirit  could  manifest  itself  under  the  form  of 
finite  spirit.  The  self-contemplation  of  God  in  the 
totality  of  finite  spirits,  he  says,  "is  alone  the  true  con- 
ception of  the  immanence  of  God  in  the  world.     Is  one. 


284  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

however,  disposed  to  name  this  the  logical  pantheism  of 
the  Hegelian  system,  then  very  little  regard  needs  to  be 
paid  to  the  mere  name;  the  important  thing  being  to 
show  that  there  is  any  other  satisfactory  way  of  recon- 
ciling the  equally  valid  claims  of  the  speculative  and  of 
the  Christian  and  religious  interest."^  From  the  tenor 
of  this  exposition  it  is  sufficiently  manifest  that  Baur  was 
willing  to  accept  as  much  pantheism  as  is  implicit  in  the 
Hegelian  idea  of  the  divine  Being,  The  notion  of  a  tran- 
scendent Deity  was  quite  foreign  to  his  standpoint.^ 

In  respect  of  Christology  and  miracles  Baur's  presup- 
positions were  very  much  in  line  with  those  of  Strauss. 
He  may  not  have  expressed  himself  on  these  themes 
in  the  categorical  terms  of  his  younger  contemporary; 
but  he  gave  adequate  indications  of  his  dogmatic  prefer- 
ences. For  him  the  idea  of  the  God-man  was  the  idea 
of  the  unity  of  humanity  in  general  with  God.  The 
peculiar  eminence  of  Christ  consisted  in  the  fact  that  in 
him  the  unity  of  the  divine  and  the  human  nature  first 
attained  to  concrete  reality,  first  became  a  matter  of  per- 
sonal consciousness,  so  that  it  could  be  effectively  ex- 
pressed and  taught.^  As  regards  miracles,  Baur  does  not, 
so  far  as  we  are  aware,  challenge  outright  their  possi- 
bility. He  notices,  however,  that  the  conception  of 
miracle  proper  is  not  acceptable  to  religious  philosophy.* 
He  uses  language  that  is  naturally  taken  in  the  reverse 
of  a  complimentary  sense  when  he  says,  speaking  of  the 
futility  of  an  attempt  to  rationalize  miracles,  "the  ele- 
ment of  the  miracle  is  precisely  the  contradiction  which 
cuts  ofif  any  further  question."^     Most  significantly  of 


1  Die   christHche    Gnosis,    oder    die   christliche    Religions-philosophie   in 
ihrer  geschichtlichen  Entwicklung,  pp.  700-706. 

^Comnare   Siebert,   Geschichte  der  neueren  deutschen  Philosophie  seit 
Hegel,  pp.  ,-?3--^5.  ^Die  christliche  Gnosis,  p.  717-  ^  Ibid.,  p   641. 

sKritisclie    Untersuchungen    uber   die    Kanonischen   Evangehen.    1847 
p.  225. 


BAUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT  285 

all,  he  disputes  and  excludes  every  miracle  to  which  he 
awards  a  detailed  consideration.  In  one  connection,  it 
is  true,  he  gives  a  verbal  acknowledgment  to  the  fact 
of  a  psychological  miracle  in  the  conversion  of  PauV  hut 
in  another  connection  he  distinctly  objects  to  the  supposi- 
tion of  a  miracle  proper  at  this  crisis  of  the  apostle's  ex- 
perience.^ On  the  whole,  his  attitude  toward  supernatu- 
ral elements  in  the  biblical  narratives  was  scarcely  more 
tolerant  than  that  of  Strauss. 

In  construing  the  New  Testament  history  Baur  has 
very  little  to  say  about  the  person  of  Christ.  He  sup- 
plies, indeed,  some  ground  for  the  judgment  that  he  con- 
sidered the  ideal  Christ,  or  the  Christ  as  he  was  pictured 
in  the  contemplation  of  the  believing  community,  as 
being  of  more  consequence  than  the  actual  historical 
Christ.  The  thought  process  leading  on  to  catholic 
Christianity  appears  to  have  been  to  him  the  object  of 
controlling  interest.  The  life  and  teaching  of  Christ 
engaged  his  consideration  only  as  supplying  a  certain 
basis  for  that  process,  and  the  process,  in  accordance  with 
the  movement  of  the  idea  in  the  Hegelian  logic,  was  con- 
ceived to  consist  in  the  unfolding  of  antagfonisms  and  in 
their  ultimate  reconciliation  in  some  higher  point  of  view. 

Somewhat  of  a  ground  for  antithetic  types  of  thought 
was  observed  by  Baur  to  have  place  in  Jesus,  inasmuch  as 
on  the  one  side  his  consciousness  was  of  a  universal 
ethico-religious  cast,  transcending  national  peculiarities, 
and  on  the  other  side  was  modified  in  its  historic  mani- 
festation by  the  specifically  Jewish  conception  of  the 
Messiah.  In  the  latter  feature  there  was  a  bond  to  the 
old  Jewish  particularism.  To  throw  off  the  restraint  of 
this  bond,  to  contemplate  religion  from  any  other  than 


*  Kirchengeschichte,  third  ed.,  I.  45. 

'  Paulus,  der  Apostel  Jesu  Christi,  second  ed.,  I.  86. 


286  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

the  specifically  Jewish  standpoint,  was  not  easy  for  those 
whose  outlook  from  childhood  had  been  entirely  defined 
by  a  Jewish  horizon.  The  earliest  disciples  were  not 
equal  to  this  task.  Not  one  of  the  twelve  conceived  of 
the  religion  which  they  were  called  upon  to  propagate  in 
the  world  according  to  the  suggestions  of  the  more  uni- 
versal elements  in  the  consciousness  of  their  Master. 
They  represented  him  rather  on  the  side  of  his  connec- 
tion with  Judaism,  and  did  not  consider  themselves 
under  obligations  to  break  away  from  the  ancestral  sys- 
tem. They  were  Judseo-Christians  in  thought  and  pur- 
pose, Jews  who  were  looking  for  a  second  instead  of  a 
primary  coming  of  the  Messiah. 

The  element  of  universality  in  Christ's  consciousness 
first  found  opportunity  successfully  to  assert  itself  in  the 
Christian  community  through  Paul,  though  an  incipient 
tendency  to  the  broader  standpoint  was  manifested  by 
the  protomartyr  Stephen.  In  Paul's  case,  however,  it 
seems  not  to  have  been  through  the  contemplation  of 
what  was  contained  in  the  personal  life  of  Jesus  that  he 
surmounted  Jewish  particularism.  Rather,  he  reached 
that  result  by  the  path  of  inner  experience.  The  way  in 
which  he  came  to  the  knowledge  of  salvation  in  Christ 
made  him  think  of  that  salvation  as  antithetic  to  Jewish 
legalism.  He  was  led  to  look  upon  Christ  as  the  end  of 
the  law,  and  consequently  the  end  of  Jewish  national 
limitations,  a  spiritual  and  universal  power,  the  head  of 
the  religion  of  humanity.  The  revelation  that  the  Father 
was  pleased  to  make  of  the  Son  in  him  brought  him  to 
the  standpoint  of  Christian  universalism,  which  was  im- 
plicit in  the  consciousness  of  Jesus  but  had  failed  to  gain 
an  adequate  recognition  from  the  older  disciples.^ 

Thus  the  stage  of  antagonisms  was  introduced.     The 

•  Kirchengeschichte,  I.  45-48. 


BAUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT  287 

antagonisms,  too,  were  very  sharp  and  persistent.  Paul 
became  on  principle  the  champion  of  evangelical  free- 
dom. He  considered  that  nothing  less  than  a  sacrifice 
of  the  grace  of  Christ,  a  veritable  betrayal  of  his  religion, 
would  be  involved  in  an  attempt  to  maintain  the  legal 
system  of  Judaism  among  the  Gentiles.  The  Epistle  to 
the  Galatians  shows  how  resolute  and  uncompromising 
he  was  upon  this  subject.  In  this  epistle  we  have  the 
authentic  statement  of  his  position  from  his  own  hand, 
and  thus  are  shut  up  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  per- 
fectly unyielding  in  his  opposition  to  the  Judaizers,  and 
that  any  writing  which  represents  him  as  making  con- 
cessions to  their  prejudices  and  prepossessions  must  be 
regarded  as  untrustworthy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  or- 
iginal apostles  stubbornly  maintained  their  adherence  to 
a  Judaizing  platform.  As  the  references  of  Paul  show, 
during  a  period  of  fourteen  years  following  his  con- 
version they  did  not  advance  a  step  toward  recognizing 
the  independent  and  universal  character  of  Christianity. 
The  story  of  Peter's  ministry  to  Cornelius  and  his  house- 
hold may  seem  to  contradict  this,  but  that  story  had  its 
origin  in  an  irenic  intent  rather  than  in  actual  history. 
Up  to  the  conference  at  Jerusalem  the  original  apostles 
had  not  caught  a  glimpse  of  the  great  truth  that  men 
could  become  Christians  without  first  passing  through  the 
gateway  of  Judaism.  They  were  behind  those  who  dis- 
turbed Paul's  congregations  by  urging  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  keep  the  law  of  Moses.  Though  at  the  conference 
at  Jerusalem  they  gave  the  apostle  the  right  hand  of  fel- 
lowship, they  by  no  means  became  cordial  supporters  of 
his  interpretation  of  the  relation  between  Christianity  and 
Judaism.  The  conduct  of  Peter  at  Antioch,  in  withdraw- 
ing from  the  table  of  the  Gentiles,  shows  how  little  de- 
pendence he  could  place  upon  the  concurrence  of  these 


288  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

men  in  his  plan  of  Christian  evangelism.  It  was  from 
them  that  the  zealots  who  disturbed  the  Corinthian 
Church  derived  their  letters  of  commendation.  In  the 
disturbances  which  led  to  Paul's  arrest  at  Jerusalem, 
Jewish  Christians,  who  had  been  under  apostolic  tuition, 
were  in  all  probability  co-agents  with  the  infuriate  dis- 
ciples of  the  Pharisees. 

And  so  the  story  runs  on  to  the  end  of  Paul's  career. 
Nor  did  the  antagonism  to  the  great  champion  of  Chris- 
tian universalism  cease  to  proclaim  itself  after  he  had 
finished  his  course.  The  apostolic  author  of  the  Apoca- 
lypse made  a  thrust  at  him  in  speaking  of  those  who 
claimed  a  license  to  eat  things  offered  to  idols,  and  ad- 
vertised still  further  his  exclusion  from  the  apostolic 
group  by  representing  only  twelve  names  as  engraved 
upon  the  foundations  of  the  wall  of  the  New  Jerusalem. 
Even  far  into  the  second  century  the  antipathy  toward  the 
apostle  to  the  Gentiles  came  to  manifestation.  We  may 
see  it  in  the  lack  of  reference  to  him  on  the  part  of  Papias 
and  Hegesippus.  Still  more  distinctly  we  may  see  it  on 
the  pages  of  the  Pseudo-Clementine  writings,  where  Paul 
is  reprobated  in  the  person  of  Simon  Magus,  who  very 
likely  was  a  fictitious  character  devised  on  purpose  to  set 
off  the  faults  of  the  late-born  apostle.^ 

While  the  antagonism  was  yet  in  progress  a  move- 
ment in  the  direction  of  reconciliation  was  started.  This 
went  on  with  widening  current  into  the  second  century. 
To  its  advance  both  parties  contributed.  The  Judaizers 
began  to  retrench  their  demands,  beginning  with  a  relin- 
quishment of  circumcision,  and  carrying  over  to  baptism 
much  of  the  stress  which  they  had  placed  upon  the  ancient 
rite.     On  the  other  side,  the  followers  of  the  apostle  to 


1  See  Baur's  Paulus,   Kirchengeschichte,  und  Kritische  Untersuchungen 
for  the  matter  of  this  paragraph. 


BAUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT  289 

the  Gentiles  began  to  modify  in  one  way  or  another  the 
PauHne  antithesis  between  the  law  and  the  gospel,  be- 
tween the  old  dispensation  and  the  new.  Thus  a  basis 
of  unity  was  reached,  and  the  sharp  struggle  of  the 
primitive  age  passed  gradually  out  of  the  sight  and  recol- 
lection of  the  Christian  body. 

The  New  Testament  books,  according  to  Baur  and  his 
immediate  followers  in  the  Tubingen  school,  reflect  more 
or  less  distinctly  the  various  stages  of  the  movement  just 
described.  Most  of  them  may  be  characterized  as  "tend- 
ency writings,"  having  been  composed  in  the  interest 
of  the  Judaizing  party,  or  of  the  Pauline  party,  or  with 
the  purpose  of  mediating  between  the  two.  Thus  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent  their  subject-matter  was  the  off- 
spring of  free  construction.  They  represent  more  of  de- 
sign and  less  of  unconscious  evolution  of  myths  than  was 
assumed  by  Strauss.  As  to  date,  the  majority  of  them 
were  second  century  products.  The  earliest  were  the 
four  epistles  of  Paul  which  are  beyond  challenge.  A 
relatively  early  date  is  also  to  be  assigned  to  the  Apoca- 
lypse, a  book  credibly  imputed  to  the  apostle  John. 

Among  the  Gospels  that  of  Matthew  is  to  be  regarded 
as  the  most  primitive.  It  is  also  the  most  trustworthy. 
Its  reports  of  Christ's  discourses  are  substantially  reliable. 
Matthew  is  strongly  tinged  with  the  Judaic  way  of  think- 
ing, but  contains  some  tokens  of  a  transcendence  of  Juda- 
ism. It  may  be  characterized  as  a  Jewish-Christian 
Gospel.  On  the  other  hand,  Luke  in  its  original  form, 
which  was  at  least  approximately  identical  with  Mar- 
cion's  version,^  was  distinctly  a  Pauline  composition.  It 
contained  tokens  of  a  designed  disparagement  of  the  or- 
iginal apostles,  notably  in  its  representations  respecting 


1  Compare  Kritische  Untersuchungen,  pp.  395  ff.  with  Das  Marcusevan- 
gelium,  Anhang. 


290  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

the  seventy  disciples  whom  Jesus  is  assumed  to  have  sent 
forth  as  his  messengers.  Later,  by  the  incorporation  of 
Jewish  elements,  somewhat  of  a  mixed  character  was 
given  to  Luke.  The  Gospel  of  Mark  borrowed  its  contents 
from  both  Matthew  and  Luke,  though  much  more  largely 
from  the  former  than  from  the  latter.  In  tone  it  is  less 
sharply  defined  than  either  of  the  two  to  which  it  owed 
its  contents,  and  may  be  described  as  a  mediating  or  neu- 
tral Gospel.  The  fourth  Gospel  is  separated  from  the 
synoptical  group  by  a  wide  chasm.  Written  late  in  the 
second  century,  after  the  mediating  movement  had  in  good 
part  been  accomplished,  it  represents  Christian  universal- 
ism  from  the  standpoint  of  a  speculative  conception  of 
Christ  as  the  Logos,  the  principle  of  light  and  life  in  a 
world  largely  given  over  to  blindness  and  insensibility. 
Its  fundamental  idea  is  "the  divine  greatness  and  glory 
of  Jesus  over  against  the  unbelief  of  the  Jews  and  in  con- 
tinuous conflict  therewith."^  The  discourses  which  it 
purports  to  reproduce  are  not  borrowed  from  history 
proper.  They  simply  express  the  Christian  consciousness 
of  the  writer,  a  consciousness,  however,  of  so  lofty  a  type 
that  a  lasting  worth  belongs  to  its  deliverances.  In  the 
fashioning  also  of  the  narrative  portions  of  the  fourth 
Gospel  a  subjective  interest  was  decidedly  influential. 

Among  the  other  New  Testament  books  the  Apocalypse 
stands  in  closest  affiliation  with  the  Judaizing  party.  The 
Epistle  of  James  is  on  one  side  anti-Pauline,  as  appears 
in  its  treatment  of  the  subject  of  justification;  but  on 
another  side  it  makes  an  approach  to  Paulinism,  since 
it  spiritualizes  the  conception  of  the  law  and  makes  no 
attempt  to  uphold  the  literal  Mosaic  code.  Among  the 
epistles  ascribed  to  Paul  the  four  which  alone  are  entitled 
to  bear  his  name — Galatians,  Romans,  First  and  Second 

*  Kritische  Untersuchungen,  p.  87. 


BAUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT  291 

Corinthians — represent  the  standpoint  of  energetic  un- 
compromising opposition  to  Judaizing  tenets  and  prac- 
tices. The  epistles  to  the  Ephesians,  Colossians,  and  Philip- 
pians,  while  Pauline  in  substance,  have  a  milder  tone,  and 
thus  were  suited  to  fulfill  a  mediating  function.  The 
late-appearing  Pastoral  Epistles  represent  also  an  attempt 
at  mediation  on  a  Pauline  basis.  In  the  Epistle  to  the 
Hebrews  we  are  confronted  by  a  mediating  writing 
which  proceeds  from  a  Jewish-Christian  standpoint  of 
a  liberal,  idealizing  type.  First  Peter  reflects  also  the  age 
of  synthesis  or  of  vanishing  antagonisms.  As  for  the 
book  of  Acts,  its  reconciling  purpose  is  stamped  upon  its 
whole  content.  In  a  radical  sense  it  is  to  be  accounted 
a  "tendency  writing."  The  first  part  of  the  book  makes 
Peter  as  Pauline  as  possible,  and  the  second  part  makes 
an  industrious  attempt  to  paint  Paul  in  Petrine  colors. 
So  resolute  is  the  writer  in  his  purpose  to  maintain  an 
even  balance  that  he  takes  pains  to  parallel  every  great 
deed  or  marvel  ascribed  to  one  of  the  two  apostles  with 
an  equally  remarkable  item  in  the  story  of  the  other. 

Such  in  outline  are  the  results  which  Baur  reached  in 
the  prosecution  of  his  critical  undertaking.  That  under- 
taking was  evidently  worth  while.  It  serves  a  genuine 
historical  purpose  to  assign  to  the  New  Testament  books 
their  proper  location  in  connection  with  the  unfolding 
thought  and  life  of  early  Christianity.  Had  the  execu- 
tion of  the  task  been  as  normal  as  the  task  was  legitimate, 
the  Tubingen  critic  would  have  won  extraordinary  and 
lasting  honors. 

II. — Arbitrary  and  Extravagant  Features  in 
Baur's  Criticism 

The  philosophical  presuppositions  of  Baur  were  so 
nearly  in  line  with  those  of  Strauss  that  it  would  be 


292  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

superfluous  to  give  them  any  independent  consideration. 
We  may  proceed  at  once,  therefore,  to  deal  with  the  basal 
assumption  of  his  criticism,,  namely,  the  fact  of  an  un- 
mitigated and  persistent  antagonism  within  the  apostolic 
group,  a  relentless  conflict  between  Pauline  universalism 
and  the  Jewish  particularism  intrenched  in  the  minds  and 
the  hearts  of  the  original  apostles. 

That  an  element  of  truth  is  contained  in  the  assump- 
tion is  not  to  be  denied.  Paul  was  undoubtedly  a  pioneer 
in  the  cause  of  Christian  universalism ;  and  it  is  equally 
indubitable  that  he  encountered  for  a  season  a  measure 
of  resistance  within  the  apostolic  circle.  But  the  unquali- 
fied and  long-continued  antagonism  which  Baur  assumes 
is  not  to  be  admitted.  The  assumption  of  the  critic  runs 
into  the  incredible  in  the  picture  which  it  requires  us  to 
sketch  of  either  party.  It  is  far  from  being  probable 
that  in  a  complex  transitional  age  Paul  and  his  apostolic 
colleagues  should  have  been  embodiments  respectively  of 
a  single  idea  or  religious  pattern  in  so  radical,  exclusive, 
and  constant  a  way  as  the  Tubingen  theory  supposes. 
Why  should  it  be  taken  for  granted  that  Paul  was  always 
in  the  tense  mood  which  is  reflected  in  an  epistle  like  that 
to  the  Galatians,  written  at  a  great  crisis  and  under  stress 
of  great  provocation?  As  is  made  manifest  in  other 
writings,  the  apostle  had  tender  feelings  toward  his  own 
nation,  and  was  most  earnestly  desirous  to  win  them  to 
faith  in  Christ.  Why,  then,  should  it  be  deemed  incredi- 
ble that  he  was  ready  to  exercise  some  accommodation  to 
Jewish  prejudices  in  connections  where  this  could  be 
done  without  endangering  the  principle  of  the  freedomi 
of  the  Gentiles  from  the  old  legal  yoke?  He  has  him- 
self testified :  "To  the  Jews  I  became  as  a  Jew,  that  I 
might  gain  Jews;  to  them  that  are  under  the  law,  as 
under  the  law,  not  being  myself  under  the  law,  that  I 


BAUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT  293 

might  gain  them  that  are  under  the  law"  (i  Cor.  ix.  20). 
Surely,  then,  we  are  not  required  to  suppose  that  he  was 
such  a  walking  abstraction  that  he  could  practice  no  sort 
of  flexibility  in  adjusting  himself  to  the  varied  require- 
ments of  a  complex  situation.  On  the  other  side,  there 
is  very  slight  demand  for  conceiving  of  the  original 
apostles  as  stolidly  fixed  in  a  Judaizing  scheme.  It  is 
natural  to  conclude  that  somewhat  of  a  leavening  influ- 
ence came  into  their  minds  from  the  broad,  unfettered 
spirit  which  was  in  their  Master,  and  that  this  by  its  own 
virtue  would  gradually  work  toward  a  freer  standpoint 
on  their  part.  The  action  of  this  cause  in  such  a  direc- 
tion is  made  esp€cially  credible  when  the  conditions  of  the 
age  are  taken  into  account.  These  men  had  before  their 
eyes  a  growing  demonstration  that  Judaism  was  too  nar- 
row to  hold  the  religion  of  which  they  were  called  to  be 
the  heralds.  They  saw  this  religion  claiming  ever  wider 
victories  in  the  Gentile  world,  and  could  not  well  avoid 
having  their  thoughts  broadened  and  liberalized  by  the 
new  and  stimulating  events.  To  assume  that  they  receded 
from  the  attitude  toward  Paul  which  they  expressed  at 
the  Jerusalem  conference  in  giving  him  the  right  hand 
of  fellowship  is  to  suppose  them  strangely  impervious 
to  the  lessons  of  the  age. 

That  Baur  was  importing,  to  a  large  extent,  his  own 
abstractions  into  the  apostolic  history  is  further  made 
evident  by  the  forced  interpretation  which  he  places  upon 
various  New  Testament  items,  and  by  the  judgment  which 
he  renders  on  one  or  another  New  Testament  book. 
Take,  for  instance,  his  assumption  that  the  Apocalypse 
gives  a  distinct  evidence  of  John's  intent  to  exclude  Paul 
from  the  number  of  the  apostles  in  its  representation  of 
just  twelve  names  being  inscribed  upon  the  foundations 
of  the  walls  of  the  New  Jesusalem.     How  utterly  gra- 


294  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

tuitous  is  the  assumption!  In  a  symbolic  book  like  the 
Apocalypse  the  Jewish  preference  for  round  numbers 
would  infallibly  operate  for  the  selection  of  the  number 
twelve  to  represent  the  apostolic  group,  even  on  the  part 
of  a  writer  who  had  not  the  slightest  question  about  the 
apostolic  standing  of  Paul.  Take  again  the  inference 
that  Luke,  as  representing  a  Pauline  platform,  designed 
to  disparage  Peter  by  recording  the  statement  that  the 
apostle  did  not  know  what  he  was  saying  when  he  opened 
his  lips  at  the  close  of  the  mystic  scene  of  the  transfigura- 
tion. Who  but  one  controlled  by  a  radical  presupposi- 
tion would  see  in  this  statement  anything  more  than  a 
simple  intimation  that  Peter,  speaking  without  premedi- 
tation and  under  the  bewildering  impression  of  the  extra- 
ordinary situation,  did  not  properly  grasp  the  meaning  of 
his  words?  Look  also  at  the  assumption  that  Luke's 
mention  of  a  temporary  mission  of  seventy  disciples  was 
dictated  by  a  Pauline  interest  and  was  meant  to  cast  a 
slight  on  the  office  of  the  twelve.  What  could  be  more 
gratuitous  than  the  putting  of  such  an  intention  into  a 
narrative  that  describes  simply  an  expedient  adopted  by 
Christ  to  prepare  the  people  for  his  own  speedy  visita- 
tion and  contains  nothing  at  all  to  call  up  the  thought  of 
Paul's  person  or  work?  Still  further,  consider  the  allega- 
tion that  the  author  of  Acts  was  at  pains  to  construct  a 
detailed  parallelism  between  the  achievements  of  Peter 
and  those  of  Paul  so  that  the  rival  apostles  might  be 
glorified  in  equal  degree.  Even  if  it  be  supposed  that  the 
writer  was  morally  capable  of  dealing  so  recklessly  with 
the  facts  of  history,  it  is  in  no  wise  probable  that  his  com- 
mon sense  would  dictate  the  need  of  such  artificial  bio- 
graphical construction  just  for  the  sake  of  equalizing 
Petrine  and  Pauline  claims;  and,  besides,  it  takes  peculiar 
powers  to  discover  a  veritable  parallelism  of  the  kind  and 


BAUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT  295 

extent  which  is  pictured.  Finally,  take  the  ground  on 
which  the  Pauline  authorship  of  the  little  Epistle  to  Phile- 
mon is  rejected.  Baur  is  obliged  to  confess  that,  taken 
by  itself,  this  epistle  offers  no  good  reason  for  challen- 
ging its  genuineness.  Why,  then,  does  he  make  the  chal- 
lenge? Simply  because  Philemon  reflects  the  same  his- 
torical situation  which  is  discoverable  in  the  Epistle  to 
the  Colossians,^  and  so,  in  case  its  genuineness  should  be 
granted,  is  too  favorable  to  the  Pauline  authorship  of  an 
important  epistle  which  it  does  not  suit  the  Tiibingen 
scheme  to  acknowledge  as  Paul's.  Judged  by  its  spirit 
and  content  the  Epistle  to  Philemon  is  one  of  the  last 
specimens  of  literature  in  the  world  that  one  would  care 
to  number  among  the  products  of  imitation  or  dishonest 
contrivance.  Jiilicher  gives  the  verdict  of  sane  criticism 
when  he  says,  "Philemon  belongs  to  the  most  certain 
property  of  the  apostle"^ ;  and  Professor  Ropes  does  not 
utter  an  extravagant  judgment  when  he  says,  "The  man 
who  holds  the  Epistle  to  Philemon  to  be  fictitious  alle- 
gory has  lived  too  much  in  the  abstractions  of  eternity 
and  not  enough  in  the  world  of  men  to  be  a  perfectly 
trustworthy  critic."^ 

The  one-sided  and  extravagant  character  of  Baur's 
criticism  is  proclaimed  in  rather  emphatic  terms  by  the 
history  of  its  fortunes.  Even  among  those  in  the  direct 
line  of  succession  from  the  Tubingen  professor  it  was 
not  long  able  to  maintain  its  ground.  While  Schwegler 
was  quite  as  radical  as  Baur  himself,  and  Zeller  in  the 
period  of  his  theological  activity  represented  substantially 
the  same  platform  as  his  master,  Albrecht  Ritschl  made 
a  conspicuous  departure  from  that  platform.  Before  the 
death  of  its  promulgator  he  published  his  dissent  from  the 

»  Paulus  der  Apostel  Jesu  Christi,  II.  88,  89. 

2  Einleitung,  fourth  edition,  p.  99. 

'  The  Apostolic  Age  in  the  Light  of  Modem  Criticism,  p.  301. 


296  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

fundamental  contention  respecting  a  radical  and  long- 
continued  antagonism  between  a  Petrine  and  a  Pauline 
party.^     Somewhat  later  another  disciple,  Adolf  Hilgen- 
feld,  expressed  the  conviction  that  Baur  had  gone  too  far 
in  his  emphasis  upon  antagonisms  within  the  apostolic 
group  and  in  his  characterization  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment books  as  "tendency  writings."^     A  kindred  judg- 
ment has  been  rendered  by  Otto  Pfleiderer,  who  began 
his  career  as  a  teacher  at  Tubingen,  and  has  always  been 
known  as  a  representative  of  the  liberal  school  of  criti- 
cism.    Referring  to  Baur's  disparagement  of  the  book  of 
Acts  as  being  mainly  a  work  of  conscious   invention, 
written  for  a  mediating  purpose,  he  says :  "It  is  certainly 
much  more  probable  that  the  author,  possessed  with  the 
consciousness  of  his  own  time,  in  which  Paulinism  had 
in  fact  already  become  very  different  from  what  it  was, 
apprehended  in  good  faith  the  circumstances  of  the  apos- 
tolic time  also,  and  understood  and  honestly  made  use  of 
his  sources  of  information  regarding  it,  with  the  presup- 
position that  the  relation  of  Jewish  and  heathen  Chris- 
tianity could  have  been  no  other  in  the  time  of  primitive 
Christianity  than  it  was  in  his  own,   namely,   that  of 
mutual  approximation,  agreement,  and  union  of  the  more 
sober  elements  of  both  sides,  in  opposition  to  the  extreme 
views  of  either  party. "^ 

In  relation  to  a  large  proportion  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment books  the  judgment  of  Baur  has  not  been  sustained 
by  later  scholarship.  His  theory  of  the  interrelations  of 
the  Synoptical  Gospels  has  been  almost  universally  set 
aside,  Mark  being  assigned  the  place  of  the  most  primi- 
tive instead  of  being  reckoned  the  latest  and  most  depend- 
ent.    The  late  date  ascribed  to  the  fourth  Gospel  has 

»  Die  Entstehung  der  altkatholischen  Kirche,  1850,  second  ed.,  1857. 
»  Historisch-Kritische    Einleitung    in    das    neue    Testament,    1875,    pp 
197-199.  3  Paulinism,  Eng.  trans.,  1877,  II.  230,  231. 


BAUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT  297 

been  exchanged  for  an  earlier  one.  Even  those  who  ques- 
tion its  Johannine  authorship  locate  it,  in  most  instances, 
within  the  first  quarter  of  the  second  century.  To  Baur's 
short  list  of  the  genuine  epistles  of  Paul  additions  have 
been  made  by  nearly  all  critics.  Hilgenfeld  added  First 
Thessalonians,  Philemon,  and  Philippians.  Pfleiderer 
admitted  the  same  epistles,  and  in  part  also  Second  Thes- 
salonians and  Colossians;  while  critics  as  remote  from 
bondage  to  traditionalism  as  Harnack  and  Jiilicher  have 
confessed  the  Pauline  authorship  of  all  these  epistles, 
and  have  been  tolerant,  furthermore,  of  the  supposition 
that  Ephesians  came  from  Paul's  hand.  In  short,  taken 
in  its  specific  contentions,  Baur's  criticism  is  largely  a 
fallen  structure.  In  saying  this,  however,  we  have  no 
intention  to  deny  that  the  impulse  received  from  him  is 
still  a  factor  in  scholarship. 


CHAPTER  III 

CRITICAL  RECONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  LIFE  OF  JESUS  B^ 
RENAN  AND  OTHERS 

I. — Renan's  Vie  de  Jesus 
Ernest  Renan  had  reached  the  age  of  forty  when, 
in  1863,  he  pubHshed,  under  the  title  The  Life  of  Jesus 
(Vie  de  Jesus),  the  first  vokime  of  a  series  on  the 
"Origins  of  Christianity."  In  the  six  succeeding  volumes 
of  the  series  Christian  history  was  carried  forward,  in 
close  conjunction  with  the  course  of  events  in  the  Roman 
empire,  to  the  age  of  Marcus  Aurelius.^  Eighteen  years 
before  the  publication  of  the  Life  of  Jesus,  Renan  in  con- 
sequence of  the  discovery  that  he  could  no  longer  accept 
the  Roman  Catholic  faith,  had  left  the  Seminary  of  Saint 
Sulpice,  where  he  was  preparing  for  the  priesthood.  In 
the  interval  between  taking  this  step  and  the  epochal 
year  of  1863  he  had  given  full  expression  to  his  essential 
platform  in  a  number  of  writings,  two  of  the  more  con- 
siderable of  which  were  The  Future  of  Science^  and 
Studies  in  Religious  History.^  The  former  was  withheld 
from  publication  till  within  two  years  of  the  author's 
death,  which  occurred  in  1892.  As  a  product  of  early 
zeal  it  contained  some  notions,  especially  in  the  direction 
of  claiming  a  practical  omnipotence  for  experimental 
science,  which  seemed  to  mature  reflection  to  savor  of 
extravagance.     Still  the  book  shows  with  a  good  degree 


iThe  titles  of  these  volumes  are  as  follows:  Les  Ap6tres,  1866;  Saint 
Paul,  1869;  L'Antechrist,i87i;  Les  Evangiles  et  la  Seconde  G6n6ration 
Chr^tienne,  1877:  L'Eglise  Chr6tienne,  1879:  Marc  Aurele  et  la  Fin  du 
Monde  Antique,  1882. 

2  L'Avenir  de  Science,   1848-49.         ^  Etudes  D'Histoire  religieuse,  1857. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  299 

of  fidelity  the  assumptions  and  ways  of  thinking  which 
were  controlhng  in  the  mind  of  its  author  throughout  his 
literary  career. 

As  the  criticisms  of  Strauss  and  of  Baur  were  shaped 
by  very  emphatic  presuppositions,  so  also  was  that  of 
Renan.  The  last,  however,  was  distinguished  from  the 
German  critics  in  that  he  was  less  closely  affiliated  with 
a  specific  philosophy.  It  would  be  going  beyond  the 
mark  to  say  that  he  owned  what  might  properly  be  called 
a  philosophical  system.  The  question  of  philosophical 
method  was  quite  subordinate  with  him ;  he  never  made 
it  the  object  of  a  particular  examination.^  While  form- 
ally disparaging  the  office  of  metaphysics,  he  failed  to 
practice  the  reserve  logically  involved  in  such  an  atti- 
tude, and  employed  metaphysical  premises  after  the  man- 
ner of  the  easy-going  eclectic.  He  took  what  suited  his 
bent  from  Kant,  Hamilton,  Comte,  and  Hegel.  He  sym- 
pathized with  Kant's  theory  of  the  categories  as  the 
necessary  molds  of  human  conceptions,  with  Hamilton's 
views  on  the  impossibility  of  construing  God  as  the  infi- 
nite and  the  absolute,  with  Comte's  stress  on  the  primacy 
of  the  empirical  sciences  as  against  the  claims  of  all 
speculative  philosophy,  and  with  Hegel's  idea  of  history 
as  an  ordered  evolution  in  the  progress  of  which  the 
union  of  contraries  has  a  prominent  place.  For  the 
subtle  dialectic  of  Hegel  he  had  scanty  appreciation ;  but 
with  the  underlying  thought  of  Hegelianism  respecting 
an  all-embracing  evolution  he  was  quite  in  accord.  With 
this  thought  he  seems  to  have  conjoined  a  vague  mon- 
ism.^ In  general  an  equivocal  phase  attaches  to  his 
treatment  of  the  deeper  themes.  As  several  of  his  fellow- 
countrymen  have  pointed  out,  he  made  small  account  of 


1  Raoul  Allier,  La  Philosophic  d'Emest  Renan,  p.  14. 
'  The  Future  of  Science,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  89. 


300  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

the  demand  for  self-consistency.^  His  talents,  in  short, 
were  rather  those  of  the  brilliant  litterateur  than  of  the 
profound  thinker. 

Among  the  characteristic  features  of  Kenan's  think- 
ing there  were  two  which  so  far  conditioned  his  critical 
work  that  they  require  special  notice.  The  first  of  these 
may  be  defined  as  a  compromising  dealing  with  the  sub- 
ject of  divine  personality.  If  Renan  did  not  squarely 
deny  the  proper  theistic  conception  he  certainly  obscured 
and  discounted  that  conception  to  a  serious  degree.  In 
the  first  elaborate  declaration  of  his  faith  as  a  free- 
thinker he  wrote:  "Let  us  say  that  the  Supreme  Being 
is  eminently  possessed  of  all  that  is  perfection;  let  us 
say  that  he  has  in  him  something  analogous  to  intelli- 
gence, to  liberty;  but  do  not  let  us  say  that  he  is  intelli- 
gent, that  he  is  free:  this  would  be  trying  to  limit  the 
infinite,  to  give  a  name  to  the  ineffable."^  In  a  later 
writing  he  seems  to  lean  to  the  notion  that  such  intelli- 
gence as  may  be  attributed  to  the  Supreme  Being  is 
more  akin  to  instinct  than  to  the  cognitive  function  of 
self-conscious  personality ;  for  he  makes  his  representative 
in  the  dialogue  say:  "The  world  evidently  has  an  aim, 
and  is  steadily  elaborating  a  mysterious  work.  There 
is  a  something  which  is  developing  itself  by  an  internal 
necessity,  by  an  unconscious  instinct,  in  a  manner  analo- 
gous to  the  movement  in  plants  toward  water  or  the 
light,  analogous  to  the  blind  effort  of  the  embryo  to  leave 
the  womb,  or  to  that  inner  necessity  which  directs  the 
metamorphoses  of  the  insect."^  Other  statements  of 
Renan  look  toward  the  same  idea  of  God  as  a  kind  of 


1  S^ailles,  Ernest  Renan,  Essai  de  Biographie  Psychologique,  pp.192,  212, 
242,  279;  Bourdeau,  Les  Maitres  de  la  Pens6e  Contemporaire,  pp.  57,  67 
Brunetiere,  Cinq  Lettres  sur  Ernest  Renan,  pp.  20-22. 

2  The  Future  of  Science,  p.  44Q. 

3  Philosophical  Dialogues  and  Fragments,  Eng.  trans.,  pp.  la,  13. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  301 

world-soul,  working  after  a  manner  quite  other  than  that 
of  a  self-conscious  agent.  Thus  he  remarks :  "In  order 
to  be  consistent,  we  ought  to  push  anthropomorphism  to 
its  extreme  limits  and  endow  God  with  a  body.  .  .  .  There 
never  was  such  a  thing  as  memory,  foresight,  the  percep- 
tion of  external  objects — in  a  word,  consciousness — with- 
out a  nervous  system."^  Again  he  says :  "God  does  not 
see  himself  except  in  his  incarnations."^  Once  more  he 
approves  the  words  of  Strauss :  "An  absolute  personality 
is  nonsense,  an  absurd  idea.  God  is  not  a  person  beside 
and  above  other  persons."  However,  it  would  not  suit 
his  method  to  abide  by  so  definite  a  position,  and  accord- 
ingly he  adds :  "If  we  make  him  impersonal,  conscience 
protests,  for  we  conceive  existence  only  under  a  personal 
form,  and  to  say  that  God  is  impersonal  is  tantamount, 
in  our  way  of  thinking,  to  saying  that  he  does  not  exist. 
Of  these  two  theories  one  is  not  true  and  the  other  is 
not  false.  Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  rests  on  a  solid 
basis ;  both  imply  a  contradiction."^  This  leaves  the  mat- 
ter in  a  thick  mist;  but  if  the  tenor  of  Renan's  state- 
ments is  considered  it  is  manifest  enough  that  his  atti- 
tude toward  the  conception  of  divine  personality  was  not 
friendly.  That  he  stood  at  a  vast  remove  from  the  plane 
of  a  warm  theistic  faith  was  evinced  by  the  following 
words  written  late  in  life :  "The  whole  of  human  develop- 
ment may  be  of  no  more  consequence  than  the  moss  or 
lichen  with  which  every  moist  surface  is  covered."*  Such 
language  obviously  implies  that  the  thought  of  a  God 
who  puts  any  value  upon  man  or  opens  any  door  to  real 
fellowship  with  himself  may  be  a  pure  illusion. 

The  other  element  in  Renan's  thinking  that  calls  for 

*  Letter  of  1862  in  Philosophical  Dialogues  and  Fragments,  p.  138. 
'Cited  by  Allier,  La  Philosophie  D 'Ernest  Renan,  p.  68. 

"  Letter  of  1861  in  Philosophical  Dialogues  and  Fragments,  pp.  176,  177 

*  The  Future  of  Science,  Preface  of  1890. 


302  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

Special  observation  is  little  else  than  a  corollary  from  the 
foregoing.  A  God  who  cannot  be  described  as  free  and 
conscious  personality,  who  is  conceived  simply  as  the  im- 
manent life  of  nature,  possessed  of  the  ability  to  view 
himself  only  in  his  incarnations,  is  plainly  no  credible 
source  of  supernatural  workings.  From  postulating  such 
a  God  it  is  but  a  logical  step  to  pass  on  to  the  denial  of 
the  miraculous  or  supernatural.  And  this  step  Renan 
took  with  unwavering  decision.  From  the  time  that  he 
turned  his  back  on  the  ancestral  faith  his  mind  was  per- 
fectly intolerant  of  the  notion  of  miracle.  His  refer- 
ences to  the  subject  constitute  a  string  of  dogmatic  nega- 
tions. The  following  are  specimen  statements  taken  in 
chronological  order :  "There  is  no  such  thing,  so  modern 
science  teaches,  as  the  supernatural.  .  .  .  The  sole  cure  of 
this  strange  malady,  which  to  the  disgrace  of  civilization 
has  not  disappeared  as  yet  from  humanity,  is  modern 
culture.  .  .  .  Posterity  will  look  upon  those  who  are  fight- 
ing supernaturalism  in  our  days  as  we  look  upon  those 
who  fought  against  the  belief  in  magic  in  the  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  centuries."^  "Criticism,  whose  first  prin- 
ciple is  that  miracle  has  no  more  place  in  the  tissue  of 
human  affairs  than  it  has  in  the  series  of  natural  facts, 
evidently  cannot  fall  in  with  the  theological  schools 
which  employ  a  method  opposed  to  its  own. ...  Its  essence 
is  the  denial  of  the  supernatural. "^  "Till  we  have  new 
light  we  shall  maintain  this  principle  of  historical  criti- 
cism, that  a  supernatural  relation  cannot  be  accepted  as 
such,  that  it  always  implies  credulity  or  imposture."^  "It 
is  an  absolute  rule  of  criticism  to  deny  a  place  in  history 
to  narratives  of  miraculous  circumstances."^    "No  trace 


1  The  Future  of  Science,  pp.  40,  41. 

^  Studies  of  Religious  History  and  Criticism,  trans,  by  O.  B.  Frothing 
ham,  p.  42,  171.  5  Life  of  Jesus,  introduction. 

*The  Apostles,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  37. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  303 

of  the  action  of  an  intelligent  hand,  as  interposing  even 
for  a  moment  to  insert  itself  in  the  compact  tissue  of  the 
world's  affairs,  has  ever  once  been  authentically  verified."^ 
''The  negation  of  the  supernatural  has  become  an  abso- 
lute dogma  for  every  cultured  spirit."^  In  face  of  such 
a  list  of  declarations  it  amounts  to  very  little  for  Renan 
to  aver  that  he  does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  miracles. 
He  absolutely  denies  the  fact  of  miracles,  and  further- 
more shuts  out  all  possible  verification  of  the  fact  by 
the  test  upon  which  he  insists.  That  test  presumes  that 
God  may  appropriately  be  called  upon  to  crown  the  ex- 
perimentation of  a  select  commission  with  either  an  in- 
fallible affirmation  or  a  negation  of  miracles.^  As  was 
indicated  in  another  connection,  this  is  by  no  means  a 
temperate  supposition.  Who,  in  truth,  has  any  right  to 
assume  that  God  will  work  miracles  on  demand,  and  es- 
pecially that  he  will  work  them  in  answer  to  the  challenge 
of  unbelief  ?  Is  it  not  the  plainest  dictate  of  reason  that 
not  man's  curiosity  over  theoretic  issues,  but  God's  judg- 
ment as  to  the  exigencies  of  his  kingdom,  must  decide 
the  where  and  when  of  miraculous  agency?  Is  it  not  also 
quite  apparent  that  a  reputed  miracle,  wrought  under 
artificial  and  prearranged  conditions,  might  be  subject, 
in  spite  of  all  precautions,  to  graver  suspicions  than  those 
pertaining  normally  to  a  reputed  miracle  which  is  con- 
genially related  to  great  moral  ends  and  given  the  place 
of  an  harmonious  factor  in  a  unique  chapter  of  sacred 
history?  The  proposed  test  of  the  critic  is  plainly  out- 
side the  sphere  of  practicability,  and  it  would  be  quite 
gratuitous  to  allow  it  to  obscure  the  essential  dogmatism 
of  his  sweeping  denial  of  the  supernatural. 

Coinciding  thus  with  Strauss  in  the  total  exclusion  of 


*  Philosophical  Dialogues  and  Fragments,  p    8. 

2  Marcus  Aurelius,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  367.  ^-Lifg  of  Jesus,  introduction. 


304  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

miracles,  Renan  was,  of  course,  obliged  to  curtail  the  his- 
toricity of  the  Gospels  much  after  the  pattern  of  the  Ger- 
man critic.    He  assumed,  however,  to  proceed  more  con- 
servatively in  a  number  of  respects.     Strauss,  he  said, 
pushed  the  supposition  of  myth  beyond  reasonable  bounds, 
underestimated  the  importance  of  the  personal  character 
of  Jesus,  made  too  much  of  the  controlling  influence  of 
a  preexisting  Messianic  ideal,  and  took  too  little  account 
of  the  efficacy  of  the  marked  traits  of  Jesus  to  modify 
that   ideal.^    He  also  objected  to  the  late  date  which 
Strauss  assigned  to  the  Gospels.     "The  more  I  have  re- 
flected on  it,"  he  remarked,  "the  more  I  have  been  led  to 
believe  that  the  four  texts  received  as  canonical  bring  us 
very  near  to  the  age  of  Christ,  if  not  in  their  last  edition, 
at   least   in  the   documents   that   compose   them.     Pure 
products  of  the  Palestinian  Christianity,  exempt  from  all 
Hellenic  influence,  full  of  the  vivid  and  frank  sense  of 
Jerusalem,  the  Gospels  are,  in  my  opinion,  an  immediate 
echo  of  the  reports  of  the  first  Christian  generation."^ 
This  was  written  some  years  before  the  publication  of 
the  Vie  de  Jesus.     A  parallel  utterance  belonging  to  a 
later  date  appears  in  the  following :  "The  Gospel  was  born 
amongst  the  family  of  Jesus,  and  up  to  a  certain  point 
is  the  work  of  his  immediate  disciples.     This  fact  it  is 
which  gives  us  the  right  to  believe  that  the  image  of 
Jesus,  as  portrayed  in  the  Gospels,  resembles  the  original 
in  all  essential  particulars."^     Relative  to  Mark's  Gospel, 
Renan  conceded  that  it  is  properly  given  a  very  intimate 
apostolic  association.    "The  document,  though  composed 
after  the  death  of  Peter,  was  in  a  sense  his  work ;  it  was 
the  way  in  which  he  had  been  accustomed  to  relate  the 
life  of  Jesus."^     The  Gospel  of  Matthew,  in  the  judg- 


1  Studies  of  Religious  Histoiy,  pp.  187-191.  *  Ibid.,  p.  195. 

3  The  Gospels,  p.  45-  *  ^^id-,  p.  59. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  305 

ment  of  Renan,  presents  a  less  faithful  narrative  than 
Mark,  but  has  a  great  compensation  in  that  it  contains 
so  largely  the  discourses  of  Jesus,  "preserved  with  an 
extreme  fidelity,  and  probably  in  the  relative  order  in 
which  they  were  first  written."^  In  the  third  Gospel  his- 
torical materials  are  handled  with  much  freedom;  but 
still  we  have  here  a  token  of  close  regard  for  the  tra- 
ditional form  of  Christ's  discourses  in  the  wide  contrast 
which  subsists  between  them  and  the  discourses  which 
Luke  has  recorded  in  the  book  of  Acts.^  As  respects 
the  fourth  Gospel,  Renan,  while  disparaging  the  trust- 
worthiness of  the  discourses,  took  considerable  account 
of  the  narrative  portions.  On  the  question  of  authorship 
he  was  somewhat  wavering.  In  the  preface  to  the  thir- 
teenth edition  of  the  Vie  de  Jesus,  written  four  years 
after  the  publication  of  the  first  edition,  he  expressed  the 
conviction  that  he  had  been  somewhat  too  favorable  to 
the  authenticity  of  the  fourth  Gospel,  and  that  it  can  be 
attributed  with  better  right  to  a  Johannine  school,  ex- 
isting at  the  end  of  the  first  or  the  beginning  of  the  sec- 
ond century,  than  to  the  apostle  John.  At  the  same  time 
he  testified:  "I  persist  in  thinking  that  this  Gospel  pos- 
sesses a  value  at  bottom  parallel  to  that  of  the  Synopti- 
cal Gospels,  and  even  superior  at  times."  Later  he  re- 
turned to  the  supposition  that  John  may  have  had  some 
direct  connection  with  the  peculiar  version  of  the  life  of 
Jesus  which  has  been  attributed  to  him.  "We  think 
now,"  he  wrote,  "that  it  is  more  probable  that  some  part 
of  the  Gospel  which  bears  the  name  of  John  may  have 
been  vn^itten  by  himself,  or  by  one  of  his  disciples  dur- 
ing his  lifetime.  But  we  persist  in  believing  that  John 
had  a  manner  of  his  own  of  telling  the  life  of  Jesus,  a 


'  The  Gospels,  p.  in.    Compare  Life  of  Jesus,  introduction. 
» Ibid.,  p    148. 


3o6  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

manner  very  different  from  the  narratives  of  Batanea 
[utilized  by  the  Synoptists],  superior  in  some  respects, 
and  in  particular  w^here  the  parts  of  the  life  of  Jesus 
which  were  passed  in  Jerusalem  afforded  a  larger  de- 
velopment."* In  the  aggregate  these  comments  on  the 
Gospels  seem  to  pay  a  rather  emphatic  tribute  to  their 
historicity.  But  the  fact  is  not  to  be  overlooked,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  Renan  was  very  free  to  hint  at  the  fabu- 
lous character  of  the  gospel  contents.  Quite  as  little  is 
the  fact  to  be  overlooked  that  he  licensed  himself  to  cast 
slurs  upon  the  sincerity  of  the  actors  who  figure  in  the 
gospel  stories,  going  in  this  respect  much  beyond  the 
position  taken  by  Strauss  in  his  original  Leben  Jesu. 
His  method  is  at  times  violently  iconoclastic.  On  the 
whole,  therefore,  the  practical  impression  fostered  by 
his  style  of  criticism  is  scarcely  more  favorable  to  faith 
in  the  gospel  history  than  that  which  is  derived  from  the 
revolutionary  book  of  Strauss.  His  total  elimination  of 
the  miraculous  element  involves  by  itself  a  serious  mutila- 
tion of  that  history.  Renan  falls  little  short  of  confessing 
as  much  in  saying,  "If  the  miracle  has  any  reality  my  book 
is  a  tissue  of  errors."^ 

A  distinct  characteristic  of  Renan's  reconstructed 
biography  of  Jesus  is  the  broad  contrast  drawn  between 
the  earlier  and  the  later  career  of  the  founder  of  Chris- 
tianity. In  the  former  he  figured  as  the  clear-minded 
teacher,  ardent  and  idealistic,  but  self-composed.  His 
horizon  was  wholly  that  of  Judaism.  He  was  untouched 
by  Hellenism,  and  knew  next  to  nothing  of  the  world  at 
large.  Within  the  circle  of  Judaism  he  was  probably 
influenced  not  a  little  by  the  maxims  of  Hillel.  To  the 
Psalms  his  lyrical  soul  gave  a  ready  response,  and  he 


'The  Gospels,  p.  220. 

2  Vie  de  Jesus,  Preface  to  the  thirteenth  ed. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  307 

was  much  at  home  in  the  splendid  dreams  of  Isaiah  and 
Daniel.  Without  argumentative  process  he  took  up  what 
these  sources  had  to  give.  "Our  hesitations,  our  doubts, 
never  touched  him."  His  disposition  was  harmoniously 
related  to  the  delightful  scenery  of  Galilee.  A  joy  as  of 
the  bridegroom  was  in  him.  "The  whole  history  of  the 
birth  of  Christianity  thus  became  a  delightful  pastoral."* 
Meanwhile  there  was  an  element  in  Jesus  which  tran- 
scended his  antecedents  and  his  surroundings.  He  had  the 
most  exalted  consciousness  of  God  that  ever  existed  in  the 
breast  of  humanity.  "A  lofty  idea  of  divinity  which  he 
did  not  owe  to  Judaism,  and  which  seems  to  have  been 
entirely  the  creation  of  his  great  soul,  was  the  foundation 
of  all  his  power."^  He  looked  to  God  as  Father,  and 
lived  in  the  bosom  of  God  by  uninterrupted  communica- 
tion. The  idea  that  he  was  the  son  of  God,  the  intimate 
of  his  Father,  "inhered  in  the  very  roots  of  his  being. "^ 
With  these  deep  elements  of  soul-life  he  combined  the 
charm'  of  a  winsome  appearance.  His  countenance  was 
doubtless  one  of  transporting  beauty.  There  was  a  charm 
in  his  person  and  speech  that  was  quite  irresistible  in  its 
effect  upon  the  friendly  and  artless  people.  "His  preach- 
ing was  sweet  and  gentle,  full  of  nature  and  the  perfume 
of  the  fields.  . .  .  He  traversed  Galilee  in  a  perpetual  holi- 
day. .  .  .  The  children  and  the  women  adored  him."* 
The  enchantment  which  those  experienced  who  were  ad- 
mitted to  companionship  with  him  made  them  careless  to 
register  the  passage  of  the  weeks  and  the  months.  "None, 
during  the  course  of  this  wonderful  advent  measured  time 
any  more  than  we  measure  a  dream.  Duration  was 
suspended;  a  week  was  as  a  century.  But  whether  it 
filled  years  or  months,  the  dream  was  so  beautiful  that 


*  Life  of  Jesus,  chap.  iv.  '  Ibid.,  chap.  v.  '  Ibid.,  chap,  vii 

*  Ibid.,  chaps,  ix-xi. 


3o8  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

humanity  has  since  lived  by  it,  and  it  is  our  consolation 
yet  to  welcome  its  diminished  perfume."^ 

But  a  cloud  passes  over  this  idyllic  scene.  In  his  later 
career,  as  Renan  pictures  it,  Jesus  bears  another  mien 
than  that  of  the  serene  prophet  of  Galilee  who  put  the 
whole  stress  upon  the  ethical  aspect  of  the  kingdom  of 
God  and  made  it  truly  the  kingdom  of  the  meek  and  the 
lowly.  He  began  to  harbor  the  apocalyptic  notion  that 
the  kingdom  is  to  be  ushered  in  by  power,  and  is  to  gain 
ascendency  by  a  sudden  and  revolutionary  transforma- 
tion of  the  world.  In  the  estimate  of  his  own  nature 
and  rank  an  element  of  exaggeration  came  to  be  enter- 
tained. "The  admiration  of  his  disciples  overwhelmed 
him  and  carried  him  away.  It  is  evident  that  the  title 
Rabbi,  with  which  he  was  at  first  content  did  not  longer 
suffice ;  the  title  of  prophet  even,  or  of  messenger  of  God, 
did  not  now  respond  to  his  idea.  The  position  which  he 
attributed  to  himself  was  that  of  a  superhuman  being,  and 
he  wished  to  be  regarded  as  having  a  more  elevated  com- 
munion with  God  than  other  men."^  He  yielded  also  to 
the  influence  of  his  surroundings  in  becoming  a  thauma- 
turgist,  or  wonder-worker.  While  he  felt  the  emtptiness 
of  public  opinion  in  this  matter,  he  did  not  greatly  re- 
sist its  pressure,  so  that  "acts  which  would  now  be  con- 
sidered traits  of  illusion  or  of  hallucination  figured  largely 
in  his  life."^  In  one  single  instance,  the  raising  of  Laza- 
rus, there  is  ground  for  suspecting  either  that  he  himself 
was  deceived  by  those  who  arranged  the  conditions  of  the 
pretended  resurrection,  or  else  that  he  condescended  to 
be  a  partner  in  a  deceiving  spectacle.  "His  conscience,'* 
so  Renan  writes  in  this  connection,  "by  the  fault  of  men, 
and  not  by  his  own,  had  lost  something  of  its  primitive 
clearness.    Desperate,  pushed  to  extremities,  he  no  longer 

»  Life  of  Jesus,  chap.  xi.  ^  Ibid.,  chap,  xv  '  Ibid.,  chap.  xvi. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  309 

retained  possession  of  himself.  His  mission  imposed 
itself  upon  him  and  he  obeyed  the  torrent."^  Even  before 
this  strange  episode,  which  preceded  his  crucifixion  by  a 
narrow  interval,  he  had  begun  to  make  it  manifest  that  he 
had  undertaken  a  task  too  great  for  any  actor  upon  the 
theater  of  a  real  world.  The  character  which  he  had 
assumed  could  not  long  be  sustained.  *Tt  was  time  that 
death  should  come  to  release  him  from  a  condition 
strained  to  excess,  to  deliver  him  from  the  impossibilities 
of  a  way  without  exit."^ 

It  would  naturally  be  supposed  that  in  a  mind  thus 
prolific  of  disparagement  the  springs  of  eulogy  would 
finally  have  been  closed.  But  the  case  was  quite  other- 
wise. After  all  his  thrusts  at  the  practical  balance  and 
moral  majesty  of  Jesus,  Renan  proceeds  to  extol  him  as 
the  immortal  leader  of  the  race,  destined  to  become,  after 
the  dark  hours  of  sacrifice,  the  corner  stone  of  humanity 
so  entirely  that  to  tear  his  name  from  this  world  would 
rend  it  to  its  foundations.^  He  declared  him  so  far  above 
the  plane  of  the  evangelists  who  undertook  to  report  his 
words  and  deeds  that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  do 
him  justice.  The  transcendent  worth  and  finality  of 
his  work  he  pictured  in  these  strong  terms :  "His  perfect 
idealism  is  the  highest  rule  of  unworldly  and  virtuous 
life.  He  has  created  the  heaven  of  free  souls,  in  which 
is  found  what  we  ask  in  vain  on  earth,  the  perfect  no- 
bility of  the  children  of  God,  absolute  purity,  total  abstrac- 
tion from  the  contamination  of  the  world ;  that  freedom, 
in  short,  which  material  society  shuts  out  as  an  impossi- 
bility, and  which  finds  all  its  amplitude  only  in  the  domain 
of  thought.  The  great  master  of  those  who  take  refuge 
in  this  ideal  kingdom  of  God  is  Jesus  still.  He  first  pro- 
claimed the  kingdom  of  the  spirit;  he  first  said,  at  least 

^  Life  of  Jesus,  chap.  xxii.         *  Ibid.,  chap.  xix.         »  Ibid.,  chap.  xxv. 


310  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

by  his  acts,  'My  kingdom  is  not  of  this  world.'  The 
foundation  of  the  true  rehgion  is  indeed  his  work.  After 
him  there  is  nothing  more  but  to  develop  and  fructify."* 

It  was  a  very  severe  comment  which  Hausrath  pro- 
nounced upon  Kenan's  book  when  he  said :  "This  Life 
of  Jesus  would  be  beautiful  were  not  this  Jesus  there."^ 
The  comment  is  just.  Renan  has  given  us  some  fine 
scene-painting.  He  has  vividly  sketched  some  of  the  ac- 
cessories of  the  life  of  Jesus.  But  for  the  hero  of  the 
story,  as  he  stands  forth  in  moral  beauty  and  strength 
upon  the  theater  of  the  gospel  history,  he  has  substituted 
an  unfamiliar  form.  Who  can  recognize  the  Jesus  whom 
he  depicts?  What  heart  of  man  can  feel  toward  that 
Jesus  an  impulse  of  worship  or  trust?  Crowned  indeed 
he  is  with  lavish  praises.  The  praises,  however,  cannot 
suffice  to  recommend  a  subject  characterized  as,  on  the 
whole,  he  has  been  characterized.  Never  did  eulogy  ring 
more  hollow  than  that  with  which  Renan  strews  his 
pages.  In  spite  of  it  all,  the  reader  is  left  with  the  im- 
pression that  he  has  produced  not  so  much  a  description 
of  the  Son  of  Man  as  a  defamation. 

Giving  attention  to  a  few  of  the  more  obvious  criti- 
cisms that  may  be  brought  forward,  we  notice,  in  the 
first  place,  the  gratuitous  character  of  an  underlying 
assumption  of  Kenan's  attempt  at  biographical  recon- 
struction. We  do  not  mean  his  dogmatic  fiat  against 
miracles,  though  that  might  properly  be  adduced  in  this 
connection,  but  rather  the  strong  contrast  which  he  af- 
fects to  find  between  the  earlier  and  the  later  career  of 
Jesus.  Where  is  the  warrant  to  be  found  for  that  con- 
trast?   Certainly  not  in  the  gospel  narratives.    There  is 


*  Life  of  Jesus,  chap,  xxviii. 

*  David  Friedrich  Strauss  und  die  Theologie  seiner  Zeit,  II.  276. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  311 

no  ground  there  for  the  highly  colored  picture  which  is 
given  of  Galilee  as  a  fit  theater  for  a  perpetual  holiday  on 
the  part  of  the  young  prophet  and  his  intimates.  As  has 
been  well  said,  "The  Galileans  were  a  comparatively  rude 
and  simple  people;  their  country  was  more  joyous  and 
fruitful  [than  the  Judsean  region]  ;  their  cottage-life  more 
sweet,  peaceful,  and  idyllic;  their  habits  in  all  respects 
more  natural.  But  of  a  higher  spiritual  susceptibility, 
or  a  richer  spiritual  wisdom  among  them  there  is  no 
trace.  It  was  at  Nazareth,  where  our  Lord  was  brought 
up,  that  'they  rose  up  and  thrust  him  out  of  the  city.' 
It  was  of  his  native  district  that  he  said,  'A  prophet 
is  not  without  honor,  save  in  his  own  country,  and  in  his 
own  house.'  It  was  of  Capernaum,  a  town  of  Galilee, 
and  Chorazin  and  Bethsaida,  kindred  villages,  that  he 
laments  with  such  pathetic  sadness,  that  they  were  utterly 
indifferent  to  his  teaching.  In  Galilee  were  found,  no 
doubt,  the  simple  Shulamite,  and  the  penitent  Magdalene, 
and  the  good  Joseph  and  Mary;  but  side  by  side  there 
were  also  found  the  political  schemer,  the  dark  bigot, 
the  fanatical  enthusiast,  no  less  than  in  Jerusalem.  The 
same  variations  of  natural  character,  with  unimportant 
modifications,  appear  in  both."^  It  was,  in  short,  a  mixed 
cup,  compounded  of  joy  and  grief,  which  Jesus  was  com- 
pelled to  drink  in  every  part  of  his  public  ministry.  The 
greatest  bitterness  may  have  been  reserved  for  the  closing 
scenes  at  Jerusalem  and  its  neighborhood;  but  Renan 
in  his  picture  of  the  long-drawn  Galilean  festival  in- 
dulges in  a  mere  fancy  sketch.  No  more  does  he  respect 
historical  data  in  his  representation  of  a  radical  change  in 
the  bearing  of  Jesus.  That  the  Son  of  Mary,  contrary 
to  his  earlier  practice,  allowed  himself  to  be  crowded  into 
the  role  of  a  thaumaturgist  is  an  unsupported  assump- 

*  John  TuUoch,  Lectures  on  Kenan's  Vie  de  J6sus,  1864,  pp.  176-178. 


312  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

tion.  The  representation  of  the  primitive  biographies 
is  that  from  the  very  beginning  of  his  pubHc  ministry 
his  benevolence  and  tender  sympathy  began  to  flow  out 
in  acts  of  heahng.  Equally  void  of  all  historic  basis  is 
the  allegation  that  the  inward  harmony  and  the  poise 
characteristic  of  his  early  career  were  wanting  in  the  later. 
Never,  according  to  the  extant  memorials,  was  he  more 
completely  master  of  himself  and  of  the  situation  than  in 
the  closing  epoch.  In  his  silencing  of  cavilers,  in  his 
discourses  to  his  disciples,  in  the  dignity  of  the  reserve 
which  he  maintained  before  accusers  and  judges,  he  ex- 
hibited as  calm  and  worthy  a  lordship  as  he  had  ever 
manifested.  In  seeing  the  contrary  the  critic  sees  what 
has  no  basis  in  any  historic  record.  When  he  says  that 
"Jesus  no  longer  retained  possession  of  himself"  he  is 
simply  drawing  upon  his  own  imagination  for  bio- 
graphical materials. 

In  the  second  place,  an  element  of  radical  incongruity 
must  be  charged  against  Renan's  portrait  of  Jesus.  Who 
can  reconcile  the  two  parts  of  the  portrait  ?  On  the  one 
hand  is  the  pure  and  lofty  spirit  whose  intuition  of  the 
divine  quite  transcended  the  plane  of  Judaism,  who  dwelt 
in  the  bosom'  of  the  Father  in  uninterrupted  communica- 
tion, and  who  is  worthy  to  be  accorded  the  scepter  of 
moral  dominion  over  all  the  generations  of  mankind. 
On  the  other  hand  is  the  enthusiast  who  allows  himself 
to  be  forced  into  an  unworthy  scheme  of  wonder-work- 
ing, who  forsakes  the  path  of  truth  and  sobriety  in  mak- 
ing exorbitant  claims  for  himself,  who  grows  desperate 
over  threatened  disaster  to  his  impracticable  program, 
and  who  needed  to  be  saved  from  ending  in  a  spectacle  of 
impotency  and  defeat  by  the  speedy  intervention  of  a 
tragic  death.  The  incongruity  is  glaring.  To  take  both 
sides  of  the  picture  would  require  a  faculty  which  may 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  313 

have  been  resident  in  the  French  critic,  but  which  makes 
no  part  of  the  ordinary  mental  constitution. 

Finally,  it  must  be  said  that  an  element  of  ethical 
shallowness  and  obliquity  enters  into  this  fanciful  biog- 
raphy. It  contains  a  strain  of  apology  for  acts  that  a 
clear  and  stanch  moral  sense  must  condemn.  Observe 
the  tone  of  the  following :  "He  who  takes  humanity  with 
its  illusions,  and  seeks  to  act  upon  it  and  with  it,  cannot 
be  blamed.  Caesar  knew  very  well  that  he  was  not  the 
son  of  Venus.  France  would  not  be  what  she  is  had  she 
not  believed  for  a  thousand  years  in  the  sacred  ampulla 
of  Rheims.  It  is  easy  for  us,  impotent  as  we  are,  to  call 
this  falsehood,  and,  proud  of  our  timid  honesty,  to  treat 
with  contempt  the  heroes  who  accepted  under  other  con- 
ditions the  battle  of  life.  When  we  shall  have  done  with 
our  scruples  what  they  did  with  their  falsehoods,  we 
shall  have  the  right  to  be  severe  upon  them."^ 

Brunetiere  gives  a  just  estimate  of  Renan's  Vie  de 
Jesus  where  he  says,  "It  is  not  history,  but  romance,  or 
less  and  worse  than  romance."^  More  than  one  passage 
in  the  book  may  well  incite  one  to  accentuate  the  last 
clause  in  this  statement. 

II. — Schenkel's  Sketch  of  the  Character  of  Jesus 

In  1863,  the  same  year  in  which  Renan  published  his 
Vie  de  Jesus,  Daniel  Schenkel  (1813-85)  sent  forth  his 
Charakterbild  Jesu.  His  book,  like  that  of  the  French 
author,  was  designed  for  popular  use.  In  tone  it  was 
more  moderate  and  reverent.  No  very  pronounced  in- 
fluence of  philosophical  premises  appears  upon  its  pages. 
A  doctrinaire  phase  is  indeed  observable;  but  this  consists 
rather  in  the  representation  of  Jesus  as  the  champion  of 
such  a  scheme  of  antidogmatic  liberalism  as  was  agree- 

^  Life  of  Jesus,  chap.  xv.  ^  Cinq  Lettres  sur  Ernest  Renan,  p.  80. 


314  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

able  to  the  thought  of  the  biographer  than  in  any  pecuHar 
postulates  respecting  God  and  the  universe.  So  far  as 
is  discoverable,  Schenkel  proceeded  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  ordinary  theistic  conception.  The  same  may  be 
said  of  Keim,  whose  more  elaborate  work  on  the  life  of 
Jesus  was  published  a  few  years  later. 

In  his  view  of  the  Gospels,  Schenkel  stood  nearer  to 
Renan  than  to  the  Tubingen  school.  Among  the  Synop- 
tists  he  considered  that  Mark  gives  the  life  of  Jesus  in 
the  purest  objectivity.  He  supposed,  however,  that  our 
Gospel  of  Mark  was  based  on  an  earlier  biography  of 
Jesus,  written  at  Rome  by  Mark  before  the  year  60.  Of 
this  primitive  document  large  use  was  made  in  the  com- 
position of  the  Gospels  of  Matthew  and  Luke.  The  fourth 
Gospel,  as  Schenkel  conceived,  cannot  be  referred  to  the 
direct  authorship  of  the  apostle  John.  Yet  it  may  be 
credited  with  Johannine  connections.  It  is  probable  that 
John  lived  at  Ephesus  to  an  advanced  age.  Here,  under 
the  stimulus  of  new  conditions,  his  thought  of  Jesus  and 
of  his  mission  took  on  an  elevated  cast.  Disciples  appro- 
priated his  representations,  and  gave  them  such  specula- 
tive coloring  as  was  naturally  imparted  by  minds  in  con- 
tact with  the  incoming  Gnostic  teaching.  Thus  the  basis 
was  prepared  for  the  fourth  Gospel,  which  appeared  after 
the  death  of  John,  its  date  being  the  interval  between  1 10 
and  120.  In  portraying  Jesus  the  evangelist  has  used 
large  liberty  in  carrying  back  the  standpoint  of  his  own 
age.  His  composition,  nevertheless,  is  a  real  source  for 
the  characterization  of  the  founder  of  Christianity.  While 
the  Son  of  Man  was  not  in  the  particular  events  and 
stages  of  his  life  just  as  he  is  pictured  by  the  fourth 
evangelist,  a  true  suggestion  is  still  given  by  that  evangel- 
ist as  to  what  he  was  in  the  height  and  depth  of  his 
activity.    To  do  justice  to  the  eternal  significance  of  his 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  315 

personality  we  need  to  supplement  the  synoptical  narra- 
tives by  the  portraiture  contained  in  the  fourth  Gospel.^ 

A  qualification  on  the  historical  character  of  all  the 
Gospels  is  found,  according  to  Schenkel,  in  stories  of 
miraculous  deeds.  He  affirms  that  we  can  form  no  proper 
conception  of  a  miracle-working  power  which  passes 
human  measures.  Applying  this  standard,  he  cuts  off 
all  the  recorded  nature  miracles.  These,  he  says,  were 
doubtless  reported  in  good  faith.  Fervent  admiration 
for  the  Master  combined  with  the  influence  of  Old  Testa- 
ment narratives  gave  rise  to  tales  of  workings  which 
belong  rather  to  the  province  of  omnipotence  than  to  that 
of  a  finite  personality.  The  only  credible  marvels  as- 
cribed to  Jesus  are  the  acts  of  healing  which  he  is  said  to 
have  performed.  Apart  from  all  supernatural  interven- 
tion, a  specially  gifted  personality,  a  man  of  ideal  moral 
force,  is  able  to  elicit  a  mighty  faith  in  those  affected  with 
bodily  or  mental  ailments,  and  through  this  faith  to  work 
certain  transformations  in  their  behalf.  So  Jesus  by 
virtue  of  extraordinary,  yet  purely  human,  endowments 
accomplished  numerous  works  of  healing.  To  the  people 
of  that  time  they  were  miracles ;  to  us  they  are  psychologi- 
cally explainable.  Being  thus  intolerant  of  the  notion  of 
miracle  proper,  Schenkel,  of  course,  cannot  admit  the 
literal  resurrection  of  Jesus.  The  appearances  of  the 
Crucified  One  he  puts  in  a  class  with  the  disclosure  of  the 
Lord  which  was  vouchsafed  to  Paul.  Not  a  bodily  resur- 
rection, but  continuous  working  in  spirit,  was  the  impor- 
tant thing.  By  his  power  over  the  company  of  his  fol- 
lowers Jesus  was  shown  to  have  truly  escaped  the  bonds 
of  death. 

With  intolerance  for  miracles  Schenkel  joined  a  pro- 
nounced antipathy  for  the  catholic  Christology.     Indeed, 

*  Das  Charakterbild  Jesu,  third  ed.,  pp.  12-14,  17-26. 


3i6  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

his  ambition  to  antagonize  that  Christology  was  obviously 
among  the  motives  which  impelled  him  to  write  his  book. 
He  takes  pains  to  make  prominent  his  conviction  that 
Jesus  was  in  essence  a  purely  human  being.  At  the  same 
time  he  places  him  far  above  the  plane  of  ordinary  man- 
hood. He  implies  a  conviction  of  his  sinlessness  by 
teaching  that  in  his  baptism  Jesus  confessed  not  his  own 
sin,  but  the  sin  of  the  people  with  which  he  humbly 
associated  himself  and  whose  cause  he  made  his  own.^ 
In  very  pronounced  terms  he  affirms  in  the  inner  life 
of  Jesus  extraordinary  factors.  His  consciousness  of 
God  was  infinitely  higher  and  deeper  than  that  of  the 
prophets.^  He  came  to  understand  that  in  his  person 
eternal  truth  in  its  original  energy  had  given  itself  a 
new  form,  and  that  he  was  made  the  medium  for  institu- 
ting in  creative  efficiency  a  new  beginning  of  life  for 
mankind.^ 

A  tribute  to  the  incomparable  greatness  of  the  person 
and  the  work  of  Jesus  is  still  further  paid  by  Schenkel 
in  the  comments  which  he  makes  on  the  shortcomings  of 
rationalism  in  dealing  with  this  theme.  "It  has  not  done 
justice,"  he  says,  "either  in  a  religious  or  historical  re- 
spect to  the  sublimity  and  uniqueness  of  the  character 
of  Jesus.  Not  only  does  the  rationalistic  portraiture  of 
Jesus  leave  the  feeling  cold,  the  imagination  empty,  the 
heart  indifferent,  but  also  the  understanding  in  its  deeper 
inquiries  fails  to  conceive  how  this  wise  Rabbi  of 
Nazareth,  how  this  enlightened  Jew,  whose  ambition  to 
carry  forward  a  work  of  enlightenment  precipitated  his 
crucifixion,  through  the  wrath  of  priests  and  the  envy 
of  officials,  came  to  found  a  world  religion,  and  to  pre- 
scribe for  centuries  its  course  to  the  whole  stream  of 


»  Das  Charakterbild  Jesu,  p.  33.  '  Ibid.,  pp.  14.  15 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  66,  122. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  317 

advancing  culture.  To  really  believe  upon  the  rationalis- 
tic Christ  is  impossible.  His  person  is  altogether  trans- 
parent and  intelligible  to  the  understanding;  only  his 
working  is  beyond  interpretation.  For  comprehending 
this  there  is  wanting  to  the  personality  the  original  fellow- 
ship with  the  divine  and  infinite.  The  divine  does  not 
appear  as  present  in  that  personality.  It  is  simply  supra- 
mundane,  and,  accordingly,  no  new  revelation  is  intro- 
duced with  Christ,  no  new  creative  beginning  is  posited 
in  the  history  of  the  world. "^ 

This  is  just  criticism ;  but  in  rendering  it  Schenkel 
has  unconsciously  described  a  deficit  in  his  own  attempt 
to  portray  the  Jesus  of  the  Gospels.  In  spite  of  formal 
tributes,  the  general  character  of  his  delineations  leaves 
the  impression  that  it  is  not  the  Saviour  known  to  the 
early  Church  and  to  the  devout  of  the  later  centuries 
that  he  presents  to  us,  but  only  a  specially  eminent  reli- 
gious hero.  The  formal  tributes,  too,  naturally  raise  a 
question  as  to  whether  Schenkel  does  not  make  a  miracle 
of  the  person  of  Jesus,  and  thus  expose  himself  to  the 
charge  of  inconsistency  in  excluding  miracles.  But  the 
consideration  of  this  point  is  properly  postponed,  since 
there  will  be  occasion  to  raise  the  like  question  in  connec- 
tion with  the  biography  of  Jesus  which  is  forthwith  to 
claim'  our  attention. 

III. — Keim's  History  of  Jesus 

Theodor  Keim  (1825-78),  who  was  a  pupil  of  Baur 
but  who  advanced  to  a  somewhat  independent  position, 
produced  a  critical  biography  of  Jesus^  which  exceeded 
in  bulk  the  very  ample  Leben  Jesu  of  Strauss.  In  re- 
spect of  standpoint  he  had  a  larger  sympathy  than  Strauss 


*  Das  Charakterbild  Jesu,  pp.  6,  7. 

'  Geschichte  Jesu  von  Nazara,  three  vols.,  1867—72. 


3i8  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

with  the  inheritance  of  cathohc  convictions,  and  was 
disposed  to  render  greater  deference  to  the  historical 
basis  of  the  Gospels.  Nevertheless,  he  did  not  keep  his 
criticism  free  from  a  strain  of  a  priori  dogmatism.  In 
various  connections  he  seems  to  have  consulted  rather 
the  demands  of  a  preformed  theory  than  any  discoverable 
requirement  of  the  historical  data. 

Keim  followed  the  Tiibingen  school  in  giving  the  pref- 
erence to  the  Gospel  of  Matthew.  He  concluded  that 
this,  in  its  original  form,  dates  from  about  the  year  68, 
and  that  additions  of  comparatively  small  compass  were 
made  near  the  end  of  the  century.  To  this  primitive 
Matthew,  he  says,  a  good  degree  of  historic  credibility 
belongs.  "The  discourses  of  Jesus  in  particular  bear 
along  with  time-marks  signs  of  a  unique  originality,  of 
a  masterful  nature,  of  a  divine  consecration  and  might, 
to  such  a  degree  that  even  the  single  word,  as  being 
clothed  with  an  antique  drapery  that  was  soon  lost  in  the 
Church,  wears  the  stamp  of  a  spirit  whom  no  follower, 
no  evangelist,  Jewish  or  Gentile,  and  also  not  even  a  Paul 
could  invent."*  Matthew  in  its  original  form  served  as 
one  of  the  sources  for  the  third  Gospel,  which  was  written 
by  a  moderate  representative  of  Paulinism  a  considerable 
interval  after  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem.  The  Gospel 
of  Mark  was  regarded  by  Keim  as  dependent  on  both 
Matthew  and  Luke.  At  first  he  placed  it  about  the  year 
loo;  later  he  was  inclined  to  locate  it  between  115  and 
120.^  In  a  similar  manner  he  shifted  the  date  for  the 
composition  of  the  fourth  Gospel.  It  was  placed  as  early 
as  from  no  to  117  in  the  first  volume  of  the  larger  biog- 
raphy of  Jesus ;  in  the  shorter  biography,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  was  assigned  to  the  interval  between  130  and 


>  Geschichte  Jesu  von  Nazara,  I.  64. 

*  Geschichte  Jesu  iibersichthch  erzahlt,  third  ed.,  1875,  p.  36. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  319 

135.  As  respects  the  historical  worth  of  this  Gospel,  the 
estimate  of  Keim  was  exceedingly  disparaging.  He  can 
hardly  be  said  to  have  expressed  himself  in  as  appreciative 
terms  as  did  Schenkel. 

While  persistently  adhering  to  his  original  theory  on 
the  interrelation  of  the  Synoptical  Gospels,  Keim  was 
aware  that  the  current  of  New  Testament  criticism  had 
set  strongly  against  that  theory.  Judged  by  the  broad 
consensus  of  recent  scholarship  in  favor  of  the  priority 
of  Mark's  Gospel,  he  must  be  pronounced  quite  unfortu- 
nate in  a  prominent  part  of  his  critical  presuppositions. 

Keim  expresses  the  opinion  that  in  dealing  with  a  per- 
sonality like  Jesus,  who  so  greatly  transcended  the  meas- 
ure of  his  time  and  of  all  times,  it  is  not  legitimate  to  dis- 
pose of  the  question  of  miracles  by  the  summary  and 
easy-going  method  of  Strauss.^  Nevertheless,  his  own 
dealing  with  this  question  approximates  to  that  of  his 
radical  predecessor.  In  his  view  misinterpretation  of  the 
words  of  Jesus,  magnifying  of  simple  incidents  under 
the  impulse  of  a  boundless  admiration,  and  readiness  to 
paint  a  beloved  Master  after  the  pattern  and  deeds  of  the 
greatest  characters  of  the  Old  Testament,  explain  many 
of  the  stories  of  miraculous  doings.  For  the  reports  of 
the  nature  miracles  no  more  substantial  sources  than 
these  are  to  be  recognized.  On  the  other  hand,  a  very 
considerable  proportion  of  the  acts  of  healing,  whether 
wrought  in  relation  to  the  physically  afflicted  or  in  rela- 
tion to  the  so-called  demoniacs — in  other  words,  the  men- 
tally afflicted — are  deserving  of  credence.  The  way  in 
which  these  acts  are  described  invites  to  confidence.  "It 
is  the  genuinely  historical  Jesus,  who  here  in  compassion- 
ate response  to  need  performs  his  deeds,  there  reluctantly 
exercises  his  power  over  the  might  of  evil,  who  resorts 

'  Geschichte  Jesu  von  Nazara,  I.  65,  66. 


320  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

under  compulsion  to  the  healing-  office,  who  works  on  prin- 
ciple with  the  spiritual  word  and  desires  spiritual  faith, 
and  who  finally  imposes  silence  upon  the  healed.  That  is 
a  kind  of  Jesus  such  as  the  sensuous  appetite  for  marvels 
belonging  to  the  time  could  scarcely  have  invented,"^ 
The  ground  of  the  ability  to  perform  these  works  re- 
sided in  the  spiritual  life  of  Jesus,  in  his  power  of  will, 
confidence,  and  compassion.  A  supplementary  ground 
was  supplied  by  the  faith  of  those  for  whom  the  benefi- 
cent works  were  performed.  "The  decisive  power  lay 
manifestly  in  the  combined  outburst  of  the  faith  [Glaii- 
benssturm]  of  the  sick  and  of  the  healer. "^ 

On  the  subject  of  the  resurrection  of  Jesus,  Keim 
championed  a  theory  which  may  be  regarded  as  a  com- 
promise between  the  catholic  affirmation  of  a  real  bodily 
resurrection  and  the  assumption  of  Renan  and  others 
that  the  appearances  of  the  one  who  had  gone  to  the  cross 
and  the  tomb  were  mere  subjective  appearances.  Keim 
granted,  indeed,  that  the  appearances  came  through  the 
medium  of  visions,  but  maintained  at  the  same  time  that 
these  had  an  objective  ground  in  the  activity  of  Jesus, 
who  in  this  way  made  himself  manifest  to  his  followers.^ 
An  extraordinary  psychical  working  is  thus  made  to  take 
the  place  of  the  physical  miracle. 

Though  denying  the  supernatural  conception  and  the 
preexistence  of  Jesus,  and  defining  him  as  in  essence 
purely  human,  Keim  hardly  stops  short  of  a  worshipful 
eulogy  in  the  tribute  which  he  pays  to  him.  He  accepts 
the  fact  of  his  sinlessness,  and  declares  that  this  by  itself 
puts  him  above  the  category  of  the  mere  religious  genius. 
Any  small  infirmities,  he  says,  which  may  be  thought  to 
have  been  manifested  by  Jesus  were  not  real  sins,  but  only 
natural  incidents  of  the  human  constitution  in  Jesus  and 

•  Geschichte  JesuvonNazara,  II.  141.  ^Ibid.,  II.  155.  '  Ibid.,  III.  600-603. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  321 

of  the  historical  situation.  As  regards  the  hidden  Hfe  of 
his  earher  years,  we  can  reason  back  to  its  exemption  from 
the  stain  of  transgression.  The  one  who  in  his  sinless 
manhood  felt  no  smart  over  his  past  record  must  have 
been  distinguished  by  a  blameless  youth.  And  in  respect 
of  positive  endowments  Jesus  stands  equally  above  the 
ordinary  level.  In  the  characteristics  of  his  inner  life 
and  in  his  historical  significance  he  is  without  parallel. 
He  represents  a  new  stage  in  the  development  of  tlie 
human  spirit.  In  his  person  a  divine  miracle  (das 
Wimder  Gottes)  is  disclosed.  The  spirit  of  sonship 
came  to  perfection  in  him,  and  he  had  in  full  measure 
that  sense  of  human  dignity  and  of  divine  love  which 
exists  in  others  in  marred  and  fragmentary  form.  He 
stands  for  a  new  creation  in  humanity,  a  completion  of 
the  divine  image.  He  is  the  divine  man  in  whom  the 
striving  of  God  after  complete  manifestation  and  the 
restless  struggle  of  man  to  grasp  God  came  to  a  satisfy- 
ing result.  He  exemplifies  the  highest  attainable  stage 
of  the  inner  union  of  God  and  man,  and  one  is  merely 
giving  place  to  an  unworthy  and  impertinent  dream  when 
he  supposes  it  possible  for  another  to  surpass  Jesus  in 
achievement  and  personality.  In  his  transcendence  of 
the  conditions  of  his  time  and  the  characteristics  of  his 
contemporaries  he  makes  the  impression  of  a  mysterious 
uniqueness,  a  superhuman  marvel,  a  divine  creation.  To 
view  his  person  is  to  view  not  merely  a  work  among 
many  works  of  God,  but  the  most  peculiar  work,  the  speci- 
fic revelation  of  God.  In  harmony  with  his  extraordinary 
standing  he  attributes,  even  in  the  face  of  seeming  down- 
fall, eternal  validity  to  his  own  person  and  cause.  He  is 
the  basis  of  rest  and  the  spring  of  motion  in  the  history 
of  the  world,  the  creator  of  a  new  higher  cosmos  whose 
days  are  reckoned  by  millenniums.    Even  his  opponents. 


322  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

in  so  far  as  they  strive  for  the  worthy,  are  compyelled  to 
fight  under  the  banner  of  the  man  who,  after  the  fashion 
of  God,  called  out  of  nothingness,  as  no  other  beside  him 
has  done,  a  world  of  life.^ 

In  view  of  his  estimate  of  the  person  of  Jesus,  Keim 
— and  also  Schenkel  in  a  somewhat  less  emphatic  sense — 
may  be  said  to  have  set  the  door  ajar  for  a  return  to  an 
essentially  catholic  standpoint.  If  one  is  to  admit  so  great 
a  miracle  in  human  history  as  Jesus  is  made  out  to  have 
been,  why  should  real  miracles  be  treated  with  so  much 
incredulity?  Whence  comes  the  assurance  that  the  in- 
comparable person,  in  the  fulfillment  of  an  unparalleled 
mission,  did  not  perform  deeds  of  superhuman  might? 
Why  cut  out  this  work,  and  that  and  the  other — which 
are  properly  subordinated  to  ethical  ends  and  which  fit 
harmoniously  into  narratives  that  fulfill  a  great  didactic 
purpose  ?  We  submit  that  Keim's  conception  of  the  per- 
son of  Jesus  provides  a  rational  basis  for  a  larger  toler- 
ance than  that  which  he  has  awarded  to  the  narratives  of 
miracles  in  the  Gospels. 

In  relation  to  Christological  theory,  also,  Keim's  esti- 
mate of  Jesus  may  be  regarded  as  affording  an  apologetic 
ground  for  the  catholic  belief.  The  altogether  excep- 
tional personality  and  life  of  this  wonderful  benefactor 
of  the  race  call  for  an  explanation.  Is  it  certain  that  any 
better  explanation  can  be  found  than  the  assumption 
of  a  special  bond  between  Jesus  and  the  divine?  And, 
if  a  special  bond  is  to  be  assumed,  is  it  certain  that  we  can 
do  better  than  to  regard  Jesus  as  the  expression  in  time 
of  the  eternally  filial,  as  has  been  claimed  in  catholic 
thinking?  A  manifest  ground  for  taking  this  course  lies 
in  the  New  Testament  content.     Anyone  who  assigns  to 

^  Geschichte  Jesu  von  Nazara,  I.i,  6,  360,  447—449 ;  II.  575  ;  111.219,649—667. 


RENAN  AND  OTHERS  ON  LIFE  OF  JESUS  323 

Jesus  the  lofty  character  and  mission  depicted  by  Keim 
must  contemn  the  notion  that  he  came  by  accident,  and 
must  insist  that  here,  more  certainly  and  grandly  than  at 
any  other  point  of  history,  the  providence  of  God  is  made 
manifest.  Now,  what  else  than  a  consistent  supplement 
to  the  providence  which  furnished  Jesus  can  we  find  in 
the  providence  which  is  adapted  to  afford  a  substantially 
authentic  interpretation  of  his  person  and  mission  ?  Evi- 
dently it  is  favorable  to  the  conservation  of  cong-ruity  in 
divine  procedure  to  suppose  that  divine  illumination  was 
efficiently  operative  in  producing  that  picture  of  the  son- 
ship  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  which  is  set  before  us  in 
the  more  constructive  portions  of  the  New  Testament. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ELEMENTS  OF  RADICALISM  IN  THE  RECENT  CRITICISM 
OF  THE  OLD  TESTAMENT 

I. — Views  Relative  to  the  Stories  of  the 
Patriarchs 

In  the  opinion  of  a  large  proportion  of  scholars  the 
modern  movement  in  biblical  criticism  has  legitimated 
very  considerable  departures  from  the  traditional  con- 
ceptions of  Old  Testament  books  and  institutions.     The 
theory  that  large  portions  of  the  Pentateuch  were  of  post- 
Mosaic  origin,  which  seemed,  as  it  was  voiced  in  the  seven- 
teenth century  by  Hobbes,  Peyrere,  Spinoza,  and  Simon, 
to  be  a  rash  and  unwarrantable  speculation,  has  claimed 
extensive  acceptance.  The  documentary  hypothesis  which 
Astruc  in  the  eighteenth  century  applied  to  Genesis,  and 
which  claimed  the  approval  of  Michaelis  and  Eichhorn, 
was  given  a  much  wider  application  in  the  nineteenth 
century  by  a  succession  of  scholars,  among  whom  a  con- 
spicuous place  was  occupied  by  De  Wette,  Ewald,  Vatke, 
Reuss,  and  Graf.    The  distinctive  thesis  of  the  last  men- 
tioned, whose  treatise  on  The  Historical  Books  of  the  Old 
Testament  appeared  in  1866,  was  the  late  origin  of  the 
priestly  legislation  embodied  in  the  middle  books  of  the 
Pentateuch.     The  same  thesis,  which  locates  this  legis- 
lation in  its  literary  form  within  exilian  or  post-exilian 
times,  was  earnestly  championed  by  Kuenen,  Wellhau- 
sen,  and  others,  and  thus  came  to  be  ranked  in  the  clos- 
ing years  of  the  century  as  a  characteristic  feature  of 
Old  Testament  criticism.     Meanwhile  revised  views  on 
other  portions  of   the  Old  Testament,   notably  on   the 
books  of  Isaiah  and  Daniel,  obtained  large  currency. 

324 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  325 

Extent  of  acceptance  is  doubtless  no  infallible  measure 
of  the  merits  of  critical  theories.  Still,  when  we  con- 
sider the  large  number  of  scholars,  whose  temper  is 
neither  iconoclastic  nor  anti-evangelical,  with  whom  cer- 
tain cardinal  contentions  of  the  newer  criticism  have  be- 
come matters  of  assured  conviction,  we  seem  in  all 
sobriety  to  be  debarred  from  rating  these  contentions  as 
being  in  themselves  specific  manifestations  of  radicalism. 
Consequently  as  here  used  that  term  has  a  less  extensive 
scope  than  has  often  been  given  to  it  by  the  advocate  of  the 
strict  traditional  standpoint.  Without  attempting  to 
decide  just  how  much  of  the  recent  criticism  of  the  Old 
Testament  has  valid  claims  to  tolerance  or  approval,  we 
make  note  of  various  conclusions  which  seem  to  us  to  in- 
volve gratuitous  disparagement  of  the  Hebrew  oracles, 
and  to  be  the  product  rather  of  a  doctrinaire  temper  than 
of  a  sober  historical  judgment. 

First  among  these  conclusions  is  that  which  denies  that 
the  narratives  of  the  patriarchal  progenitors  of  Israel 
contain  anything  of  the  character  of  real  personal  his- 
tory. On  two  different  grounds  this  negative  proposition 
has  been  put  forth  :  first,  on  the  ground  that  the  patriarchs 
Abraham,  Isaac,  Jacob,  etc.,  are  to  be  regarded  as  per- 
sonifications of  tribes,  being  the  forms  under  which  later 
generations  pictured  the  lost  beginnings  of  the  national 
antecedents;  secondly,  on  the  ground  that  what  is  given 
under  these  titles  is  in  substance  nothing  but  a  group  of 
myths  relative  to  the  sky  and  its  orbs. 

The  former  method  of  negating  the  historicity  of  the 
patriarchal  narratives  is  the  one  which  claims  the  larger 
currency  in  the  ranks  of  Old  Testament  critics.  Use  is 
made  of  it,  for  instance,  by  Kuenen.  "The  'sons  of 
Israel,'  "  he  says,  "who  penetrated  into  Canaan  under 
Joshua  formed  a  union  or  bond  of  twelve  kindred  tribes. 


326  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

For  the  present  we  will  pass  over  the  question  how  that 
bond  originated.  Once  in  existence,  it  led  to  the  idea  that 
the  twelve  tribes — just  as  each  separately  had  sprung  from 
one  father — were  collectively  children  of  one  ancestor. 
...  In  short,  the  tribes  were  regarded  and  treated  as 
individuals,  and  were  transferred  to  the  house  of  their 
common  father  in  the  same  mutual  relation  in  which  they 
actually  stood  to  each  other.  ...  Of  course,  we  do  not 
hesitate  to  apply  also  to  the  rest  of  the  patriarchs  the  in- 
terpretation which  we  have  proposed  for  Jacob  and  his 
sons.  As  progenitors  of  tribes — and  it  is  in  this  char- 
acter that  they  appear  in  Genesis — they  too  are  not  per- 
sons, but  personifications.  ...  Of  course,  in  the  abstract, 
it  is  possible  that  such  persons  as  Abraham,  Isaac,  and 
Jacob  should  have  existed.  .  .  .  But  our  present  investi- 
gation does  not  concern  the  question  whether  there  ex- 
isted men  of  those  names,  but  whether  the  progenitors 
of  Israel,  and  of  the  neighboring  nations  who  are  repre- 
sented in  Genesis,  are  historical  personages.  It  is  this 
question  which  we  answer  in  the  negative."^ 

The  same  scheme  of  interpretation  is  adopted  by  Well- 
hausen.  In  his  view  the  stories  of  the  forefathers  in 
Genesis  proceeded  from  the  ethnological  relations  and 
arrangements  of  worship  of  the  time  of  the  kings,  being 
the  representations  with  which  the  story-tellers  and 
writers  of  that  age,  borrowing  from  their  own  surround- 
ings, filled  up  the  empty  canvas  beyond  the  Mosaic 
period.2  The  stories  are  not  pure  myths ;  but  such  facts 
as  they  may  embrace  belong  rather  to  national  or  tribal 
history  than  to  that  of  individuals.  "The  Leah  tribes 
were  comprehended  with  the  Rachel  tribes  under  the 
common  father  Jacob-Israel ;  then  entire  Israel  with  the 

>  The  Religion  of  Israel  to  the  Pall  of  the  Jewish  State,  trans,  by  A.  H. 
May,  I.  111-113. 

'  Israelitische  und  Judische  Geschichte,  second  edition,  p.  ir. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  327 

people  of  Edom  under  the  old  name  Isaac ;  further,  Isaac 
with  Lot,  the  father  of  Moab  and  Ammon,  under  Abra- 
ham. .  .  .  The  historical  succession  and  juxtaposition 
conform  to  the  method  of  logical  or  statistical  subordina- 
tion and  coordination;  in  reality  the  elements  are  com- 
monly older  than  the  groups,  and  the  smaller  groups 
older  than  the  larger."  Thus  Abraham  is  the  youngest 
figure  in  the  series,  and  probably  was  prefixed  to  Isaac 
at  a  comparatively  late  date.  Abraham,  it  is  true,  is  not 
known  to  have  been  the  name  of  a  tribe  or  people.  But 
that  affords  no  suitable  warrant  for  regarding  him  as  an 
historical  person;  "sooner  he  might  be  esteemed  the  free 
creation  of  spontaneous  poetizing."^ 

Stade  is  equally  pronounced  in  denying  to  the  patri- 
archs the  character  of  historical  persons,  and  decides  that 
the  representation  of  their  sojourn  in  the  country  west 
of  the  Jordan  is  without  any  good  basis  in  fact.^  The 
thoroughly  legendary  character  of  the  Genesis  narratives 
is  also  affirmed  by  Smend.  "The  history  of  the  fore- 
fathers," he  maintains,  "is  only  an  ideal  prefiguration  of 
the  history  of  Israel,  and  the  intercourse  of  Jahve  with  the 
forefathers  is  only  an  expression  of  the  faith  that  his 
grace  was  already  operative  in  the  first  beginnings  of 
Israel."^ 

As  a  representative  of  those  who  see  in  the  patriarchal 
history,  above  all  else,  a  set  of  myths  relating  to  the  sky 
and  its  orbs,  we  may  mention  Goldziher.  "Originally," 
he  says,  "the  names  of  the  patriarchs  and  the  actions 
which  are  told  of  them  signified  nothing  historical,  but 
only  something  in  the  domain  of  nature.  The  names  are 
appellations  of  physical  phenomena,  and  the  actions  are 


1  Prolegomena  zur  Geschichte  Israels,  second  edition,  pp.  336-338. 
'  Geschichte   des   Volkes   Israel,    I.    127;  Biblische  Theologie   des   Alten 
Testaments,   §  22. 

"  Lehrbuch  der  alttestamentlichen  Religionsgeschichte,  p.  12. 


328  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

actions  of  nature."^  The  way  in  which  Goldziher  appHes 
this  exegetical  canon  may  be  observed  in  the  following 
sentences :  "We  see  in  the  myths  of  Abraham  and  of 
Jephthah  the  two  sides  of  the  same  idea,  each  having  its 
peculiar  form  and  frame:  the  former  tells  of  the  victory 
of  the  night,  the  dark  sky  of  night,  over  the  sun;  the 
latter  of  that  of  the  dawn  over  the  shades  of  night.  .  .  . 
One  of  the  most  conspicuous  names  of  the  dark  sky  of 
night  or  clouds  in  the  Hebrew  mythology,  and  contain- 
ing a  rich  fund  of  mythical  matter,  is  Jacob.  .  .  .  Both 
Esau  and  Laban  are  solar  figures.  What  we  learn  of 
them  in  the  epic  treatment  of  the  old  myth  found  in  the 
Old  Testament  presents  a  multitude  of  solar  character- 
istics. We  especially  note  this  in  Esau,  whose  heel  Jacob 
grasps  at  their  birth.  This  mythical  expression  is  clear 
enough.  Night  comes  into  the  world  with  day's  heel  in 
his  hand,  or,  as  we  should  say.  Night  follows  close  upon 
day,  driving  him  from  his  place. "^ 

Winckler  resorts  in  ample  measure  to  a  similar  line 
of  interpretation  in  his  radical  curtailment  of  the  his- 
toricity of  the  biblical  narratives  up  to  the  accounts  of  the 
early  kings  of  Israel.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  true,  he  sup- 
poses that  these  narratives  were  born  of  the  tendency 
of  a  relatively  late  age  to  depict  the  past  after  the  pattern 
of  its  own  conditions,  a  procedure  which  was  patronized 
with  special  industry  by  David  and  the  writers  of  his  court 
under  the  pressure  of  a  political  exigency.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  supposes  Babylonian  mythology  and  as- 
trology to  have  been  a  potent  factor  in  shaping  the  nar- 
ratives in  question.^  Abraham  when  placed  in  conjunc- 
tion with  Lot  reduces  in  his  interpretation  to  one  of  the 


•  Mythology  Among  the  Hebrews  and  its  Historical  Development,  trans, 
by  R.  Martineau,  p.  i8.  '  Pages  104,  133,  134. 

3  Geschichte  Israels.  Die  Keilinschriften  und  das  alte  Testament,  3te 
aufl.  von  E.  Schrader,  neu  bearbeitet  von  H.  Zimmem  und  E.  Winckler. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  329 

Dioscuri.  As  the  husband  of  Sarah,  who  stands  for  Ish- 
tar,  he  is  identified  with  Tammuz,  and  thus  is  associated 
with  the  moon  god  Sin,  the  father  of  Tammuz  and  Ish- 
tar.  Jacob  also  bears  the  character  of  a  moon  divinity, 
only  as  the  father  of  twelve  sons  he  is  connected  rather 
with  the  completion  of  the  year  than  with  the  month. 
Stucken  is  at  one  with  Winckler  in  his  disposition  to  read 
into  the  early  history  of  Israel  a  set  of  myths  derived  from 
star-worshiping  Babylonia.  He  is  minded,  however,  to 
construe  Abraham  as  primarily  representing  Orion,  and 
Sarah  as  standing  for  Sirius.^  Zimmern,  while  admit- 
ting that  some  of  the  points  made  by  Winckler,  in  his 
endeavor  to  detect  lunar,  solar,  or  stellar  myths  in  the 
stories  of  the  forefathers,  are  untenable,  still  holds  that 
his  work  in  that  direction  is  quite  legitimate  and  in  vari- 
ous points  successful."^ 

Evidently  the  two  theories  for  explaining  the  content 
of  the  patriarchal  narratives,  if  taken  in  a  radical  sense, 
are  not  compatible  each  with  the  other.  If  the  funda- 
mental motive  in  the  construction  of  these  narratives  was 
supplied  by  ethnological  conditions,  then  it  was  not  fur- 
nished by  a  vivid  impression  of  solar,  lunar,  or  stellar 
phenomena.  If  the  narratives  are  in  essence  personifica- 
tions of  tribal  facts,  then  they  are  not  in  essence  astral 
myths.  Place  can  logically  be  made  for  either  theory 
only  by  reduction  of  emphasis  upon  the  other.  As  re- 
spects the  relative  merits  of  the  two,  the  weight  of 
scholarship  and  the  demands  of  sober  thinking  alike,  as 
it  seems  to  us,  award  the  preference  to  the  former.  It 
makes  by  far  too  great  a  strain  upon  a  reasonable  faith 
to  ask  one  to  believe  that  the  most  vital  factors  in  the  na- 


*  Astralnrv'then  der  Hebraer,  Babylonier  und  Aegypter. 
^  Die  Keilinschriften  und  das  Alte  Testament,  p.  365. 


330  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

tional  and  religious  consciousness  of  a  people  had  noth- 
ing to  do  with  a  real  historical  evolution,  an  actual  na- 
tional drama,  but  were  simply  translations  into  other 
terms  of  facts  open  to  the  common  gaze  of  men  on  the 
face  of  tlie  sky.  To  suppose  that  the  Israelites,  to  the 
neglect  of  all  reminiscence  of  their  own  past,  engrossed 
themselves  in  a  play  with  mythological  phantoms  is  to 
suppose  that  they  were  veritably  a  moonstruck  people. 
Then,  too,  how  closely  it  borders  on  the  grotesque  to 
assume  any  sort  of  connection  between  various  passages 
in  the  patriarchal  stories  and  the  alternating  appearances 
of  day  and  night,  of  sun  and  moon,  of  clear  sky  and 
clouds.  When  the  mythologist  asks  us  to  see  in  the  de- 
scription of  the  relations  between  Sarah  and  Hagar  a 
figurative  representation  of  the  rivalry  between  the  moon 
and  the  sun,  we  are  inclined  to  ask  him  what  there  is  to 
prevent  an  unfelicitous  item,  which  may  chance  to  find 
a  place  in  his  own  domestic  annals,  from  being  inter- 
preted in  the  same  way.  Positive  disproof  of  his  peculiar 
exegesis  may  not  be  easy ;  but  there  is  scanty  need  of  such 
disproof.  Its  own  fancifulness  and  artificiality  may 
safely  be  trusted  to  limit  very  decidedly  the  patronage 
awarded  to  his  scheme  of  interpretation. 

The  ethnological  theory,  which  supposes  that  under 
the  names  of  the  patriarchs  of  Israel  the  tribes,  out  of 
which  the  nations  of  later  times  grew,  were  pictured  in 
their  inferred  characteristics  and  relations,  has  its  most 
plausible  ground  in  the  fact  that  in  the  early  biblical  lists 
a  close  discrimination  between  individuals  and  tribes  or 
peoples  seems  not  to  have  been  observed.  In  the  tenth 
chapter  of  Genesis,  for  example,  nations  are  mentioned 
as  individuals,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  individual  Nim- 
rod  is  placed  in  relation  to  one  of  them,  namely  Cush,  as 
a  son.    But  too  much  is  not  to  be  made  out  of  instances 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  331 

like  these.  The  failure  to  discriminate  verbally  between 
the  tribe  and  the  individual  in  a  passing  reference  is  quite 
a  different  thing  from  treating  a  tribe  as  an  individual 
throughout  the  details  of  an  extended  narrative.  The 
proof  that  a  biblical  writer  could  proceed  in  the  former 
way  is  far  from  conclusive  evidence  that  he  was  capable 
of  proceeding  in  the  latter  way. 

Quite  as  inconclusive  is  another  ground  which  has  been 
urged  for  the  ethnological  theory.  The  Israelitish  con- 
ception of  the  patriarchal  history,  says  the  advocate  of 
that  theory,  goes  on  the  supposition  that  nations  or  tribes 
come  into  being  by  the  growth  of  a  family  which  had  its 
beginning  in  a  single  ancestor.  This  supposition,  it  is 
claimed,  is  baseless.  "It  is  quite  certain,"  writes  Kuenen, 
"that,  although  it  is  not  entirely  supposititious,  this  theory 
of  the  origin  of  nations  is  not  the  true  one.  Families 
become  tribes,  and  eventually  nations,  not  only,  nor  even 
chiefly,  by  multiplying,  but  also,  nay,  principally,  by  com- 
bination with  the  inhabitants  of  some  district,  by  the 
subjection  of  the  weaker  to  the  stronger,  by  the  gradual 
blending  together  of  sometimes  very  heterogeneous  ele- 
ments."^ The  trouble  with  this  pronouncement  is  that  it 
takes  too  little  account  of  varying  conditions.  Where 
causes,  whether  social,  moral,  or  physical,  conduce  to  a 
relative  isolation  it  is  quite  possible  that  for  a  consider- 
able period  family  expansion  should  be  the  principal 
means  of  approach  to  tribal  or  national  dimensions.  That 
Israel  in  its  early  stages  grew  principally — it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  say  exclusively — in  this  way  is  quite  conceivable, 
and  is  not  to  be  summarily  denied  on  the  score  of  a 
sweeping  postulate  as  to  historic  process. 

The  theory  under  review,  it  should  be  observed,  would 
not  be  justified  by  the  discovery  that  one  or  another 

*  The  Religion  of  Israel,  I.  1 10. 


22,2  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

item  appropriate  to  a  tribe  had  been  associated  by  the 
bibhcal  writer  with  the  name  of  a  patriarch.  Not  to  men- 
tion the  fact  of  possible  similarities  between  the  char- 
acter and  position  of  an  individual  and  of  the  tribe 
emanating  from  him,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that,  in  his 
attempt  to  picture  the  remote  historical  individual,  the 
sacred  writer  might  blend  with  matter  properly  descrip- 
tive of  the  individual  something  which  was  primarily 
suggested  by  tribal  or  national  facts.  Indeed,  there  are 
scholars  who,  while  they  contend  that  the  Israelitish 
patriarchs  were  actual  persons,  still  are  disposed  to  admit 
that  the  narratives  about  them  in  the  Bible  were  colored 
to  some  extent  by  ethnological  data  in  the  mind  of  the 
narrator.* 

Positive  objections  to  the  scheme  which  excludes  patri- 
archal individuals  in  favor  of  tribes  are  not  wanting.  In 
the  first  place,  it  is  not  known  that  the  names  of  some  of 
these  reputed  individuals  were  employed  as  a  customary 
or  even  exceptional  designation  of  a  tribe.  This  is  true 
of  the  head  of  the  patriarchal  list.  As  was  noticed  above, 
Wellhausen  confesses  as  much,  and  knows  not  how  better 
to  dispose  of  Abraham  than  to  classify  him  as  the  prod- 
uct of  spontaneous  poetizing. 

Again,  if  in  the  early  and  continuous  tradition  of  Israel 
no  reference  was  made  to  great  personalities  back  of  Moses 
their  intrusion  upon  the  theater  of  the  national  history  by 
a  late  generation  needs  to  be  explained.  We  may  say  with 
Driver,  "Why,  unless  there  had  been  positive  historical 
recollections  forbidding  it  to  do  so,  did  not  Israelite  tra- 
dition concentrate  all  the  glory  of  founding  the  national 
Church  and  State  upon  Moses  ?  If,  in  spite  of  the  great 
deliverance  undoubtedly  achieved  by  Moses,  Israelitish 
tradition  nevertheless  goes  back  beyond  Moses,  and  finds 

*  Ryle,  article  "Abraham  "  in  Hastings's  Dictioifery  of  the  Bible,  I.  15.  16. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  333 

in  the  patriarchs  the  first  roots  not  only  of  the  possession 
of  the  land,  but  also  of  the  people's  higher  worship  of  God, 
this  can  only  be  reasonably  accounted  for  by  the  assumption 
that  memory  had  retained  a  hold  of  the  actual  course  of 
events."^  The  high  importance  claimed  by  the  patriarchs 
in  the  national  consciousness  is,  in  truth,  a  pretty  cogent 
evidence  on  the  side  of  the  belief  that  they  were  not  mere 
products  of  artificial  construction.  No  lengthy  discourse, 
it  is  true,  is  expended  upon  them  by  the  prophets;  but 
they  are  introduced  in  a  way  which  presumes  upon  a 
common  recognition  of  their  lofty  standing  and  function. 
Even  the  earliest  of  the  literary  prophets  have  recorded 
indubitable  references  to  Isaac  and  Jacob,^  and  both  of 
these  are  coupled  in  Deuteronomy  with  Abraham,^  who 
further  is  mentioned  by  the  elder  Isaiah,*  by  Micah,'* 
by  Jeremiah,^  by  Ezekiel/  and  by  the  later  Isaiah.®  Some 
of  these  references  may  have  been  denied  by  various 
critics  to  the  writers  under  whose  names  they  are  given. 
It  does  not  appear,  however,  that  their  challenge  has  any 
very  solid  grounds  aside  from  theoretical  bias.^  The  war- 
rantable conclusion  is  that  the  prophets  as  a  body  made 
no  more  question  about  the  historic  verity  and  eminence 
of  the  Israelitish  patriarchs  than  they  did  about  the 
reality  of  Moses  and  the  redemption  from  Egyptian 
bondage. 

Finally,  we  have  an  evidence  which  is  adapted  to  ap- 
peal equally  to  the  ordinary  reader  and  to  the  scholar. 
The  patriarchal  stories  read  like  the  history  of  individuals. 
Most  of  their  details  were  not  needed  for  the  portrayal 
of  tribal  facts,  and  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  any  motive 


'  The  Book  of  Genesis,  with  Introduction  and  Notes,  p.  xlvii. 

2  Amos  vii.  9,  16;  Hos.  xii.  3-5,  12.  3  Deut.  i.  8;  vi.  10;  xxx.  20. 

*  Isa.  xxix.  22.  5  Mic.  vii.  20.  '  Jer.  xxxiii.  26. 
'  Ezek.  xxxiii.  24.                                  '  Isa.  xli.  8;  li.  i,  2. 

•  Compare  James  Orr,  The  Problem  of  the  Old  Testament,  pp.  94-98. 


334  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

for  their  introduction  by  a  writer  who  had  a  design  to 
sketch  facts  of  that  order.^ 

II. — Estimates  of  Moses  as  Leader  and  Lawgiver 
It  is  only  at  the  extreme  end  of  critical  negation  that 
an  out-and-out  denial  of  the  historicity  of  Moses  has  been 
entered.  Occasionally  an  intemperate  champion  of  celes- 
tial mythology  or  a  zealot  for  the  pan-Babylonian  concep- 
tion of  ancient  history  may  have  gone  to  that  excess. 
But  with  the  great  body  of  critics  the  reality  of  Moses 
as  an  historical  character  has  been  a  steadfast  datum. 
The  question,  therefore,  which  it  is  worth  while  to  con- 
sider concerns  not  so  much  his  real  existence  as  the  na- 
ture and  extent  of  the  work  whicli  he  accomplished. 

In  pronouncing  on  these  points  Kuenen  hardly  repre- 
sents the  acme  of  critical  radicalism.  He  admits  the 
actual  occurrence  of  an  exodus  from  Egypt,  in  the  man- 
agement of  which  a  potent  leadership  was  demanded  and 
exercised.  "We  may  not  doubt,"  he  says,  "that  the 
exodus  is  an  historical  fact.  Independently  of  the  Penta- 
teuch and  the  book  of  Joshua,  it  is  proved  by  the  testi- 
mony of  the  prophets.  They  obviously  start  from  the  sup- 
position that  none  of  their  contemporaries  disagree  with 
them  as  to  the  deliverance  out  of  Egypt.  This  would  be 
inexplicable  if  the  Israelites  had  not  really  dwelt  in 
Egypt,  and  escaped  from  Pharaoh's  control  before  they 
settled  in  Canaan."^  Kuenen  also  concedes  the  proba- 
bility that  in  the  Pentateuch,  as  we  have  it,  there  is  one 
great  memorial  of  the  legislative  activity  of  Moses.  "He 
endeavored,"  writes  the  critic,  "to  inculcate  his  own  con- 
ception of  the  requirements  of  Jahve^  on  the  people  whom 

1  Compare  Driver,  article  "Jacob,"  Hastings's  Dictionary  of  the  Bible, 
II.  534.  2  The  Religion  of  Israel,  I.  117- 

s  Some  of  the  critics  with  whom  we  are  dealing  use  this  form,  and  we 
have  taken  the  liberty  to  employ  it  generally  in  references  to  the  covenant 
God  of  Israel. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  335 

he  liberated.  We  learn  what  this  conception  was  from 
the  ten  commandments,  or  'the  ten  words,'  as  they  are 
called  in  the  Pentateuch  itself.  They  are  most  probably 
derived,  if  not  in  their  present  form,  yet  as  far  as  the 
main  thoughts  are  concerned,  from  Moses  himself."^ 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  Kuenen  makes  a  sweeping  reduc- 
tion from  the  record  traditionally  connected  with  Moses. 
We  have  in  that  record,  he  contends,  as  also  in  that  rela- 
tive to  Joshua,  an  illustration  of  a  compacting  process. 
"Events  which  in  reality  were  distributed  over  a  very- 
long  period,  deeds  which  were  achieved  by  more  than  one 
generation  and  mostly  by  particular  tribes,  were  com- 
pressed by  tradition  into  a  very  short  space  of  time  and 
were  ascribed  to  all  Israel."^  Nor  was  this  all.  A  very 
free  hand  was  used  in  describing  the  events  associated 
with  the  Mosaic  period.  The  books  from  Exodus  to 
Joshua  inclusive  abound  in  accounts  which  will  not  en- 
dure critical  inspection.  "Their  representations,  to  put  it 
in  a  word,  are  utterly  unhistorical,  and  therefore  cannot 
have  been  committed  to  writing,  till  centuries  after  Moses 
and  Joshua."^  Even  those  passages  in  the  reputed  his- 
tory which  exhibit  Moses  as  the  inculcator  of  a  monothe- 
istic faith  cannot  be  accepted  without  qualification.  What 
can  legitimately  be  affirmed  is  that  he  imposed  a  type  of 
religious  obligation  which  naturally  worked  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  lofty  monotheistic  standpoint  of  the  literary 
prophets.  "It  is  highly  probable  that  he  received  a  deep 
impression  of  the  might  and  glory  of  the  God  of  his  na- 
tion, chose  him  for  the  sole  object  of  his  adoration,  and 
elevated  this  his  choice  into  a  law  for  all  Israel."^  As  re- 
spects the  authorship  of  written  laws,  nothing  can  be 


1  The  Five  Books  of  Moses:  a  Lecture  Delivered  in  1870.  See  also  The 
Religion  of  Israel,  I.  274;  II.  7.  '  The  Religion  of  Israel,  I.  134. 

^  An  Historico-Critical  Inquiry  into  the  Origin  and  Composition  of  the 
Hexateuch,  p.  42.  *  The  Religion  of  Israel,  I.  280. 


336  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

accredited  to  Moses  aside  from  a  brief  form  of  "the  ten 
words."  No  authoritative  code  having  Mosaic  associa- 
tions was  pubHshed  before  the  age  of  Josiah.  Any  col- 
lections of  laws  which  may  have  been  in  existence  before 
that  time  were  without  governmental  sanction.  To  no 
extant  collection  did  the  prophets  as  a  body  accord  the 
character  of  a  divinely  sanctioned  code.  "Least  of  all 
did  they  recognize  the  authority  of  the  ceremonial  in- 
junctions; for  if  we  except  Ezekiel  and  certain  utterances 
relative  to  the  Sabbath,  they  show  complete  indifference 
toward  them  or  even  declare  that  they  do  not  include 
them  among  the  commands  of  Jahve."^ 

Wellhausen  agrees  very  largely  with  Kuenen,  but  on 
some  points  appears  a  shade  more  negative  in  his  views. 
He  qualifies  very  appreciably  the  office  of  Moses  as  the 
reputed  founder  of  a  theocratic  state.  Moses,  he  says, 
proclaimed  Jahve  as  the  God  of  Israel.  But  a  state  specifi- 
cally distinguished  by  holiness  he  did  not  found  on  that 
basis ;  or,  if  he  did,  it  did  not  have  the  slightest  practical 
consequence  or  the  least  historical  significance.  "Out  of 
the  common  religious  feeling  grew  for  the  first  time  the 
state,  and  indeed  not  a  specially  holy  state,  but  the  state 
as  such."2  Again,  Wellhausen  treats  as  utterly  unhis- 
torical  the  supposed  connection  of  Moses  with  the  Penta- 
teuchal  legislation.  "The  law,"  he  asserts,  "is  the  prod- 
uct of  the  spiritual  development  of  Israel,  not  the  start- 
ing point  thereof.  As  a  whole  it  is  first  adapted  to  post- 
exilian  Judaism  and  shows  itself  then  for  the  first  time 
as  operative;  previously  it  had  no  adaptation  and  was 
perfectly  latent."^  Not  even  so  much  as  "the  ten  words" 
can  be  referred  to  Mosaic  authorship.  So  at  least  the 
critic  seems  to  teach  in  what  he  says  of  the  relation  of  the 

1  The  Religion  of  Israel,   II.   7,   8;  The  Origin  and  Composition  of  the 
Hexateuch,  p.  175. 

2  Israelitische  und  Judische  Geschichte,  p.  30.  '  Ibid.,  p.    17- 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  Z2,7 

decalogue  to  the  Deuteronomic  reformation  in  the  reign  of 
Josiah,^  Further,  Wellhausen  is  very  positive  in  repudia- 
ting the  conclusion  that  Moses  is  entitled  to  be  regarded 
as  an  inaugurator  of  monotheism.  "That  is  contra- 
dicted," he  argues,  "most  emphatically  by  the  simple  fact 
that  Jahve  is  a  proper  name,  which  gives  prominence  to 
one  individual  in  a  genus.  Monotheism  was  unknown  to 
ancient  Israel."  He  adds:  "As  little  as  Jahve  was  the 
universal  God,  so  little  was  he  in  our  sense  the  super- 
sensible and  spiritual  God.  Finally,  if  the  idea  of  the  God- 
head as  fundamentally  moral  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  Mosaic 
inheritance  of  ancient  Israel,  that  can  occur  only  with 
very  limited  right.  At  least  we  must  keep  at  a  distance 
our  conception  of  morality."^ 

Stade  and  Smend  so  nearly  coincide  with  Wellhausen 
on  this  theme  that  there  is  no  need  to  give  their  views  in 
detail.  Both  deny  that  Moses  fulfilled  the  role  of  a  law- 
giver in  any  eminent  sense  and  locate  his  historical  im- 
portance in  what  he  did  rather  than  in  what  he  wrote, 
namely,  in  the  fruitful  beginnings  of  a  new  national  and 
religious  career  which  he  helped  to  create  for  Israel.  Both 
teach  that  he  inculcated  rather  the  exclusive  service  of 
Jahve  than  a  proper  theoretical  monotheism.  The  Mosaic 
authorship  of  the  decalogue  is  questioned  by  Stade,  and 
Smend  discredits  the  historic  verity  of  the  Sinaitic 
covenant.^ 

In  an  attempt  to  estimate  Moses  the  scientific  inquirer, 
it  must  be  admitted,  deals  in  considerable  part  with  proba- 
bilities rather  than  with  certainties.  Just  how  much  of  the 
traditional  views  can  stand  the  test  is  not  a  matter  for 
precise  and  conclusive  historical  induction.    The  best  that 

•  Israelitische  und  Judische  Geschichte,  p.  130.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  30-32. 

'  Stade,  Geschichte  des  Volkes  Israel,  also  Biblische  Theologie  des  Alten 
Testaments;  Smend,  Lehrbuch  der  alttestamentlichen  Religionsgeschichte. 


338  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

can  be  done  is  to  observe  a  just  balance  in  weighing  evi- 
dences which  seem  to  make  for  conflicting  propositions. 
In  our  view  the  more  negative  critics  have  sometimes 
shared  in  the  fault  which  they  have  so  freely  charged 
against  the  traditionalists.  In  their  partiality  for  certain 
presuppositions  they  have  permitted  themselves  to  be 
pushed  into  a  one-sided  review  of  the  evidences  and  have 
used  the  faculty  of  critical  divination  with  unwarrantable 
freedom  and  confidence. 

What  has  just  been  said  may  be  applied  on  the  theme 
of  the  significance  of  Moses  as  a  religious  leader.  Some 
weight  may  undoubtedly  be  given  to  the  presupposition 
that  the  high  ideal  of  ethical  monotheism  was  progres- 
sively developed  in  Israel.  But  this  presupposition  may 
easily  be  overworked.  If  history  attests  that  the  law  of 
gradual  progress  has  had  a  wide  scope  in  the  perfecting 
of  religious  thought,  it  attests  no  less  that  gifted  person- 
alities have  been  the  efficient  agents  of  progress,  and  have 
betimes  struck  levels  of  religious  feeling  and  conception 
to  which  succeeding  generations  for  lengthened  periods 
have  found  it  difficult  to  ascend.  As  Kautzsch  remarks, 
"Those  who  recognize  everywhere  simple  development 
in  a  straight  line  from  crude  or  at  least  naive  naturalism 
to  more  and  more  purified  moral  conceptions  quite  over- 
look the  circumstance  that  their  contention  is  opposed 
by  demonstrably  historical  facts.  Epoch-making  religious 
ideas  generally  come  upon  the  scene  in  full  strength  and 
purity;  it  is  only  in  course  of  further  development  that 
these  products  of  religious  creative  genius,  or,  better, 
of  divine  impulse,  are  corrupted  and  disfigured  by  the 
intrusion  of  vulgar  ideas  and  selfish  interests.  Such  was 
the  fate  of  the  religion  of  Jesus  Christ  in  the  Roman 
Church  with  its  popes  and  monks;  and  the  same  thing 
happened  to  many  of  the  great  fundamental  ideas  of  the 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  339 

Reformation  at  the  hands  of  Protestant  scholasticism. 
And  we  are  quite  safe  to  assume  something  of  the  same 
kind  in  the  process  of  the  development  of  Jahvism.  The 
great  fundamental  ideas  upon  which  its  institution  rests 
were  often  forced  into  the  background  during  the  wander- 
ing period  of  the  people's  history  and  in  the  time  of  end- 
less struggles  for  national  existence  under  the  Judges."^ 
From  this  standpoint  it  is  clearly  apparent  that  criticism 
makes  a  very  dubious  venture  when  it  selects  from  the 
books  pertaining  to  the  post-Mosaic  period  sentences 
which  imply  an  inferior  conception  of  Jahve  or  of  his 
moral  government,  and  then  proceed  to  draw  the  infer- 
ence that  a  high  standard  could  not  have  been  set  forth 
by  Moses.  In  the  same  books  glimpses  of  higher  and 
better  conceptions  unquestionably  are  in  evidence.  Now, 
it  is  easy  enough  to  affirm  that  the  latter  were  bor- 
rowed by  the  historians  from  a  late  stage  of  development, 
while  the  former  are  a  true  token  of  views  handed  down 
from  the  age  of  the  founder  and  left  unchallenged  by  his 
standard.  But  evidently  it  is  not  so  easy  to  prove  that 
the  lower  grade  of  conceptions  does  not  represent  a  lapse, 
by  reason  of  intellectual  and  moral  slowness,  from  an  ideal 
recognized  at  an  earlier  time  by  at  least  the  best  spirits 
in  Israel.  Certainly  the  early  publication  of  the  high 
ideal  was  matter  of  earnest  conviction  throughout  the 
later  ages.  Not  a  single  champion  of  ethical  monotheism 
in  the  post-Mosaic  history  of  Israel  has  left  on  record 
the  slightest  intimation  that  he  regarded  himself  as  an 
innovator  in  his  advocacy  of  that  system.  In  the  ab- 
sence, then,  of  an  a  priori  theory  as  to  the  necessary 
course  of  religious  development,  there  is  no  positive  veto 
to  the  conclusion  that  Moses  stood  practically  on  the  plane 
of  ethical  monotheism,  though  it  may  be  admitted  that 

^  Article  "Religion  of  Israel,"  Hastings's  Dictionary  of  the  Bible,  V.  632. 


340  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

his  interest  was  rather  centered  upon  the  exclusive  right 
of  Jahve  over  Israel  than  upon  the  theoretic  question  of 
the  sole  validity  of  the  monotheistic  postulate.  The  ob- 
jection that  Jahve  as  a  personal  name  denotes  one  repre- 
sentative of  a  genus  is  rather  verbal  than  substantial.  An 
historical  consideration  could  easily  have  afforded,  espe- 
cially in  an  age  not  given  to  abstract  terminology,  a  pref- 
erence for  the  personal  name  even  on  the  part  of  one 
who  was  disposed  to  put  into  it  a  monotheistic  significa- 
tion. 

In  regard  to  the  legislative  function  of  Moses,  if  there 
is  reason  to  stop  short  of  dogmatic  affirmations  there  is 
equal  ground  to  refrain  from  sweeping  negations.  One 
broad  fact  may  legitimately  be  given  much  weight  as 
against  the  latter.  In  all  the  later  ages  of  Israel's  history 
Moses  was  accorded  an  unrivaled  position  as  the  national 
lawgiver.  That  reputation  evidently  antedated  every  Old 
Testament  code  which  criticism  finds  any  reason  for  as- 
signing to  post-Mosaic  times ;  for,  apart  from  such  reputa- 
tion, the  compiler  or  editor  of  a  code  could  neither  have 
experienced  a  motive  nor  apprehended  a  right  to  associ- 
ate it  with  the  name  of  Moses.  The  fact  that  the  associa- 
tion was  made  so  uniformly  is  a  clear  proof  of  a  ruling 
conviction  that  the  groundwork  of  Israd's  legislation 
was  derived  from  the  great  leader  in  the  Exodus.  The 
firm  intrenchment  of  this  conviction  in  the  national  con- 
sciousness may  properly  count  for  something  as  an  his- 
torical token.  It  is  claimed,  it  is  true,  on  the  other  side, 
that  the  prophets  as  good  as  ignored  the  function  of  Moses 
as  lawgiver.  But  this  claim  is  in  need  of  a  better  justi- 
fication than  has  been  given.  Doubtless,  in  their  lofty 
appreciation  of  the  ethical  conditions  of  the  divine  king- 
dom, and  in  their  struggle  against  a  shallow  and  lax 
public  conscience,  the  prophets  were  capable  of  speaking 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  341 

in  a  depreciatory  tone  of  the  virtue  of  ceremonial  obser- 
vances. This  fact,  however,  is  perfectly  intelligible  apart 
from  the  supposition  that  they  entertained  very  slight 
regard  for  the  function  of  Moses  as  lawgiver.  Their 
zeal  for  higher  things  made  it  possible  for  them  to  put 
into  an  impassioned  message  a  disparaging  reference  to 
the  inferior  interest  of  mere  ritual.^ 

The  infrequency  of  their  formal  references  to  Moses 
might  seem,  indeed,  to  imply  the  lack  of  any  vivid  im- 
pression of  his  achievements  as  a  framer  of  national 
institutions.  But  we  are  advised  against  a  hasty  resort 
to  this  inference  by  prominent  historical  facts.  In  the 
book  of  Deuteronomy,  which  no  one  supposes  to  have 
been,  in  its  main  contents,  later  than  the  reign  of  Josiah, 
and  which  therefore  was  in  evidence  in  the  midst  of  the 
great  prophetical  era,  the  lawgiving  function  of  Moses  is 
profoundly  emphasized.  That  a  book  so  largely  imbued 
with  the  prophetical  animus  as  is  Deuteronomy  should 
take  this  ground  may  be  counted  no  mean  indication  of 
the  common  understanding  in  the  ranks  of  the  prophets 
as  to  what  was  actually  included  in  the  providential  vo- 
cation of  Moses.  Moreover,  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that 
their  minds  escaped  being  influenced  by  the  picture  of 
Mosaic  leadership  and  of  the  transactions  at  Sinai  which 
were  contained  in  the  Jahvist  and  Elohist  narratives. 
In  short.  Professor  Orr  seems  to  keep  within  the  bounds 
of  a  sober  induction  when  he  says :  "If  Deuteronomy  was 
promulgated  in  the  reign  of  Josiah ;  if  the  JE  histories 
existed  a  century  and  a  half  earlier,  it  is  strange  inconse- 
quence to  talk  of  the  paucity  of  references  in  the  prophets 
before  Malachi  as  showing  that  Moses  was  not  connected 
in  the  Israelitish  mind  with  the  work  of  legislation."^    As 

1  Compare  Konig,  Der  Offenbarungsbegriff  des  Alten  Testaments,  II.  351, 
352.  *  The  Problem  of  the  Old  Testament,  pp.  99,  100. 


342  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

previously  indicated,  it  is  remote  from  our  intention  to 
attempt  to  measure  precisely  the  function  of  Moses  as 
legislator.  What  we  have  said  we  have  said  in  justifica- 
tion of  the  conviction  that  the  more  negative  theories 
proceed  beyond  the  warrant  of  the  evidence.  The  repu- 
tation of  Moses  as  lawgiver  is  not  shown  to  have  been 
simply  the  product  of  an  unhistoric  imagination  or  of 
sacerdotal  invention.  It  is  permissible  to  believe  that  it 
was  built  upon  a  real  historic  basis. 

III. — Judgments  on  Prophecy 

Sentences  which  read  like  distinct  declarations  of  a 
naturalistic  standpoint  occur  in  the  writings  of  Kuenen. 
The  notion  that  Israel  was  specially  selected  of  God  to 
serve  as  the  medium  of  a  divine  revelation  he  repudiates 
as  a  childish  fancy.  'Tsrael,"  he  says,  "is  no  more  the 
pivot  on  which  the  whole  world  turns  than  the  planet 
which  we  inhabit  is  the  center  of  the  universe.  In  short, 
we  have  outgrown  the  belief  of  our  ancestors.  Our  con- 
ception of  God  and  of  the  extent  of  his  activity,  of  the 
plan  of  the  universe  and  its  course,  has  gradually  become 
far  too  wide  and  too  grand  for  the  ideas  of  Israel's 
prophets  to  appear  any  longer  otherwise  than  misplaced 
in  it."  Again  he  remarks:  "Although,  considered  as  a 
whole,  the  Old  Testament  may  with  justice  be  adduced 
as  testifying  in  favor  of  supernaturalism,  its  separate 
parts  regarded  in  the  light  of  criticism  speak  loudly  for 
a  natural  development  both  of  the  Israelitish  religion 
itself  and  of  the  belief  in  its  heavenly  origin."^ 

This  naturalistic  conception  of  the  Old  Testament  re- 
ligion Kuenen  applies  specifically  to  Hebrew  prophecy. 
He  admits,   indeed,   the  exceptional   character  of   that 


1  The  Religion  of  Israel,  I.  9,  11. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  343 

prophecy,  but  refuses  to  see  therein  any  token  of  a 
specifically  divine  or  supernatural  origin.  "The  proph- 
ets of  Baal  and  Ashera,"  he  writes,  "of  whom  the 
Old  Testament  itself  informs  us,  can  only  have  had  some 
unessential  traits  in  common  with  those  of  Jahve,  at  least 
with  the  later  prophets  of  Jahve.  In  short,  Hebrew 
prophecy  is  indeed  something  quite  peculiar,  just  as  much 
as,  for  instance,  the  Greek  philosophy.  Just  as  the  latter 
can  only  be  explained  by  the  character  and  the  history 
of  the  Hellenes,  so  the  turn  of  mind  peculiar  to  the  Israel- 
ites and  the  course — certainly  no  ordinary  course — of 
their  fortunes  must  have  combined  to  bring  about  the 
rise,  and  especially  the  later  development,  of  prophecy 
in  Israel.  But  if  we  take  both  into  consideration,  even 
this  unique  phenomenon  is  explained  without  difficulty."^ 
Prophecy  is  a  human  phenomenon,  the  highest  utterance 
of  the  Israelitish  spirit.^  In  a  sense,  the  critic  grants, 
it  is  from  God.  But  this  admission  is  no  clear  token  of 
an  intention  to  modify  the  naturalistic  premises  to  which 
he  has  given  such  unequivocal  expression.  One  who 
substitutes  pantheism  for  theism  proper  could  say  as 
much,  since  all  things  are,  in  his  view,  from  the  ultimate 
power  to  which  he  chooses  to  apply  the  divine  name. 

Unfulfilled  predictions,  Kuenen  contends,  contradict 
the  supposition  of  the  supernatural  inspiration  of  the 
prophets.  On  the  other  hand,  fulfilled  predictions  do 
not  establish  that  supposition.  "From  the  nature  of  the 
case  the  agreement  between  the  prediction  and  the  event 
admits  of  more  than  one  explanation.  It  must  first  be 
proved  that  the  prediction  actually  preceded  the  event. 
If  that  proof  is  given,  the  agreement  itself  can  be  derived 
either  from  the  divine  inspiration  of  the  prophet,  or  his 


1  The  Religion  of  Israel,  I.  212. 

'  The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel,  p.  4. 


344  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

right  discernment  of  the  course  of  the  events,  or  the  influ- 
ence which  the  prophecy  itself  exercised  on  the  dispo- 
sitions and  actions  of  those  who  became  acquainted  with 
it — if,  for  this  possibiHty  also  cannot  be  excluded,  it  is 
not  to  be  regarded  as  accidental."^  The  citation  is  sigpiifi- 
cant  as  showing  the  dogmatic  determination  with  which 
Kuenen  excludes  the  supernatural.  Very  likely  it  was  a 
crass  form  of  supernaturalism  which  he  had  in  mind 
rather  than  the  idea  of  an  immanent  divine  working 
directed  by  purpose  and  foresight,  and  regardful  of  the 
psychical  constitution  of  its  subject.  But  in  his  recorded 
statements  he  seems  not  to  admit  so  much  as  this  kind 
of  working.  Prophecy  reduces  in  his  definition  to  the 
fully  explained  product  of  national  characteristics  and 
conditions. 

Holding  these  premises,  Kuenen  evidently  could  not 
be  inclined  to  deal  sympathetically  with  that  element  of 
prophecy  which  relates  to  the  Messiah  and  to  the  Mes- 
sianic age  and  kingdom.  He  admits,  indeed,  that  Chris- 
tians cannot  be  blamed  for  seeing  in  some  of  the  words  of 
the  prophets  and  the  psalmists  forms  of  expression 
adapted  to  portray  their  suffering  Master,  Nevertheless, 
he  holds  that  in  making  the  application  they  depart  from 
the  domain  of  strict  exegesis.  Under  close  inspection  the 
meaning  which  the  common  Christian  interpretation  has 
put  into  the  Old  Testament  passages  proves  to  be  illusive. 
"The  traditional  Messianic  prophecy  is  undoubtedly  a 
beautiful  whole.  As  an  expression  of  the  belief  of 
Christendom  in  the  unity  and  regular  development  of 
God's  plan  of  redemption,  it  preserves  its  value  for  us 
and  for  all  subsequent  ages.  But  it  forms  no  part  of  the 
historical  reality.  One  stone  after  another  must  be  re- 
moved from  it,  and  placed  elsewhere.     When,  finally, 

*  The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel,  p.  277. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  345 

the  support  which  the  eariiest  Christian  Hterature  seemed 
to  offer  has  fallen  away  the  whole  edifice  collapses."^ 

The  definite  expression  of  a  naturalistic  standpoint  in 
which  Kuenen  indulged  is  not  found,  so  far  as  we  have 
discovered,  in  the  writings  of  Wellhausen.  Indeed,  he 
seems  to  disagree  with  the  older  critic's  assumption  of 
the  competency  of  criticism  to  explain  everything  on  the 
score  of  natural  and  ascertainable  causes.  "The  reason 
why,"  he  says,  "the  Israelitish  religion  has  led  from  an 
approximately  like  beginning  to  an  altogether  different 
outcome  from  that  of  the  Moabitish  does  not  admit  of  an 
ultimate  explanation.  However,  a  succession  of  changes 
can  be  described  in  which  the  way  was  laid  down  from 
heathenism  onward  to  the  rational  worship  of  God  in 
spirit  and  in  truth. "^  Such  language,  if  it  does  not 
assert,  at  least  makes  room  for  the  idea  of  specific  divine 
purpose  and  causation  back  of  Israel's  history. 

In  relation  to  the  Messianic  element  in  prophecy  Well- 
hausen shares  in  the  coldness  of  Kuenen.  He  discovers 
very  little  of  that  element  in  most  of  the  prophetical 
writings.  The  Jewish  Messianic  hope,  he  maintains,  was 
not  adapted  to  prefigure  the  real  Christ,  and  no  deference 
was  paid  to  it  by  him.  Indeed,  he  cut  himself  entirely 
loose  from  it,  and  disowned  the  titles  which  might  serve 
to  suggest  any  connection  with  it.  In  calling  himself  by 
the  name  which  is  rendered  "Son  of  Man"  he  had  no 
thought  of  assuming  the  role  of  Messiah.  "Since  Jesus 
spoke  Aramaic,  so  he  did  not  call  himself  6  vlbg-  rov 
dvOpoJnov,  but  barnascha.  That, however,  signifies  man  [der 
Mensch]  and  nothing  further;  the  Aramaeans  had  no 
other  expression  for  the  conception.  The  earliest  Chris- 
tians, however,  did  not  understand  that  Jesus  called  him- 


^  The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel,  p.  496. 
^  Israelitische  und  Jiidische  Geschichte,  p.  35. 


346  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

self  simply  man.  They  regarded  him  as  the  Messiah, 
turned,  accordingly,  barnascha  into  a  designation  of  the 
Messiah,  and  translated,  not  as  they  ought  to  have 
done,  with  ^  dvepconog;  but  quite  falsely  with  6  vlbg-  rov 
dvdpd-novj"  ^ 

In  passing  upon  Kuenen's  naturalistic  estimate  of 
Hebrew  prophecy  it  is  appropriate  to  notice  the  con- 
cessions which  he  makes  relative  to  the  extraordinary 
character  of  that  great  factor  in  the  Old  Testament  sys- 
tem. In  the  first  place,  he  concedes  a  remarkable  sense 
of  divine  vocation  in  the  prophets.  "The  canonical 
prophets,"  he  says,  "all,  without  distinction,  are  possessed 
by  the  consciousness  that  they  proclaim  the  word  of 
Jahve,  and  express  that  conviction  on  frequent  occasions 
and  in  the  most  unambiguous  manner.  .  .  .  This  self- 
consciousness  of  the  Israelitish  prophets  is  a  fact  of  the 
very  greatest  importance.  We  see  here  men  who  can 
find  no  words  sufficient  to  declare  the  might  and  majesty 
of  Jahve;  who  have  a  deep  and  lively  feeling  of  their 
own  utter  nothingness  before  him,  and  nevertheless,  in 
spite  of  the  distance  which  separates  them  from  him, 
declare  emphatically  that  they  know  his  counsels  and 
speak  his  word."^  Now,  what  is  the  explanation  of  this 
unique  sense  of  vocation  which  the  critic  so  strongly 
asserts?  Certainly  the  supposition  does  not  seem  far- 
fetched that  the  Spirit  of  God  was  there  and  wrought 
specifically  to  induct  these  men  into  the  execution  of  a 
great  providential  task. 

Again,  Kuenen  admits  that  the  prophets,  far  from 
being  the  mouthpiece  of  national  wishes  and  sentiments, 
stood  very  largely  in  distinct  opposition  to  the  popular 


1  Israelitische  und  Jiidische  Geschichte,  pp.  342,  346,  349. 
^  The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel,  pp.  74,  76. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  347 

current.  "The  canonical  prophets,"  he  writes,  "have 
struggled  forward  in  advance  of  their  nation  and  of  their 
own  fellow  prophets.  In  consequence  of  this,  their  view 
of  the  state  of  the  people  and  their  expectation  regarding 
Jahve's  dispensations  have  become  different,  and  their 
preaching  frequently  directly  opposed  to  the  popular 
spirit  and  its  organs."^  Why  as  a  class  should  they  have 
been  thus  distinguished  ?  Who  can  say  that  this  peculiar- 
ity in  their  activity  is  not  consonant  with  the  supposition 
that  the  Spirit  of  God  wrought  in  them  as  select  agents 
of  the  kingdom  of  truth  and  righteousness  ? 

Again,  Kuenen  accords  to  the  message  of  the  prophets 
a  lofty  preeminence  as  respects  the  essential  worth  of  its 
content.  "Ethical  monotheism,"  he  affirms,  "is  their  crea- 
tion. They  have  themselves  ascended  to  the  belief  in  one 
only  holy  and  righteous  God,  who  realizes  his  will,  or 
moral  good,  in  the  world,  and  they  have  by  preaching 
and  writing  made  that  belief  the  inalienable  property  of 
our  race.  .  .  .  The  one  God  of  heathenism  was  another 
than  that  of  Israel ;  he  was  not,  like  the  latter — if  I  may 
so  express  myself — ethical  to  the  very  core."^  If,  now, 
the  source  is  to  be  regarded  as  correspondent  to  the 
product,  why  should  not  the  preeminent  excellence  of 
the  prophetical  message  be  taken  as  a  mark  of  the  pre- 
eminent working  of  the  Divine  Spirit? 

Still  further,  our  critic  commends  the  moral  and  re- 
ligious disposition  of  the  prophets  as  corresponding  in 
very  fair  degree  with  their  lofty  message.  "Here  is  a 
series  of  men,"  he  remarks,  "for  whom  religion  is  the 
highest  thing,  and  the  realization  of  religion  the  aim 
of  their  life.  Where  do  you  find  more  earnestness  in 
the  conception  of  a  task  so  beautiful  ?  where  greater  per- 
severance amid  temptation  and  contest?  where  heartier 

'The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel,  p.  582.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  585,  590. 


348  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

love  of  good  and  of  the  One  who  works  good?  where 
firmer  confidence  in  the  triumph  of  truth  and  right  ?"^ 
With  these  questions  we  may  well  join  the  supplemental 
inquiry,  Does  not  the  harmony  between  the  character 
of  the  prophets  and  their  lofty  message  afford  us  a 
specially  firm  warrant  for  the  conviction  that  the  Spirit 
of  God  wrought  mightily  in  them  as  the  select  instru- 
ments for  achieving  a  great  purpose? 

Once  more,  Kuenen  supposes  the  religion  of  the 
prophets  to  have  been  the  congenial  antecedent  of  that 
incomparable  historic  person  on  whom  Christianity  is 
founded.  "The  prophecy,"  he  says,  "that  Jahve  would 
give  his  law  in  the  inward  parts  of  the  children  of  Israel 
and  write  it  in  their  hearts  had  become  realized  in  him. 
.  .  .  He  was  therefore  able  both  to  practice  himself  and 
to  recommend  in  his  preaching  to  others  the  purely 
spiritual  religion  of  the  heart.  Thus  the  altogether 
unique  significance  of  Jesus  is  unmistakable.  Chris- 
tianity is  the  religion  of  Jesus,  his  creation,  the  fruit  of 
his  most  excellent  individuality.  But  it  is  no  less  true 
that  in  Christianity  the  religion  of  Israel  fulfilled  its 
destiny  and  became  a  world-religion."^  The  significance 
of  the  connection  is  obvious.  If  Jesus  stands  forth  as 
the  practical  realization  of  the  religious  ideal,  and  Hebrew 
prophecy  prepared  the  way  for  him,  then  it  is  entirely 
credible,  if  God  has  any  connection  with  this  world's 
events,  that  his  Spirit  wrought  with  special  potency  in 
Hebrew  prophecy.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  there  can  be 
any  motive  to  resort  to  a  different  belief  on  the  part  of 
one  who  is  not  wedded  to  a  deistic  or  pantheistic  stand- 
point. 

The  argument  for  the  naturalistic  interpretation  of 
prophecy  which  Kuenen  bases  on  the  fact  of  unfulfilled 

1  The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel,  p.  S91.  '  The  Religion  of 

Israel,  II.  278,  279. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  349 

predictions  suffers  from  an  element  of  exaggeration  and 
arbitrariness.  The  imprint  of  divine  agency  upon  the 
lofty  ethical  and  religious  content  of  prophecy  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  obliterated  by  failure  of  this  or  that  presage 
to  obtain  a  discoverable  fulfillment.  Furthermore,  it  is 
no  plain  dictate  of  logic  that  fulfilled  prophecies  can 
count  for  nothing  in  favor  of  prophetical  inspiration 
so  long  as  any  specimens  of  unfulfilled  prophecies  are 
in  evidence.  No  reasonable  theory  of  inspiration  ignores 
the  modifying  influence  of  human  conditions,  or  claims 
that  the  prophet  never  mingled  with  the  divine  mes- 
sage any  element  of  personal  opinion  or  preference. 
The  dead  level  conception  has  no  indefeasible  right  as 
applied  even  to  the  work  of  a  single  biblical  writer. 
There  might,  then,  be  instances  of  unfulfilled  predic- 
tions, and  yet  so  much  be  found,  within  the  compass  of 
prophecy,  of  lively  presage,  firm  anticipation,  and  con- 
fident delineation  of  issues  lying  beyond  the  horizon — 
so  much  to  which  the  actual  course  of  events  corres- 
ponded— that  it  would  be  reasonable  to  infer  a  power  of 
uplift  and  direction  back  of  the  prophets'  thoughts  about 
the  future.  To  this  consideration  there  is,  of  course, 
to  be  added  the  commonly  admitted  maxim  that  the  con- 
ditional element,  largely  characteristic  of  prophetical  fore- 
casts, serves  to  modify  the  demand  for  strict  fulfillment. 
The  downfall  of  the  edifice  of  Messianic  prophecy, 
which  Kuenen  assumes,  has  not  been  made  obvious  ex- 
cept to  eyes  anointed  with  a  special  kind  of  critical  eye- 
salve.  It  may  be  admitted,  doubtless,  that  one  and 
another  stone  which  have  been  located  in  that  edifice 
by  the  traditional  interpretation  might  better  have  been 
left  out;  but  that  is  not  saying  that  sufficient  materials 
are  not  left  for  a  comely  edifice.  It  may  be  admitted, 
furthermore,  that  prophecy  in  depicting  the  Messiah  and 


350  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

the  Messianic  age  made  use  to  a  considerable  extent  of 
local  colors,  and  thus  sketched  ideals  in  terms  which  could 
not  be  literally  fulfilled  under  different  historical  con- 
ditions, but  only  as  respects  their  more  essential  import. 
In  other  words,  account  may  need  to  be  taken  of  a  typical 
or  emblematic  sense  in  not  a  few   of   the  prophetical 
delineations.     This  however,  may  be  done  with  entire 
legitimacy.    In  picturing  the  ideals  to  which  they  looked 
forward  it  was  the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world  for 
the  prophets  to  borrow  from  their  environment,  to  frame 
their  conceptions  in  forms  which  did  not  so  much  closely 
describe  future  realities  as  typify  them  more  or  less  per- 
fectly.   It  would  be  asking  too  much  to  require  that  their 
forecasts  should  be  free  from  incidental  features  supplied 
simply  by  their  surroundings.     It  was  enough  that  their 
delineations  should  sketch  with  measurable  fidelity  the 
great  consummations  of  the  kingdom  of  God  to  which 
the  Christ  stands  central.  That  they  accomplished  this  end 
was  evidently  the  deeply  rooted  conviction  of  the  New 
Testament  writers.     There  is  substantial  ground  for  be- 
lieving that  it  was  the  vital  conviction  of  the  Master 
himself.     No  good  reason  is  apparent  why  that  convic- 
tion should  be  surrendered.     Traditional  interpretations 
of  prophecies  reputed  to  be  Messianic  may  indeed  need 
in   some   instances  to   be   revised,    but   the   great   truth 
remains  that  the  landscape  of  Old  Testament  prophecy 
slopes  upward  to  Jesus  of  Nazareth. 

The  attempt  of  Wellhausen  to  emphasize  the  discon- 
nection between  Old  Testament  Messianic  prophecy  and 
New  Testament  reality,  by  denying  to  the  consciousness 
of  Jesus  the  recognition  of  a  Messianic  vocation,  cannot 
be  regarded  as  a  happy  undertaking.  While  his  conten- 
tion has  its  partisans,  it  is  not  countenanced  by  the  ma- 
jority of  New  Testament  critics,  whether  of  the  moderate 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  351 

or  of  the  radical  class.  Thus  Haraack,  referring  to  Well- 
hausen's  disinclination  to  admit  the  assertion  of  Mes- 
sianic claims  on  the  part  of  Jesus,  says :  "In  that  doubt 
I  cannot  concur;  nay,  I  think  that  it  is  only  by  wrenching 
what  the  evangelists  tell  us  off  its  hinges  that  the  opinion 
can  be  maintained.  The  very  expression  'Son  of  Man' — 
that  Jesus  used  it  is  beyond  question — seems  to  me  to  be 
intelligible  only  in  a  Messianic  sense.  To  say  nothing 
of  anything  else,  such  a  story  as  that  of  Christ's  entry 
into  Jeusalem  would  have  to  be  simply  expunged  if  the 
theory  is  to  be  maintained  that  he  did  not  consider  him- 
self the  promised  Messiah  and  also  desire  to  be  accepted 
as  such."^  With  equal  force  of  conviction  Wernle  con- 
tends for  the  conclusion  that  Christ  recognized  himself 
as  the  Messiah.  The  finality,  he  argues,  which  was  at- 
tached by  him  to  his  own  work  strongly  sustains  that 
conclusion.  "That  is  the  decisive  consideration.  The 
superhuman  self-consciousness  of  Jesus,  which  knows 
nothing  higher  than  itself  save  God  and  can  expect  none 
other,  could  find  satisfactory  expression  in  no  other  form 
but  that  of  the  Messianic  idea.  That  which  weighs  with 
Jesus  in  accepting  this  idea  is  not  its  political  but  its  final 
and  conclusive  character. "^  Bousset  concurs  with  this 
point  of  view.  "We  cannot  eliminate,"  he  remarks, 
"from  the  personality  of  Jesus,  without  destroying  it, 
the  trait  of  super-prophetic  consciousness,  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  accomplisher  to  whose  person  the  flight  of  the 
ages  and  the  whole  destiny  of  his  followers  are  linked. 
And  when  Jesus  wished  to  give  form  and  expression  to 
this  consciousness,  and  thereby  to  lift  it  from  its  state  of 
fermentation  into  one  of  clearness  and  stability,  the  only 
possibility  that  presented  itself  was  that  of  the  Messianic 


^What  is  Christianity?  p.  131. 

'  The  Beginnings  of  Christianity,  I.  44,  45. 


352  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

idea."  In  the  judgment  of  Bousset  it  is  not  improbable 
that  Jesus  cherished  this  idea  from  the  time  of  his  bap- 
tism; and  that  expHcit  declaration  of  it  was  made  at 
Csesarea  Philippi  he  regards  as  historically  certain.^ 

While  thus  opposed  by  the  weight  of  critical  authority, 
Wellhausen's  theory  depends  too  largely  on  a  narrow 
verbal  basis  to  command  confidence.  The  assumption 
that  the  Aramaic  term  which  was  rendered  into  the 
Greek  phrase,  6  vldg-  rov  dvOpuj-nov,  had  in  itself  a  less  defi- 
nite sense  than  belongs  with  that  phrase  does  not  forbid 
the  conclusion  that  it  was  used  by  Jesus  in  such  special 
connections  as  to  suggest  and  legitimate  the  meaning 
which  from  the  earliest  days  of  Christianity  was  put  into 
the  selected  Greek  form.  It  is  to  be  noticed,  moreover, 
that  Wellhausen  feels  compelled  to  admit  that  Jesus 
actually  figured  as  the  Messiah  in  his  final  entrance  into 
Jerusalem.^  Did  he  proceed,  then,  in  conformity  with  his 
self-consciousness  in  that  act  ?  Who  would  wish  to  sup- 
pose that  he  consented  to  have  part  in  an  artificial 
pageant?  If,  however,  the  element  of  Messianic  con- 
sciousness asserted  itself  at  that  point,  why  not  on  previ- 
ous occasions — as,  for  instance,  in  the  celebrated  conver- 
sation with  his  disciples  at  Caesarea  Philippi  ?  But,  says 
Wellhausen,  the  Messiahship  to  which  he  gave  counte- 
nance in  that  closing  incident  was,  in  its  high  spiritual 
import,  in  contrast  with  the  ordinary  Judaic  conception. 
Assuredly  it  was.  It  remains,  however,  to  be  shown  that 
Jesus  did  not  see  in  the  old  prophecies  much  of  the  linea- 
ments of  the  ideal  which  he  himself  cherished.  We  be- 
lieve that  he  did,  and  that  his  attitude  toward  those 
prophecies  was  characterized  by  inward  sympathy  and 
appreciation  rather  than  by  a  feeling  of  disjunction. 

1  Jesus,  chap.  ix.     Note  also  Schmiedel's  argument  for  the  fact  of  con- 
fessed messiahship,  article  "Gospels."  Encyclopaedia  Biblica,  col.  1888. 
^  Israelitische  und  Jiidische  Geschichte,  p.  349- 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  353 

IV. — Conclusions  Respecting  the  Significance  of 
THE  Old  Testament  Revelation  in  General 

It  is  gratifying  to  observe  that  the  school  of  modern 
literary  criticism,  however  it  may  deal  with  one  and  an- 
other section  of  Old  Testament  history,  accords  a  high 
religious  value  to  the  outcome  of  the  movement  which 
has  its  record  in  the  Hebrew  oracles.  As  has  been  seen, 
Kuenen,  in  spite  of  his  naturalistic  standpoint  and  his 
curt  declaration  that  the  biblical  religion  is  just  one  of  the 
religions  of  the  world,  assumes  that  even  in  its  Old  Testa- 
ment division  it  ascends  to  a  height  which  places  it  in 
very  favorable  contrast  to  the  ethnic  systems.  Well- 
hausen  pays  a  tribute  of  unstinted  appreciation  to  the 
tender,  lofty,  and  spiritual  piety  which  came  to  expres- 
sion through  Jeremiah  and  the  prophets  of  the  exile. 
Stade  speaks  in  strong  terms  of  the  religious  preemi- 
nence of  Israel.  "Without  doubt,"  he  says,  "Israel  has 
been  in  the  domain  of  religion  a  much  more  epoch-mak- 
ing, unique,  and  powerful  agent  than  the  Romans  have 
been  in  the  domain  of  the  state,  or  the  Greeks  in  that  of 
art  or  philosophy."^  Again  he  remarks  that  Christian 
faith  regards  the  great  representatives  of  Old  Testament 
teaching  as  "bearers  of  a  special  revelation  of  God, 
through  which  preparation  was  made  for  the  perfect  rev- 
elation of  God  in  Christ,  and  recognizes  in  the  history 
of  Israel  and  Judaism  the  special  guidance  of  God."^ 
Smend  speaks  of  Israel's  religion  as  a  "God-given  re- 
ligion which  could  serve  as  the  mother-soil  of  Chris- 
tianity," and  describes  the  vocation  of  Israel  in  these 
emphatic  terms:  "Divine  Providence  fashioned  here  a 
people  whose  national   faith  possessed   and  asserted  a 


*  Geschichte  des  Volkes  Israel.  I.   3.  4. 

'  Biblische  Theologie  des  Alten  Testaments,  J  i. 


354  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

peculiar  power  of  life,  and  which  in  its  highest  perfection, 
was  to  become  the  religion  of  all  the  world. "^  As  may 
be  judged  from  citations  like  the  above,  these  writers 
recognize  in  the  Old  Testament  a  high  providential  func- 
tion in  preparing  for  Christianity,  It  may  be  added  that 
in  common  they  regard  the  Old  Testament  level  as  tran- 
scended in  important  respects  in  the  person  and  teaching 
of  the  Christ,  who,  as  Wellhausen  says,  "was  more  than 
a  prophet,"  since  "in  him  the  Word  was  made  flesh."^ 

The  most  disparaging  estimate  of  the  Old  Testament 
which  has  come  from  scholarly  circles  in  recent  times 
is  that  represented  by  certain  archaeologists  who  are  dis- 
posed to  exalt  Babylon  as  the  source  of  about  all  that  was 
good  or  eminent  in  the  ancient  world.  As  being  promi- 
nent advocates  of  this  judgment,  Hugo  Winckler  and 
Friedrich  Delitzsch  may  be  brought  under  review,  though 
a  consideration  of  their  writings  may  take  us  a  little 
beyond  the  bounds  of  our  period. 

Winckler  makes  this  broad  statement :  "The  Old  Testa- 
ment is  rooted  in  form  and  content  in  Babylonian 
science.  The  expression  of  the  spiritual  life  of  Israel,  so 
long  as  it  subsisted  as  a  people,  proceeded  from  Baby- 
lonian wisdom  and  was  continuously  fashioned  in  con- 
formity to  it,  in  like  manner  as  the  entire  Israelitish 
civilization  in  conformity  to  the  Babylonian."^  This  is 
equivalent  to  saying  that  the  Israelitish  system  in  its 
whole  extent  was  based  upon  Babylonian  astronomy  and 
astrology,  since  religious  theory  in  Babylon  was  very 
much  of  the  nature  of  an  attachment  to  those  branches 
of  scientific  and  speculative  inquiry.  "The  foundation 
of  all  Babylonian  wisdom,"  says  our  author,  "is  religion, 
the  teaching  respecting  the  gods,  and  these  gods  present 

*  Lehrbuch  der  alttestamentlichen  Religionsgeschichte,  pp.  6,  3a. 
^  Israelitische  und  Jiidische  Geschichte,  p.  350. 
'Geschichte  Israels,  I.  123. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  355 

themselves  in  visible  form  to  the  human  eye  in  the  stars. "^ 
The  lines,  accordingly,  along  which  Israel  received  the 
most  important  contributions  from  Babylon  would  seem 
to  be  pretty  well  determined.  Thence  came  not  merely 
a  general  view  of  the  world  as  a  physical  system,  but  also 
plentiful  elements  of  a  mythology  which  was  closely 
linked  with  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars.  A  previous  page 
has  indicated  how  large  a  portion  of  Babylonian  mytliol- 
ogy  Winckler  thinks  to  be  discoverable  in  the  history  of 
Israel.  It  remains  for  us  to  notice  here  that  he  places  the 
crowning  distinction  of  the  Israelitish  religion,  its  mono- 
theistic faith,  under  pronounced  obligation  to  Babylonian 
thinking.  The  rise  of  this  faith,  he  argues,  must  have 
had,  as  its  immediate  antecedent,  a  highly  developed 
polytheism,  along  with  a  stage  of  culture  involving  such 
comprehensive  views  of  things  as  to  make  the  polytheistic 
interpretation  seem  inadequate.  Now,  it  was  precisely  at 
the  great  center  of  Oriental  wisdom  that  this  antecedent 
was  supplied.  The  Israelites  may  have  worked  up  the 
monotheistic  idea  in  their  own  way,  but  the  basis  for 
this  achievement  was  derived  by  them  preeminently  from 
Babylonian  sources;  "from  the  central  points  of  culture 
where  the  human  spirit  was  actively  interested  to  unite 
the  products  of  a  highly  developed  knowledge  with  all 
the  phenomena  of  the  surrounding  world,  and  where  new 
views  were  in  conflict  with  the  old."^  Thus  in  religion, 
as  well  as  in  the  matter  of  secular  science,  Israel  takes  on 
essentially  the  character  of  a  dependency  of  Babylonia. 
Delitzsch,  in  the  first  of  the  two  popular  lectures  on 
"Babel  und  Bibel,"  which  occasioned  for  a  little  space 
considerable  agitation  in  Germany,  emphasizes  the  influ- 
ence of  Babylon  within  the  Israelitish  domain  not  only 


*  Die  Keilinschriften  und  das  Alte  Testament,  p.  157. 
^  Ibid.,  pp.  208,  209. 


356  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

on  such  matters  as  coinage,  weights  and  measures,  and 
the  outward  forms  of  laws,  but  also  on  the  content  of  the 
sacrificial  and  priestly  systems,  on  the  institution  of  the 
Sabbath,  and  on  the  accounts  of  creation  and  the  flood. 
He  takes  note  also  of  a  pictorial  representation  (a  cylin- 
der-seal) in  which  he  is  inclined  to  see  a  Babylonian 
version  of  the  Eden  story.  Even  traces  of  a  monotheis- 
tic faith,  he  believes,  are  discoverable  in  words  brought 
in  by  northern  Semites  about  2500  B.  C,  and  he  judges, 
moreover,  that,  in  spite  of  the  crass  polytheism  of  the 
current  religion,  the  more  enlightened  spirits  recognized 
the  superior  claims  of  the  monotheistic  conception  in  the 
assumption  that  the  various  gods  are  one  in  Marduk, 
the  god  of  light.  In  his  second  lecture  Delitzsch  reaf- 
firms in  strong  terms  his  conclusion  as  to  the  pervasive 
influence  of  Babylon  in  the  biblical  province,  denies  to 
the  Old  Testament  the  character  of  revelation,  and  makes 
disparaging  references  to  its  legislation  as  compared  with 
the  Babylonian.  From  the  tone  of  the  lecture  it  may  be 
inferred  that  it  was  written  under  the  spur  of  the  exasper- 
ated feeling  caused  by  rather  intemperate  comments  on 
the  preceding  lecture. 

In  considering  the  merits  of  this  pan-Babylonian 
theory  of  ancient  history,  with  its  minifying  estimate  of 
Israelitish  achievement,  we  may  properly  notice  that  to 
a  very  large  extent  it  is  repudiated  even  by  the  advanced 
school  of  biblical  criticism.  Notwithstanding  his  fellow- 
feeling  for  ultra  critics  in  general,  and  for  Winckler  in 
particular,  Cheyne  takes  exception  to  this  scholar's  work 
in  these  pronounced  terms :  "In  his  treatment  of  religion 
he  is  far  from  satisfactory,  owing  to  his  unfortunate 
lack  of  religious  sympathy.  With  all  his  earnestness 
and  acuteness  he  has  not  succeeded  in  making  it  probable 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  357 

that  prophecy,  even  in  its  poHtical  aspect,  can  be  explained 
from  Babylonia,  And  neither  he  nor  anyone  else  has  been 
able  to  show  that  the  course  of  development  of  the  idea 
of  Jahve  can  be  altogether  paralleled  in  Babylonia.  That 
Babylonian  and  perhaps  Arabian  influences  affected  that 
development  at  certain  points  need  not  to  be  denied. 
But  the  predominant  character  of  the  religion  of  Israel 
refuses  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  pan-Babylonian 
theory."*  Stade  gives  emphatic  expression  to  the  like 
conclusion.  Referring  to  Winckler,  Delitzsch,  and  others, 
he  says :  "The  oft-recurring  representation  on  the  part 
of  Assyriologists  that  the  Israelite-Jewish  religion  is 
essentially  a  reflection  of  old  Babylonian  religious  ideas, 
and  that  the  birthplace  of  monotheism  is  to  be  sought 
in  that  quarter,  stands  in  contradiction  not  only  with  Old 
Testament  data,  but  with  all  that  we  know  respecting 
the  history  of  man's  spiritual  life  and  of  the  religions 
serving  as  the  vehicles  of  that  life.  It  overlooks  (i) 
the  significance  of  personality  in  history,  especially  in 
the  religion  of  Israel;  (2)  the  fact  that  the  thoughts 
which  direct  the  spiritual  life  of  men  into  new  paths 
arise  and  win  strength  not  in  the  centers  of  culture  but 
aside  from  these.  The  representation  in  question  results 
from  a  tendency  occasioned  by  imperfect  historical  and 
theological  training,  to  lay  hold  of  superficial  resem- 
blances, to  the  overlooking  of  fundamental  differences, 
and  to  a  consequent  failure  to  apprehend  the  peculiar 
character  of  phenomena. "^  Quite  as  significant  as  this 
judgment  of  Stade  is  that  of  Gunkel,  as  coming  from  a 
scholar  who  has  himself  taken  generous  account  of 
Babylonian  influence.  With  specific  reference  to  the 
opinions  of  Delitzsch  he  draws  this  contrast  between  the 


^  Bible  Problems  and  the  Materials  for  Their  Solution,  p.  145. 
2  Biblische  Theologie  des  Alten  Testaments,  i  i. 


3s8  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

religion  of  Babylon  and  that  of  Israel :  "There  crass  poly- 
theism, here  in  the  classic  time  monotheism;  the  Baby- 
lonian religion  thoroughly  interwoven  with  magic, 
which  lies  far  beneath  the  feet  of  the  great  prophets; 
there  the  veneration  of  images,  here  the  absence  of 
images  in  the  Jewish  worship;  there  the  implication  of 
the  gods  with  nature,  here  the  exaltation  of  religious 
thought  in  the  classic  age  to  faith  in  one  God  who  stands 
above  the  world;  there  religious  prostitution,  which  once 
also  had  swept  over  Israel,  but  which  here  was  driven 
away  in  affright  by  the  holy  storm  of  prophecy.  The 
fairest  treasure  of  Israel,  however,  is  the  maxim  of  her 
prophets,  for  which  they  cherished  a  passionate  zeal,  the 
maxim,  namely,  that  God  desires  no  offerings  and  cere- 
monies, but  piety  of  heart  and  righteousness  of  deeds. 
This  most  intimate  connection  of  religion  with  morality 
is  that  preeminently  in  which  the  religion  of  Israel  as- 
cends to  a  towering  height  above  all  the  other  religions 
of  the  ancient  Orient."*  It  is  worth  while  to  add  the 
judgment  of  Jeremias  as  being  likewise  that  of  an  ap- 
preciative student  of  Babylonian  antiquities.  "The  new 
historico-religious  information,"  he  observes,  "which 
comes  from  the  monuments  of  the  ancient  Orient  will 
show  ever  more  clearly  the  superiority  of  the  Israelitish 
religion  even  for  the  pre-prophetical  period."^ 

The  supposition  of  Winckler  and  Delitzsch  that  Israel- 
itish monotheism  was  under  distinct  obligations  to 
Babylon  seems  to  rest  on  very  unsubstantial  grounds. 
The  fact  which  Delitzsch  brings  up  respecting  the  names 
introduced  by  the  northern  Semites — that  is,  names  in 
which  El,  meaning  God,  is  contained — has  very  little 
bearing  on  monotheistic  faith.     The  polytheistic  Greeks 


•^  Israel  und  Babylonien.  Der  Einfluss  Babyloniens  auf  die  israelitische 
Religion,  p.  ^:i.  ^  jm  Kampfe  um  Babel  und  Bibel,  p.  5. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  359 

made  perfectly  analogous  compounds,  such  as  Theophilos 
and  Theopompos,  and  other  polytheistic  peoples  have 
given  illustration  of  the  same  usage.^  As  regards  the 
texts  which  are  supposed  to  imply  that  the  gods  are  one 
in  Marduk,  scholars  are  not  agreed  on  the  warrant  for 
putting  this  sense  into  them^ ;  and  even  should  its  pres- 
ence there  be  admitted  we  should  have  only  a  pale  specu- 
lation, which  did  nothing  to  vanquish  polytheism,  and 
thus  bears  only  the  scantiest  resemblance  to  Israel's 
mighty  attestation  of  the  sole  right  and  rule  of  one  God. 
Israel's  prophets  cannot  fairly  be  supposed  to  have  de- 
rived any  vital  incentive  to  their  monotheistic  message 
from  such  texts.  In  general,  Babylonian  soil  was  poorly 
adapted  to  grow  a  crop  of  effective  monotheistic  sug- 
gestions. "There  is  not  the  slightest  trace,"  says  Jas- 
trow,  "of  any  approach  to  real  monotheism  in  Babylonia, 
nor  can  it  be  said  that  the  penitential  psalms  constitute 
a  bridge  leading  to  such  approach.  The  strong  hold  that 
astrology  at  all  times,  and  up  to  the  latest  periods,  had 
upon  both  the  popular  and  the  educated  mind  was  in 
itself  sufficient  to  prevent  the  Babylonians  from  passing 
to  any  considerable  degree  beyond  the  stage  in  which 
the  powers  of  nature  were  personified  and  imbued  with 
real  life."^ 

That  some  of  the  Old  Testament  narratives  show  a 
distinct  family  likeness  to  representations  in  the  Baby- 
lonian literature  is  the  common  admission  of  unbiased 
scholarship.  The  parallelism  between  the  flood  stories 
of  the  two  literatures  is  striking.  There  are  also  points 
of  obvious  correspondence  between  the  cosmogony  of  the 
first  chapter  of  Genesis  and  that  of  the  Babylonian  tablets. 
Yet  in  both  instances  the  contrasts  are  sufficient  to  show 


1  Compare  Gunkel,  Israel  und  Babylonien,  p.  30. 

-  See  the  objection  of  Jensen  as  cited  by  Konig,  The  Bible  and  Babylon, 
Eng.  trans.,  p.  77.  3  x^e  Religion  of  Babylonia  and  Assyria,  p.  319. 


36o  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

that  Israel  was  no  mere  copyist,  and  the  conclusion  would 
seem  to  be  justified  that,  appropriating  at  a  remote  point 
traditions  which  were  common  to  the  Semites,  it  shaped 
them  in  conformity  with  its  own  higher  standpoint.  A 
qualified  indebtedness  to  Babylonian  precedent  is  also  to 
be  alarmed  in  relation  to  the  institution  of  the  Sabbath. 
Indisputably  the  Babylonians  recognized  in  some  sense 
the  seven-day  division  of  time.  The  seventh,  the  four- 
teenth, the  twenty-first,  and  the  twenty-eighth  days  of  the 
month  were  signalized  as  unfavorable  days  and  as  days 
of  propitiation.  Furthermore,  important  restrictions  as 
to  occupation  were  imposed  for  those  days.  It  is  to  be 
noticed,  however,  that  the  nineteenth  day  had  the  same 
character  as  the  four  special  days  mentioned,  and  that  the 
restrictions  on  occupations  applied  especially  to  the  king, 
though  perhaps  not  exclusively.^  That  a  serious  attempt 
was  made  to  impose  the  obligation  of  the  Sabbath  rest 
upon  the  people  at  large  does  not  appear.  In  the  code  of 
Hammurabi  no  such  obligation  is  implied.  Whatever 
suggestions,  then,  may  have  come  from  Mesopotamia, 
the  Israelites  were  not  mere  borrowers  as  respects  the 
institution  of  the  Sabbath.  Even  in  its  central  conception 
the  Israelite  Sabbath,  as  being  a  day  of  holy  festival, 
differed  from  the  Babylonian. 

As  concerns  the  paradise  story,  nothing  more  has  been 
found  in  the  Babylonian  records  than  dim  and  uncertain 
resemblances  to  the  principal  items  of  the  narrative  in 
Genesis.  The  general  picture  of  "the  island  of  the 
blessed"  at  the  confluence  of  rivers  and  the  legend  of 
Adapa's  failure  to  partake  of  the  food  of  immortality 
can  be  found  reproduced  in  the  second  and  third  chapters 
of  Genesis  only  by  the  assistance  of  a  fertile  imagina- 

»  Jastrow,  The  Religion  of  Babylonia  and  Assyria,  pp.  377.  378:  Barth 
Babel  und  israelitisches  Religionswesen,  pp.  6-14;  Gunkel,  Israel  und 
Babylonien,  p   28. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  361 

tion.  In  its  misty  notion  of  the  location  of  the  garden 
of  Eden  the  bibhcal  narrative  may,  indeed,  partially  coin- 
cide with  a  Babylonian  hint  on  the  situation  of  the  island 
of  the  blessed,  but  otherwise  the  parallelism  is  of  the 
faintest  kind.  Of  the  biblical  story  of  the  temptation  and 
fall  of  the  first  parents  the  Babylonian  monuments  have 
not  furnished  an  unequivocal  counterpart.  This  may  be 
said  in  spite  of  the  cylinder-seal  on  which  Delitzsch  com- 
ments, and  which  contains  the  picture  of  a  tree,  of  a 
serpent,  and  of  two  beings  in  human  form.  Some  of  the 
features  of  the  biblical  story  do  not  appear  in  the  picture. 
The  two  beings  are  fully  clothed,  and  neither  is  repre- 
sented as  the  medium  by  which  the  fruit  of  the  tree  is 
passed  to  the  other.  Expert  scholarship  also  finds  rea- 
son to  question  whether  the  pictured  persons  were  meant 
to  represent  human  beings  rather  than  divinities.  Says 
Jensen :  "Should  one  see  in  the  two  forms  two  divinities, 
who  dwell  by  the  tree  of  life,  and  in  the  serpent  its  guard- 
ian, all  would  be  fully  explained."^ 

The  above  argument  against  the  pan-Babylonian 
theory  is  not  to  be  understood  as  implying  that  it  would 
have  been  contrary  to  a  special  divine  vocation  on  the  part 
of  Israel  to  have  appropriated  many  products  of  Babylon- 
ian thought  and  legislative  industry.  Why  should  not  the 
culture  of  such  a  world  center  be  made  tributary  to  the 
outfit  of  a  people  having  a  great  and  specific  religious 
mission  ?  The  paramount  question  is  not  as  to  the  source 
whence  various  materials  in  the  Israelitish  system  were 
derived.  That  question  respects  rather  the  amount  of 
competency  shown  by  Israel  to  subordinate  materials  to 
the  high  points  of  view  which  have  permanent  worth  and 
significance  for  the  kingdom  of  God  in  the  world. 

*  Cited  by  Konig,  Bibel  und  Babel,  p.  28 


CHAPTER  V 

ELEMENTS  OF  RADICALISM  IN  THE  RECENT  CRITICISM 
OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT 

L — Denial  of  the  Supernatural  Conception 

The  types  of  New  Testament  criticism  reviewed  in 
preceding  chapters,  together  with  such  themes  as  the 
challenging  of  the  supernatural  and  the  denial  of  the 
transcendent  sonship  of  Christ,  have  already  given  occa- 
sion to  deal  with  a  subject-matter  which  might  be  regarded 
as  falling  in  considerable  part  under  the  heading  of  the 
present  chapter.  It  will  be  appropriate,  therefore,  to 
limit  our  attention  to  a  few  special  topics. 

We  begin  with  the  most  significant  item  in  the  preface 
to  the  biography  of  Jesus  as  given  by  Matthew  and 
Luke.  This  item — the  supernatural  conception  or  virgin 
birth — has  been  assailed  by  "advanced"  criticism  in  recent 
years  with  something  like  intolerant  zeal.  Indeed,  the 
tone  of  more  than  one  critic  in  treating  of  the  subject 
suggests  that  the  time  has  come  for  displacing  the 
statement  of  the  venerable  creed  by  the  declaration,  / 
disbelieve  in  the  supernatural  conception. 

The  grounds  urged  in  behalf  of  this  confidently  asserted 
negation  are  mainly  the  following:  (i)  The  genealogy 
of  Jesus,  as  given  in  both  Matthew  and  Luke,  respects 
the  line  of  Joseph,  and  therefore  is  indicative  of  the  pre- 
supposition that  Joseph  was  the  natural  father  of  Jesus. 
(2)  Joseph  and  Mary  are  freely  referred  to  in  the  evan- 
gelical narrative  as  the  parents,  or  as  the  father  and 
mother,  of  Jesus. ^     (3)  Stress  is  placed  in  the  Gospels 

»  Luke  ii.  27.  33.  41.  43'  48. 

362 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         363 

upon  the  reception  of  the  Spirit  by  Jesus  at  his  baptism — 
a  point  of  view  that  ignores  the  supposition  of  origination 
through  the  specific  and  extraordinary  agency  of  the 
Spirit.  (4)  Joseph  and  Mary  are  said  to  have  marveled 
at  the  high  strain  in  which  Simeon  indulged  over  the 
newborn  infant,  and  also  to  have  been  puzzled  by  the 
words  which  Jesus  spoke  at  the  age  of  twelve,  whereas, 
if  they  were  cognizant  of  the  miracle  of  the  supernatural 
conception,  they  should  have  been  prepared  for  such 
things.  (5)  With  that  miracle  in  view  Jesus  could  not 
have  spoken  as  he  is  said  to  have  done  respecting  his 
mother,^  nor  could  his  mother  and  brethren  have  uttered 
the  recorded  words  respecting  him^ ;  moreover,  on  the 
given  premise  the  doubt  of  his  brethren  respecting  him 
ought  not  to  have  found  place.^  (6)  The  silence  of 
Mark  and  of  John  is  adverse  to  the  historical  reality  of 
the  supernatural  conception.  (7)  Paul  speaks  of  Jesus  as 
having  been  born  of  the  seed  of  David,  and  makes  no 
qualification  of  the  statement  by  reference  to  an  extraor- 
dinary agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Again,  he  emphasizes 
the  community  of  Jesus  with  those  whom  he  came  to 
redeem,  by  saying  that  he  was  "born  under  the  law,"  there- 
by intimating  the  conviction  that  he  was  not  essentially 
distinguished  as  to  birth  from  his  brethren  of  Israelitish 
stock.  (8)  Certain  ancient  versions  of  the  first  chapter 
o-f  Matthew  are  unfavorable  to  the  idea  of  the  super- 
natural conception.  Thus  the  Sinai-Syriac  manuscript, 
while  it  gives  the  accepted  text  of  Matt.  i.  18-20,  re- 
cords in  i.  16  the  contradictory  declaration  that  Joseph 
begat  Jesus.  A  like  reading  is  found  in  one  of  the  cita- 
tions in  the  Dialogue  of  Timothy  and  Aquila,  belonging 
presumably  to  the  early  part  of  the  fifth  century.* 

1  Mark  iii.  33-35;  Matt.  xii.  48.  2  Mark  iii.  20,  21.  ^  John  vii.  j. 

*  For  this  list  of  objections  see  in  particular  Schmiedel,  Encyclopccdia  Bib- 

lica,  articles  "Mary"  and  "Gospels";  Lobstein,  The  Virgin  Birth  of  Christ. 


364  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

Respecting  the  origin  of  the  story  of  the  supernatural 
conception,  different  views  have  been  expressed  among 
opponents  of  its  historical  character.  Schmiedel,  while 
he  makes  some  account  of  suggestions  furnished  by  Jew- 
ish prophecy  and  by  the  way  in  which  Philo  refers  to  the 
birth  of  children  of  promise,  concludes  that  the  efficient 
source  of  the  story  must  be  sought  in  a  different  quarter, 
namely,  "in  Gentile-Christian  circles."^  This  is  as  much 
as  saying  that  the  notion  of  the  supernatural  conception 
sprang  out  of  habits  of  thought  nurtured  by  Gentile 
mythologies.  On  the  other  hand,  Lobstein  emphasizes 
the  adequacy  of  the  explanation  afforded  by  Old  Testa- 
ment antecedents.  "It  is  unnecessary,"  he  says,  "to  re- 
sort to  the  hypothesis  of  pagan  influences  or  of  Hellenic 
or  Oriental  factors  in  order  to  explain  the  origin  of  the 
belief  in  the  supernatural  birth  of  Christ.  The  tradition 
consecrated  by  our  Gospels  has  its  roots  deep  down  in 
Israel's  religion,  transformed  by  the  new  faith.  The 
dogma  of  the  supernatural  birth  is  the  result  of  the  union 
of  traditional  interpretation  with  the  Christian  principle. 
Recent  researches,  completing  and  enriching  observa- 
tions made  long  ago,  have  collected  numerous  and  strik- 
ing analogies  between  the  biblical  myth  and  legends  of 
Greek  or  Eastern  origin.  Yet  in  such  analogies  it  would 
be  rash  to  see  direct  imitations  or  positive  influences. 
The  aversion  which  primitive  Christianity  felt  for  poly- 
theistic paganism  was  so  deep-seated  that  before  suppos- 
ing the  new  religion  to  have  been  influenced  by  pagan 
mythologies  we  must  examine  with  the  utmost  care  the 
points  of  resemblance  which  are  sometimes  found  to  exist 
between  beliefs  and  institutions. "^  Cheyne  agrees  with 
Schmiedel  more  nearly  than  with  Lobstein.     He  thinks 


'  Encyclopasdia  Biblica.  article,  "Mary,"  col.  2963,  4. 
2  The  Virgin  Birth  of  Christ,  pp.  75,  76. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         365 

that  the  emphasis  should  be  placed  upon  the  Gentile 
mythologies  as  sources  of  the  belief  in  the  supernatural 
conception  of  Jesus,  but  holds  at  the  same  time  that  the 
contribution  from  these  mythologies  came  through  Jew- 
ish channels.^ 

With  all  due  respect  to  the  distinguished  critics,  it  may 
be  affirmed  that  most  of  the  grounds  which  are  urged 
against  faith  in  the  supernatural  conception  are  quite 
trivial.  In  speech  which  was  not  designed  to  be  formally 
dogmatic  it  was  the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world  to 
place  Joseph  along  with  Mary  under  the  parental  cate- 
gory, since  he  fulfilled  parental  offices  toward  Jesus,  and 
in  the  common  view  was  undoubtedly  taken  as  his  father. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  conviction  of  Mary,  it  was 
in  the  nature  of  the  case  next  to  impossible  that  belief  in 
the  extraordinary  distinction  of  her  child  should  gain 
real  lodgment  in  the  minds  of  neighbors  and  acquaint- 
ances generally  in  advance  of  an  extraordinary  history 
of  the  child.^  Inevitably  he  would  be  referred  to  as  the 
carpenter's  son,  and  the  evangelist  in  admitting  a  like 
form  of  words  was  only  adopting  an  accommodation 
which  it  was  much  easier  to  admit  than  to  exclude.  With 
respect  to  the  alleged  incompatibility  between  the  super- 
natural conception  of  Jesus  and  his  replenishment  with 
the  Spirit  at  his  baptism,  it  is  perfectly  in  place  to  remark 
that  the  incompatibility  is  no  dictate  either  of  ancient 
or  modern  dogmatics.  Indeed,  it  is  a  strange  conceit 
that  the  origination  of  embryonic  life  by  special  divine 
efficiency  should  involve  the  absence  of  further  demand 
for  the  working  of  the  Spirit.  Rather,  one  might  argue 
that  the  fact  of  the  supernatural  conception,  as  being  a 

*  Bible  Problems,  pp.  71-73- 

'  Compare  R.  J.  Cooke,  The  Virgin  Birth  of  Our  Lord,  Methodist  Review. 
Nov.,  1904. 


366  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

sign  of  an  extraordinary  vocation,  contained  in  itself  a 
pledge  of  the  special  induement  with  the  Spirit  which  is 
reported  to  have  occurred  at  the  baptism  in  the  Jordan. 
The  objection  based  on  the  marveling  of  Joseph  and 
Mary  over  one  and  another  incident  is  equally  gratuitous. 
There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  for  their  minds  the 
extraordinary  conception  should  have  furnished  a  basis 
for  any  complete  induction  as  to  the  issues  of  the  future. 
Though  they  may  have  been  brought  thereby  into  a  gen- 
eral frame  of  expectancy,  they  could  form  no  definite 
picture  of  coming  events,  and  so  remained  subjects  for 
various  surprises.  That  Mary  should  even  have  been  dis- 
quieted at  a  particular  turn  in  the  career  of  Jesus  is  noth- 
ing incredible.  Complete  immunity  from  human  frailty 
alone  could  have  repressed  all  excessive  maternal  solici- 
tude. On  the  other  side,  the  attitude  of  Jesus  toward  his 
mother  involved  no  denial  of  the  special  honor  placed 
upon  her  by  the  fact  of  the  supernatural  conception,  but 
only  accentuated  worthily  the  spiritual  point  of  view 
which  recognizes  no  bond  of  kinship  on  earth  superior 
to  that  of  a  common  absorption  in  the  will  of  the  heavenly 
Father.  Relative  to  the  hint  that  the  brethren  of  Jesus 
were  not  above  the  temptation  to  doubt  about  his  divine 
mission,  it  only  needs  to  be  said  that  no  report  about  the 
miracle  of  Jesus's  birth,  had  it  come  to  their  ears,  would 
have  afforded  security  against  doubt.  In  common  with 
others  they  could  be  prepared  for  an  unshaken  faith, 
whether  in  the  supernatural  conception  or  the  Messiah- 
ship  of  Jesus,  only  in  sight  of  his  finished  career,  with  the 
great  crowning  event  of  the  resurrection  included.  As 
for  Mark's  neglect  to  report  the  miraculous  conception, 
it  is  quite  unjustifiable  to  see  therein  any  denial  of  that 
event.  With  about  equal  right  one  might  charge  Mark 
with  denying  the  human  birth  of  Jesus  altogether,  since 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         367 

he  says  nothing  about  it,  and  makes  the  baptism  in  the 
Jordan  the  opening  scene  in  his  narrative.  His  object 
seems  to  have  been  to  give  a  succinct  account  of  the  pub- 
he  ministry  of  Jesus.  According  to  a  credible  tradition 
he  based  his  Gospel  on  the  testimony  of  Peter.  In  doing 
so  he  may  have  found  a  motive  to  begin  with  the  public 
ministry  of  Jesus,  that  being  the  only  part  of  the  life  of 
the  Master  respecting  which  Peter  could  give  first-hand 
testimony.  Furthermore,  he  has  recorded  nothing  that 
makes  against  the  supernatural  conception.  The  same  is 
true  of  John.  The  latter,  with  his  pronounced  doctrine 
of  the  Logos,  may  not  have  been  inclined,  it  is  true,  to 
greatly  emphasize  the  supernatural  conception.  But  he 
in  no  wise  excludes  it.  On  the  contrary,  an  opportunity 
for  its  insertion  comes  readily  to  hand  in  a  consideration 
of  the  method  by  which  the  Word  was  made  flesh.  As 
regards  Paul  also,  it  Is  noteworthy  that,  while  he  has  not 
asserted  the  supernatural  conception,  he  has  interposed 
no  obstacle  to  its  acceptance.  It  would  have  been  as  easy 
for  him  to  have  said  that  Jesus  was  begotten  by  a  human 
father  as  it  was  to  affirm  that  he  was  born  of  a  woman. 
Only  the  latter  statement  occurs.  The  description  of 
Christ  as  being  of  the  seed  of  David  is  not  invalidated 
by  the  supposition  of  supernatural  conception.  It  remains 
literally  true  if  Mary  was  of  Davidic  lineage,  and  true  in 
point  of  legal  right,  as  will  be  seen  below,  even  if  descent 
be  reckoned  in  the  line  of  Joseph.  The  implicit  denial 
of  the  supernatural  conception  which  is  found  in  the 
Pauline  statement  that  Jesus  "was  born  under  the  law" 
is  far  from  being  a  necessary  implication  of  that  state- 
ment. Whatever  extraordinary  fact  may  have  charac- 
terized his  birth,  he  was  born  into  a  family  which  recog- 
nized the  law  of  Moses,  and  the  full  yoke  of  that  law 
certainly  passed  upon  him. 


368  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

The  two  remaining  objections  have  a  somewhat  better 
claim  to  consideration  than  those  which  have  been  com- 
mented upon.  It  is  not  apparent,  however,  that  they  are 
entitled  to  vanquish  faith  in  the  supernatural  concep- 
tion. The  recorded  genealogy,  it  may  be  admitted,  ap- 
pears to  give,  in  either  version,  the  line  of  Joseph  rather 
than  that  of  Mary,  But  it  remains  to  be  proved  that  this 
was  not  justified  by  the  fairest  application  which  could  be 
made  of  the  Jewish  standpoint  to  the  extraordinary  situa- 
tion. "The  descent  from  David,"  says  Dalman,  "is  at- 
tested by  the  evangelists  with  regard  to  Joseph  only,  and 
not  Mary,  in  accordance  with  the  view  that  descent  on 
the  mother's  side  does  not  carry  with  it  any  right  of 
succession,  and  that  her  husband's  recognition  of  Mary's 
supernatural  child  conferred  upon  it  the  legal  rights  of 
his  son.  Lichtenstein  [Heb.  Comm.  on  Mark  and  Luke, 
1896]  recalls  the  fact  in  this  connection  that  all  property 
acquired  by  a  spouse  becomes  uniformly  the  possession 
of  the  husband  according  to  Keth.  vi.  i,  and  that  in  the 
case  of  any  question  as  to  one's  origin  common  opinion 
was,  in  point  of  law,  the  decisive  consideration.  Neverthe- 
less, neither  of  these  points  touches  the  right  of  succession* 
The  criterion  for  this,  according  to  Bab.  bathr.  viii.  6, 
is  whether  the  father  is  willing  to  recognize  anyone  as 
his  son.  A  case  such  as  that  of  Jesus  was,  of  course, 
not  anticipated  by  the  law ;  but  If  no  other  human  father 
was  alleged,  then  the  child  must  have  been  regarded  as 
bestowed  by  God  upon  the  house  of  Joseph,  for  a  be- 
trothed woman,  according  to  Israelitish  law,  already 
occupied  the  same  status  as  a  wife.  The  divine  will,  in 
the  case  of  this  birth,  conferred  upon  the  child  its  own 
right  of  succession,  which,  once  Joseph  recognized  it, 
would  not  have  been  disputed  even  by  a  Jewish  judge. "^ 

'  The  Words  of  Jesus  Considered  in  the  Light  of  Post- Biblical  Jewish 
Writings  and  the  Aramaic  Language,  pp.  319,  320. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         369 

In  brief,  the  genealogy  was  constructed  in  a  manner  zp- 
propriate  to  Jewish  points  of  view,  even  on  the  supposition 
of  the  supernatural  conception. 

In  relation  to  the  divergent  texts  the  judicial  statement 
of  Professor  Sanday  will  indicate  how  inconclusive  they 
are.  Referring  to  the  reading  in  the  Sinai-Syriac  and 
the  Dialogue  of  Timothy  and  Aquila  he  remarks :  "There 
would  appear  to  be  three  main  possibilities:  (i)  The 
genealogy  may  have  had  an  existence  independently  of 
the  Gospel,  and  it  may  have  been  incorporated  with  it  by 
the  editor  of  the  whole.  In  that  case  it  is  quite  conceiv- 
able that  the  genealogy  may  have  ended,  'luorjcf)  de  eyewrjoev 
rbv  'It/otovv.  Unless  it  were  composed  by  some  one  very 
intimate  indeed  with  the  Holy  Family,  it  might  well  re- 
flect the  state  of  popular  opinion  in  the  first  half  of  the 
apostolic  age.  (2)  The  reading  might  be  the  result  of 
textual  corruption.  There  would  always  be  a  natural 
tendency  in  the  minds  of  scribes  to  assimilate  mechanic- 
ally the  last  links  in  the  genealogy  to  preceding  links. 
A  further  confusion  might  easily  arise  from  the  ambigu- 
ous sense  of  the  word  yevvdv,  which  was  used  of  the 
mother  as  well  as  of  the  father  (cf.  Gal.  iv.  24).  If  we 
suppose  that  the  original  text  ran,  'Iwa^^  rbv  dvdpa  Uapiag- 
ij  eyivvijosv  ^Irjaovv  rov  Xeyofievov  Xpcarov,  that  would  ac- 
count for  the  two  divergent  lines  of  variants  better  than 
any  other.  A  reading  like  this  appears  to  lie  behind  the 
Coptic  (Bohairic)  version.  (3)  It  is  conceivable  that  the 
reading  (or  group  of  readings)  in  Syr-Sin  may  be  of 
definitely  Ebionite  origin.  That  which  we  call  'heresy' 
existed  in  so  many  shades,  and  was  often  so  little  consist- 
ent with  itself,  that  it  would  be  no  decisive  argument 
against  this  hypothesis  that  the  sense  of  the  readings 
is  contradicted  by  the  immediate  context.  It  would  be 
enough  for  the  scribe  to  have  Ebionite  leanings,   and 


370  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

he  may  have  thought  of  natural  and  supernatural  genera- 
tion as  not  mutually  exclusive."^  Thus  the  divergent 
texts  form  no  secure  basis  for  negating  the  common 
Christian  faith  on  this  theme.  Supposing  the  super- 
natural conception  to  have  been  a  fact,  it  could  not  with 
the  least  degree  of  prudence  and  propriety  have  been 
given  any  prominence  till  after  the  finished  career  of 
Jesus,  and  then  only  in  the  bosom  of  a  believing  com- 
munity. The  original  popular  notion  that  Jesus  was  in 
the  full  sense  the  son  of  Joseph  would  therefore  have  a 
chance  to  keep  in  the  field  for  a  season,  and  that  it  should 
have  left  some  trace  on  the  literature  of  the  early  cen- 
turies is  not  to  be  accounted  improbable. 

A  review  of  the  attempted  explanations  of  the  origin 
of  the  belief  in  the  supernatural  conception  is  rather 
favorable  than  prejudicial  to  that  belief.  As  was  noticed, 
Schmiedel  disputes  the  adequacy  of  Jewish  antecedents 
to  account  for  the  belief.  He  does  not  find  that  it  was  any 
part  of  the  customary  Messianic  faith.  "The  notion  of 
a  supernatural  birth,"  he  says,  "never  at  any  time  attached 
to  the  idea  of  the  Jewish  Messiah."^  Dalman  fully  con- 
curs with  this  statement,^  and  it  may  be  regarded  as  con- 
firmed by  the  known  position  of  the  stricter  wing  of  the 
Ebionites,  by  the  statement  which  Justin  Martyr  puts 
into  the  mouth  of  the  Jew  Trypho,"*  and  by  the  testimony 
of  Hippolytus.^  On  the  other  hand,  Lobstein  is  doubt- 
less in  the  right  in  supposing  antipathy  to  pagan  mytholo- 
gies to  have  served  as  a  strong  barrier  in  the  early  Chris- 
tian community  against  borrowing  from  that  source. 
The  comments  in  the  primitive  Christian  literature  upon 
the  pagan  stories  of  the  misalliances  of  the  gods  are  brim- 

'  Hastines's  Dictionary  of  the  Bible,  article  "Jesus  Christ,"  11.  645. 

^Encyclopaedia  Biblica.  article  'Mary,''  col.  2956. 

'  The  Words  of  Jesus   p.  276. 

*  Dial,  cum  Tryph.,  xlix.  i.  ^  Philosophumena,  ix    25. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         371 

ful  of  scorn  and  rebuke.  Accordingly,  we  rrvay  presume 
that  hesitation  rather  than  readiness  to  promulgate  the 
superhuman  birth  of  Jesus,  even  in  such  ideally  discreet 
phrases  as  are  used  in  the  Gospels,  would  have  been  in- 
spired by  a  reference  to  the  content  of  pagan  mythologies. 
As  regards  the  Philonic  references  to  divine  agency  in  the 
birth  of  children  of  promise,  while  they  might  possibly 
arrest  the  attention  of  one  whose  mind  was  already  pos- 
sessed by  the  thought  of  the  supernatural  conception, 
they  were  much  too  remote  from  all  semblance  of  sober 
historical  statements  to  be  efficient  sources  of  that 
thought ;  and  it  is  to  be  noticed,  too,  that  the  New  Testa- 
ment books  which  afford  the  clearest  tokens  of  Philonic 
influence  make  no  mention  of  the  supernatural  concep- 
tion. But  if  neither  Jewish  belief,  in  its  common  or  in 
its  speculative  form,  nor  Gentile  mythology  stands  forth 
as  the  probable  cause  of  the  Christian  affirmation  that 
Jesus  was  conceived  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  we  are  entitled 
to  look  for  that  cause  in  the  center  of  the  Christian  com- 
munity itself.  We  may  identify  it  with  the  testimony  of 
the  mother,  whose  modesty  was  suitably  proportioned  to 
the  unparalleled  honor  bestowed  upon  her,  and  with  the 
faith  which  her  testimony  found  with  the  chosen  few  who 
were  admitted  to  her  inmost  confidence. 

That  this  faith  was  able  to  maintain  itself  and  to  pass 
on  into  a  wider  circle  was  due  to  its  congruity  with  the 
total  manifestation  of  Christ  in  the  world.  The  sup- 
position of  the  supernatural  conception  is  in  accord  with 
the  extraordinary  personality  and  vocation  of  its  sub- 
ject. Doubtless  it  would  be  going  too  far  to  say  that  this 
supposition  is  theoretically  indispensable.  Of  course, 
the  maintenance  of  the  divinity  of  Christ  is  not  at  all 
dependent  upon  it,  since  divinity  proper  is  no  subject  for 
generation  in  time.     Supernatural  conception  could  have 


372  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

a  bearing  only  upon  the  finite  human  factor  in  Christ. 
It  helps  to  explain  the  uniqueness  of  his  humanity.  We 
are  bound,  however,  to  admit  that  a  singular  relation 
of  humanity  with  divinity,  however  that  humanity  may 
have  been  originated,  might  be  expected  to  yield  a  unique 
result.  So  we  may  properly  hesitate  to  affirm  an  impera- 
tive dogmatic  demand  for  the  supernatural  conception. 
But  the  truth  remains  that  this  item  of  the  evangelical 
record  appears  in  eminent  accord  with  the  unique  per- 
sonality and  career  of  the  Christ.  It  was  enshrined  in 
an  early  and  vital  Christian  tradition.  To  compel  the 
mind  and  heart  of  Christendom  to  surrender  it,  criticism 
will  need  to  bring  forward  more  cogent  evidences  than 
it  has  yet  furnished. 

II. — Unfriendly  Treatment  of  the  Gospel  History 

Among  the  recent  contributions  of  radical  criticism  a 
canon  for  judging  the  gospel  content  challenges  atten- 
tion. Proceeding  on  the  assumption  that  the  worshipful 
attitude  toward  their  hero  which  was  maintained  by  the 
biographers  of  Jesus  was  a  fruitful  source  of  exaggera- 
tion, Schmiedel  concludes  that  a  basis  of  credibility  must 
be  sought  in  such  items  of  the  gospel  records  as  do  not 
reflect  the  attitude  in  question,  such  items  as  rather  run 
counter  to  the  demands  of  a  bent  to  glorification  than 
afford  satisfaction  thereto.  Items  of  this  description 
constitute  "foundation  pillars,"  and  whatever  is  con- 
formable to  them  may  be  used  with  a  fair  degree  of  con- 
fidence in  constructing  our  idea  of  the  person,  the  teach- 
ing, and  the  work  of  Jesus,*  In  the  view  of  Schmiedel 
a  careful  scrutiny  of  the  Gospels  reveals  nine  passages — 
very  brief  in  every  instance  and  consisting  mostly  of 


*  Encyclopaedia  Biblica,  article  "Gospels." 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         373 

single  verses — which  are  sufficiently  credible  to  serve  as 
a  basis  of  historic  inference.^ 

A  critic  who  is  prepared  to  give  a  sweeping  application 
to  the  above  canon  will,  of  course,  dispose  very  easily 
of  large  sections  of  the  Gospels.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
Schmiedel  proceeds  with  great  facility  in  this  line  of 
critical  achievement.  He  cuts  off  at  a  stroke  all  of 
Christ's  acts  of  healing  which  are  not  explainable  on  or- 
dinary grounds  of  medical  science.  "It  is  quite  per- 
missible for  us,"  he  says,  "to  regard  as  historical  only 
those  of  the  class  which  even  at  the  present  day  physicians 
are  able  to  effect  by  psychical  methods — as,  more  es- 
pecially, cures  of  mental  maladies."  The  greater  mar- 
vels imputed  to  Christ,  he  concludes,  have  rather  a  para- 
bolic than  a  proper  historical  content.  A  narrative  like 
that  in  the  fourth  Gospel  on  the  raising  of  Lazarus  thor- 
oughly subordinates  the  literal  to  the  symbolical.  It  may 
be  described  as  a  symbolical  story  designed  to  magnify 
the  office  of  Christ  as  the  giver  of  life  to  the  world. 
Even  in  the  Synoptical  Gospels  certain  striking  accounts 
of  miracles  may  be  regarded  as  simply  transformations 
of  parabolic  utterances.  "As  for  the  feeding  of  the  five 
thousand  and  the  four  thousand,  so  also  for  the  withering 
of  the  fig  tree,  we  still  possess  a  clue  as  to  the  way  in 
which  the  narrative  arose  out  of  a  parable.  .  .  .  And  it 
is  not  difficult  to  conjecture  expressions  made  use  of  by 
Jesus  out  of  which  the  narrative  of  the  walking  on  the 
water  and  the  stilling  of  the  tempest  could  be  framed." 
Account  may  also  be  made  of  the  influence  of  Old  Testa- 
ment stories.  While  it  may  not  be  necessary  to  go  with 
Strauss  in  supposing  these  stories  to  have  been  well-nigh 

1  The  following  is  the  list-  Mark  x.  17  f. :  Matt.  xii.  31  £.,  Mark  iii.  31; 
Mark  xiii  32  .  Mark  xv  34  with  Matt,  xxvii.  46 ;  Mark  viii  12,  Mark  vi.  5  f. , 
Mark  viii.  14-21 ;  Matt,  xi  5  with  Luke  vii.  22  (the  stress  being  here  upon 
the  concluding  clause). 


374  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

the  sole  originating  cause  of  the  narratives  of  incredible 
marvels  in  the  Gospels,  they  may  still  be  judged  to  have 
contributed  to  the  shaping  of  such  narratives. 

Some  of  those  who  have  figured  as  associates  with 
Schmiedel  in  critical  enterprise  have  given  even  more 
striking  illustrations  than  he  has  afforded  of  the  ease 
with  which  the  gospel  content  may  be  retrenched.    Cer- 
tainly it  would  be  a  rare  critic  who  could  outdo  the 
achievement  of  the  editor  in  chief  of  the  Encyclopaedia 
Biblica  in  eliminating  the  story  of  Judas  the  betrayer. 
*'The  growth  of  the  story  of  Judas,"  he  writes,  "can  be 
adequately  explained.     Supposing  that  the  original  tra- 
dition  left  the   ease  with  which   the   capture  of   Jesus 
was  effected  unaccounted  for,  Christian  ingenuity  would 
exert   itself   to  find   an   explanation.      Passages    in   the 
Psalms  which  spoke  of  the  righteous  man  as  treated  with 
brutal  insolence  by  his  own  familiar  friends  (Psa.  xli.  9; 
Iv.  12-14)  would  suggest  the  originator  of  the  outrage; 
the  betrayer  of  Jesus  must  have  been  a  faithless  friend. 
And  if  an  apostle,  who  could  he  have  been  but  Judas 
Iscariot?    For  Iscariot  was  not  a  Galilean,  like  the  other 
apostles;    he    had    a    harsh,    crabbed    temper    {^aXE-rroif), 
and  he  carried  the  purse  of  the  little  company.    The  last 
circumstance    suggested    a    reminiscence    of    Zech.    xi. 
12  f. — a  mysterious  passage  which  seemed  to  become 
intelligible  for  the  first  time  if  applied  to  Jesus."    This 
view  may  indeed  be  regarded  as  opposed  by  the  story  of 
the  treason  in  our  oldest  documents  and  by  the  account 
of  the  appointment  of  Matthias  to  the  vacancy  in  the 
apostolate.     "It  cannot,  however,  be  proved  that  Judas's 
treason  formed  part  of  the  oldest  tradition ;  it  is  separable 
from  the  surest  traditions  of  the  life  of  Jesus,  and  the 
appointment  of  Matthias  may  perfectly  well  have  taken 
place,  even  if  Judas  did  not  betray  Jesus.     The  proba- 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         375 

bility  is  that  no  one  knew  how  the  emissaries  of  the 
Pharisees  found  Jesus  so  easily,  and  that  the  story  of 
Judas's  treason  was  a  very  early  attempt  to  imagine  an 
explanation."^  After  contemplating  this  specimien  of 
critical  skill  one  will,  of  course,  suffer  no  surprise  in  en- 
countering from  the  same  fertile  writer  the  statement 
that  "We  cannot,  perhaps,  venture  to  assert  positively 
that  there  was  a  city  called  Nazareth  in  Jesus's  time."^ 

The  element  of  historical  induction  in  the  illustrative 
instances  of  critical  procedure  just  presented  is  much 
too  scanty  to  earn  serious  consideration.  To  a  mind 
convinced  that  the  gospel  content  must  be  eliminated,  or 
transformed  into  something  quite  unlike  to  itself,  the 
given  instances  may  afford  a  measure  of  satisfaction,  as 
furnishing  descriptions  which  may  possibly  bear  some 
resemblance  to  actual  occurrences  in  the  life  of  Jesus. 
But  if  one  is  not  already  convinced  of  the  necessity  of 
putting  aside  the  gospel  content,  or  of  subjecting  it  to 
a  radical  metamorphosis,  he  will  not  be  placed  under  ra- 
tional compulsion  to  do  so  by  specimens  of  criticism  like 
those  recorded.  They  simply  represent  ingenious  at- 
tempts to  give  a  shade  of  plausibility  to  preconceived 
points  of  view.  We  may  appropriately  leave  them  with- 
out further  comment  to  edify  whom  they  can  edify.  In 
so  far  as  they  are  based  on  a  dogmatic  exclusion  of  the 
supernatural  they  fall  under  considerations  which  have 
been  given  in  a  preceding  connection.^ 

It  is  quite  in  place,  however,  to  inspect  the  canon  for 
judging  the  gospel  content  which  is  put  forth  by 
Schmiedel.  Evidently  the  canon  in  question  cannot  be 
characterized   as   wholly   false.     What   the   biographer 


•  Cheyne,  Encyclopaedia  Biblica,  article  "  Judas  Tscariot." 

^  Encyclopaedia  Biblica.  article  "Nazareth."  '  Part  ii,  chap.  i. 


376  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

could  not  have  reported  out  of  the  incentives  of  homage 
and  admiration  has  good  claims  to  the  character  of  real 
history.  At  least,  it  is  well  secured  against  one  kind  of 
challenge,  namely,  that  based  on  the  liability  of  a  wor- 
shipful biographer  to  exaggerate.  Of  course,  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  a  writer  having  the  highest  regard  for  his 
hero  might  out  of  carelessness  and  dullness  do  less  than 
justice  to  that  hero  on  one  or  another  point.  Still,  his- 
torical criticism  will  proceed  discreetly  in  taking  distinct 
note  of  any  statements  which  could  not  have  emanated 
from  the  deep  reverence  and  intense  affection  of  the  nar- 
rator. Candor  requires  us  to  admit  that  Schmiedel's 
canon  may  legitimately  be  given  a  certain  sphere  of 
application.  But  that  is  far  from  saying  that  it  consti- 
tutes an  adequate  basis  for  estimating  a  great  and  ex- 
traordinary subject-matter  like  that  of  the  gospel  history. 
Taken  in  an  exclusive  fashion,  it  is  supremely  adapted 
to  reduce  to  utter  meagerness  any  wealthy  biographical 
content  to  which  it  is  applied.  Suppose  one  attempts 
to  rate  Martin  Luther  according  to  its  prescription, 
going  through  the  extant  biographies  of  the  reformer, 
selecting  the  items  alone  which  present  him  at  such  a 
low  level  that  they  cannot  be  suspected  to  have  been  gen- 
erated or  colored  by  an  overwrought  admiration.  Would 
a  life  of  Luther  reconstructed  out  of  that  assortment  of 
materials  afford  any  rational  explanation  of  the  mighty 
task  which  he  achieved  in  the  transformation  of  Europe? 
Who  would  not  say  that  such  a  method  of  reconstruction 
would  serve  only  to  turn  history  into  a  dumb  enigma? 
Still  less  can  Jesus  Christ  and  his  world-transforming 
mission  be  satisfactorily  expounded  by  the  like  method. 
The  method  is  too  grudging;  yea,  it  is  intolerably  narrow. 
The  person  and  work  of  Christ  as  pictured  in  the  Gospels 
rightfully  claim  a  broader  basis  of  judgment.    They  are 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         z^^ 

entitled  to  be  judged  from  the  standpoint  of  their  con- 
gruity  with  the  crowning  consummations  of  the  Old 
Testament  religion;  from  the  standpoint  of  the  mighty- 
influence  which  went  forth  from  them  as  attested  by  the 
apostolic  and  post-apostolic  literature;  from  the  stand- 
point of  their  intrinsic  excellence  and  self-consistency. 
In  connection  with  this  last  basis  of  judgment  it  is  appro- 
priate to  repeat  a  sentiment  which  has  been  expressed  in 
the  striking  but  sober  maxim,  "None  but  a  Jesus  could 
fabricate  a  Jesus."  No  unbalanced  biographer,  easily 
parting  company  with  facts  in  order  more  fully  to  exalt 
his  hero,  could  have  provided  the  immortal  portrait  which 
meets  Christian  contemplation  in  the  gospel  records' — 
the  Christ  who  so  marvelously  combined  the  most  beau- 
tiful and  worthy  traits,  who  maintained  such  an  ideally 
perfect  balance  between  morality  and  religion,  and  in 
whose  consciousness  the  ordinary  and  the  transcendent 
were  so  perfectly  reconciled,  the  divine  and  the  earthly 
being  mingled  in  such  a  way  that  "the  lowly  and  human 
never  degrade  him  in  our  eyes,  nor  his  power  and  great- 
ness remove  him  out  of  our  sympathies  and  understand- 
ing." When  critics  neglect  ranges  of  important  data 
like  these,  and  suggest  the  need  of  reconstituting  the 
gospel  history  on  the  basis  of  a  few  texts  which  exhibit 
the  Son  of  Man  merely  on  the  side  of  ordinary  earthly 
limitations,  we  are  tempted  to  recall  the  case  of  that 
ancient  party  which  Jesus  reproved  for  losing  sight  of 
the  greater  things  through  absorption  in  the  smaller. 

III. — The  Elimination  of  Pauline  Authorship 

While  the  scholarly  world  as  a  whole  has  become 
increasingly  intrenched  in  the  conclusion  that  Paul 
wrote  more  of  the  New  Testament  epistles  than  the 
Tubingen  criticism  accepted  as  coming  from  his  hand, 


378  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

the  "advanced"  school  in  Holland,  following  confessedly 
in  the  wake  of  Bruno  Bauer,  has  gone  on  to  the  goal  of 
an  absolute  negation  of  Pauline  authorship.  Speaking 
for  this  school,  W.  C.  Van  Manen,  of  Leyden,  says : 
"With  respect  to  the  canonical  Pauline  epistles,  the  later 
criticism  has  learned  to  recognize  that  they  are  none  of 
them  by  Paul;  neither  fourteen,  nor  thirteen,  nor  nine, 
nor  ten,  nor  seven,  nor  eight,  nor  yet  even  the  four  so 
long  universally  regarded  as  unassailable.  They  are  all, 
without  distinction,  pseudepigrapha."*  As  contributors 
in  greater  or  less  degree  to  this  critical  verdict.  Van 
Manen  names  such  scholars  among  his  own  countrymen 
as  A.  Pierson,  S.  A.  Naber,  A.  D.  Loman,  J.  C.  Matthes, 
J.  Van  Loon,  H.  U.  Meyboom,  and  J.  A.  Bruins.  Beyond 
this  circle  of  compatriots  he  scans  the  horizon  well-nigh 
in  vain  for  supporters.  He  is  able,  it  is  true,  to  point 
to  Rudolf  Steck,  of  Zurich,  and  to  Daniel  Volter,  of 
Amsterdam.  But  only  the  former  of  these  can  be  char- 
acterized with  full  right  as  an  outside  advocate  of  the 
thesis  of  the  Dutch  school.  Volter,  not  to  mention  the 
fact  of  his  ultimate  residence  in  the  Dutch  domain,  can- 
not be  described  as  a  German  scholar  who  coincides  alto- 
gether with  the  radical  Dutch  critics.  On  the  contrary, 
he  expressly  distinguishes  his  position  from  that  of  Pier- 
son,  Naber,  Loman,  Van  Manen,  and  Steck,  emphasizing 
the  fact  that  in  the  epistles  to  the  Corinthians,  the 
Romans,  and  the  Philippians  he  recognizes  portions 
which  are  to  be  attributed  to  the  apostle  Paul.^  In  the 
English-speaking  world  the  following  of  the  extreme 
Dutch  school  is  in  number  and  weight  quite  insignificant. 
With  the  denial  of  the  epistles  to  Paul  the  critics  under 
consideration  unite  the  denial  that  any  one  of  them  can 


*  Encyclopaedia  Biblica,  article  "Paul." 

*  Paulus  und  seine  Brief e.     Kritische  Untersuchungen,  1905. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         379 

be  referred  to  a  single  author.  As  described  by  Van 
Manen,  these  epistles  are  composite  doctrinal  treatises 
which  emanated  from  a  distinct  circle  in  approximately 
the  same  age,  an  age  not  earlier  than  the  end  of  the  first 
century  nor  later  than  the  middle  of  the  second.  In  place 
of  the  individual  writer,  says  Steck,  we  are  to  recognize 
in  the  so-called  Pauline  epistles  the  work  of  a  school, 
and  this  thought  of  a  school  is  to  be  applied  even  to  the 
four  principal  epistles  in  spite  of  the  impression  which 
they  make  of  unity  in  respect  of  content  and  language.^ 
Among  the  grounds  which  the  Dutch  school  alleges 
for  disallowing  to  Paul  even  the  four  principal  epistles 
the  following  are  prominent :  ( i )  The  doctrinal  and  re- 
ligious contents  of  these  writings  are  indicative  of  a 
development  which  Paul  could  not  possibly  have  reached 
a  few  years  after  the  crucifixion  of  Jesus.  (2)  In  these 
writings  widely  divergent  lines  of  thought  come  to  mani- 
festation, on  the  one  hand  a  kind  of  teaching  claiming 
to  pass  beyond  Paul,  and  on  the  other  a  teaching  which 
seems  to  lag  behind  in  a  Jewish  or  Jewish-Christian 
range.  That  these  sharply  drawn  contrasts  should  have 
been  evolved  in  Paul's  lifetime  is  hardly  to  be  imagined. 
Furthermore,  Paulinism  itself,  as  it  is  exhibited  in  the 
principal  epistles,  presupposes  that  the  original  form  of 
Christianity,  with  its  Jewish  conception  of  the  Messiah, 
had  been  replaced  by  larger  and  more  spiritual  concep- 
tions; and  for  this  transformation  a  very  considerable 
period  of  time  was  requisite.  (3)  The  problems,  theoret- 
ical and  practical,  which  come  to  discussion  in  these 
epistles — problems  respecting  justification,  election,  the 
use  of  sacrificial  flesh,  Sabbath  observance,  the  estate  of 
marriage,  and  the  like — are  not  such  as  would  naturally 
have  been  brought  forward  within  twenty  or  thirty  years 

1  Der  Galaterbrief  nach  seiner  Echtheit  untersucht,  p.  363. 


38o  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

after  the  death  of  Christ.  (4)  Advanced  points  of  view- 
in  the  line  of  a  Christian  gnosis  indicate  as  the  time  of 
composition  a  post-apostoHc  era.  And  the  same  is  true 
of  representations  about  the  rejection  of  Israel  and  about 
the  persecutions  of  the  Church.  (5)  Contrasts  between 
the  several  epistles,  or  between  different  portions  of  the 
same  epistle,  as  making  against  unity  of  authorship  in 
general,  are  adverse  to  the  theory  of  a  Pauline  origin.^ 

As  has  been  indicated,  this  sweeping  negation  of  Paul- 
ine authorship  is  opposed  by  an  overwhelming  consensus 
among  scholars.  Many  of  the  most  eminent  students  of 
the  New  Testament  have  not  been  able  to  convince  them- 
selves that  it  deserves  the  tribute  of  serious  attention. 
It  is  repudiated  by  the  radicalism  as  well  as  by  the  con- 
servatism of  Germany.  Critics  representing  almost  all 
degrees  of  divergence  from  the  traditional  standpoint — 
Harnack,  Jiilicher,  Holtzmann,  Pfleiderer,  Clemen, 
Peine,  Von  Soden,  Weinel,  Vischer,  Bousset,  Wernle, 
Wrede,  Schmiedel,  and  others — esteem  it  an  eccentricity 
in  criticism,  a  fanciful  extreme  to  which  sane  scholarship 
can  render  no  countenance. 

This  consensus  appears  as  the  reverse  of  arbitrary, 
whether  viewed  in  connection  with  the  grounds  asserted 
by  the  party  of  negation  or  in  relation  to  the  positive  evi- 
dences for  Pauline  authorship.  The  former  can  hardly  be 
called  plausible,  much  less  weighty.  Take  the  alleged 
impossibility  that  Paul  should  have  reached  in  the  given 
period  such  a  doctrinal  development  as  is  reflected  in 
the  epistles  attributed  to  him.  Why  should  not  the 
gifted  mind  of  this  profoundly  earnest  man,  under  the 
stimulus  of  contact  with  those  who  had  been  with  Jesus, 


*  Thus  substantially  Van  Manen,  Encyclopaedia  Biblica,  articles  "Paul. 
"Romans,"  etc. 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         381 

after  once  being  convinced  of  the  futility  of  Pharisaism, 
and  of  the  glory  of  the  risen  Christ,  advance  rapidly  along 
the  pathway  of  his  new  faith?  Indeed,  as  regards  the 
cardinal  principles  of  that  faith,  in  what  period  would 
these  have  been  so  likely  to  have  been  set  forth  in  sharpest 
antithesis  to  Pharisaic  legalism  as  in  the  period  in  which 
both  the  recollection  of  his  own  emancipation  existed 
in  full  intensity  and  the  company  with  which  he  had  be- 
come allied  was  wrestling  with  the  problem  of  its  rela- 
tion to  Judaism  ?  Did  not  Luther  go  in  two  decades  as  far 
as  he  ever  went  in  revolt  from;  the  mediaeval  system? 
Did  not  Zwingli  in  scarcely  more  than  a  decade  make  a 
most  radical  departure  from  Romtan  legalism,  polity, 
ceremonialism,  and  image-worshiping  customs?  Was  it 
not  in  the  first  burst  of  the  Reformation  that  the  strongest 
doctrines  of  divine  grace  and  sovereignty  which  have 
ever  found  place  in  Lutheranism  came  to  utterance  with- 
in its  bounds?  Did  not  also  the  Reformed  Church  very 
speedily  commit  itself  to  a  most  stalwart  type  of  teach- 
ing on  these  themes?  What,  then,  is  there  past  reason- 
able faith  in  the  supposition  that  Paul,  when  once  his 
point  of  view  had  been  revolutionized,  should  have 
moved  on  by  rapid  stages  to  a  grasp  of  the  main  issues 
logically  involved  in  his  revised  outlook?  Absolutely 
nothing.  We  have  only  to  suppose  him  to  have  been  the 
kind  of  man  revealed  in  the  record  to  secure  a  valid 
basis  for  the  conviction  that,  under  the  guidance  of 
Divine  Providence,  he  achieved  what  he  is  represented 
to  have  achieved  in  the  way  of  doctrinal  construction. 

As  for  the  various  parties  which  come  to  manifesta- 
tion in  the  Pauline  epistles,  a  relatively  early  period  is 
just  the  one  best  suited  to  the  presence  and  activity  of 
the  most  conspicuous,  not  to  say  of  all  of  them.  When 
should  the  question  of  the  relation  to  Judaism  be  in  the 


382  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

first  degree  a  burning  question?  Evidently  at  the  time 
when  the  new  faith  began  to  push  its  way  into  the  Gentile 
world  and  the  task  of  adjusting  the  relations  of  Jew  and 
Gentile  became  insistent.  When  should  this  question 
cease  to  be  a  burning  question?  Evidently  at  a  point 
when  the  advance  of  Christianity  in  the  Gentile  world 
had  begun  to  disclose  that  world  as  the  great  field  of 
promise  for  Christianity,  and  had  caused  the  Jewish 
constituency  to  appear  as  an  inconsiderable  factor  in  the 
Church.  The  conditions  are  thus  seen  to  imply  just 
what  the  known  literature  of  the  second  century  attests 
to  have  been  the  fact,  namely,  that  the  cause  of  the 
Judaizers  had  come  to  be  in  that  century  a  comparatively 
indifferent  issue.  To  place,  then,  at  that  late  date  such 
writings  as  Galatians  and  Romans,  with  their  fervid 
and  anxious  polemic  against  Judaizing,  is  to  wrench  them 
out  of  all  credible  historical  connections.  Both  the 
Judaizers  and  the  intense  opposition  to  their  scheme  be- 
long where  the  commonly  accepted  view  of  the  Pauline 
epistles  places  them.  The  other  parties,  too,  do  not 
appear  to  be  misplaced.  In  relation  to  the  great  principle 
of  evangelical  freedom,  no  party  is  disclosed  which  went 
beyond  Paul.  That  some  in  their  haste  and  shortsighted- 
ness should  have  applied  that  principle  in  a  way  which 
outran  the  prudence  of  the  broad-minded  apostle  is  no 
cause  for  surprise.  As  respects  the  enlarged  and  spirit- 
ualized conception  of  the  Messiah  reflected  in  his  epistles, 
a  door  of  entrance  for  that  had  been  prepared  in  the 
teaching  of  Jesus.  For  a  time,  it  is  true,  the  minds  of 
the  first  disciples  may  have  retained  from  their  Jewish 
education  a  competing  conception.  But — to  repeat  a 
previous  statement — the  higher  viewpoint  embraced  in 
the  sayings  of  Jesus  must  naturally  have  worked  as  a 
leaven  to  modify  that  conception,  and  concurring  with 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         383 

this  cause  was  the  vital  impression  coming  from  the  vic- 
torious progress  of  the  gospel  in  the  Gentile  world.  In 
face  of  the  actual  demonstration  that  the  gospel  could 
not  be  confined  within  the  metes  and  bounds  of  Judaism, 
the  disciples  could  not  well  avoid  going  forward  to  the 
standpoint  of  Christian  univeralism.  Accordingly,  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Paul,  in  representing  that 
standpoint,  would  have  been  isolated.  In  at  least  the 
latter  part  of  his  career  he  must  have  stood  in  the  midst 
of  a  Christian  body  which  held  substantially  his  own 
view  respecting  the  relatively  independent  and  the  world- 
embracing  character  of  the  religion  of  Christ. 

In  the  above  we  have  already  responded  to  the  objec- 
tion of  the  Dutch  critics,  that  the  ordinary  view  supposes 
a  too  early  intrusion  of  such  theoretical  problems  as 
those  relating  to  justification  and  election.  The  same 
conditions  which  made  the  relation  to  Judaism  a  burning 
question  involved  an  occasion  to  approach  the  given 
problems.  A  masterful  mind,  dealing  fundamentally  with 
that  question,  would  be  under  compulsion  to  look  those 
problems  in  the  face,  since  they  are  logically  implicated 
therein.  As  concerns  the  practical  problems  mentioned, 
such  as  the  use  of  sacrificial  flesh,  it  is  puzzling  to  under- 
stand how  anyone  should  imagine  that  a  long  period 
was  requisite  to  bring  them  forward.  The  most  primary 
adjustment  between  Jewish  and  Gentile  standpoints  re- 
quired attention  to  them,  and  it  is  scarcely  conceivable 
that  in  an  alert  and  mobile  community,  like  that  of 
Corinth,  for  instance,  a  decade  could  pass  without  invol- 
ving a  very  positive  demand  for  administrative  dealing 
with  them. 

The  allegation  that  even  the  principal  epistles  show 
traces  of  a  post-apostolic  doctrine  of  the  gnosis  has  no 
real    historic    warrant.     Speculative    tendencies    had    a 


384  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

place  in  Judaism  before  Paul  was  born.  Not  long  after 
his  death  a  quite  pronounced  Gnostic  scheme  was  pub- 
lished by  Cerinthus.  It  goes  entirely  beyond  warrant, 
therefore,  to  suppose  that  Paul  in  his  day  could  not  have 
touched  upon  anything  in  the  line  of  the  gnosis.  Even 
if  the  culture  with  which  he  came  in  contact  furnished 
no  suggestions  in  that  line,  it  by  no  means  follows  that 
his  versatile  mind  could  not  have  grasped  such  con- 
ceptions of  a  higher  wisdom  or  gnosis  lying  at  the  basis 
of  the  Christian  dispensation  as  are  intimated  in  the 
principal  epistles.  In  all  that  there  is  nothing  which  pre- 
supposes the  full-blown  Gnostic  systems  of  the  second 
century;  nothing,  in  fact,  which  might  not  have  had 
place  at  the  middle  of  the  first  century.  By  that  time  also 
it  was  quite  in  order  for  Paul  to  speak  of  the  rejection 
of  the  Jews.  The  observed  fact  that  as  a  nation  they 
repudiated  the  Christ,  while  the  Gentiles  were  receiving 
him,  involved  by  itself  the  conclusion  that,  for  the  time 
being  at  least,  they  had  come  short  of  the  grace  of  God. 
Paul  was  only  describing  the  actual  situation  in  speaking 
of  their  temporary  rejection.  In  like  manner,  there  is 
no  occasion  to  suppose  that  the  apostle  would  have  set 
foot  in  an  imaginary  sphere  in  making  such  mention  of 
persecutions  as  occurs  in  the  epistles  bearing  his  name. 
A  religion  so  high  and  exacting  in  teaching  and  purpose 
as  Christianity  could  not  take  many  steps  in  the  world 
of  that  age  without  provoking  a  fierce  hostility.  This 
hostility,  it  is  true,  may  not  have  issued  forthwith  into  a 
settled  governmental  opposition;  but  that  is  not  what 
is  depicted  in  the  Pauline  epistles.  The  impression  which 
this  group  of  writings  imparts  respecting  Roman  admin- 
istration is  perfectly  adapted  to  the  time  anterior  to  the 
Neronian  outbreak. 

In  reply  to  the  objection  based  on  contrasts  in  the 


RECENT  CRITICISM  OF  NEW  TESTAMENT         385 

epistles  it  is  legitimate  to  observe  that  these  are  no  greater 
than  might  be  expected  to  be  exhibited  by  a  writer  liv- 
ing in  a  creative  period,  moving  through  changing  con- 
ditions, and  sharing  in  some  measure  in  the  common 
human  liability  to  changing  moods.  Indeed,  did  the 
epistles  bear  a  reverse  character,  were  they  distinguished 
throughout  by  a  smooth  self-consistency,  there  would  be 
ground  for  the  suspicion  that  they  had  passed  under  the 
hand  of  the  prosaic  method-worshiping  reviser.  En- 
kindled religious  oratory  is  never  conformed  to  the  model 
of  a  flat  country.  In  saying  this,  however,  we  have  no 
intention  of  admitting  that  the  Pauline  epistles  are  speci- 
ally lacking  in  the  characteristics  of  continuity  and  inner 
consistency.  On  the  contrary,  they  attest  everywhere 
a  subtle  mind  that  entertained  a  fair  respect  for  logical 
connections.  We  may  even  speak,  w^ith  an  eminent 
commentator,  of  "the  well-balanced  arrangement  of  the 
greater  epistles."* 

On  the  side  of  positive  evidences  we  have  strong  ex- 
ternal attestations.  Especially  weighty  is  that  furnished 
by  Clement  of  Rome  in  his  first  epistle.  He  formally 
refers  to  First  Corinthians  as  a  writing  of  Paul,^  and 
copies  from  the  first  chapter  of  Romans.^  Now,  Clement 
was  a  writer  who  stood  in  close  proximity  to  the  apos- 
tolic age.  Harnack  finds  convincing  evidence  that  he 
wrote  in  the  last  decade  of  the  first  century,^  and 
Schmiedel  considers  this  the  probable  date  of  his  epistle.^ 
This  date  is  strongly  approved  by  the  testimony  of 
Hegesippus  respecting  the  occurrence  at  that  time  of  the 
disturbance  in  the  Corinthian  church  which  is  presup- 
posed   in    Clement's   communication.^     Not   less    is   the 

^  Von  Soden,  The  History  of  Early  Christian  Literature,  pp.  25,  26. 
^  I  Epist.  ad  Cor.,  chap,  xlvii.  ^  Ibid.,  chap.  xxxv. 

*  Die  Chronologie  der  altchristlichen  Literatur,  I.  251—255. 

*  Encyclopaedia  Biblica,  article  "Galatians," 

*  Eusebius,  Hist.  Eccl.,  iii.  16. 


386  CRITICAL  THEORIES 

given  date  approved  by  the  content  of  the  epistle,  with  its 
apparent  identification  of  presbyters  and  bishops/  and 
its  lack  of  any  reference  to  second  century  Gnosticism. 

Again,  we  have  a  cogent  evidence  for  the  emanation 
of  the  PauHne  epistles  from  their  professed  source  in  a 
multitude  of  peculiar  details  which  are  brought  in 
naturally  enough,  but  which,  nevertheless,  are  quite  aside 
from  the  main  purpose  of  the  epistles.  Mere  compilers 
or  manufacturers  of  dogmatic  instructions  would  have 
had  neither  an  adequate  motive  to  bring  them  in  nor  the 
skill  to  impress  upon  them  their  stamp  of  individuality. 
They  attest  most  emphatically  a  definite  personal  source 
and  definite  historical  situations. 

Finally,  in  their  combination  of  intellectual  subtlety 
with  spiritual  sensibility,  in  their  union  of  daring  for 
doctrinal  construction  with  comprehensive  practical  wis- 
dom, in  the  sense  of  possession  and  in  the  fervency  of 
expectation  to  which  they  alike  testify,  the  epistles  bear- 
ing the  name  of  Paul,  or  at  least  the  great  majority  of 
them,  demonstrate  that  they  emanated  from  a  master- 
ful personality.  Had  not  history  furnished  us  with  the 
commanding  figure  of  the  apostle  to  the  Gentiles,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  conjure  up  a  man  of  like  dimensions  to 
occupy  the  vacant  place. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  the  critical  nihilism  of  the 
Dutch  school  and  of  its  scanty  following  is  totally  with- 
out warrant,  not  merely  because  it  contradicts  the  faith 
and  scholarly  conviction  of  nineteen  centuries,  but  be- 
cause it  is  unequivocally  vetoed  by  a  sane  application  of 
historical  canons.^ 


1  Epistle  of  Clement,  chaps,  xlii,  xliv. 

2  On  the  general  theme  of  the  section  see  Clemen,  Paulus,  sem  Leben  und 
Wirken;  Knowling,  The  Testimony  of  St.  Paiil  to  Christ,  Boyle  Lectures 
foi  1903-05. 


Conclusion 

In  the  light  of  the  review  which  has  been  made  it  is 
scarcely  possible  to  avoid  the  impression  that  the  nine- 
teenth century  has  been,  to  an  extraordinary  extent,  a 
period  of  testing  for  the  Christian  faith.  Whatever  may 
be  thought  of  the  relative  weight  of  the  practical  diffi- 
culties which  have  stood  in  the  way  of  that  faith  in  dif- 
ferent ages,  it  may  safely  be  said  that,  in  respect  of 
fullness  and  variety  of  intellectual  ordeals,  no  other 
period  has  been  so  prolific  as  the  recently  completed 
century. 

What  is  the  result?  Can  the  friends  of  Christianity 
congratulate  themselves  on  means  of  assurance  that 
nothing  has  been  changed,  that  the  era  of  energetic  test- 
ing has  brought  forth  no  demands  for  the  modification 
of  belief?  That  would  hardly  be  a  valid  ground  for 
congratulation.  A  living  religion,  deep  enough  and  real 
enough  to  meet  the  needs  and  to  command  the  loyalty 
of  an  advancing  race,  ought  to  be  able  to  secure  an  im- 
proved exposition  of  one  or  another  point  in  its  content 
through  such  an  intellectual  engagement  as  that  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  Had  any  previous  age  gained  a 
complete  exposition  of  Christianity,  the  fact  would  tend 
to  the  prejudice  of  its  claim  to  finality,  as  making  it  to 
appear  insufficiently  large  and  comprehensive  to  chal- 
lenge to  perpetual  study.  There  is  likely  to  be  room  for 
an  improved  understanding  of  the  preeminent  religion, 
and  it  is  only  requisite  that  the  better  understanding 
should  tend  rather  to  confirm  and  glorify  than  to  over- 
throw and  obscure  the  great  characteristic  features  of 
that  religion.    This  is  the  point  of  view  which  is  properly 

387 


388  CONCLUSION 

brought  to  the  front  in  connection  with  an  inquiry  after 
resuhs.  The  inquiry  respects  the  effect  of  the  extraor- 
dinary testing  on  the  great  characteristic  features  of  the 
Christian  faith. 

It  may  be  affirmed  in  all  sobriety  that  these  have  suf- 
fered no  loss  of  prestige  from  the  movements  of  thought 
in  the  nineteenth  century.  Take  that  basal  constituent  of 
the  Christian  system,  the  conception  of  God  as  supreme 
ethical  Person.  It  has  been  brought  into  competition 
with  pantheism,  with  materialism,  with  certain  forms 
of  evolutionism,  with  positivism,  and  with  pessimism. 
The  idealistic  philosophies  of  the  early  part  of  the  century 
had  at  least  points  of  affiliation  with  pantheism.  Un- 
doubtedly a  considerable  incentive  to  pantheistic  as 
against  theistic  thinking  was  derived  from  them.  The 
outspoken  materialism  of  the  middle  and  latter  part  of 
the  century  was  consistently  and  boldly  antitheistic, 
formally  intolerant  of  the  notion  of  a  personal  God. 
Evolutionism  in  the  dogmatic  form  advocated  by  Haeckel 
was  radically  intolerant  of  that  notion,  and  in  the  pro- 
fessedly agnostic  form  championed  by  Spencer  it  was 
far  from  friendly  to  the  same  notion.  Positivism  and 
pessimism  also  were  implicitly  or  explicitly  antitheistic. 
What  now  have  these  adverse  forces  effected?  Abso- 
lutely no  permanent  detriment  to  Christian  theism. 
Materialism  has  been  discredited.  By  an  overwhelm- 
ing consensus  of  philosophical  thinkers  it  has  been  de- 
clared an  impossible  theory  of  the  universe.  The  short- 
comings of  antitheistic  evolutionism,  whether  in  the 
Spencerian  form  or  in  that  of  Haeckel,  have  been  effectu- 
ally exposed.  The  latter  never  won  any  title  to  respect 
for  philosophical  competency,  and  the  former  has  been 
condemned  to  a  waning  influence.  As  for  positivism  and 
pessimism,  championship  of  their  distinctive  features  is 


CONCLUSION  389 

much  too  feeble  to  have  any  serious  bearing  on  the  out- 
look for  theistic  belief.  In  relation  to  the  predilection 
for  pantheistc  teaching  which  was  fostered  by  the  ideal- 
istic philosophies,  it  may  be  needful  to  say  that  it  has 
not  yet  been  fully  spent.  But  it  is  also  in  place  to  say 
that  potent  correctives  to  that  predilection  have  gained 
a  standing  in  philosophical  thinking.  The  idealistic  sys- 
tems themselves  contained  some  elements  that  are  more 
congenially  related  to  the  theistic  than  to  the  pantheistic 
standpoint.  Such  an  element  was  the  profound  stress 
which  Fichte  placed  upon  the  ethical  will  as  the  most 
fundamental  thing  in  the  sphere  of  reality.  Such  an 
element  also  was  the  rank  which  Hegel  assigned  to  self- 
consciousness  among  the  categories.  Through  these 
representations  the  philosophers  named  provided  some- 
what of  an  offset  to  the  pantheistic  implications  of  their 
own  systems.  And  in  recent  philosophical  thinking  this 
offset  has  been  reinforced  by  a  conspicuous  tendency  to 
make  enlarged  account  of  the  element  of  will  in  constru- 
ing ultimate  reality  and  in  explaining  the  world.  At  the 
same  time  doubt  about  the  compatibility  of  teleology  with 
the  evolutionary  process  in  organic  nature  has  in  large 
degree  been  vanquished.  Thus  the  conditions  have  been 
made  favorable,  in  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  for 
assuming  that  a  will,  working  according  to  purpose,  is 
back  of,  and  operative  in,  the  world.  In  other  words, 
the  conditions  favor  the  ascendency  of  the  theistic  postu- 
late, the  establishment  of  the  truth  that  in  naming  ulti- 
mate reality  we  name  simply  the  Supreme  Person.  Never, 
in  fact,  has  the  wide  firmament  of  human  contemplation 
been  more  thoroughly  and  securely  illuminated  by  this 
transcendent  truth  than  it  is  in  the  precise  epoch  in  which 
we  stand. 

Take  another  fundamental  constituent  of  the  Christian 


390  CONCLUSION 

system,  the  unique  preeminence  and  lordship  of  Jesus 
Christ,  the  conception  of  Christ  as  central  to  the  redemp- 
tive process  in  the  world  and  qualified  to  be  thus  central 
by  the  intrinsic  worth  and  glory  of  his  personality.  Has 
any  ground  been  afforded  for  slackened  faith  in  that 
constituent?  We  fail  to  discover  substantial  evidence 
of  any  such  thing.  The  trend  of  exegesis  as  a  whole 
has  been  in  the  direction  of  establishing,  beyond  the 
possibility  of  contradiction,  that  the  thought  of  the  tran- 
scendent sonship  and  of  the  redemptive  office  of  Christ 
is  deeply  imbedded  in  the  New  Testament.  The  outcome 
of  critical  investigation  in  general  is  to  approve  the  con- 
clusion that  in  the  Christ  of  the  New  Testament  the  un- 
blemished ideal  is  presented  to  us,  and  that  the  ideal  is 
there  depicted  because  the  reality  had  been  furnished  and 
had  made  its  ineffaceable  impression.  How  infrequently, 
within  the  limits  of  respectable  scholarship,  has  a  sug- 
gestion to  the  contrary  been  offered  during  the  past 
century!  Before  the  matchless  figure  of  the  Gospels 
the  voice  of  disparagement  has  almost  always  been 
hushed,  and  in  the  few  cases  in  which  it  has  been  heard 
has  so  obviously  failed  to  justify  itself  that  its  message 
has  been  hollow  and  ineffective.  In  more  than  one  in- 
stance the  critic  who  has  been  free  to  treat  much  of  the 
Christian  tradition  with  a  ruthless  hand  has  felt  com- 
pelled to  acknowledge  in  the  Son  of  Man  a  greatness 
and  goodness  surpassing  all  natural  explanation.  For 
example,  the  author  of  a  very  radical  book,  in  which 
the  notion  of  miracles  is  treated  with  conspicuous  in- 
tolerance and  catholic  Christianity  as  known  in  past  ages 
is  supposed  to  have  been  placed  upon  the  shelf,  remarks : 
"The  empirical  inexplicability  of  Jesus  may  as  well  be 
conceded."  Such  admissions  are  properly  regarded  as 
decidedly  significant.     If  Jesus  is  not  to  be  explained 


CONCLUSION  391 

on  ordinary  grounds,  then  why  may  not  the  explanation 
be  sought  on  a  higher  ground?  Why  may  not  the 
cathoHc  conception  of  his  unique  relation  to  the  divine, 
the  conclusion  that  in  him  the  Word  was  made  flesh,  im- 
bedded as  this  conclusion  is  in  the  New  Testament,  re- 
ceive friendly  recognition?  Plainly,  it  is  no  long  or 
hazardous  step  which  is  taken  when  one  passes  on  from 
a  confession  of  inexplicable  perfection  in  the  historic 
Christ  to  accepting  the  substance  of  the  catholic  teaching 
respecting  his  nature  and  relationship.  In  the  demon- 
strated power  of  the  Christ  to  effect  perennially  a  living 
impression  of  his  transcendent  perfection  the  catholic 
teaching  regarding  his  person  is  shown  to  have  no  mean 
tenure. 

Once  more,  take  that  element  of  Christian  faitli  which 
concerns  the  primacy  of  the  Bible  in  the  world's  ethical 
and  religious  literature.  Has  the  basis  for  confidence  at 
this  point  been  wrecked?  Not  at  all.  Doubtless  the 
enormous  and  unexampled  industry  expended  upon  the 
task  of  biblical  criticism  in  the  nineteenth  century  has 
wrought  to  modify  the  conception  of  the  Bible.  It  has 
rendered  the  high  technical  theory,  characteristic  of 
theological  thinking  in  the  seventeenth  century,  an  un- 
comfortable and  precarious  theory  for  almost  any 
scholar,  and  has  condemned  it  to  the  category  of  an  im- 
possible theory  for  the  great  majority  of  scholars  who 
either  have  made  an  adequate  review  of  modern  thought 
or  achieved  anything  like  a  detailed  and  searching  in- 
vestigation of  the  Bible.  But  to  say  that  much  is  by  no 
means  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  cause  of  the  Bible  has 
suffered  damage.  Without  doubt  some  inconveniences 
result  from  the  relative  dethronement  of  the  technical 
theory.  But  ample  compensation  is  provided  for  these 
in  the  release  of  Christian  apology  from  an  artificial  and 


392  CONCLUSION 

overburdensome  task,   and  in   an  enlarged  freedom  to 
concentrate  attention  upon  that  which  constitutes  a  sure 
title  to  an  immortal  primacy  of  the  Bible.     That  title 
has  not  been  touched  and  cannot  be  touched  by  criticism. 
This   is   made  evident  by  the   fact  emphasized   above, 
namely,  that  criticism,  with  insignificant  exceptions,  has 
been  compelled  to  pay  homage  to  the  unique  perfection 
of  the  Christ.     For  the  Bible  is  the  book  which  depicts 
the  Christ,  and  which  in  its  tenor  and  outcome  is  con- 
genially related  to  him.     By  virtue  of  this  fact  it  holds 
an  incomparable  religious  treasure,  and  is  placed  beyond 
the    reach    of    earthly    competition.     And    the    primacy 
which  is  seen  to  belong  to  the  Bible  from  this  point  of 
view   is  only  confirmed   by  careful   comparison   of   its 
ethico-religious  content  with  that  of  the  ethnic  scriptures. 
Means  of  such  comparison  have  been  made  available 
in  full  measure  by  the  scholarly   industry  of  the  last 
century.     The  result  is  not  at  all  embarrassing  to  the 
friend  of  the  Bible.    Though  he  may  endeavor  to  be  as 
hospitable  as  possible  toward  every  point  of  excellence 
in  the  ethnic  scriptures,  he  will  still  be  compelled  to 
say  that,  in  the  full  and  balanced  presentation  of  the  most 
precious  truths,  they  fall  much  below  the  Bible,  and  that 
their  scattered  lights  taken  together  are  no  substitute 
for  the  illumination  which  it  supplies  to  the  human  spirit. 
In  the  amplitude  of  its  ethico-religious  wealth,   in  the 
perfection  and  balance  of  the  exposition  and  illustration 
of  the  truths  most  vitally  important,  the  Bible,  at  the  end 
of  all  criticism  and  comparison,  retains  still  for  clear- 
sighted scholarship  its  distinct  primacy.    No  child  of  the 
race  who  comes  to  it  in  the  spirit  of  candor  and  earnest 
inquiry  can  fail  to  find  in  it  the  word  of  life. 

The  Christian  believer  has  no  occasion  to  walk  with 
downcast  eyes  and  desponding  heart.     Doubtless  it  is 


CONCLUSION  393 

incumbent  upon  him  to  keep  in  mind  the  demands  of 
humility.  To  vent  scornful  reproaches  upon  those  who 
do  not  share  his  faith  is  out  of  harmony  with  the  require- 
ment for  brotherly  regret  over  their  destitution.  Anath- 
emas are  strangely  inappropriate  upon  the  lips  of  one 
who  in  the  midst  of  the  tokens  of  his  fallibility  must 
confess  that  he  is  still  striving  after  better  light.  But 
a  demand  to  avoid  arrogance  involves  no  interdict 
against  cheerful  confidence.  The  Christian  believer,  at 
the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century,  should  exercise 
his  prerogative  to  go  forward  with  illumined  counte- 
nance and  joyful  spirit.  No  formidable  barrier  has  been 
placed  in  the  way  of  his  faith.  The  outlook,  whatever 
array  of  hostile  forces  may  be  In  sight,  is,  on  the  whole, 
inspiriting.  Never,  in  fact,  since  the  time  when  the  reve- 
lator  was  entranced  by  the  vision  of  the  New  Jerusalem 
descending  out  of  heaven,  has  the  prospect  for  Christian- 
ity been  better  than  it  is  at  present. 


INDEX 


Abbot,  F.  E.,  187,  188 
Adickes,  E.,  63,  71 
Adler,  F.,  209,  *fiE. 
Agnosticism,     12,     14,    98,    ff., 

108,  ff.,  123,  £E. 
Aiken,  C.  F.,  223 
AUier,  R.,  299 
Aquinas,  T.,  259 
Arianism,  227,  flE. 
Arnold,  M.,  164,  165 


Baader,  F.  von,  188 

Babylon,     influence     of,     328, 

354.  ff. 
Bain,  A.,  43,  46,  47 
Balfour,  A.  J.,  113 
Ballou,  H.,  233 
Barth,  F.,  360 

Bauer,  B.,  41,  274,  275,  378 
Baur,  F.  C,  282,  ff. 
Belot,  G.,  89 
Belsham,  T.,  227 
Bentham,  J.,  43,  241,  244,  245 
Besant,  A.,  190,  192,  194,  198 
Beyschlag,  W.,  237 
Bible,  primacy  of  the,  5,  6,  391. 

See  Criticism 
Blavatsky,  H.  P.,  189,  ff.,  216 
Bolin,  W.,  61,  93 
Bonham,  J.  M.,  208,  224,  241 
Bourdeau,  G.,  300 
Bousset,  W.,  224,  351 
Bowne,  B.  P.,  53,  115 
Bradley,  F.  H.,  129,  ff. 
Brahmanism,  137,  138,  196,  201, 

219,  220 


Bridges,  J.  H.,  94 
Bruce,  A.  B.,  179 
Bruins,  J.  A.,  378 
Brunetiere,  F.,  300,  313 
Btichner,  L.,  63,  65,  fif.,  158 
Buck,  J.  D.,  189 
Buddhism,  137,  138,  181,  220,  ff. 
Bunsen,  E.  von,  222 


Cabanis,  P.  J.  G.,  64 
Caird,  E.,  90 
Caldwell,  W.,  141 
Carpenter,  J.  E.,  232 
Chadwick,  J.  W.,  228 
Channing,  W.  E.,  228,  ff. 
Channing,  W.  H.,  228 
Cheyne,  T.   K.,   356,  364,   374, 

375 
Christianity,    essential    content 

of,  3;  finality  of,  181,  ff. 
Christian  Science,  Mrs.  Eddy's, 

199,  ff. 
Christology,  4,  19,  20,  183,  227, 

ff.,  233,  ff.,  265,  267,  271,  273, 

278,  284,  306,  ff.,  316,  320,  ff., 

390 
Clarke,  J.  F.,  230 
Clemen,  C,  380,  386 
Clifford,  W.  K.,  59 
Clodd,  E.,  55 
Colville,  W.  J.,  201 
Comte,  A.,  78,  ff.,  158 
Conception,    the    supernatural, 

362,  ff. 
Congreve,  J.  H.,  94 
Cooke,  R.  J.,  365 


*ff.  indicates  that  the  matter  in  question   is  referred  to  on  a  number  of 
successive  pages. 

395 


396 


INDEX 


Criticism,  Old  Testament,  i6i, 
162,  214,  324,  S.;  New  Tes- 
tament, 160,  161,  ff.,  175, 
263,  flf.,  272,  275,  ff.,  285,  fif., 
291,  fif.,  303,  ff.,  314,  318, 
362,  S. 

Czerski,  J.,  181 

Czolbe,  H.,  64 

Dalman,  G.,  368,  370 

Danvin,  C,  96,  97,  250 

Davies,  C.  M.,  209 

Delitzsch,  F.,  354,  flf. 

De  Wette,  W.  M.  L.,  161,  162, 

324 
Domer,  J.  A.,  154 
Drews,  A.,  148 
Driver,  S.  R.,  332,  333,  334 
Dubois- Reymond,  E.  H.,  70 
Duns  Scotus,  259 

Eddy,  M.  B.  G.,  199,  ff. 
Eddy,  R.,  233 
Eichhom,  J.  G.,  324 
Essenism,  192,  222,  223 
Ethical    Ctdttire,    Societies    of, 

209,  ff.,  225 
Ethics,  theories  of,  241,  fE. 
Eucken,  R.,  54 
Evolution,  doctrine  of,   96,   97, 

104,  fE.,  IIS,  fE.,  247,  flE.,  255, 

260,  299 
Ewald,  H.,  324 

Peine,  P.,  380 

Feuerbach,  L.,  41,  61,  91,  fE.,  159 

Fichte,  J.  G.,  17,  fE.,  23,  flE.,  40, 

389 
Fischer,  K.,  18,  142 
Fiske,  J.,  159,  224 
Flint,  R.,  74 
Fltigel,  O.,  125 
Fomllde,  A.,  88,  89,  242 


Freedom  and  necessity,  31,  46, 
50,  66,  75,  138,  158,  252,  257, 
258 

Freeman,  J.,  228 

Free  Religion,  181,  flE.,  215,  fE, 

Gabler,  G.  A.,  41 

Gannett,  E.  S.,  227,  228 

Gaimett,  W.  C,  227 

Garrett,  E.,  216 

Garvie,  A.  E.,  125 

Gizycki,  G.  von,  212 

God,     views     respecting.       See 

Theism 
Goldziher,  I.,  327,  328 
Goschel,  K.  F.,  41 
Gospels,  criticism  of  the,  265,  fE., 

280,  289,  290,  296,  304,  305, 

314,  315,  318,  322,  372,  fE. 
Graf,  K.  H.,  324 
Green,  T.  H.,  53,  247 
Grill,  J.,  237 
Gunkel,  H.,  357,  359 
Guthrie,  M.,  108,  115,  255 
Guyau,   M.,   204,  flE.,   224,   251, 

253.  256 

Haeckel,  E.,  62,  65,  flE.,  119,  flE., 

158,  251,  25s,  388 
Hamilton,  W.,  97,  loi,  108,  109 
Hardy,  E.,  223 
Hamack,  A.,  123,  223,  235,  297, 

351.  380 
Harrison,  F.,  94,  95,  114 
Hartmann,  E.  von,  144,  flE.,  160 
Hausrath,  A.,  271,  310 
Hecker,  M.  F.,  138 
Hedge,  F.  H.,  230,  231 
Hegel,  G.  W.  F.,  17,  flE.,  32,  flE., 

38,41,  129,  135,  145.  155.  263, 

282,  299,  389 
Herrmann,  J.  G.  W.,  123,  125 
Hilgenfeld,  A.,  296,  297 


INDEX 


397 


Hinduism,  137,  145.    See  Brah- 

manism 
Hobbes,  T.,  324 
Hodge,  C,  259 
Hoffding,  H.,  52,  61 
Holtzmann,  H.  J.,  224,  237,  380 
Holyoake,  G.  J.,  207,  208 
Hopkins,  E.  W.,  221 
Hume,  D.,  45 
Huxley,  T.  H.,  55,  flf.,  132,  156, 

249,  260 

Idealism,     the     post  -  Kantian, 

16,  flf. 
Immortality,  32,  48,  66,  76,  90, 

93.  139 
Iverach,  J.,  113 

James,  W.,  51,  134 

Jastrow,  M.,  359,  360 

Jensen,  P.,  359,  361 

Jeremias,  A.,  358 

Johnson,  S.,  186 

Judge,  W.  Q.,  190,  192,  195,  197 

Jiilicher,  A.,  295,  297,  380 

Kaftan,  J.,  123,  125,  234 
Kant,  Immanuel,  11,  S.,  299 
Kautzsch,  E.,  338 
Keim,  T.,  317,  ff. 
Kidd,  B.,  127,  128 
King,  H.  C,  134 
Knowling,  R.  J.,  386 
Konig,  F.  E.,  341,  359 
Kuenen,  A.,  324,  331,  334,  342, 
346,  353 

Ladd,  G.  T.,  59,  73,  76,  204,  253 

Lardner,  N.,  227 

Lassalle,  F.  J.  G.,  41 

Levy,  A.,  61.  91 

Levy-Bruhl,  L.,  82 

Lewes,  G.  H.,  43 

Lillie,  A.,  216,  222 


Lindsey,  T.,  227 
Littr^,  E.,  84,  86 
Lobstein,  P.,  363,  364,  370 
Loman,  A.  D.,  378 
Longfellow,  S.,  186 
Loon,  J.  van,  378 
Lotze,  H.,  123 


Mackintosh,  R.,  118 
McTaggart,  J.  McT.  E.,  34 
Mahatma,    the,    194,    195,    215, 

216 
MainlSnder,  P.,  148.  149 
Manen,  W.  C.  van.  378,  379 
Mansel,  H.  L.,  45,  loi,  109 
Marheineke,  P.,  41 
Martineau,  J.,  231,  232,  247 
Marx,  K.,  41 
Masson,  D.,  52 

Materialism,  42,  47,  54,  fi.,  135 
Matthes,  J.  C,  378 
Meyboom,  H.  U.,  378 
Michaelis,  J.  D.,  324 
Mill,  J.,  43.  44 
Mill,  J.  S.,  43.  S.,  78,  86,  88,  93, 

155,  245.  246 
Miracles,  68,   153,  flf.,  265,  284, 

302,  303,  315,  319,  322 
Moleschott,  J.,  63,  65,  ff. 
Monism,  24,  29,  47,  48,  62,  69, 

76,  120,  ff.,  273,  299 
Moses,  as  leader  and  lawgiver, 

334,  ff. 
Myths,  166,  267,  ff.,  327,  ff. 

Naber,  S.  A.,  378 
Nietzsche,  F.,  242,  243,  253 

Oken,  L.,  41 

Olcott,  H.  S.,  189,  192,  193,  198 

Oldenberg,  H.,  221 

Ormond,  A.  T.,  97 


398 


INDEX 


Orr,  J.,  126,  333,  341 
Owen,  R.  D.,  199 

Pantheism,  25,  29,  30,  38,  40, 
41,  137,  145.  196,  199.  201, 
283,  388,  389 

Parker,  T.,  165,  183,  S. 

Patriarchs,  324,  flf. 

Pauline  epistles,  290,  291,  377,5. 

Paulsen,  P.,  34,  247 

Paulus,  H.  E.  G.,  160,  161 

Pentateuch,  324,  ff. 

Pessimism,  135,  fif. 

Peyrere,  I.,  324 

Pfleiderer,  O.,  114,  126,  166, 
237,  296,  297,  380 

Pierson,  A.,  378 

Pollock,  F.,  59 

Positivism,  78,  ff. 

Potter,  W.  J.,  187 

Price,  R.,  227 

Priestley,  J.,  227 

Prophecy,  Hebrew,  342,  ff. 

Quietism,  138,  202,  203 

Rationalism,  22,  141,  146,  160, 

316,  317 
Reischle,  M.,  123,  125,  235 
Renan,  E.,  162,  ff.,  298,  ff. 
Resurrection     of     Christ,     163, 

177.  ff-.  315.  320 
Reuss,  E.,  324 
Richter,  J.  P.,  170 
Rishell,  C.  W.,  179 
Ritschl,  A.,  123,  ff.,  234,  295 
Ritschlians,  123,  233 
Roberty,  E.  de,  133 
Romanes,  G.  J.,  57,  58,  60,  68 
Ronge,  J.,  181 
Ropes,  J.  H.,  295 
Royce,  J.,  117  ' 

Ryle,  H.  E.,  332 


Sabatier,  A..  126,  127 

Salter,  W.  M.,  211,  213,  214 

Sanday,  W.,  369 

Schelling,  F.  W.  J.,  17,  ff.,  28,  ff., 

40,  129,  263 
Schenkel,  D.,  313,  ff. 
Schleiermacher,  F.  D.  E.,  126 
Schmidt,  N.,  236 
Schmiedel,  P.  W.,  352,  363,  364, 

370,  372,  ff.,  380,  385 
Schopenhauer,  A.,  36,   135,  ff., 

160,  189,  242 
Schurman,  J.  G.,  256 
Schwegler,  A.,  295 
S^ailles,  G.,  300 
Secularism,  204,  ff.,  241 
Sensationalism,   42,  ff.,   61,  62, 

79 
Seth,  A.,  35,  39,  169 
Seydel,  R.,  222 

Sheldon,  W.  L.,  210,  213,  214 
Siebert,  O.,  69,  284 
Simon,  R.,  324 

Sinnett,  A.  P.,  190,  193,  195 
Smend,  R.,  327,  337,  353 
Sociology,     the     Comtean,     78, 

81,  ff. 
Soden,  H.  von,  380,  385 
Spencer,  H.,  31,  43,  ff.,  94,  96,  ff., 

159,  247,  ff.,  255,  388 
Spinoza,  B.,  37,  63,  324 
Spiritualism,  or  spiritism.    198, 

199 
Stade,  B.,  327,  337,  353,  357 
Steck,  R.,  378,  379 
Stephen,  L.,  44,  46,  48,  208,  241, 

250.  253 
Stimer,  M.,  242 
Strauss,    D.    F.,    41,    61,    182. 

263,  ff. 
Stucken,  E.,  329 
Supernatural,  the,  153,  ff.     See 

Miracles 
Swing,  A.  T.,  126 


INDEX 


399 


Theism,  compromised  or  denied, 

25,  29,  38,  60,  61,  62,  67,  84, 
92,  102,  flf.,  120,  131,  137,  146, 
154,  158,  159,  181,  196,  207, 
212,  253,  300,  301;  defended, 

26,  30,  89,  114,  ff.,  132,  167,  ff., 
258,  ff.,  388,389 

Theosophy,  188,  ff.,  218,  fif. 
Trinity,  22,  40.    See  Christology 
Tulloch,  J.,  311 
Tyndall,  J.,  57 

Ulrici,  H.,  62 
Unitarianism,  227,  S. 
Universalism,  233 
Utilitarianism,  244,  ff.,  253,  ff. 

Vatke,  J.  K.  W.,  324 
Vischer,  E.,  380 
Vogt,  C.  63,  fif. 


Volter,  D.,  378 
Vorlander,  K.,  63 

Ward,  J.,  55,  115,  116 

Ware,  H.,  228 

Weber,  A.,  28 

Wegscheider,  J.  A.  L.,  161 

Weinel,  H.,  380 

Wellhausen,  J.,   224,  326,   336, 

345.  350.  353.  354 
Wernle,  P.,  237,  239,  351,  380 
Williams,  C.  M.,  247 
Winckler,  H.,  328,  354,  ff. 
Windelband,  W.,  69 
Wrede,  W.,  380 
Wyld,  G.,  198 

Zeller,  E.,  23,   28,  34,  39,  265, 

295 
Zimmem,  H.,  328,  329 


Date  Due 

r'; 

f) 

Theological   Semmary-Speei 


1    1012  01012  4875 


